THE WORLD BANK'S EMPLOYMENT PROGRAMS IN ECUADOR AND BEYOND: EMPOWERING WOMEN, DOMESTICATING MEN, AND RESOLVING THE SOCIAL REPRODUCTION DILEMMA.

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ABSTRACT OF THE DISSERTATION

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The World Bank is trying to fix a problem embedded in its gender policy. Having prioritized the effort to get women into paid employment the institution must account for the work women already do - the labor of social reproduction. This dissertation explores the solutions to that problem enacted by Bank staff. I ask if the institution has addressed the problem posed by unpaid caring labor, if it has generated answers to that problem, why it has generated those answers, and whether those answers are good ones. I rely on software-aided analysis of policy documents and examination of Bank gender efforts in Ecuador. The Ecuador chapters explore the relationship between the Bank and the state in economic reform, and the role of gender policy entrepreneurs in the institution. Through interviews and fieldwork I examine gender policy in floriculture, and in a loan for indigenous and Afro-Ecuadorian people.

I argue that the Bank's prioritization of women's employment was caused by three factors: 1. work was linked to efficiency, productivity and natural market adjustment 2. work was framed as a "keystone" linked to other development goals. 3. work was seen to empower women. These factors coalesced to ensure that employment appeared the best policy choice for the institution, fulfilling the requirements of mainstream technocrats and progressive development activists. I then turn to the social reproduction dilemma embedded in the effort to get women into work. I contest assumptions that the Bank ignores this issue, and I identify three policies proposed to deal with the problem: 1. Providing state supported maternity leave and childcare.2. Saving time through restructuring schedules, new technology, and infrastructure 3. Restructuring heteronormativity to encourage a two-partner model of love and labor, wherein women work more and men care better. The second and third policy options are privileged by the institution, because they demonstrate productivity benefits, they are quantifiable, they are tied to other development desirables, and they appear to empower women. Childcare seems to lack these attributes. Finally I critique the endorsed solutions, arguing that they represent a heteronormalizing push to domesticate poor men and teach women rational love.

DEDICATION

For my parents. Thank you.

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"Challenging male economic authority...may be as successful a way of contesting the hegemony of the penile phallus as lesbians packing their trousers with dildoes" (Cooper 1995, 132).

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Introduction.

The World Bank – the world's largest and most influential development institution – is trying to fix a problem embedded in its gender and development policy. Having prioritized the effort to get women into work as the "cure all" for the development malaise, it must account for the work women already do – the unpaid labor of social reproduction that does not register in mainstream economics but which the Bank's gender policymakers take very seriously. I focus on this policy problem because it is, for feminist development scholars, one of the most pressing development issues of the present moment, and also because the Bank's answers to it deserve explanation and critique. In the contemporary context, the Bank's gender policies are a crucial site for political scientists interested in the gendered dimensions of international political economy precisely because this organization is one of the most influential, active agencies involved in the issue. Thus I wanted to know if the Bank had addressed the problem posed by unpaid caring labor, if it had generated answers, why it had generated those answers, and whether those answers were the right ones. This dissertation presents the results of those queries. It also attempts to forge a critique of the Bank's policy answers that remains attentive to the institutional constraints within which gender policymakers work. In this way it contributes to a range of academic debates regarding the significance of unpaid labor in international political economy; the nature of the Bank itself; the way in which marginalized policy actors secure space for their efforts within mainstream institutions; and the role of international financial institutions and states in economic reform. Having provided an overview of the institution and its Women in/Gender And Development policy, in this introduction I explain why the social reproduction problem troubles development scholars, before describing the methodology used to examine the Bank's own policy responses and summarizing the results attained.

The World Bank: An Overview

Any researcher seeking to understand development policy must understand the World Bank. It is the largest and most influential development institution in the world, employing 9300 people and lending more money to more countries than any other development body - $20.1 billion for 245 development projects in 2004. It has been variously described as the "foremost international development agency" (Payer 1982, 15), "a cornerstone of the liberal world economy" (O'Brien, Goetz, Scholte and Williams 2000, 11), the "flagship" (Yunus 1994, ix) and "pace-setter" (Hancock 1989, 57) of development policy, "the fulcrum of the new aid regime" (Gibbon 1993, 45) with an influence that is "total and global" (Yunus 1994, x) given that its "command of material and intellectual resources places it at the forefront of the development assistance regime" (O'Brien, Goetz, Scholte and Williams 2000, 115). In addition to providing loans, the Bank also gives policy advice to governments, and it is has a large and growing research role, part of a conscious repositioning of the institution as the world's "knowledge bank." Indeed Bank staff are regarded by many as the ultimate development experts and, as critical development scholar Arturo Escobar puts it, the prevailing wisdom in the policy field is that "if 'the Bank' does not have clear answers, nobody else does" (1995, 160).

This primacy has made the Bank a prominent target of criticism by activists and academics who believe it currently has the wrong answers to development problems, and it also creates an imperative for observers to understand why the Bank generates certain solutions to pressing policy questions rather than others.

The "World Bank Group" includes five organizations: the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development (IBRD), the International Development Association (IDA), the International Finance Corporation, the Multilateral Investment Guarantee Agency, and the International Centre For Settlement of Investment Disputes. It is customary to refer to the first two agencies – the most prominent ones in the group - as "the World Bank", or "the Bank".[i] Both the IBRD and the IDA are United Nations specialized agencies, and both lend money to developing countries. The former was the original incarnation of the Bank when it was designed, alongside the International Monetary Fund, at the Bretton Woods conference in 1944. While the Fund aimed to stabilize economies in crisis, the IBRD was intended to contribute to peace and post-war reconstruction both by lending to poor nations for modernization projects, and by prompting recovery in the industrialized "first world" countries to whom its development contracts were (and still are) awarded. It raises money on international bond markets, and makes loans to countries considered creditworthy - $11billion worth in FY 2004, in 87 projects in 33 countries. The IDA was created in 1960. It gives money on easier terms – through grants or interest-free loans - to countries with poor creditworthiness, and it raises money through contributions by member states. The IDA is the world's largest source of such development assistance. IDA credits make up about ¼ of the Bank's current financial assistance – $9 billion for 158 projects in 62 countries in 2004.

The Bank currently has 184 members. Countries select representatives (usually a government minister) to the Board of Governors, which meets twice yearly to set overall Bank policy. A 24-member executive board oversees daily operations. Votes on the executive board are weighted depending on a country's shares in the Bank itself, although decisions are usually based on consensus (O'Brien, Goetz, Scholte and Williams 2000, 27).[ii] The board is chaired by the Bank's President; "long-standing, informal agreement" and "custom" dictate that this person is American, while the Fund is chaired by a European.[iii] The Bank's current President is James Wolfensohn, a naturalized US citizen with an MBA from Harvard who had a successful career in international investment banking before he took over the institution in 1995.

The Bank's overarching mission has changed considerably since its inception, and some observers argue that it is torn between competing identities (O'Brien, Goetz, Scholte and Williams 2000, 26). As its own webpage on "what is the World Bank" explains, it is "not a "bank" in the common sense." On one hand it makes a handsome profit. In 1970 it registered its first overall profit from "net negative transfers," meaning that it was receiving more from its borrowers in repayments than it gave them in "aid" (Rich 1994b, 11). This profit-making capacity resulted in a heightened search for more projects in which to invest the surplus, projects which in turn generated more profits for Rich World contractors. In effect much of the Bank's money never leaves the Rich World, going straight from Washington D.C. to development contractors in the US, UK, Germany, Japan, and France. In 1986 the Bank's Annual Report boasted that of every $10 the institution received, $7 was spent on goods and services in rich countries (Hancock 1989, 159). For the US specifically, of every $1 contributed to the Bank 82 cents was being returned to American businesses through purchase orders. Money can also go directly to multi-national corporations who get investment guarantees; this is so well-known that the spoof website “Whirled Bank Group” – a wonderful parody of the institution and a site for excellent activist information – contains a page in which one can “log in” as a multi-national corporation and see if you have “won” a Bank contract.[iv] Companies on their list who have received money from Bank group agencies include Coca Cola, Citibank, Dominos Pizza, Enron, Exxon, Shell, and Union Carbide.

The Bank also trumpets its role in opening up new markets for Western business through enforcing trade liberalization as a condition of loan receipt; when threatened with Congressional funding cuts in the 1990s the Bank took out full-page newspaper advertisements reminding American businesses of such benefits (Caulfield 1996, 314). More directly, ex-Bank staff can also help specific corporations get contracts; in two years in the late 1990s US corporations got almost $5 billion in contracts with the help of former Bank staff in their employ, for example (Young 2002, 23). By the end of the 1990s, nearly half of the roughly $25 billion paid out annually as World Bank loans was disbursed to Northern corporations contracted to carry out development projects in the South, and $2.5 billion was dispensed in privately distributed consultancy contracts (23).

That said, however, the Bank is also a development agency, and it does not justify its activities purely through the profit motive. Originally focused on reconstruction in post-war Europe it was rapidly outflanked by the Marshall plan, and it spent its early years in frantic search of a purpose. It eventually found one in the late 1940s by reorienting its activities to development, and the institution began to resemble its current state when taken over by Robert McNamara in 1968.[v] He refocused the Bank’s activities on poverty reduction and fulfillment of basic needs. He also massively expanded the organization; in a three month spurt at the start of his Presidency the institution borrowed more on capital markets than it had done in any year its history (George and Sabelli 1994, 42), and under his leadership Bank lending rose six-fold (Rich 1994a, 81).

However the Bank's mission was reoriented again in the early 1980s after McNamara's departure, as the institution responded to the debt crisis by embracing a neo-liberal development model characterized by one critic as "capitalism with the gloves off" (McChesney 1999, 8). GNP growth was "reenthroned" as the centerpiece of Bank development philosophy (Bergeron 2004, 65), and the Keynesian emphasis on state–led development efforts and large scale industrialization projects was replaced by a focus on free-market economic reform.[vi] This stressed the need to cut back the state, open trade, reduce social spending,[vii] deregulate, and privatize. The turn to neo-liberalism was accompanied by a shift to structural adjustment lending, whereby debt-ravaged countries were advised (or coerced, depending on one's position) by the Bank and the Fund to restructure their economies in return for further loans.[viii] In 1986 the Bank's adjustment lending to Latin America tripled, to $2 billion (Teichman 2004, 42). As the Bank defines it,

> "Structural adjustment typically refers to a set of economic policy reforms undertaken by countries beginning in the late 1970s and early 1980s to reverse economic decline or respond to external economic shocks. Such programs aim to stabilize the economy in the short run and put it on a steady growth path for the long run... Stabilization measures focus on bringing aggregate national demand in line with national product plus external financing. In most cases this means reducing the fiscal deficit by removing subsidies, introducing user fees for public services, and downsizing the public sector. It also means devaluing the currency to restore internal and external balance. Structural reforms have tended to focus on creating more appropriate incentives for sustained economic growth-deregulating trade and domestic goods markets, privatizing government enterprises, and removing regulatory constraints to saving and investment" (World Bank 2001, 212-3).

Structural adjustment and the broader neo-liberal development model in which it is embedded allow extremely limited space for state intervention in the economy or in social policy. State services are justified if they are deemed essential to growth, and if they compensate for perceived market failures – in this sense the state can act to kick start private investment but otherwise development should be market-led.[ix] With the advent of structural adjustment all loans were supposed to be explicitly connected to this over-arching free market policy agenda, a change that tied lending for specific projects to macro-economic policy lending far more tightly than had been the case in the past.

Importantly, however, the Bank's mission is no longer as unambiguously embedded in neo-liberal orthodoxy as it was in the 1980s. A "limited, but significant ideological shift" (O'Brien, Goetz, Scholte and Williams 2000, 9) has occurred, involving increased acceptance of policy intervention to temper market excesses, and heightened emphasis on participation, empowerment, and substantive democracy (10). The institution has shifted back to a focus on poverty reduction and social development since the appointment of Wolfensohn as President, heralded as "the renaissance banker" by the Bank's admittedly partial website on biographies of its leaders.[x] The Bank's new mission - "to reduce poverty and improve well-being by helping low and middle-income countries achieve sustainable, equitable development" (World Bank 2000a, 2) – is emblazoned on many documents, and the statement "we are dreaming of a world without poverty" now welcomes visitors to the Bank's headquarters in Washington D.C. Policy texts are littered with references to empowerment, social and human development concerns, partnership, and poverty alleviation, and Wolfensohn has expanded recruitment to bring in more staff with NGO connections. He has also criticized the Fund. His less-than-fully-successful efforts[xi] to reform the institution have caused high profile fights within senior management and problems with staff morale, and some argue that the institution is afflicted with "mission creep", over-stretching to take on whatever fashionable development trend passes by Wolfensohn's desk (Fidler 2001).[xii] However, all agree that the Bank's development mission is currently in flux, involving both adherence to 1980s neo-liberal imperatives and to newer concerns regarding social development and poverty alleviation. The Bank's answers to key policy questions – including the ones related to its focus on women/gender - are embedded in this context.

The History of Women In/Gender And Development in the Ban, Or How to Dismantle A "Dinosaur Master's House" (Staudt 2002, 57).

Women in development (WID) or gender and development (GAD) approaches are notoriously difficult to define, because they mean different things to different policy advocates. They imply a general concern with the way in which international development processes can have differential, inequitable effects on men and women. They are thus driven by a desire to make development better by paying attention to gender relations. [xiii] According to Josette Murphy (author of several internal gender studies for the institution; see 1995 and 1997), the Bank was originally slow to develop a focus on women, and it only contributed to the 1975 Mexico City Conference on WID because the UN forced it to.[xiv] In January 1977 the Bank hired its first advisor on WID, a senior UN official already involved in women's issues. She distributed the institution's first pamphlet on WID at the 1980 UN conference on women in Copenhagen. In 1981 the

Bank began WID seminars for its staff (Murphy 1995, 29), and in 1984 it issued its first operation manual statement with detailed guidance on the issue. The institution increased its contribution in the 1985 Nairobi conference, sending a senior manager for the first time (29). However Murphy refers to this early period (1967-85) as "the reactive years," in which "sparse resources and uneven management support kept implementation at a low level" (2).[xv] The "sharp increase in gender attention" did not occur until the later 1980s (vii), when high-level management support and "consistent encouragement" (45) were forthcoming under President Conable. He made WID one of four special emphasis areas in 1987, "for the first time conferring legitimacy on the topic and requiring Bank managers to show that they were addressing the issues in their portfolio" (45). Resources increased, communication with the Board about gender improved, each of the Bank's regional departments was instructed to appoint its own WID advisors, and the institution initiated a program of country gender assessments (2). In 1993 the WID group was renamed the Gender Analysis and Policy Team, to help mainstream gender analysis into the organization's activities rather than simply to "add-in" women as an afterthought.[xvi] In 1994 the institution published its first official policy paper on gender, a crucial achievement for internal policy advocates.[xvii]

The Beijing conference the following year was another key watershed in the history of gender policy within the institution. The Bank took it far more seriously than previous UN conferences on women and for the first time its delegation was led by the President, who is regarded as "a tremendous positive resource for change" by gender staff (O'Brien, Goetz, Scholte and Williams 2000, 53). Bank staff also contributed to preparatory meetings for Beijing, and the institution "distilled its research and policy advice" through two publications. After the conference momentum was kept up through internal seminars, the establishment of a committee on gender to report quarterly to the President, and the development of closer Bank relations with NGOs and outside experts who dealt with gender issues (Murphy 1997, 13). Following criticism at Beijing over the effects of its economic policies on poor women the Bank integrated gender into its poverty assessments (World Bank 1996b, 2). By 1997, all regions had a gender coordinator, as well as gender coordinators at the departmental or country levels, and many resident missions[xviii] had staff responsible for gender issues as well (World Bank 1997c, 2). A World Bank Gender Home Page was created in 1997, and the Bank launched a new "Just in time" gender advisory service for staff providing data and recommendations (12). In 2001 the institution released its second policy report on gender, to establish its approach to GAD for the future; by then the Bank could claim that "close to half of the Bank's assistance strategies for member countries now include actions designed to promote gender equality" (World Bank 2000a, vii). Although these gender efforts have been criticized as public relations exercises,[xix] they set the Bank apart from other international financial institutions and suggest it to be a particularly important site for feminist policy analysis.[xx] The institution has positioned itself at the forefront of GAD efforts, and it understands itself as a disseminator of "good practice" on gender in the development community (World Bank 2001, 273). As a 2000 policy text put it: "the time has come to speak about the economics of gender, and the World Bank should lead the way" (World Bank 2000d, 5).

The approach taken to the analysis of Bank gender efforts in this dissertation draws heavily on discussions of how institutional constraints shape policy output, an issue with which political scientists have grappled for many years. Specifically, as Douglas North noted, while institutions (as frameworks for socially constructed rules and norms) function to reduce uncertainty, their choices are not necessarily optimal, logically consistent, efficient, or even intended.[xxi] Thus in attempting to explain policy outcomes scholars have turned to a range of institutionally-relevant factors. Particularly important here is the recognition that policy choices are embedded in history. Thus, in a process known as path dependency, early stages of political development are often characterized by more openness than later ones (Pierson 2000; 2000c; Tichenor 2002). The development of basic social understandings required to define a policy problem as of importance involves high start up costs and learning effects, which can be tenacious once established (Pierson 2000a, 79). Consequently, as Pierson argues, "actors seeking to "convert" organizations, policies or formal institutions must recognize which aspects of the current arrangement are deeply embedded…The range of choices available is shaped by these constraints" (Pierson 2000b, 116). As he clarifies, "the claim is not that path dependence "freezes" existing arrangements in place. Change continues, but it is bounded change" (Pierson 2000a, 76). The task for researchers and activists is to identify the specific factors which bound change in this way – to learn how actors can harness existing organizational forms in the service of new ends, in a process that Kathleen Thelen terms "functional conversion" (2000, 105-6).

In effect, feminists inside the Bank are attempting functional conversion, and consequently their experiences connect to broader debates regarding the way that marginalized policy actors secure change within institutions designed for other purposes. In this respect feminists who have studied the Bank draw attention to two important factors: 1. the liminal "insider/outsider" space inhabited by feminist bureaucrats, and 2. the influence of institutional context on gender policy output.[xxii] Although the insider/outsider status is not limited to women in development institutions,[xxiii] it *is* a key feature of feminist development politics, hence the title of a recent feminist collection on development workers: *Missionaries or Mandarins* (Miller and Razavi, 1998). With regard to the Bank, for example, gender efforts have been heavily reliant on motivated staff who pressure the institution from inside, despite the fact that advocacy for gender equity can seriously damage one's career (Buvinic, Gwin and Bates 1996, 78).[xxiv] Before the appointment of the Bank's WID advisor in 1977, staff inside the Bank met informally over lunches to discuss WID, and individual employees supported WID work when the Bank had still not given it any official attention. Although the Bank did little for the 1980 Copenhagen conference, for example, some staff helped organize sessions in the NGO forum (Murphy 1995, 33). The Bank's gender policy thus relies on staff who trying to achieve change within an institution that is often hostile to, or ignorant of, their concerns – they are inside the Bank since they are employed by it, but "outside" in their commitments to gender equity.

There is also a strong connection between internal efforts to get fair treatment for women who work in the Bank, and externally-oriented WID/GAD activities. The staff association focused on the status of women employed in the Bank, established in 1972, provided a forum for the informal WID lunch group, for example (Murphy 1995, 26). The continued salience of this connection is evident in the fact that several evaluations of gender in the Bank collapse the two issues. For example the 1996 report on *Implementing the World Bank's Gender Policies* includes a final chapter on "increasing the number of women in senior management," alongside chapters on project and policy output (World Bank 1996b; see also 1997c, 1997f and 2000a, vii).[xxv]

In addition, "paltry resources" (Murphy 1995, 34) allocated to WID/GAD from the Bank have often been supplemented by external funds. The consultants who worked on a 1999 gender report for the Bank were funded by money from the Netherlands and Sweden (Moser, Tornqvist and van Bronkhorst, 1999, vii). The second policy paper was also in part funded by money from Scandinavian governments (World Bank 2001, xix). Gender policy entrepreneurs have criticized this situation for years (Murphy 1995, 5), and the Bank has pledged several times to change it (World Bank 1997c, 31). However as can be seen in the Ecuador case used in this dissertation, reliance on non-Bank, grant funds from specific countries to finance GAD activities is still common within the institution, again contributing to the liminal, insider/outsider location inhabited by gender policy actors.

Finally, the institution has used external feminist consultants as policy advisors to an unprecedented degree, and inside policy makers rely on, and are connected to, outside feminists in multiple ways. Caroline Moser, a feminist academic who has been critical of Bank policy, has co-written several GAD documents for the institution (1996; 1997; Moser, Tornqvist and Bronkhorst 1999), and in 1996 the organization established an External Gender Consultative Group to assist in the design of its gender policies, and to strengthen links with NGOs. This meets annually with top Bank management, and includes NGOs, academics, and representatives from professional organizations representing women (O'Brien, Goetz, Scholte and Williams 2000, 43). The authors of *Towards Gender Equality*, a 1995 Bank document on the role of public policy in GAD efforts, held a consultation session with NGOs prior to the publication of their research (World Bank 1995c, ix). Similarly in November 1998 the authors of the 2001 gender policy report organized a consultative workshop to get feedback on their draft efforts; Diane Elson and Gita Sen were invited (World Bank 1999c; 2000e). Naila Kabeer was used as a peer reviewer, and the acknowledgements thanked Peggy Antrobus for her coordination of e-discussions on the report (World Bank 2001, xviii) – both of these feminist political economists are critical of mainstream development policy. Bank gender staff also meet regularly with representatives from the Association of Women in Development, the largest organization representing people interested in GAD (World Bank 1997c, 29). These factors confirm that the Bank's gender policy makers must be seen as complexly situated institutional "insider/outsiders".

Secondly, questions about institutional context and its influence on shaping policy agendas are crucial to feminist development scholars.[xxvi] This stems from a recognition that "it is incumbent upon us to understand and diagnose organizations and to act politically within and outside of organizations" (Staudt 2002, 67). Specifically, according to Carol Miller and Shahra Razavi's recent overview of feminist engagement with development institutions, GAD policy advocates have largely pursed a policy of "entryism" to achieve their goals (1998, 2), in which they attempt to transform development institutions from within. These "integrationist tactics" (Kabeer 2000, 33) show how women's advancement can serve existing institutional agendas. Thus Miller and Razavi (borrowing from Nelson Polsby) argue that insider advocates act as "feminist policy entrepreneurs" (1998, 7; see also Goetz 1997), framing their issues in ways sensitive to institutional context. Given that the IFIs which dominate international development lending are themselves dominated by growth-related concerns, feminists have overwhelmingly used efficiency rationales to justify their efforts in such spaces, arguing that development institutions should focus on women because without them growth is endangered. For example, Ingrid Palmer uses neo-classical efficiency rationales to claim that gender discrimination distorts the market, and leads to inefficiency and waste (in Razavi 1998, 27). Women are thus configured as an "untapped resource" (Moser 1993, 2), who should be integrated into development rather than being left to use their time "unproductively" (3).

Bank staff are particularly strongly affected by this pressure for efficiency-based framings. With a mandate to promote growth and modernization, the Bank's charter forbids it from engaging in activities that do not have economic development as their objective; thus its interventions must be justified by appeals to productivity, efficiency, and growth. Indeed the institution repeatedly emphasizes its apolitical nature and the need to avoid intervention in controversial domestic political arenas. Furthermore, the Bank's institutional culture is characterized in a range of studies as professional, technocratic, economistic, and statistics-driven (O'Brien, Goetz, Scholte and Williams 2000, 47). Some 80% of the institution's employees are economists, and economics constitutes the dominant culture of expertise within the organization; this is one of the reasons that Bank staff are regarded as the ultimate development experts in the first place.

Consequently, feminist development scholars have often used the Bank as a paradigmatic example of how feminist insiders must frame gender issues using pro-market efficiency rationales to secure funding, and Bank feminists are notorious in development circles for their appeals to what Anne Marie Goetz terms "efficiency rhetoric."[xxvii] Given that gender activities are demand-driven, the onus is put "on gender specialists to 'sell' their services in ways which will attract project designers – and in a neo-liberal economic environment this means stressing the business case for gender equity" (O'Brien, Goetz, Scholte and Williams 2000, 45). There is a perceived need for the Bank's gender policymakers to "make economic sense" (World Bank 1990, 9), to give "the economic rationale for investing in gender " (1996b, 9), to produce "convincing research results" (1995c, 107) that quantify "the benefits from addressing gender issues" (Murphy 1995, 3), to craft "persuasive economic arguments" (107), and to focus on those elements of gender equality that are "demonstrably costly" to the market (World Bank 1994, 64). It is not enough for policy makers to prove that gender equalities exist, as the first chapter of one 1995 report attempted to do; without the second chapter proving that *Gender Inequalities Hamper Growth* no discussion of appropriate Bank interventions can occur.[xxviii]

Gender staff are fully aware of the constraints set on their policy options by this institutional context. When asked in interviews why gender was not still not addressed widely in Bank work, some argued that "the Bank emphasis on the technical rather than the social hindered attention to gender" (Murphy 1995, 106). Yet staff act strategically to make progress therein. [xxix] In one recent discussion policymakers argued:

> "It is more effective to get women into the mainstream, where men hold power and can respect women for their expertise, than to appeal to a male sense of gender equity... Tackling gender equity from the perspective of women's economic contributions opens doors to mainstreaming gender. Economic arguments can be persuasive in convincing people of the need to do something for gender equality" (World Bank 2000d, 3).

Thus the first entry in a nine point list of suggestions given to the Bank by participants in this workshop on GAD was:

> "Demonstrate to staff that gender issues can make a difference. Zero in on key messages econometrically" (6).

GAD staff are not particularly tolerant of those who do not understand this institutional context, or who do not display the strategic savvy to get their policy issues framed appropriately. They argue, as Murphy puts it, that "what is needed is a conceptual framework or an agreed upon mode of analyzing and using a gender perspective *that suits or broadens the institution's objectives and information requirements*" (Murphy 1995, 107 emphasis added). Consider for example, her criticism of the Bank's first WID advisor, an "outsider" appointed against the advice of the informal working group on WID, who wanted a Bank staff-member (30). Murphy claimed that the 35 case studies produced under the guidance of the institutional outsider "lack the analytical rigor and quality of more recent work. The advisor was unsuccessful in her repeated attempts to get some of these "Notes" formally published by the Bank" (31). The implication that the notes may have been published and been more influential had they been more analytically "rigorous" is debatable, but that Murphy highlights it demonstrates the perceived importance of "quality research" in GAD policy entrepreneurship. Indeed the Bank's 1994 policy paper was deliberately delayed because of a perceived lack of good research to back it up, since staff: "considered that, to convince Bank economists that WID was a legitimate development concern...a sound conceptual and evidential base would be required" (World Bank 1994, 54).

Quantification is considered particularly crucial in this respect, and numbers constitute the key "rhetoric of factuality" (Porter 1995, 77) for the institution. The emphasis on statistically-supported justifications for policy and for quantifiable evidence of success is associated by most observers with Robert McNamara, who was driven by what some consider an almost obsessive desire to count (George and Sabelli 1994, 40-8). This left Bank staff with a legacy of management pressure for numbers to prove that projects and policies succeeded in a narrow sense. Hence GAD policymakers are particularly fond of research findings that have quantified "the benefits from addressing gender issues" (Murphy 1995, 3), particularly given that many of the most committed gender staff are not economists. They thus try to frame arguments in quantified terms in order to avoid perceptions of outsider status, or of political bias.[xxx] Feminists measured, for example, the productivity-impairing effects of rape and domestic violence, the costs of illegal abortion, the economic effects of AIDS (World Bank 1997c, 8), the returns to be secured from investment in women's health (World Bank 2000a, 5), and "econometric evidence to demonstrate the high returns from investing in girls' education" (Murphy 1995, 54). The current policy paper also privileged "studies that use rigorous empirical methods" (World Bank 2001, xiii-xiv) to present "compelling evidence" showing that "societies that discriminate on the basis of gender pay a significant price... These costs are widespread and *quantitatively significant*" (97-8 emphasis added).

The efficiency-based policy rationales for WID/GAD that result from this institutional context are the subject of fierce debate, stemming from different answers to Kathleen Staudt's enduring question: "To "speak truth to power" has long been the goal of policy analysts, but just how similar must the speech be to the master's language?" (1998, 52). Many scholars insist on the need to tolerate multiple discursive strategies given the institutional constraints within which advocates operate. Staudt, for example, criticizes institutional "outsiders" who polarize relations and refuse to acknowledge advances secured by insiders.[xxxi] Contesting Audre Lorde's claim that activists can not use the master's tools to dismantle the master's house, Staudt argues that "master-free houses are few and far between" (2002, 57), and hence that "engagement in the master's house is one is among many valid political strategies in contemporary development enterprises" (58). Thus although "in the minds of many outsiders and insiders, the World Bank was and is no friend to women" (62), even there insiders have achieved "nudges forward toward modest gains in gender equality" (63), increasing spending for social sectors, for example. Staudt consequently issues "a passionate plea for engagement" (68), even with "dinosaur master's houses like the World Bank" (64).

However others are highly critical of efficiency rationales for GAD, decrying their instrumentalist nature, and claiming that gender policies are being used to promote pro-market approaches that negatively impact women, and that reinforce the power of a "gender technocracy" (Lind 2004, 75).[xxxii] Naila Kabeer, for example, argues that although integrationist approaches may give short-term payoffs, "achievements are likely to be circumscribed within predetermined parameters set by institutional rules" (2000, 33). She thus advocates transformative approaches which aim to change the rules rather than play by them (34). Suzanne Bergeron also criticizes feminist development economists who have engaged with the Bank for "leaving its technocratic approach…and its construction of expertise largely intact" (2004, viii). This construction of expertise leads feminist development professionals to "perpetuate images of impoverished Third World women as helpless victims of patriarchy, since such representations authoriz(e) their right to organize a planned liberation of this client population, construed as lacking the sovereign power to liberate themselves" (Saunders 2002, 5).[xxxiii] Others argue that the stress on efficiency threatens to neutralize the transformative potential of GAD work, since "the reframing of gender equity concerns in terms of social and economic efficiency gains…has the effect of depoliticizing the issue and runs the risk of making women more perfectly exploitable for development" (Miller and Razavi 1998, 10). Similar critiques have been made of the Bank's environmental policy efforts, characterized by one observer as a way that "the World Bank could turn its critics into consultants" (Young 2002, 2).

There are several limitations of this scholarly impasse. It can reinforce purist fantasies of an "outside" space beyond the need to engage in struggle, compromise, and strategy, and it can lead to mutual suspicion between insiders and outsiders that is frankly unhelpful (O'Brien, Goetz, Scholte and Williams 2000, 57). In Bank-specific terms, however, certain limitations appear particularly pertinent. Firstly, the debate over efficiency rhetoric implies that the Bank's institutional culture is static, with the organization becoming emblematic of "efficiency rationales" despite important shifts in context. For example in an otherwise compelling account Bergeron argues that the Bank's most recent policy paper on gender uses an efficiency approach (Bergeron 2004, 135), despite the fact that it is saturated with references to empowerment. Others continue to insist that the Bank's institutional culture makes it "relatively indifferent to the gender justice and equity argument" (O'Brien, Goetz, Scholte and Williams 2000, 24), despite crucial shifts in the organization's philosophy since 1995. In fact the Bank's rationale for gender policy has always been multiple, complex, and varied - as set out in the 1994 policy paper it involved "improved efficiency, poverty alleviation, and equity" (14). Alternatives have become particularly important with the re-emergence of a poverty focus under Wolfensohn, and discourses of empowerment, partnership, civil society, and rights are central to recently published work. The Bank is more open to non-quantitative ways of representing truth; many reports mix graphs and photographs, for example, and children's drawings and interviews have also been used. Indeed anthropologists and sociologists are being targeted in an effort to expand qualitative research in the institution (Escobar 1997). Given the heightened presence of such internal dissidents, it is becoming increasingly difficult to ascertain which side the Bank is really on, as one review recently put it (Fox and Brown 1998, 1). I am thus wary of polarizing debates about efficiency rhetoric that imply the Bank has a static, unitary institutional culture; rather institutional context is in flux, and it is unclear how feminist policy entrepreneurs are responding.

Secondly, in perusing the current impasse in research on the Bank one can appear forced to choose between an unkind and totalizing condemnation of feminist policy advocacy and an uncritical endorsement of "whatever works" - one either sacrifices institutional sensitivity or radical critique. This perception is enhanced by the fact that the best and brightest critical development scholars typically adopt a less-than-generous approach to Bank policy entrepreneurship. From Spivak: "You . . knife the poor nation in the back and offer band-aids for a photo opportunity" (1999, 371). From Escobar: "This institution should be seen as an agent of economic and cultural imperialism at the service of the global elite" (1995, 167). From a recent attack on the Bank inspired by the Seattle protests, the institution is: "a manifest danger to the world's least fortunate citizens" (Surin 2003, 136), in an essay that dismisses the increasing emphasis on empowerment, participation, and poverty alleviation as "a damp squib" (135). From Adams: "A pathetic, unconvincing and ultimately futile attempt to reform an unreformable institution" (1994, 147). And finally, from one of the most brilliant books on the Bank: "professionals who really are la crème de la crème are swallowed and absorbed by the Bank, digested and, in the end, are destined to produce what any other digestive system produces" (George and Sabelli 1994, 134).

These condemnations are certainly unkind and perhaps morally purist, ignoring how academics and activists are themselves complicit in perpetuating systems of inequality through their own adherence to institutional rules of the game (Staudt 2002, 57). They most definitely ignore the commitment to social justice that motivates progressive staff in their "gentle sabotage of agency norms" (Rathgeber 1995, 212). More seriously, however, institutionally-oblivious condemnations of Bank policymakers can result in less-than-rigorous policy analyses that actually undermine the effectiveness of the critique being attempted. Critics who frame the Bank as a uniformly evil enterprise and who make no distinctions between departments or policies are repeatedly outflanked; put simply, they make it easy for the Bank to re-position itself as the savior of the progressive development dream. In a textual example, a recent book inspired by the Seattle protests against the Bank and the Fund adopted the title "World Bank literature" to refer, in essence, to global capitalism. The authors claimed that the term was a heuristic device, a provocation with no direct referent, a broad description of literature influenced by the Bank and the Fund. Some authors analyzed Bank texts (Kuma 2003, xxx), but most did not. This analysis took no account of crucial distinctions between the Bank and the Fund, between different parts of the Bank, between multinational corporations and international financial institutions, and so on – and this is all aside from the flawed assumption that Bank texts accurately represent Bank policy in the first place.

These errors can also lead to troublesome politics, as evident during the April 2000 protests against the IMF and the Bank in Washington D.C. in which thousands of activists participated. The Bank spent the weekend of the protests trying to convince journalists in the mainstream US media that they were allies of the protesters, sharing their goal of helping the poor. Crucially they used GAD staff to illustrate these progressive credentials; feminists within the Bank were thus made hyper-visible in the institution's attempt to repair its dented public image.[xxxiv] Protesters who not were confined in D.C. jails for the duration of the event condemning "global capitalism" were left scrambling for a way to respond to a seemingly friendly institution that could speak their language, that criticized the IMF, and that employed good people who had seized space from which to forge apparently progressive policies. If policy analysts *started* from these premises, their work would be more powerful and harder to refute. Developing an institutionally sensitive analysis of Bank policy is thus not simply about a generous-spirited evaluation of feminist policy efforts: it is part of a rigorous and sustainable policy critique that avoids granting easy victories to the Bank, especially since it has shifted to a "friendly" version of development littered with references to NGOs, partnership, and gender.

Finally, and equally dangerously, critics of "efficiency discourses" often assume that they are easy to use, and they are critiqued because they are instrumentalist. Greater attention to institutional context reveals a far more interesting scenario that facilitates more trenchant critique of neo-liberalism. As the Bank's own policy paper notes "measuring and assessing the many dimensions of gender inequality (is) tricky and difficult, and the lack of gender-differentiated data and analyses in several important aspects of gender equality is a real obstacle" (World Bank 2001, 3). Indeed the data supporting efficiency claims is often poor. For example Sally Baden and Anne Marie Goetz note that evidence on the correlation between fertility decline and education is "tenuous" (1997, 43), yet this correlation is central to much Bank gender policy. Similarly Bergeron argues in an excellent discussion of the Bank's economic models that "the statistical information used to make estimates in the applied model is often of questionable value" (Bergeron 2004, 114). However such statistics "which by the Bank's own account should probably be handled with tongs, if at all, are used routinely as the basis of policy prescriptions and treated within the model as a fact of the economy" (114). I am concerned that in failing to contest such "flimsy or contested evidence" (114) critics perpetuate the Bank's "illusion of expertise" (115), and reinforce the pervasive framing of neo-liberalism as a coherent, reified, all encompassing, always already, fully formed "thing" that can be used instrumentally. I attempt an institutionally-sensitive critique of Bank gender policy in an effort to avoid these errors – to pay attention to how institutional context and contestations over the Bank's mission shape the nature and form of truth claims made by policymakers, without making an apriori assumption that efficiency claims "work" to prove what the Bank says they prove, and without losing sight of broader concerns regarding the normative nature of the Bank's development agenda.

The Social Reproduction Problem, the Exhaustion Solution, and the (Re)forging of Sexual Subjectivities.

Specifically, I apply this approach of institutionally-sensitive critique to the policy preferences endorsed by the Bank in an attempt to resolve tensions between unpaid care and renumerated labor, a policy problem I term "the social reproduction dilemma."

Feminists have long argued that development studies, like political economy more generally,[xxxv] has a social reproduction problem, embedded in the distinctions made between productive and unproductive activity, between paid and unpaid work, between labor and love. Social reproduction refers to the production and reproduction of labor power – that is the subsistence needs of individual workers, in present and future form, and of "'all the main production relations in the society'" (Mary MacIntosh in Pearson 2000, 227). It includes childcare, housework, subsistence agriculture, cooking, voluntary work to sustain community organizations, and so on – labor that is not counted in official statistics as work because it is understood to be "non-productive" or outside of capitalist, market relations of production. Feminist scholars have long argued that dominant models of growth overlook the economic value of unpaid labor in social reproduction, labor which is disproportionately done by women.[xxxvi] They have also repeatedly criticized political economists for the implicit construction of the household economy as the feminized "other" of capitalism, defined in terms of a lack of efficiency, rationality, and productivity (Gibson-Graham 1996). Put simply feminists argue that, as Ruth Pearson put it, "a gendered political economy must go beyond discussions of gender divisions of labor within the household to challenge the separation of social reproduction as well as daily and generational reproduction from the notion of what is economic" (2000, 243). This involves demonstrating the connections between market and non-market work, and highlighting how necessary human dependencies must be provided for, in some form.

Marilyn Waring, economist, feminist, farmer, and former New Zealand politician, provided the most powerful account of the process by which women's work was rendered invisible in mainstream development economics in her 1988 book *If Women Counted.*

There she explored the United Nation's System of National Accounts (UNSNA), set up in 1953 to provide the development community with a coherent picture of the world's economic system. These accounts are used to track development trends, compare nations, and provide information for public policy (Waring 1988, 48-9); adherence to the UNSNA is required for all countries to which the World Bank lends money. Because the UNSNA only measures what is exchanged in the marketplace for cash, it does not consider subsistence farming to be "productive," since ""primary production and the consumption of their own produce by non-primary producers is of little or no importance"" (quoted in Waring 1988, 77). Thus the household does not produce income, and people who work unpaid in it are not working (89). This skewed formulation of productivity has frankly absurd consequences: rural women carrying water are unproductive, but water companies boost the nation's growth, and one is economically inactive if caring for children in the home, but working if one does it at a daycare (hence the oft-cited fact that if men marry their housekeepers the GNP goes down). Unlike Ester Boserup (1970), who saw work associated with social reproduction as unproductive and who urged women to enter modern employment, Waring argued that measures of value must be changed, to recognize production for household consumption and reproduction as of importance to the international economic system. Instead of imputing monetary values to this work, Waring suggested that researchers measure how and where individuals use their time; when employed in Canada and New Zealand, these methods revealed that the household is the single largest sector in the economy (Waring 1999, xxvii), and that women do far more work than men (xxxvi).

Several decades after this path-breaking analysis of the systematic invisibilization of women's labor, there is now a substantial body of feminist research showing that dominant understandings of work, productivity, growth, and the economy are gendered, confirming the connections between market and non-market labor. [xxxvii] For example in a historical analysis of the North Eastern United States Jean Boyston (1990) found that in the early 19th century domestic labor mediated between wages and the maintenance cost of households, since women's shopping and home production helped families survive in a period of rising prices and wage cuts. Women's unpaid domestic labor thus constituted an invisible safety net that enabled employers to amass profits. In her book *Who pays for the Kids?*, feminist economist Nancy Folbre confirmed Waring's point that market economies depend on unpaid family labor provided largely by women. Indeed this labor used to be considered economically important, and "housewife" was included as a professional occupation in both the 1861 British census and the 1875 Massachusetts state census. However housewives were gradually moved out of the "productive work" category, leading to a tautological situation in which "the movement of women into the paid labor force promotes economic development *by definition*, because work that earns money income, unlike family labor, is included in estimates for national income" (1994, 96, emphasis in original). Folbre subsequently argued that since society benefits from the unpaid services and sacrifices of those who raise children, childcare needs to be recognized in economics as a public good (in Peterson and Lewis 1999, 44). Likewise development economist Diane Elson claimed that unpaid domestic labor produces inputs for the public and private sector, including an available labor force and social assets such as ethics and trust necessary to sustain a community (2000, 85), and hence it should be valued by economists.

In a key contribution development scholar and Bank consultant Caroline Moser developed a tripartite description of labor which takes into account unpaid work and the importance of social reproduction. She argued that women have a productive role, a reproductive role, and a community management role in which they are responsible for voluntary unpaid work and so on (1993, 34).[xxxviii] Men have triple roles too, but their productive work is more likely to be regarded as such, and their community management roles are more likely to be formal, political ones and hence easier to recognize (35). Thus it is women's triple role responsibilities that are most ignored by development planners; either they emphasize women's reproductive work and render their productive work invisible, or they urge women to enter the formal labor market without realizing that they are already over-burdened with other responsibilities (32). With respect to the latter situation, Moser astutely observed that "recognition of the triple role is obviously essential, if the participatory component (i.e. having women working in and helping to manage development projects) is not simply to extend the work load of low-income women" (1993, 168). These debates about planning methodology stem directly from a recognition of the importance of social reproduction labor in international development economics, and of what one observer terms the "glorious tangle of production and reproduction" that characterizes people's lives (Kum Kum Bhavnani quoted in Talcott 2003, 478).

Much of this scholarship on the gendered nature of hegemonic conceptualizations of work and care has been related to the state, given the concern with how configurations of social policy help (re)produce certain arrangements of paid and unpaid work. For example, in a remarkably prescient analysis some English Wages for Housework advocates noted during the 1970s that the state was helping to secure social reproduction by relying on women's unpaid domestic labor during times of economic crisis. Women were forced to act as what Selma James termed "prime shock absorbers" (1975, 32), not merely in order that employers could cut wages but also so that the state could cut benefits and secure economic recovery. In 1971 Jean Gardiner noted that women were responding to the British recession by shifting their purchase of convenience foods to cheaper unprocessed foods that required more time and energy to turn into meals (in Malos 1995 [1980], 8), a point supported by Edmond and Fleming's findings that English women responded to price rises by shopping longer, cooking more, and hand-washing (1975, 11). Given cuts in state services, women had to mind children displaced by the closure of subsidized nurseries, and care for the sick discharged early from hospitals. In short, "women (were) expected to absorb the costs of the crisis by working harder" (12) as the state reduced its (admittedly insufficient) support for collectivized social reproduction (see also Barrett 1980). This context explains why English women supporting wages for housework temporarily abandoned their children in state social security offices when benefits were stopped for striking miners (Craig, Luck and Maharaj 1975); they were protesting the state's attempt to use their unpaid domestic labor as a shock absorber during economic crisis.

In recognition of the increasing importance of supra-state influences on social policy formulation, however, internationally-oriented feminist scholars have been focusing considerable attention on social reproduction debates in recent years, trying to answer Folbre's enduring question of "how does society pay for the costs of social reproduction?" (in Peterson and Lewis 1999, 346) in a development context. In particular, many scholars have been critical of structural adjustment measures undertaken since the 1980s for their failure to take social reproduction requirements sufficiently seriously.[xxxix] Virtually every feminist account of structural adjustment agrees that restructuring states have attempted to secure economic recovery by (re)privatizing social reproduction. As Amy Lind puts it in an analysis of neo-liberalism in Bolivia, Ecuador and Peru, "the burden of privatization measures has been transferred "invisibly" to the realm of women's work" (2004, 58). In a compelling analysis of Cuba's economic restructuring efforts, for example, Ruth Pearson argues that the country has shifted from collective responsibility for social reproduction to privatized provision (2000), an analysis supported by Kligman and Gal's account of the Eastern European experience (2000). In the Latin America context, women spent hours shopping for cheaper food when prices were deregulated and currencies were devalued, cooking cheaper but more labor intensive meals (Benería and Feldman 1992, 95), and queuing for goods. Women also shored up the decline in social services by extending their working day (Moser 1993, 70); they took on extra paid jobs to feed their families, they cared for the sick and elderly when the state stopped doing so, and their daughters cared for younger children when they had to work outside the home.[xl] Certainly these negative impacts were not evenly distributed throughout the Global South, and some states cushioned their populations from the effects of economic reform better than others (Peterson and Lewis 1999, 691). However everywhere it was employed structural adjustment rested on an implicit assumption that women constituted "under-employed human resources sitting about with time on their hands available to take over" (Waring 1999, xxxvii). Thus in effect the policy represented an attempt to (re)privatize responsibilities on the backs on women (Brodie 1994, 48).

Given its role as a key player in neo-liberal economic restructuring, the World Bank is a prime target for this sort of critique. Many feminists are highly skeptical of Bank gender policy because, they assert, it fails to deal with the core tension between work and care involved in adjustment efforts (Wood 2003). As noted in a recent critical study, "the Bank is charged with persistently refusing to entertain a gendered critique of its macroeconomic policy framework; and with failing to alter its approach to structural adjustment to minimize its negative impact on poor women" (O'Brien, Goetz, Scholte and Williams 2000, 45). Indeed in many respects the social reproduction problem embedded in structural adjustment is the Bank's problem, and the institution is forced to confront the dilemma of how to secure the continued provision of labors of social reproduction when the state rolls back its provision of social services inline with a neo-liberal development agenda.

According to most feminist observers, the dominant solution to the problem of how to ensure social reproduction needs are met in this context has been a pointed non-solution. Put simply the Bank do nothing at all, a response I term the "exhaustion solution" to social reproduction given that women have to work harder to sustain unpaid labor demands alongside assuming responsibilities in the paid labor force and picking up the slack of the retreating state. This failure to deal with the social reproduction issue assumes that women's time is "infinitely elastic" (Elson 1996, 71),[xli] both in its capacity to take on paid employment and to shore up the decline in state-provided social services.

It has been rightly criticized for its exploitative, exhausting, and profoundly anti-feminist implications, and it has been a key focus of feminist critiques of Bank development policy since the 1980s.

However in some respects this critique is incomplete, particularly in its failure to examine the productive power of international development agencies to create new subjectivities as part of an attempt to negotiate the social reproduction dilemma. Critical development studies literature has long focused on this dimension of development. For example, Arturo Escobar argues that Bank development discourse constructs people as client groups to be managed by experts (1995, 155), framing them as "a problem, a subject of preoccupation, but according to interests defined by others" (190). He thus treats development economics as a productive instrument of power, a historically contingent regime of truth that helps create the effects – including the subjectivities – that it claims to merely describe.[xlii] Some feminists have related these debates to the social reproduction problem by arguing that reform relies upon and helps to recreate new, adjusted forms of masculinity, femininity, and heterosexuality. As feminist development critics Leghorn and Parker pointed out over 20 years ago, "women undergo tremendous socialization in heterosexuality to ensure that they see men as primary in their emotional, sexual and material lives, and that their unpaid work in the home is mystified as love" (1981, 15). This mystification is more important than ever under structural adjustment, since women's "love" is now required alongside their "work" to ensure social reproduction requirements are met. Policy makers have to forge these new subjectivities; one can not assume that they always-already exist. For example Peggy Antrobus concluded that adjustment policies "are grounded in a gender ideology which is deeply, and fundamentally exploitative of women's time/work and sexuality" (quoted in Sparr 1994, 183), while Jacqui Alexander claimed in a pioneering analysis of gender, sexuality, and restructuring in the Bahamas that reform "relies upon and operates within dominant constructions of a servile femininity, perennially willing to serve, a femininity that can automatically fill the gaps left by the state" (1994, 19).

Crucially, Alexander argues that scholarship in feminist political economy misses much of this process, because it is still characterized by the "belief in naturalized heterosexuality, the belief that it lies outside of the sphere of political and economic influence" (1994, 21). Indeed sexuality is usually ignored in political economy, since the subject matter appears to lack the requisite "mess and goo" (Binnie 1997, 228) associated with sexuality studies by those unwilling either to extend its purview beyond interactions and populations marked as erotic, or to denaturalize normative articulations of sexuality. This unwillingness holds in the most radical anti-development literature cited above.[xliii] As geographers Jon Binnie and Gill Valentine (1999) note, this failure to critically interrogate normative articulations of sexuality is shared by many social sciences, although it is particularly surprising in development studies given that the field exposures researchers to a vast array of normative ways of arranging heterosexuality. In a recent paper asking "why is development work so straight?" Gilles Kleitz claims that Western narratives of the poor and underdeveloped:

> "(do) not seem to cover the possibility of varied sexual identities and subjectivities. The poor simply can't be queer, because sexual identities are seen as a rather unfortunate result of western development and are linked to being rich and privileged" (2000, 2).

Thus when "development theory and practice impose reproductive heterosexuality…as the only functional form of sex," researchers fail to take notice. This failure arises in part because (re)articulations of normative sexuality have been successfully naturalized as non-political even as they undergo profound shifts. A key imperative of current research is thus to challenge the naturalization of normalized sexuality, by analyzing the sexualized assumptions embedded in policy, and by examining how sexualities are actively produced by policy agents that appear asexual.

Given that development studies offers little theoretical guidance for this investigation, I utilize insights from researchers in sexuality studies who have developed the concept of heteronormativity. Heteronormativity refers to practices that help normalize specific forms of heterosexuality and make them hegemonic (Berlant and Warner 1998, 548). It is different from heterosexuality (which can also refer to multiple behaviors and desires), since it refers less to sex and more to norms, institutions, and structures that help naturalize dominant forms of heterosexuality as universal and morally righteous. Proponents of the concept recognize that normative forms of heterosexuality change across time and space, and rely for their success on profoundly political interventions. They also argue that the use of sexuality as an analytic concept must be extended beyond discussion of gay, lesbian, bisexual, and transgendered people to consider the currently "unmarked," naturalized status of heterosexuality and the ways in which it is (re)produced in changing forms by political actors.[xliv] As political scientist Cathy Cohen argues, not all heterosexuals enjoy the power and entitlement of normative heterosexuality here; for example in the US there are many heterosexuals on the "outside" of heteronormativity (1997, 452),[xlv] including single mothers, teenage mothers, women dependent on specific types of state support, and sex workers. Hegemonic heterosexuality in the U.S. also involves a privileged of monogamous coupling, assumptions that romantic love and sex are connected, and principles of lifelong partnering among heterosexuals – "straight" people who organize their sexuality in different forms are non-normative, to varying degrees. Indeed a key feature of cutting edge research into sexuality and social policy is its recognition that policies in which gays and lesbians are hardly mentioned (such as welfare) can be crucial sites for the regulation and (re)production of different heterosexualities.

In this respect, much attention has been focused on disciplinary knowledge production as a crucial arena for the generation of "truths" about gender and sexuality, in their deviant and normative forms (Foucault 1990). Specifically, the notion of opposite but complimentary sexes is a central mechanism through which hegemonic heterosexuality is currently forged. The duality of sex is cast into the prediscursive domain (Butler 1990), and biology is drawn into the service of a model of sexuality involving two "opposite" sex partners, impelled by evolutionary impulse and nature to couple. The notion of a "natural" body knowable outside of cultural construction has been questioned by historians (Laqueur 1990), biologists (Fausto-Sterling 2000), philosophers (Butler 1990) and a dazzling array of assorted others,[xlvi] who have shown that sex has not been linked to reproduction across all times and places, that before the 18th century in Europe there was only one sex, and that "medical practice pulls bodies into line with a social ideology of dichotomous gender" (Connell 1995, 49). This social ideology is embedded in a specific time, place, and vision of the body, culture, and nature whereby wholeness is to be achieved through "functional" gender partnerships, spheres are to be linked, parts of the self are to be made complete, and anatomies are framed as fitting together naturally in a biologistic notion of complementarity. The ideology is politically dangerous, as Hawkesworth argues, since "constructing a functionalist narrative of gender that appears to possess universal validity occludes cultural specificity and historical variability, according gender an intransigence that is markedly unhelpful to feminist projects" (1997, 681). Yet despite the insights from this literature many social science fields proceed as if the sexed subject was a fixed, biological creation, with compulsory heteronormativity its logical destiny.[xlvii]

In addition to these debates about knowledge production, attention has been devoted to the role of state-level policies in forging normative sexuality, through research into "how the state is constituted as a heterosexual body and how heterosexual imperatives constitute citizens" (Phelan 2000, 432).[xlviii] In one of best examples, Davina Cooper argues that the Thatcherite state was a site of both repressive and productive power with respect to sexuality (1995, 16). As she notes the productive dimension of this engagement is often overlooked by those who refuse to acknowledge the political ways in which normative heterosexuality is forged. Certainly Thatcher's legislation used repressive power; it proscribed homosexuality, censored teachers and generated a climate of fear in local government. However state power also had a productive dimension, in that it mobilized and tried to (re)produce normative heterosexual subjects,[xlix] while framing sexuality as it related to gay men and lesbians as a private matter outside the public policy realm. Policy measures that actively (re)produced heteronormativity were thus naturalized into invisibility. Similarly Jacqui Stevens (1999) explores how state-sanctioned kinship rules (re)produce heteronormative affiliations of family, race, and nation, while Anne-Marie Smith (2001) analyzes US welfare reform as an example of state regulation of citizen's sexuality, in which unmarried mothers are penalized, poverty is blamed on sexual irresponsibility, and marriage is promoted as an anti-poverty strategy.

However, as pointed out in a recent anthology on state attempts to forge normative families, “state intervention into family life did not always occur exclusively, or even primarily, through mothers” (Haney and Pollard 2003, 3). Fathers were also frequently targeted, since as Maxine Molyneaux notes in a Latin American focused discussion “the sober, hardworking father was the natural complement to the dependent housewife-mother” (Molyneaux 2000, 56; see also Orloff 2003). This is confirmed by Karin Rosemblatt’s research on Chile (2000a; 2000b). During the 1930s and 1940s Chilean popular front leaders aimed at reform of gender and familial relations, but their efforts rested fundamentally on changing working class men – to make them more reliable providers, more clean, responsible, sexually restrained, sober, and temperate, and to instill “above all, love of family” (Rosemblatt 2000b, 4). Indeed in part in response to such research on the role of the state in forging normative partnerships in Latin America Molyneaux asks “will states, in an excess of bureaucratized zeal, continue their intervention into the most intimate realms of human relations, and will they do so with or without the blessing of feminism?” (Molyneaux 2000, 71).

Unfortunately, however, these studies on how sexuality is embedded in apparently non-sexualized policy sites usually focus on domestic agendas, ignoring how international institutions shape the expression of sexuality. This state-focused explanatory frame claim is arguably incomplete given the multiple and complex links between domestic and international policy agendas (Clarke 2000), especially in a development studies context characterized by intense debates about the decline in state sovereignty.

Important exceptions include work that has examined sexuality in a colonial and post-colonial context (Puri 1999; McClintock 1995). Using colonial evidence, for example, Ann Stoler has argued that "the family" is a sexualized site, which "should not be seen as a haven from the sexualities of a dangerous outside world, but as the site for their production" (1995, 112). Likewise Laura Briggs' research on Puerto Rico found that the US used tropes of "failed nuclear families" as a justification for imperialist intervention in the late 19th Century, since the construction of a modern society rested on restructuring sexuality. "Modernity required 'modern' families" (Briggs 2003, 42), which in turn required efforts to promote marriage, to regulate sex workers and so on. In a more contemporary context some researchers have linked scapegoating of sexual minorities to the negative effects of globalization (Adam 1999), while others have examined the interaction between development and sexual rights for sexual dissidents, arguing for a more "sex positive' approach to HIV/AIDS programs and so on (Gosine 2004). However none except Alexander (1991/4) attempt to re-conceptualize heternormativity as influenced by both national and supranational contexts in terms that focus on IFIs, or that go beyond rather simplistic assertions of mutual domestic and international interests in scapegoating sexual minorities.[1] There is thus a paucity of research on the international dimension of this question: on the role of IFIs in (re)producing and (re)forming intimacies as part of an effort to secure economic adjustment. I attempt to remedy that oversight, by remaining attentive to the potential role of the Bank itself as a policy actor attempting to restructure normative sexuality.

I thus focus on the social reproduction problem because it is, for feminist development scholars, one of the most pressing policy issues of the present moment, and also because I believe the Bank's answers to it merit explanation and critique, neither of which they have received to an adequate degree. Clearly my approach to social reproduction and the policies enacted to secure it differs from mainstream accounts in that it takes sexuality seriously as a category of analysis in political economy, but I address a question that has puzzled comparativists and political economists interested in development for decades – how do we pay for the kids and the other human dependencies on which our existences rest in a neo-liberal context? Specifically, I ask if, and how, the Bank has answered this question, in part because its answers are simply the most important in the development field and they reveal much about a fascinating institution undergoing a crucial shift in mission. However I also address these questions in part because the answers shed a much broader light on a range of more general debates regarding the social reproduction dilemma itself, the role of marginal policy entrepreneurs in mainstream institutions, the way that policy output is shaped by institutional constraints, the links between neo-liberalism and sexualized policy interventions, and the interaction between states and international financial institutions in contemporary restructuring efforts. This research puzzle is thus a highly pertinent one, and contributing to its resolution promises to generate findings of interest to a range of political science conversations.

Methodological Approach

In my attempt to ascertain if the Bank had generated answers to the social reproduction problem, and to then investigate why it had generated certain solutions rather than others, I relied first on published policy texts. The Bank has written extensively on gender issues, issuing two policy documents on gender, evaluations of country strategies and projects, and research on women's position in the world. In order to analyze the Bank's official, D.C position on women's employment, the social reproduction dilemma, and suggested solutions (chapters 1-3) I focused on high-level, official gender and development policy documents produced by the institution between 1979 and 2001. In 1979 the Bank published its first pamphlet on WID, and in 2001 it launched a high profile policy paper on GAD, *Engendering Development in Rights Resources and Voice*. Other texts selected include official evaluations of the Bank's gender lending, progress reports, and officially-cleared documents prepared to showcase the Bank's gender efforts for important international conferences. In a recent co-authored analysis of Bank gender policy Caroline Moser refers to these as ""formally cleared World Bank documents with a gender focus" (Moser, Tornqvist and van Bronkhorst 1999, 2), and she considers them good resources for policy analysis, as does Murphy in her review of "key documents that reflect Bank policies for treatment of gender issues" (1995, 87). In addition, I review speeches, presentations, and websites through which the Bank present a public, official stance on gender; these include James Wolfensohn's address to the 1995 UN conference on women in Beijing, official materials produced to accompany the launch of the 2001 policy paper, and Bank-posted web material associated with their gender site. A list of these documents and an explanation of text section strategy used for the project is attached as appendix 1.

Firstly, texts were assessed for the relative importance accorded employment as a solution to the "problem" to which Women In/Gender and Development efforts were directed, in its own right and as a component of other policy priorities. The textual analysis software package ATLAS-ti was utilized to facilitate this process; an explanation of the coding process is contained in Appendix 1. Secondly, to ascertain the Bank's position on social reproduction I searched formally-cleared policy texts for how categories and concepts related to the employment focus (such as work, female labor force participation rate, wages, entrepreneurship and so on) were put into conversation with categories and concepts related to social reproduction (such as the triple role, time burdens, children, family, care, love, social services, household labor, housework and so on). Far from having to tease out the unspoken assumptions about social reproduction upon which the Bank's prioritization of employment rest, I looked for those moments in a text where employment and social reproduction were put into direct and explicit conversation, with specific solutions for their (re)articulation being presented. Having identified the solutions proposed I was able to assess whether the factors identified as important to the success of the broader work policy within GAD were relevant explanatory factors in this policy arena – whether the successful solutions had the same features as those associated with the employment policy, and whether the failed ones did not.

The investigation is located in what Arturo Escobar terms an anthropological approach to policy, whereby policies - and particularly policy texts – are understood to be productive instruments that result in concrete practices of thinking and acting (1995, 11). As Escobar and others who focus on the productive power of development agencies argue, policy texts are central ways in which development knowledge is produced and social reality is shaped.[li] In particular, as development scholar Gavin Williams argues, development texts "provide an over-arching framework which makes sense of current policies as a means of addressing development problems. They spell out the common sense of the development community" (1995, 175). Studies in this tradition demonstrate that policy helps to construct what it claims to analyze as pre-discursively given, and all pay attention to what Mary Katzenstein terms the "politics of meaning-making" (1995, 35). As Sandford Schram puts it, policy is not simply a response to preexisting problems, but rather is itself central to their formulation (1995, xxx). Thus Paul Pierson advises: "social scientists interested in contemporary political development must treat public policies not only as dependent variables but also as independent ones" (1994, 8), recognizing that policies themselves have causal power and shape political action in crucial ways.

Having explained in chapter four why the Bank should be analyzed as an independent policy actor in Ecuadorian development, in chapters five-eight I explore the Bank's gender policy interventions in Ecuador as they relate to women's employment, the social reproduction dilemma, and the institution's proposed solutions. I focused on three dimensions of these policy interventions: 1. the Bank's vision of gender policy set out in Ecuador-specific policy texts on gender and on the country more generally (chapter five); 2. Bank gender policy in relation to export promotion efforts, focusing on floriculture as a specific example of a Bank-supported export industry in which gender is an important concern (chapter six), and 3. Bank gender policy in a project based initiative, a rural "ethnodevelopment" loan oriented to indigenous and Afro-Ecuadorian people (chapters seven and eight). By looking at gender policy as laid out in country-specific documents, and as practiced in policy and project-based lending, I aimed to trace efforts "all the way down," and to hereby take the Bank's money and ideas equally seriously.

To research these country-specific activities, I again analyzed key policy texts on gender put out at the national and regional level, and I explored loan and project documents such as memos, budgets, case studies and so on. I also conducted interviews with Bank gender consultants and with people involved in relevant project and policy-based initiatives. Thus for the chapter on export promotion and floriculture I interviewed several policymakers involved in the Bank's export promotion loans, and industry representatives and NGOs focused on the flower industry. In 2003-4 I spent five months in Ecuador, in two trips, visiting Bank gender projects and talking to staff involved in lending activities. I spent much of this time visiting regional offices and projects associated with the ethnodevelopment loan. In short I analyzed both the Bank's macroeconomic loan documents on how to promote exports, and the booklets it produced for indigenous adolescents on sex education and the importance of daily genital bathing. I spoke to staff in the Bank's offices in Quito, and I spoke to community managers of tiny project funds for chicken raising initiatives in the Sierran highlands. This was part of an attempt to trace the Bank's answers to the social reproduction dilemma all the way down, and to hereby test out an explanatory model showing why certain policy answers are developed while others are sidelined as widely as possible. Further justification for the choices involved in this effort is provided below.

Why More Than Documents?

> "And yet the question remains: how do you make people see that these policies are as real as an airplane hitting a building? "(Robbins 2003, 298).

As important as formally cleared, D.C.-based policy documents are in the world's largest development institution, they are not the only dimension of Bank activity to which researchers should devote attention. A focus on D.C. texts is inadequate for a research project seeking to uncover Bank policy priorities, for two interconnected reasons. Firstly, the Bank employs 9300 people, 3000 of whom work in country offices, "in the field" as the developing world is commonly known. This is becoming increasingly important as a site for employment in the Bank; since Wolfensohn's take-over since he has shifted more resources to grounded activities in regional offices. From here the Bank produces different policy documents, written at the country and/or regional level. Country-specific policy strategies may be designed in collaboration with D.C. staff at the regional and/or sectoral level; they may be imposed as a directive from above; they may stem from national-level discussions between Bank staff and borrowing governments; or (perhaps most commonly), they may emerge from a complex process of interaction between all of the above. Focusing on D.C. documents ignores this policy site.

Secondly, most of the 9300 people who work for this institution do far more than publish development policy texts. They design and enact loans and grants in specific countries for concrete change at the project and policy level. They produce grounded development outcomes – training workshops, altered state policy, buildings, irrigation channels, micro-credit institutions, and so on. It is a huge, arguably unjustified leap of faith to assume that these outcomes neatly reflect the policy texts. It is here that many critics of Bank policy come methodologically unstuck, so to speak. For example, in a recent (and fascinating) theological account of structural adjustment in Africa as fundamentalist, John Mihevc (1995) relies entirely on Bank documents, failing to link his analysis to any concrete loans or projects. Similarly Cynthia Wood (2003) provides a text-focused overview of Bank gender policy that makes virtually no mention of lending – notwithstanding the importance of the Bank as a shaper of development ideas this seems a partial account of its activities. As Subir Sinha (2003) argues in a recent critical piece on Bank fisheries policy, texts are often incoherent and contradictory, and they do not reflect lending practices in a direct way. Likewise, in an essay that supports Bank efforts to restructure education spending in Latin America, Wendy Hunter and David Brown found that although the institution successfully transmitted norms and values to technocrats, "it is less successful in convincing the politicians who control the purse strings" (2000, 113).

The failure to recognize this disjuncture between policy text and policy outcome is one of the reasons for the persistent hostility with which anti or critical development research has been received by development practitioners. The latter are often highly resistant to the focus on the purely textual, on the epistemic violence done by discursive framings of policy problems in documents that they regard with amusement or contempt, if they read them at all. Staff know full well that promises in policy texts may change little in actual lending, and they are often skeptical of academic work that proceeds as if methodologically immune to this reality. While practitioners' dismissal of the importance of documents in creating knowledge, shaping policy, framing the "development problem" and so on may be exaggerated, and based on a crude and unfair reenactment of the distinction between irrelevant ideas and real money, arguably the burden of proof is on the critical development scholar to demonstrate a link between the texts and the development outcomes, rather than simply to assume it a priori. The best research on the

Bank is thus that which considers the ideas and the money together, that traces the policies all the way through, from the publicly prominent texts, through regional and country-level policy research, to the loans and grants themselves.[lii]

Why state level policy?

When trying to trace the Bank's policies all the way down in this way, it is important to consider both policy and project based lending. The former is geared towards broad changes in a country's development agenda, while the latter involves loans for specific development projects – damns, roads, schools, infrastructure, and so on. Historically, project-based lending was the most important component of Bank activity, and it has been the target of much of the criticism directed at the institution.[liii] However, in recent years policy-based lending has become increasingly important to the Bank's portfolio (Stiglitz 1999); it now makes up around 60% of the institution's lending activity. This shift occurred in the 1980s during the height of structural adjustment lending, and it led several researchers and NGOs to insist that Bank activity could not be adequately assessed without a focus on policy-based efforts (Caulfield 1996, Fox and Brown 1998, 18).

There are several methodological difficulties involved in researching policy-based lending, however, and it seems perverse to many political scientists to consider measures passed by Congresses, approved by Presidents, drafted by elected legislators and so on to be Bank output. To justify my own methodological approach, therefore, it is necessary to substantively address debates concerning the inter-relation between the state, international financial institutions, and policy-based loans to achieve economic restructuring, since it should be emphasized from the start that my attempt to analyze

Ecuadorian development policy as Bank policy is not to deny the role of the state therein. It is not to assume a priori that the Bank is usurping state sovereignty (although it may be), and it is not to imply that the Bank have to impose reforms on governments rendered powerless by debt (although it may do). Neither, however, is it to conflate state involvement in reform with state autonomy, democracy, or a resolution to a collective action problem reflecting latent majority interests in restructuring. This approach requires a little elaboration.

Critics of neo-liberalism are familiar with the claim that the reform measures involved in much policy-based lending are imposed by the Bank and/or Fund (Farred 2003; Kuma 2003; Danaher 1994). These arguments draw heavily on earlier research into the role of international and domestic capitalist actors in shaping the policies of third world, underdeveloped, peripheral, or just poor states. For example world systems theorists such as Immanuel Wallerstein and dependency theorists such as Andre Gunder Frank argued that the international system of political economy locks third world states into dependent positions. In this vision, states are extremely weak, dominated by multi-national corporations, and/or extremely repressive to their own populations in order than their nations can serve their appropriate place in the international order as impoverished, deliberately underdeveloped sources of profit for corporations tied to Western nation-states (Shafer 1994, 239-240; Friedan 1991, 236-7). Rather than spreading democracy, this development process led to the proliferation of what Barbara Geddes, in a recent overview of dependency theory, termed "the stunted and malformed offspring of a careless and exploitative intercourse between advanced and backward nations" (2003, 11). Dependency theory "turned modernization theory on its head" in this respect, attributing development problems to capitalist integration and asserting a conflict of interests between transnational actors and the real development needs of host countries (12).

This position has been extremely influential in Latin American studies, with both Wallerstein and Gunder Frank focusing their research on the region. Cardoso also contributed to the debate using Latin American evidence. He identified dependent development as involving factors such as poor terms of trade, over-concentration in primary exports, low productivity in traditional agriculture, and highly unequal income distribution which creates markets for imported luxury consumer goods but little else. The perceived need to foster import substitution and domestic industry stemmed from this diagnosis of the policy problem. In turn, in explicating his "bureaucratic-authoritarian" model of politics and economics Guillermo O'Donnell claimed that to accumulate capital developing countries in the region had to suppress their working class, to ensure that labor movements did not derail the process of (mal)development.

These approaches have influenced contemporary discussions of the role of the state and IFIs in neo-liberal restructuring. To achieve adjustment ends, it became common for Bank loans to come with multiple conditionalities attached, to change laws that were seen to restrict free trade, for example, to reduce tariffs, to privatize state-owned enterprises, and so on. In 1986, for example, 13% of World Bank structural adjustment loans were conditional on specific privatization policies; by 1992 this had risen to 59% (Avery 1994, 95). Bank conditionality agreements are often more detailed than IMF ones, leading to accusations that the institution is "excessively meddlesome" (Bergeron 2004, 111; see also Teichman 2004, 42). Thailand's second structural adjustment loan contained over 100 separate policy conditions (Walton and Seddon 1994, 18), and in 1992 the Indian government gave their draft budget to the World Bank, and incorporated most of its recommendations, *before they even submitted it to their own parliament for debate* (Caulfield 1996, 195).

Aid conditionality has also forced states to surrender some sovereignty over exchange rates, trade policy and so on, and the rapid shifts in economic policy associated with structural adjustment (such as sudden interest rate rises and devaluations) effectively insulate state decision-makers from social contestation of policy. For example in a study of reform in Mexico and Argentina Judith Teichman argues that "the process of structural adjustment with which international policy networks have been so intimately involved was corrosive to democratic practices in so far as bank positions, policies, and the debates that occurred in international policy networks were not shared with congresses and the civil society of client countries (2004, 65). Thus some researchers have argued that economic policy was imposed from above in a fundamentally undemocratic manner (Przeworski 1992), and that reforms have "eroded state autonomy" (Millar 2000, 40). Similarly Luiz Carlos Bresser Pereira, José María Maravall and Adam Przeworski argue that ""whenever democratic governments followed neo-liberal tenets, the outcome has been stagnation, increased poverty, political discontent, and the debilitation of democracy"" (1994, 199). Such critique suggests that by adopting a neo-liberal restructuring policy agenda states are in effect advised to make the majority of their populace worse off for some time to come, and elites in some regions may thus anticipate – with good reason - a threat from popular protest (Walton and Seddon 1994).

This IFI-focused explanation for reform is a crucial check against accounts that assume restructuring is a normatively neutral or positive process, and it draws necessary attention to the strong-armed, undemocratic nature in which policy change can be imposed on unwilling governments and populations in some cases. However it is a partial explanation. It ignores important regional differences in the reform experience. Eastern European countries experienced less protest against neo-liberal restructuring than those in Latin America, for example, and the "contentious" collective action that was evident there in the early 1990s is not readily explained by economic factors (Ekiert and Kubik 1998).[liv] Meanwhile African experiences of restructuring are often less imbricated in democratization trends.

Even in a Latin American context, however, the explanation also ignores the crucial role of state actors and domestic political elites in supporting neo-liberal policy shifts (Geddes 2003, 18). As Molyneaux argues in a recent anthology on the Latin American state, "even with the shift toward the shrinking state of neoliberalism and the ebbing of state power through globalization, states retain significant force and a not inconsiderable influence in shaping the contours and fortunes of societies" (2000, 37). As several authors point out, states faced with similar pressures from IFIs have responded very differently in the timing, scope, and consolidation of economic reform (Teichman 2004; Haggard and Kaufman 1995; Stallings 1992). Peru entirely rejected restructuring, Mexico embraced it, and many countries failed to deliver on promises made to international creditors. IFI's lack of information and monitoring ability may severely limit their ability to impose reform (Kahler 1992, Gilbert, Powell and Vines 1999), conditionality efforts notwithstanding, and domestic context matters crucially for the reform route taken.[lv] Research on these issues is an important corrective to the impulse in much critical literature on restructuring to erase the state's role and attribute excessive causal power to IFIs.[lvi] It also avoids rather purile "either/or" framings of the state-IFI causality debate that consider debate effectively ended once the state has been shown to be a policy actor in any form.[lvii]

In addition, pro-market reforms *require* state involvement in the economy, to regulate currency exchange, oversee financial transactions, and enforce respect for private property. Peter Evans thus argues that "the state is not eclipsed by the simple fact of its becoming more dependent on trade" (1985, 67). Indeed evidence from East Asia suggest that the greater trade openness demanded by IFIs is related to an *increased* role for the state, since countries such as South Korea and Singapore had high degrees of government intervention in the economy. Some business leaders recognize this, preferring stable democratic regimes with firm rules, less corruption, and accountable leaders over weak states with erratic dictatorships that are liable to seize their profits (Evans 1985; Shafer 1994), or to pursue damaging economic policies that undermine long-term growth and promote social unrest (Haggard and Kaufman 1995).

Moreover, neo-liberal economic reform concentrates substantial resources in state hands, and has been welcomed by local elites for precisely this reason. As Kevin Danaher (1994), Pamela Sparr (1994), Graham Hancock (1989) and several other critics of reform point out, structural adjustment is often a *collaborative* effort between Northern and Southern elites, and the latter have often embraced the policy, with its opportunities for elite enrichment. As one recent Washington Post article on IMF- and World Bank-sponsored economic reform in Argentina put it "rather than curbing corruption… the reforms allowed graft to persist or even to expand as dishonest civilian politicians and their associates tapped into the massive new wealth created by privatization, foreign borrowing and soaring public spending" (Anthony Faiola, quoted in Millar 2000, 40). A recent Bank working paper by former Polish finance minister Grzegorz Kolodko extended this analysis beyond corruption. He argued that contemporary Bank policy recognizes the importance of redesigning the role of the state, rather than urging "its urgent withdrawal from economic activities" (1999, 5), since "transition calls not for a dismissal of government but for its streamlining and adjustment to the new circumstances" (17). Indeed recent IFI literature on economic adjustment signals recognition of the need to avoid donor imposition, and to secure government ownership of reforms.[lviii] Thus the neo-liberal development model seeks to redefine the state rather than eliminate it entirely.

As Peter Evans argues, and as should be made explicit early, recognizing the continued importance of the state in this respect is not necessarily a move towards democracy. Often the adjustment of its role takes the form of expanded investment in domestic security concerns. Hence "the danger is not that states will end up as marginal institutions but that meaner, more repressive ways of organizing the state's role will be accepted as the only way of avoiding the collapse of public institutions" (1985, 64). For example the Bank's 1995 document on promoting the transition to a free market concludes by noting that law and order have deteriorated in some countries, and that states must refocus their resources in response (Similarly a 1995 article on the Bank's role in transition concludes by noting that law and order have deteriorated in some countries, and that states must refocus their resources in response (Dervis, Selowsky and

Wallich, 1995, 152). Another observer calls this the "Pinochet/Chicago boys option" (Carriére 2001, 147) after the union of authoritarianism and neo-liberalism needed to secure effective reform in Chile. He goes on: "there is a fascist core or logic to neoliberal restructuring: it destroys lives and livelihoods by the millions and must be imposed from above by highly authoritarian means" (148).

Many more mainstream accounts – including some from advocates of reform – also suggest an inherent conflict between the expansion of political participation and the state's pursuit of exclusionary economic policies in line with IFI advice, a pursuit that that may indeed benefit state and domestic elites, but which, in many countries in Latin America at least, seems extremely unpopular with the electorate. Several observers argue that early efforts to restrict democratic participation in the state, particularly by strengthening executive power, may be necessary to push reform through, in order to stop the state being captured by opponents of restructuring.[lix] These opponents are considered by some to be narrow interest groups with investments in the status quo. Brown and Hunter, for example, argue than in many settings in Latin America "special interests" have prevailed over "collective interests" in reform (2000, 139) such that free education has been illegitimately upheld as a state priority. However, as Haggard and Kaufman note, there is a key tension between the short-term need for "state autonomy" from "special interests" required to implement reform, and the long-term need for broader party support and a social consensus regarding the benefits of stabilization and adjustment, required if reforms are to be sustainable. For example, although a strong executive may initially be necessary to overcome collective action problems hindering implementation of reform, it can backfire in the long term by providing an easy target for opposition. Thus “a strong executive is not a reliable substitute for organized party support that can provide coherent legislative and electoral backing for the government’s policy course” (1995, 165).

Advocates of reform generally frame the resolution to this tension as a matter of time – once reforms are implemented their benefits will be evident and thus they will secure the consent of the majority. Restructuring is hereby framed as a classic collective action problem: there are latent majority interests in reform, and one must thus enhance state autonomy from special interests who may otherwise hold the state hostage and impose policies that benefit them at the expense of broader economic growth. In this way is resolved the apparent tension between on one hand the view of reform as normatively positive, as of benefit to the majority, and as linked to democracy, and on the other the perceived need for strong-armed executives and restricted political participation to ensure the “state autonomy” needed to implement it. In short if the state implements far-sighted reform in the national interest, the people will come.

If this attempt to put the state back into the reform process in a way that salvages restructuring as a democratic endeavor is to be properly contested, analysis must not resort to a IFI-focused explanation that frames domestic elites as unimportant or as always-already powerless victims of international capitalism. I attempt to avoid such an approach in this dissertation, seeking to analyze specific policies produced at the country level as, in part, Bank policies while also taking into account the role played by state actors, without assuming that support from these actors demonstrates the broader “democratic” nature of economic reform. Thus I reject the crude position that neo-liberal policies are associated with a blanket reduction in state sovereignty, or even a restriction of it to the authoritarian repression of dissent, while also avoiding the assumption that state involvement reflects broader popular support or can be read as evidence of what the Bank call "policy neutrality" or "autonomy." To explicate this approach, I devote chapter 4 to the question of the role of the Ecuadorian state and the Bank in restructuring efforts, to counter any potential objection that the Bank is not an independent policy actor in these reforms.

Why Ecuador?

I chose to focus my country-specific policy and project level research on a number of Bank initiatives in one country – Ecuador. Founded as an independent state in 1830 after the collapse of the Confederation of Gran Colombia, Ecuador – located on the equator from which it takes its name - is now home to 12.8 million people.[lx] These are split unevenly between four regions that differ in climate, economics, politics, language, cuisine, and culture – the Sierra, the coast, the Amazon (known as the Oriente – literally the East), and the Galapagos islands. Roughly half the population lives in the Sierran highlands, in which the capital, Quito, is located. Andean Highland indigenous groups are a significant proportion of the population in this region – in the country as a whole they make up anywhere between 10 and 40% of the population[lxi] but in the Sierra they dominate rural areas. The Sierra is the administrative center of power, and has traditionally been regarded as more conservative in its political outlook than the coast. 46% of the population lives in the coast, home to most of Ecuador's Afro-Ecuadorian population and some smaller in-land indigenous groups. The coast is dominated by the city of Guayaquil, long the country's economic powerhouse given its centrality as a port and its role in export industry. Elites in Guayaquil have struggled with those in Quito for dominance over the country's political and economic future, and Guayaquil has provided the base for many of Ecuador's populist political movements and leaders (de la Torre 2000). 3-4% of the population live in the Amazon, a region that covers over half of the country (Kyle 2000, 18); they are a mixture of indigenous groups and mestiza settlers drawn there mainly since the discovery of oil in the 1970s.

Ecuador is an interesting site for closer interrogation of World Bank policy for several reasons. At the most general level it is relevant because the Bank gives money to it and expects the money back – this was obviously a criteria for country selection.[lxii] However it is a relevant example for several other (and better) reasons as well. It is heavily indebted, it is in economic crisis, and it has been deeply divided by conflict over structural adjustment, unemployment, inequality, inflation, privatization, tariff reduction, and debt since the 1980s. These conditions are hardly uncharacteristic of the contemporary Latin American development experience, and place Ecuador in the same context as much larger countries such as Argentina, Mexico, and Brazil. Indeed in its 2002 book on economic crisis and dollarization the Bank uses Ecuador as a showcase of "a country with structural problems of low growth, regional divides, and social and ethnic fragmentation made more acute by a severe currency and banking crisis in the late 1990s" (Beckerman and Solimano 2002, ix) – it is thus far from controversial to consider the nation representative of broader development trends. Indeed as David Corkhill and David Cubitt argue in an overview of the country's economic and political history, Ecuador is "in some ways…the most purely typical Latin American republic" (1988, 1). By this they mean that it emerges as a median case on several indices of importance to political scientists, such as population density, racial composition, political fragmentation and party structure, class structure, and (importantly for the purposes of this project), development policy. Likewise veteran Ecuador specialist Norman Whitten argued in a recent anthology that the country is a "microcosm of South American conflict and contradiction in its modernity" (2003, 20).

Specifically, Ecuador's experiments with development have often been characteristic of broader regional, and sometimes global, trends. Underdeveloped as a source of primary materials and textiles for Spain until independence the country has experienced several export boom and bust cycles, focused on cacoa (1850-1940), "Panama" hat weaving and trading in the later 1800s, bananas (1950-1970), and more recently petroleum (Kyle 2002; Gauderman 2003; Pineo 1996). The state became an increasingly important player in development policy during the second half of the 20th century, particularly during the military government of Galo Plaza. He was a classic developmentalist leader who pledged to modernize the country through industrial growth, expansion of the state's developmentalist bureaucracy and colonization of the Amazon where the state has waged an "ideological battle" over development for centuries (Colloredo-Mansfeld 1999; 9; Cockcroft 1996, 441; Black 1999). Influenced by dependency theory like much of the region, the country followed an import substitution approach to economic growth during the 1960s and 70s, imposing high tariffs on imported goods and seeking to restrict trade in order to nurture domestic industry. However the discovery of oil in the Amazon in the late 1960s led to another dramatic export-led economic boom, an influx of foreign exchange earnings (which leapt from $43 million in 1971 to $350 million by 1974 – Kyle 2000), and a massive expansion of state borrowing from private banks and IFIs in order to finance public spending. State commitments to education, health care, social security, the military and police, infrastructure and so on grew rapidly in this period, and the state apparatus was considerably strengthened.

This boom came to an abrupt end when oil prices slumped in the 1980s, and new sources of international credit dried up. Ecuador found itself in the classic Latin American situation during the "lost decade" of the 1980s when it was trying to consolidate its recent shift back to democracy – it was massively endebted, experiencing low or negative economic growth, and facing increasing poverty and inequality rates. Thus began the era of attempts to implement economic restructuring, in an effort to restore economic growth, correct imbalances, and ensure development. In the last 20 years trade has been liberalized, prices have been raised, subsidies have been cut, social spending has been drastically reduced, and labor markets have been made more "flexible." In 1999 the country experienced a dramatic fiscal crisis which destroyed 20 banks holding 40% of bank deposits, and as a result poverty increased to 56% of the population (López-Cálix 2003, 4). Migration intensified, and remittances became the second most important source of foreign currency, representing about 10% of GDP in 2000 (North 2004, 203).[lxiii] In response, in January 2000, the President announced that the country would dollarize. He was forced to resign shortly thereafter due to an attempted coup, but dollarization – and the restructuring efforts understood to underpin it - continued. As explained in chapter 4, these efforts remain extremely divisive, and protests against adjustment were a daily part of my fieldwork experience. Indeed Ecuador is an excellent example of a Latin American country deeply affected by internal debates about restructuring, and in which national elites, civil society, and the Bank all play key roles as policy actors.

In addition, Ecuador is an excellent site for research into Bank *gender* policy. The Bank's resident mission in Quito has been an important site for feminist policy entrepreneurship, at a domestic, regional, and international level, and Ecuadorian feminists have been involved in a range of Bank work. For example the Bank has funded national events for women's day, and it has collaborated with domestic feminist institutions (see chapter 5). The institution has also incorporated gender into many concrete loans, some of which I explore in chapters 5-8. Finally, the Bank has put out several important studies and documents on gender in an Ecuadorian context, supported by the regional Latin American and Caribbean Gender Unit run out of D.C. Indeed the Latin American region is regarded as having the most advanced gender unit in the Bank (Hafner-Burton and Pollack 2002, 368). In turn the Bank's office in Ecuador put out one of the most comprehensive gender reviews[lxiv] of all countries in the Latin American and Caribbean region, wherein the country receives specific attention;[lxv] this was highlighted as a best practice example in the *Engendering Development* policy paper.

Finally, Ecuador has long been marked an important country for Bank gender policymakers, since it was the site of Caroline Moser's now well-known research into gender and household coping strategies under structural adjustment. From 1978 to 1988 while an academic at the London School of Economics Moser conducted a pioneering study on household responses to poverty in a low-income housing settlement in Guayaquil. This study was subsequently extended as part of a far larger project on household vulnerability to economic change, funded (in part) by the Bank. The study remains noteworthy within GAD circles for its recognition of the importance of caring labor, its operationalization of the triple role framework, and its concern that paid work responsibilities may overburden women. Thus in some respects Ecuador is the paradigmatic example of a country wherein the exhaustion solution to the social reproduction dilemma has been assumed. Without meaning to attribute an overly-experimental orientation to the country selection process, it does seem methodologically valuable to focus on a country that has to date been notable for helping prove the solution to social reproduction that my project is trying to complicate.

In summary, then, Ecuador a good site for investigating Bank gender policy because it is a good site for research on Bank development lending more generally, and because feminists are active policy entrepreneurs in this resident mission. In turn this dissertation interrogates their efforts across a range of sites, in an attempt to research the Bank as a generator of ideas and of concrete loans, as an institution involved in macroeconomic change and micro-level projects, as a body interested in both export promotion and adolescent sex education. These multiple levels of analysis make for long introductions, but they are required of any rigorous attempt to trace the Bank's answers to the social reproduction problem embedded in its gender lending.

Summary of Findings

In chapter 1 I ask both why and how employment emerged as the central concern of the Bank's Women In/Gender And Development policy. Given that there were a range of potential policy priorities available to the Bank, I ask why this solution was chosen above rivals. I identify three factors as particularly important: 1. the linking of work to growth, efficiency, and productivity, and the associated argument that it represents a market adjustment, an inevitable, natural response to shifting patterns of productivity and profitability that will occur (albeit more slowly) without Bank action. This argument allows the Bank to frame itself as a non-intervenor in the market, or at least as a simple handmaiden of change that would occur more slowly by itself were the market left to freely respond to productive incentives. 2. the framing of work as a "keystone" policy, in which Bank policymakers effectively incorporated previous priorities (notably poverty reduction, education, and fertility reduction) into the work focus and ensured new initiatives (violence prevention) relied on work-related solutions; and 3. the promotion of employment as empowering, hereby connecting neo-liberal growth models with liberal feminist attempts to help poor women. These three factors coalesced to ensure that employment appeared the best policy choice for the institution, fulfilling the requirements of mainstream technocrats interested in efficient development and progressive development activists who use the language of empowerment.

In Chapter 2 I turn to the social reproduction dilemma embedded in this effort to get women into work. Contesting assumptions that the Bank ignores this issue by endorsing a default "exhaustion solution" to the social reproduction problem that over-burdens women, I identify a clear recognition of the existence of a policy dilemma, and the need for concrete interventions to resolve it. Indeed policy entrepreneurs have been remarkably successful in their framing of the social reproduction dilemma as a serious policy issue deserving concrete policy interventions; it is recognized at the highest levels of the institution, in the Bank's most public presentations, as an issue that threatens to undermine the organization's core development goals.

It is to these concrete interventions, and their critique, that I turn in chapter 3. I map out three policies proposed to deal with the social reproduction problem in Bank gender texts: 1. Saving time through restructuring schedules, new technology, and infrastructure, 2. Restructuring heternormativity to encourage a two-partner model of love and labor, wherein women work more and men care better, and 3. Providing state supported maternity leave and childcare. I explain the relative "success" or "failure" of these proposals (defined in terms of their being privileged or prioritized by the institution) through reference to the factors that accounted for success of the work strategy as a solution to the broader WID/GAD problem: the linking of work to productivity, the framing of work as a way to achieve other development goals, and the promotion of work as a common-sensical development "good" that would empower women. "Successful" solutions to the social reproduction dilemma – those that win out in the institution itself - are those that can demonstrate productivity benefits, that are quantifiable, that can be framed as market adjustments, that are tied to many other development desirables already prioritized by the institution, and that appear to empower women. Failed solutions lack these attributes. On this basis, time management and restructuring heteronormativity are endorsed unequivocally by the Bank; state-supported maternity leave and childcare are not. Policymakers find it very difficult to connect childcare to efficiency discourses, given that: 1.childcare policies are inefficient when assessed on standard "cost benefit" measures, and particularly so when compared to privatized solutions, and 2. the Bank has framed the market as leading inexohorably to the decline of communal provision for childcare, and thus the policy is marked as an intervention that goes against market trends. Furthermore communal provision for childbearing and childrearing fails because policymakers are unable to argue that it is empowering – in contrast, interventions are marked as disempowering to women. This is in part because empowerment has been framed as male inclusion, and in part because policymakers are concerned employers will fire women if childcare is provided, hereby undermining their opportunities to secure liberation through employment.

Having recognized the existence of these policy solutions and explained why the Bank prefers some over others, I also critique the approach taken by the institution, arguing that the solutions endorsed are profoundly troubling. I question the privileging of infrastructural development and technological interventions given their connection to the Bank's ideological and material investment in modernization approaches, and I ask why these assumptions of communal responsibility for social reproduction are acceptable, when so many others are not. In essence the time saving policies promise another quick technological development fix that threatens to further increase debt burdens and unpaid labor responsibilities. The option ultimately re-endorses the very models of standard neo-liberal economics critiqued by the Bank's own staff, and it rests on a profoundly inconsistent treatment of productivity which attempts to recognize the economic importance of some forms of unpaid caring labor, but not too much.

Meanwhile the attempt to restructure normative partnerships locates the key cause of "the gender problem" in the household, ignoring supra-household concerns. It rests on and reinforces the Bank's definition of good gender analysis as requiring complimentary notions of sharing, balanced partnership, a profoundly heteronormative and privatizing conceptualization of the gender issue which leads, seemingly inexorably, to privatizing policy solutions fixated on micro-adjustments in loving partnerships. Yet simultaneously the solution is unable to resolve the tension between the Bank's inconsistent framing of households as units of competitive individualism and of altruistic love, as sites for self-interested bargaining and for the expression of sharing, selfless care. This results in a refusal to acknowledge the conflicts that are likely to stem from the proposed policy interventions, and in a framing of sharing couplehood as empowerment, leading to a tension-ridden definition of empowerment as "autonomy with necessary attachment." The effort to (re)privatize responsibility for social reproduction by adjusting the way in which love is expressed in the family also rests on pathological portrayals of poor men. They are understood to be relentlessly more irresponsible, drunken, violent, and oppressive than their richer brothers, and they are offered liberation through compulsory domestication, through coercive attempts to force them into caring behavior by tying them to families in order that can pick up the slack created by women's shift to paid employment.

I devote the remainder of the dissertation to exploring the social reproduction problem as it is resolved by the Bank's gender policymakers in Ecuador. In chapter 4 I explore the Bank's overall diagnosis of the "development problem" with which the country is afflicted, and I argue that neo-liberal restructuring attempts should be seen, at least in part, as Bank policy. Domestic political and business elites have embraced neo-liberal reform, welcoming enrichment opportunities granted through trade liberalization and export promotion. However the restructuring policies enacted in this country also reflect the interests and desires of the IFIs to which the state is indebted, and the Bank has a key role in this respect. I thus assess the argument – made repeatedly by the institution's Ecuador office - that reforms reflect state and country consensus. In contrast

I note that the Bank recognizes, repeatedly, that a lack of such consensus exists in Ecuador, both politically and socially. The Bank recommends dual "stick and carrot" strategies to resolve this outstanding problem of lack of support for reform: 1. increased conditionality and tighter Bank control of government action, and 2.increased engagement and "partnership" with civil society to build consensus. This engagement is of a particularly limited type; the Bank understands that it needs to disperse knowledge about the beneficial impacts of restructuring in order to remedy common misunderstandings that lead to misguided protest, and it wishes to draw civil society actors into restructuring efforts as service providers. In this way civil society actors will be demobilized as protest agents.

Having thus justified my decision to analyze Bank loans in Ecuador as Bank policy output rather than as reflecting state preference alone or social consensus more broadly, I examine its current GAD efforts in chapter 5, using interviews and Ecuador-based policy texts on gender. I sketch out the institutional location of Bank GAD policy entrepreneurs, tracing their complex and sometimes contradictory relations with Bank, state, and civil society actors. They are positioned as neither insiders nor outsiders, occupying a liminal space that renders their activities marginal and institutionally vulnerable. Policymakers respond to this situation by making a distinction between themselves and the "economists;" this is crucial to their vision of themselves as insider-outsiders, working on feminist projects rather than standard Bank projects, contributing to gender equality rather than the national debt. That said, however, they are also heavily conscious of and reflexive about the institutional constraints within which they operate. Two constraints were identified by several interviewees as particularly prominent: 1. the pressure to frame gender policy using appeals to productivity, rigor, and quantifiable efficiency, and 2. the pressure to frame gender policy as involving complementarity, sharing partnership, and inclusion of men. I thus argue that although liberal feminist GAD discourse may be broadly influenced by notions of equity as balance, the emphasis on male inclusion and appeals to partnership is very much a Bank-specific one. Once more, getting women into paid employment was a clear priority for the gender consultants and staff associated with the Bank in Ecuador, again because this initiative was seen to increase efficiency, include men, and empower women. Once more, however, I found that gender policymakers were concerned about the social reproduction dilemma, and they proposed concrete solutions designed to resolve it – specifically a focus on technological/infrastructural improvement to save time, and an attempt to restructure intimate relations within the family by getting women into work and ensuring men love better. These two policies succeeded because they were framed as adding to productivity and efficiency, as already-already market-driven, and as empowering to both men and women. Childcare provision, which lacks these framings, failed to secure unambiguous support. I again see cause for concern at the dominance of these two successful solutions to the social reproduction problem, particularly the latter in which poor men are held them responsible for a range of development outcomes caused by other factors.

In chapter 6 I turn to policy-based lending, focusing on export promotion in general, and the flower industry in particular. I explain export-promotion as a Bank priority in the country, and I explore the interactions between the state, the Bank, and the private sector in the policy field. I assert that although the state and exporting companies are important actors in this policy field, the Bank has a key role in shaping the loan priorities and structuring interactions between other participants, rendering it legitimate – and I argue necessary – to analyze these actions as in part Bank policies. Indeed these loans intentionally restructure forms of access to political influence in Ecuador, reducing the role of the state and increasing the influence of the Bank and the private sector in an attempt to secure a "neutral" policy environment that permits "stakeholder" participation.

Although these loans seem to be gender neutral, and are usually analyzed as such, I demonstrate a clear awareness within the Bank that export-promotion is connected to gender concerns, primarily through its effects in increasing female labor force participation. Gender policy entrepreneurs within the institution thus support export promotion as a result of their own aim to get women into work. I consider this interaction between export promotion and gender concerns in greater detail through a focus on floriculture, an industry with a significant proportion of female employees and on which gender staff in Ecuador have conducted research. Although work in flowers is seen to boost economic growth, reduce poverty, and empower women, once again policymakers recognize the importance of unpaid work and the dangers of overburdening women through the "exhaustion solution" to social reproduction. However crucially the Bank's gender staff argue that social reproduction tensions have been successfully resolved in floriculture, since men have taken on extra domestic labor. The industry thus becomes the shining example of women's empowerment, and of the successful implementation of the Bank's preferred policy solution to the social reproduction problem: getting men to love better, and to turn that love into extra unpaid work in the family. In promoting this solution once more the Bank ignores childcare provision, the policy solution that the floriculture industry itself says is important, and the inadequacies of which women employed in it highlight as important.

Again, I argue that this treatment of the social reproduction problem is dangerous. In essence the institution concentrates attention on shifts in minutes of time use within the home, and it fails to collect data on which workers have access to childcare facilities, hereby leading to a wasted opportunity to demand more concrete policy reform. The social reproduction dilemma is resolved here because it is reprivatized onto the backs of men and women who are framed as hereby liberated, leaving the pathologies of neo-liberal macroeconomic policy untouched. The solution reinforces a privatizing, heteronormative definition of gender analysis as focused on including men and sharing partnerships, a definition which can not conceive of conflict within the family. Women are once more framed as ultra-responsible and altruistic with the money they earn, and as inevitably connected to normative families; the autonomy on offer to them is one that relies on, and reproduces, their always-already commitment to male partners. In turn poor men are understood as irresponsible and lazy, displaying classed and racialized pathologies such as alcoholism, domestic violence, irresponsibility, poor fathering practices, and infidelity. Indeed, despite evidence to the contrary, the Bank argues that men's greater involvement in domestic work reflects the progressive effects of secularism, urbanization, and better education, linking the emergence of better loving couples to a bundle of modernization narratives that again end up pathologizing poor, rural people.

In chapters 7 and 8 I present a case study of the Bank's attempt to resolve the social reproduction problem through gender and development efforts as they relate to project-based lending in Ecuador, attempting to trace the Bank's gender lending all the way down by considering a social development loan with very grounded, tangible effects. I focus on the PRODEPINE loan for indigenous and afro-Ecuadorian rural development, a prominent initiative held up as a good practices example of "ethnodevelopment" and gender mainstreaming within Ecuador and the region more generally. I argue that the Bank is a key actor in this loan, particularly given the weakness of the state. I thus consider the gender activities enacted by PRODEPINE to be primarily Bank activities. Once more, these activities were focused on getting women into work, and once again employment was framed as important to increase productivity, reduce poverty, and empower women, although loan staff also argued that women's increased labor force participation was a market-driven inevitability to which PRODEPINE was merely responding. In addition, in this policy site Bank policymakers claimed that communities demanded employment projects. I found mixed evidence on this issue, although it was abundantly clear that PRODEPINE staff had a far more active role in promoting employment initiatives than was recognized (or admitted) in written documents.

Again, however, the Bank's gender policymakers are aware of the social reproduction tension that emerges as a result of this prioritization of employment, and once more they propose concrete solutions to resolve it: infrastructural improvement to ensure better time management, and, most prominently, restructuring partnerships between couples to ensure that men love better and women act with (limited) rationality in the marketplace. Indigenous and Afro-Ecuadorian rural women were understood to need socializing into a culture of savings, and a market mentality, in order that their incorporation into productive activity succeeded as an empowerment strategy, and

PRODEPINE intervened persistently to ensure this socialization. Meanwhile men needed to be taught caring skills, and to be forcibly tied to families, in order that they would pick up the slack of social reproduction as their wives moved into productive activity.

PRODEPINE's attempt to resolve the social reproduction dilemma by restructuring heteronormativity also relied on and (re)produced claims that some ethnic groups are more complimentary and equal in their gender relations than others, and the project invoked a distinct racialized hierarchy in this respect, resting on the extent to which communities approximated ideals of sharing monogamous partnership. Thus Andean groups were praised for their harmonious gender relations, Amazonian communities were considered highly oppressive because men are polygamous, and Afro-Ecuadorian men were criticized repeatedly for their sexual promiscuity and serial monogamy. This focus on ethnically marginalized poor men's sexual degeneration was present alongside more familiar concerns with their alcoholism, violence, laziness, profligate spending, and pathological irresponsibility. Again, childcare dropped out of consideration and was erased as a policy priority, even when raised by the communities at issue, since it was not understood as empowering, nor was it linked to broader concerns about productivity or efficiency.

In the concluding chapter I consider firstly how these findings relate to debates in feminist political economy, the scholarly arena to which the dissertation is ultimately most indebted. In specific terms, I wanted to know if the Bank had addressed the social reproduction problem (it has), if it had generated answers (it has – investment in technology and infrastructure to save time and, most prominently, restructuring loving partnerships between men and women), why it generated those answers (because they are seen as efficient and empowering), and whether those answers were the right ones (they are not). I focused on social reproduction concerns because they are, for feminist development scholars, some of the most pressing policy issues of the present moment, and because I believed the Bank's answers deserved explanation and critique. Although I do not argue that feminists erred in criticizing the Bank for overburdening women through the exhaustion solution during the early years of structural adjustment, I do claim that the Bank has now developed other responses; a limited concentration on the exhaustion solution is thus ungenerous to those policymakers inside the institution who have fought for such alternatives, and unhelpful to those critics who need to assess Bank interventions in all their contemporary complexity. I have attempted to contribute in particular to the latter imperative, arguing that the Bank's preference for better time management and restructured heteronormativity raises multiple concerns for development scholars, ones I summarize in the closing section. I also consider why contestation of the reprivatizing solution is currently lacking within feminist circles, and I suggest that it demonstrates the need to incorporate insights from masculinity and sexuality studies into feminist political economy.

However in the course of resolving a research puzzle focused on feminist political economy I also generated findings of relevance to other political science conversations, and I address some of those in the closing discussion. Specifically I draw attention to the implications of the findings for analysis of the Bank itself, for institutionalist discussions about policy development, and for debates about the role of the state and international financial institutions in contemporary restructuring efforts. I reiterate the value of Bank-focused research that recognizes the multifaceted, fluid nature of the institution, particularly in a post-1995 context, and I suggest that the intersection between empowerment and efficiency will become increasingly important as a site for new policy solutions in the institution in this context. My findings also suggest that in many cases the Bank's point is not "proved" with the neo-classical analysis employed by policymakers. The institution's own data disrupts its claims that human capital differences explain wage gaps, that income correlates with rights, that work empowers, that unemployed men are more violent than working men and so on. Pointing this out is important if the Bank's research role is to be properly understood and critiqued.

Secondly, my findings relate to debates within institutionalism regarding the influence that institutional context has on policy framings, and the ways in which policy entrepreneurs attempt to negotiate complex insider-outsider spaces to secure support for their initiatives. The choices made by these policy actors are explained by institutional factors. The model that explains why the Bank endorsed employment priorities within GAD policy also explained why it endorsed technology, infrastructure and restructured heteronormativity, and why it did not endorse childcare. In this sense the results confirm the importance of assessing institutional constraints on policy output.

Thirdly, the Ecuador-based research findings relate to broader debates within international political economy concerning the role of IFIs and states in restructuring. While I demonstrate that domestic political and economic elites support key elements of the restructuring agenda, I also argue that the Bank is a crucial policy actor in neo-liberal reform efforts in Ecuador; these efforts do not reflect social consensus and they are often not government-led, despite the Bank's claims to the contrary. Moreover, the Bank not only acts a policy actor in this country; it acts to undermine democracy in order to secure the passage of neo-liberal reform, suggesting the need to fundamentally recast conversations that frame restructuring as a normatively neutral or positive endeavor. Of course, I do not argue that these findings provide a model for all Bank-state interactions, given that some states are far stronger, and that there are crucial regional differences in how neo-liberal restructuring has been implemented and received, but perhaps Ecuador's experience is not unrepresentative of some countries wherein the state is weak and neo-liberal reform is highly contentious. In this case, the Bank made that situation worse, and its damaging impact speaks directly to the on-going political science debate about the relationship between restructuring and democracy.

Finally, I consider the possibilities of contesting the solutions to the social reproduction problem currently being promoted in the Bank. I give some tentative suggestions for potential strategies which may help create space in the institution for critique of existing policy, and for development of better alternatives. This focus on improving policy options within the Bank seems an apt one with which to close, given that the research project attempted to forge a critique of existing policy that remained attentive to the institutional constraints within which gender policymakers work. In this way it contributes to a range of other academic debates, but it was always primarily concerned with the social reproduction research puzzle, and with trying to ensure that the Bank had the right answers. Given that it does not, it seems appropriate to consider how feminists can help stop the damage being caused by the wrong answers currently in place, and create space within which to push for alternatives.

[i] See Payer 1982; Caulfield 1996; Danaher 1994; George and Sabelli 1994. The other three agencies are newer components of the Bank's activities – the International Finance Corporation was created in 1956 to invest in and help finance private sector projects in developing countries where access to capital is considered lacking; the MIGA (set up in 1988) helps encourage foreign direct investment in developing countries by advising countries on how to attract it and by providing loss-protection guarantees to investors. The International Centre for the Settlement of Investment Disputes (created in 1966) also helps encourage FDI, by aiding in conciliation and arbitration of investment disputes between governments and private foreign investors.

[ii] The Bank's Articles of Agreement dictate that five of the 24 executive directors represent the member countries having the largest number of shares in the institution - the US, with 16.4% of the votes, Japan with 7.9%, Germany with 4.5%, and the UK and France with 4.3% each. The Bank's "about us" webpage claims that "the number of shares a country has is based roughly on the size of its economy" – actually it is based on the contribution to the Bank as shareholders, which is very different. The other 19 Executive Directors represent several countries – governments elect them for a two year term.
http://web.worldbank.org/WBSITE/EXTERNAL/EXTABOUTUS/0,,contentMDK:20040558~menuPK:34559~pagePK:34542~piPK:36600,00.html?

[iii] World Bank "About Us" website:
http://web.worldbank.org/WBSITE/EXTERNAL/EXTABOUTUS/0,,contentMDK:20040558~menuPK:34559~pagePK:34542~piPK:36600,00.html?

[iv] www.whirledbank.org

[v] Indeed the Bank's webpage on biographies of Bank presidents simply skips the years 1949 to 1968.
http://web.worldbank.org/WBSITE/EXTERNAL/EXTABOUTUS/ORGANIZATION/PRESIDENTEXTERNAL/0,,contentMDK:20083965~menuPK:232070~pagePK:139877~piPK:199692~theSitePK:227585,00.html

[vi] Caulfield 1996; Sparr 1994; Baaker 1994; Teichman 2004; Stiglitz 1999

[vii] This is denied by the Bank, which insists that it never asked countries to cut social spending during structural adjustment. As one gender text argues, "It is important to note that the World Bank has never made an adjustment loan conditional on the reduction of social expenditures. In fact, the Bank has begun to make maintaining or increasing social expenditures a condition of adjustment loans" (World Bank 1996b, 5; see also 1997a, 19). In this way the Bank is seen to protect social spending. This framing is simply laughable to critics of the institution, who point to Bank policies to charge user fees for education and health, to promote state "divestiture" from higher education spending, health insurance, social security, and childcare, and who question the state's ability to make sovereign policy decisions in the context of strong-arm neo-liberal policies even absent explicit conditionalities – see chapter 4.

[viii] With respect to their role in reform efforts, the Fund focuses on short term stabilization in emergency conditions, while the Bank sees its mandate as helping to restore "balance" and implementing longer-term structural reform in order that economic problems do not reoccur.

[ix] As the Bank advise: "Since active measures have real resource costs, policymakers will need to be selective about which measures to undertake, focusing strategically on where government intervention has the largest social benefits. This implies focusing on areas where market failure and spillover effects are likely to be greatest. This also implies focusing on areas that the private sector is unlikely to take on independently - or to take on well" (World Bank 2001, 23).

[x] http://web.worldbank.org/WBSITE/EXTERNAL/EXTABOUTUS/ORGANIZATION/PRESIDENTEXTERNAL/0,,contentMDK:20083965~menuPK:232070~pagePK:139877~piPK:199692~theSitePK:227585,00.html

[xi] In some respects the hopes of the reformers have been disappointed. The poverty-minded Joseph Stiglitz, hired as the Bank's chief economist by Wolfensohn to broaden the institution's agenda, was "invited to resign" (fired) in 1999 for his public criticism of the institution's neo-liberal development model, and Ravi Kapur, chief architect of the Bank's 2000-1 World Development Report focusing on empowerment and participation, left after Bank authorities insisted the report get toned down (Parpart 2002).

[xii] Indeed the Bank is rather notorious for this expansive mission, with one critic arguing that its organizations "are seeing themselves more and more as a world government" (Deepak Nayyar, quoted in Caulfield 1996, 196). Likewise George and Sabelli argue that in the neo-liberal world order, GATT and the

WTO function as the International Ministry of Trade, the IMF operates as the International Ministry of Finance, leaving "the Bank (as) the prime candidate for the Ministry of Everything Else" (1994, 161).
[xiii] Most analysts trace the emergence with this desire to a series of developments in the 1960s and early 1970s including the increased presence of women involved in decolonization struggles in the UN, growth of second wave feminist movements, the UN's tentative steps towards analyzing women's position, and the filling of "information gaps" (Snyder 1995, 97) related to women's role in development by texts such as Ester Boserup's book *Women and Economic Development* (1970). However, there is little commonality in approach among WID/GAD scholars and activists. Some advocate the inclusion of women in development projects that presently ignore them, while others advocate the design of new, women-only projects to take into account women's special needs. Some want to help women become more productive contributors to the world's economy, while others want that economy to recognize the work women already do. Some blame the failure of development to benefit women on sexist planners and backward traditions, while others blame it on capitalism and racism. See Snyder (1995), Kabeer (1994), and Saunders (2002) for an overview.
[xiv] Murphy 1995, 27; see also World Bank 1990 and 1994; Moser Tornqvist and von Bronkhorst 1999, 6; O'Brien, Goetz, Scholte and Williams 2000.
[xv] This assessment may understate the importance of the Bank's early efforts. Thirty-five case-studies and evaluations of Bank experience were published between 1979 and 1985 in the series "Notes on Women in Development" (Murphy 1995, 31). Although these had a "limited" impact on the Bank, they "played a key role in establishing the principles of gender analysis training used throughout the development community during the 1980s" (31). Other agencies, including the UNDP and USAID, adopted the training models, and the team was ultimately poached by the latter, publishing a manual for USAID "which became a classic in the literature on gender analysis. Typical of the Bank's position during this period, an innovative idea was not sufficiently well-received to be carried to its fullest realization within the Bank, and other agencies picked it up" (31) – but the influence of the Bank-nurtured ideas was crucial.
[xvi] Women In Development (WID) efforts were the original incarnation of feminist development policy in the 1970s, stemming from Boserup's key text on the need to include women in development. WID efforts are often characterized as "add-in" policies that treated women as separate from men, in stand alone projects that were managed through women's units. Gender and Development (GAD) initiatives came later, and as originally articulated by Southern feminists (notably from the critical development group DAWN; see Sen and Grown 1987) they involved a critique of liberal feminist assumptions about the benefits of including women in capitalist development models. Thus a GAD framework implied that development organizations would focus on meeting the basic needs of all people, and on empowering people to confront structural inequities. However the term has now lost much of this meaning, and the difference between WID and GAD varies heavily depending on institutional context. According to official policy reviews, the Bank's shift to GAD was a response to the perceived isolation of WID efforts, and their treatment of women as separate from men (see especially Murphy 1995/1997, and Moser, Tornqvist, and Bronkhorst 1999). I argue in chapter 3 that for the Bank the key distinction appears to be that men are largely absent from WID efforts, while GAD efforts include men and attempt to reframe gender relations to achieve privileged models of normative couplehood – but see Moser 1993 and Kabeer 1994 for a more standard overview of the distinction.
[xvii] Policy papers indicate that a topic "is a legitimate Bank concern, integral to good development planning," and they require a "stock-taking" of available evidence on the issue which in turn requires external consultation and raises the profile of the topic in Bank work (1995, 55). The policy paper also went beyond what Murphy terms "fragments of guidance" for staff on GAD (37), being accompanied by a new Operational Policy and a best practice note which called for integrating gender concerns in Bank work (Murphy 1997, 1). See appendix 1 on text selection for more on this.
[xviii] Resident missions are not full country offices but they establish a Bank's presence in a country – smaller countries usually have them. The Bank has a resident mission for Ecuador in Quito.
[xix] The feminist monitoring organization Women's Eyes on the World Bank criticize a Bank-NGO consultative group on gender for the rarity of its meetings and the Bank's failure to share information with the 14 NGOs who are its members (1997, 3). They claim that the group "represents a public relations exercise rather than a means of serious dialogue on the issues" (4). However, this effort to woo feminists is not something other architects of the global economic order, such as the International Monetary Fund or the World Trade Organization, bother to emulate.

[xx] They also confirm the necessity for scholars of international development policy to get acquainted with GAD work. The fact that the Bank – the largest and most influential development institution in the world – takes gender seriously reflects rather negatively on IPE scholars who do not.

[xxi] See also Goetz 1997, 5; Smith 1997; Pierson 2000; Pierson 2000c; Morone 1998; Skocpol and Fiorina 1999; Bridges 2000, 111; Thelen 2000; Jervis 2000; Fox and Brown 1998.

[xxii] Another dimension of this debate is that the Bank has discovered institutions in recent years, and now espouses a self-consciously institutionalist approach to development (see especially World Bank 2001, and recent publications on the importance of the state in markets discussed below). This recognition of the importance of institutions mirrored a broader shift in the Bank's development approach, reflecting a sense that free markets needed stronger legal and institutional support mechanisms in order to survive, given the disastrous experiences of liberalization in Russia, Brazil, and East Asia. It also confirms Robert Kaufman's (1999) assessment that by the mid 1990s IFIs acknowledged that 1980s efforts had devoted insufficient attention to administrative restructuring, and they responded with a new focus on centralization and the political insulation of macroeconomic policy. Although not the focus of this investigation such attention to institutions certainly supports the legitimacy of looking at the Bank through an institutionalist lens.

[xxiii] For example feminist bureaucrats are referred to as "femocrats" in Australia, in a nice representation of their half-in/half-out status (Eisenstein 1995, 69). Likewise the editors of an influential anthology on feminist organizations argue that the insider/outsider tension is characteristic of feminist politics generally (Ferree and Martin 1995, 8) – essays in this collection identify the "balancing act" it engenders in sites as diverse as the Catholic church, Ms magazine, and the Australian state. As Ferree and Martin put it: "Whether (feminist policy actors) are as uncorrupted by power as they believe matters less than the insights they offer into the tensions of dual loyalties and the practical experience of being both "mandarins" and "missionaries" (Ferree and Martin 1995, 17).

[xxiv] Sometimes these people were not directly employed by the Bank at all – rather they were married to the institution, in a fascinating blurring of the inside/outside boundaries so familiar to feminists scholars of policy change in non-feminist institutions. In 1975 when the Bank first included WID in its annual meeting, in response to the pressure generated by the UN's Mexico City conference, the event was included on the spouses program (Murphy 1995, 32); again in 1980 a WID session was held at the post-Copenhagan annual meeting, for spouses (33). In her assessment of the gradual evolution of managers' support for WID, Murphy notes that "Staff interviewed recall the important role played by managers' wives for whom seminars on WID issues were offered during annual meetings" (34).

[xxv] Indeed progress on the inside and the outside has often gone hand in hand. In the last five years the Bank has appointed its first female managing director, and it has recruited a record number of women to high posts. It has also appointed a Senior Advisor on Gender Equality, made commitments to eradicating sexual harassment (World Bank 1997f, 17), implemented maternity leave policies, established a fund to encourage the use of women as consultants (13), and supported women's networking efforts (18).

[xxvi] Staudt 1985/2002; Goetz 1997; Kabeer and Subrahmanian 2000; Hafner-Burton and Pollack 2002

[xxvii] See Kardam 1991; Miller 1998; Rathgeber 1995; Chowdhry 1995; Hafner-Burton and Pollack 2002

[xxviii] This same pattern was used in the Bank's first policy paper on gender (World Bank 1994), where the "the Payoffs to Investing in Women" were presented before policy measures are suggested. Even the second policy paper – which is far more concerned with "soft" concepts such as participation, empowerment, human welfare, and social development than the Bank's early reports - "proves" that gender inequality exists in its first chapter, and shows that it "hinders development" in the second, before any concrete policy solutions are presented. Likewise a text box entitled "The Gender Policy of the Bank" used productivity to explain how gender policy is justified under the Bank's articles of agreement: "There is no doubt that raising women's productivity would improve key development goals everywhere and directly reduce poverty. Failure to address this aspect of development work could lead to inefficiency, exacerbate inequities between men and women, and threaten the sustainability of development efforts. From the point of view of Bank staff, work on gender is not only permissible under the Articles of Agreement, but also required by the policy framework of the institution" (World Bank 2000d, 2).

[xxix] Again this is not limited to development policymakers. As Mary Katzenstein notes, feminists generally "are often very word conscious, usually out of calculated instrumentality as to what phraseologies will "work"" (1995, 35). Feminist bureaucrats are thus well-known for designing what Eisenstein terms "politically palatable" policy that they can "sell" to their bosses (1995, 76).

[xxx] As Murphy noted in her 1995 evaluation of Bank gender policy, "early attention to WID in project design was the work of a few committed individuals, including several anthropologists and sociologists" (Murphy 1995, 35) – this created a potential problem of outsider status for many GAD staff, and helped

drive the perceived need to frame arguments in quantified terms that the Bank's economists could understand. In this sense preference for quantification also confirms Theodore Porter's analysis of how accountants and engineers found themselves pressured to replace personal judgments with measurements due to their vulnerability to pressure from powerful outsiders (1995, xi). For example the Bank's second WID advisor focused on building a statistical basis for WID demands not because she was professionally strong, but because WID was marginalized inside the Bank and its advocates were suspected of bias; to legitimize GAD as a professional (rather than political) concern she tried to "prove" the need for Bank intervention using "objective" numbers. Similarly there is a massive disjuncture between the lengths to which gender policy entrepreneurs have to go to get a policy into the mainstream versus more standard claims that can often appear completely data-less. While feminists are trying to prove that rape has productivity costs the Bank state that "countries that have implemented reforms early on, carried them out consistently, and received adequate financial support have generally enjoyed faster and stronger economic growth than countries that have undertaken reforms too slowly, intermittently, or not at all" - this claim is supported by no evidence. If, as Anne Marie Goetz notes, "the politics of personal bureaucratic survival dictate that the political project of the GAD agenda be underplayed, as this is seen as an unprofessional, non-technical personal bias" (1998, 54), they also dictate that the GAD agenda be countable, at least in the Bank. As Porter summarizes, then, "quantification lends authority to officials who have very little of their own" (Porter 1995, 8), and in this case it arguably reflects weakness, insecurity, and vulnerability rather than institutional strength.

[xxxi] see also Saunders 2002; 25; Spalter-Roth and Schreiber 1995, 105; Kardam 1991; Rathgeber 1995; Miller and Razavi 1998.

[xxxii] Goetz 1998; Waring 1988; Wood 2003; Chowdhry 1995, Spivak 1996

[xxxiii] see also Mohanty 1991; Spivak 1985/1996/1999; Narayan 1997

[xxxiv] See for example the Bank staff interviewed by National Public Radio, April 16th 2000, 8pm.

[xxxv] For example, distinctions between work and non-work are central to political economy and they stem, in part, from Adam Smith's attempt to delimit boundaries between use and exchange value. The key distinction here is that productive labor adds value to an item, while unproductive labor does not. On this basis the labor of a servant, bishop, king, soldier, lawyer, and opera singer is unproductive while the labor of a manufacturer is productive, and diamonds are expensive while water is cheap – indeed items with the greatest use value often have the low exchange value precisely because little is added to them by human effort. This distinction was maintained, although reframed, by Marx, who also understood nature as furnishing the material for human labor to turn into wealth. He too made a distinction between use and exchange value, and between productive and unproductive labor, based on whether or not the product was turned into a commodity. Discussions of social reproduction relate directly to this distinction between productive and unproductive labor, work and non-work, use and exchange value.

[xxxvi] Perkins-Gilman 1966, Woolf 1938, Waring 1988; Folbre 1994; Elson 1996/2000; Gibson-Graham 1996; Peterson 2002.

[xxxvii] Political theorists have also addressed this question of the inevitability of human dependency, focusing particularly on how liberalism assumes radical masculine autonomy. As Wendy Brown puts it: "The autonomous subject of liberalism requires a large (female) population of nonautonomous subjects, a population that generates, tends, and avows the bonds, relations, dependencies and connections that nourish human life...If liberal autonomy were universalized, the supports upon which it rests would dissolve" (1995, 157-8). However given that this dissertation focuses on international political economy I concentrate more on the debate as interpreted by scholars in that field.

[xxxviii] Note that Moser separates productive and reproductive work, while Waring considers reproductive work to be productive, and mocks the fact that under the UNSNA a woman giving birth is not seen to be producing anything. Elizabeth Prügl makes a similar critique of Spike Peterson's recent sketch of the "reproductive, productive, and virtual" economy, claiming that the separation of reproductive from productive activities perpetuates masculinist visions and should be abandoned (Prügl 2002 and Peterson 2002). There is an extensive literature on this debate in feminist political economy; see Cook and Roberts (2000) and Peterson and Lewis (1999) for an introduction.

[xxxix] Sparr 1994, Brodie 1994; Elson 1996; Beneria and Feldman 1992; Baaker 1994; Haney and Pollard 2003; Talcott 2003.

[xl] This raises interesting questions regarding the "gendered" nature of social reproduction responsibility. Feminist analyses of structural adjustment have long shown that mothers can shift burdens onto daughters by taking them out of school (Moser 1993) and that rich women can buy their way out of domestic labor responsibilities, employing poor women (and sometimes poor men, particularly very young and very old

men), to fulfill household maintenance responsibilities. This division of labor is as much reflective of class, race, and age hierarchies as gender ones, a complexity I seek to explore in chapter three re: the Bank's attempt to get poor men (pathologized as lazy and unloving) to pick up the slack of social reproduction.
[xli] see also Moser 1993; Brodie 1994; Waring 1999; Wood 2003
[xlii] Escobar is not alone in his account of the "cultural productivity" of political economy (1995, 51); other studies in this tradition include James Ferguson's research on how Bank development efforts in Lesotho fail in their own terms yet work to aid state expansion and bureaucratic entrenchment (1994); Timothy Mitchell's work on expertise in Egyptian development (2002), Magdelena Villarreal's exploration of how women targeted in a state bee keeping initiative in Mexico reframed themselves as progressive entrepreneurs (1996); Gibson-Graham's (1996) discussion of how hegemonic definitions of "the economy" work to produce certain economic effects and constrain our ability to suggest alternatives; and David Williams' article on the way in which Bank policies (re)produce the capitalist subjectivities they assume, while maintaining their universal naturalness (1999).
[xliii] See also Marchand and Parpart 1995; Crush 1995; Apffel-Marglin and Marglin 1996. Gibson-Graham's work is an important exception. Using the notion of a rape script Gibson-Graham discuss how globalization is framed as penetrating non-capitalist economic forms, and they ask "how might we get globalization to lose its erection?" (1996, 126), but their comments are focused more on sexualized rhetorics than on the productive power of development agencies to shape normative arrangements of gender and sexuality on the ground. See Moser 1993; Kabeer 1994; and Sparr 1994 for evidence of erasure of sexuality in GAD work. It is repeated outside academia; the activist organization Women's Eyes on the World Bank, for example, insists that the Bank address "multiple marginalities" based on sex, race, class and ethnicity (1997, 1); it does not mention sexuality. Bureaucratic hostility to feminist policy advocacy also frequently takes the form of lesbian-baiting, a common response to WID/GAD in the development field - see Rosenbloom (1996) and Rothschild (2000) for an extended discussion of how lesbian baiting is used to undermine WID/GAD initiatives. My efforts to raise sexuality issues with delegates at the Association of Women in Development conference in November 1999 were met with hostility from feminists; panel participants refused to answer questions about the sexuality debates at Cairo, and they refused to allow non-heterosexual questioning of the term "sexuality". One activist informed me lesbians needed to fight for their own rights and stop expecting "women" to do it for them. At the closing session of the conference we were given a song to sing by a North American White feminist who is a lesbian. It is from an album celebrating that identity, and that song specifically is about the beauty of loving women, and of lesbians being "whole" people. However we were told it was a song celebrating women, by a North American White Feminist; the omission of non-normative sexuality was telling. Interestingly Bank staff were far happier to answer questions about sexuality. According to staff in the gender and equity field there are no "out" lesbians in the Bank's senior staff (notes from Association of Women in Development Conference, November 1999), but I discussed sexuality concerns with Bank staff at the AWID forum in 1999 and all were perfectly comfortable with the extension of the term to include non-normative populations. Gender staff in the institution are also proud of the Bank's domestic partnership provisions, and the institution was characterized as tolerant of gay male employees, at least in D.C.
[xliv] Hence my use of the heteronormativity concept in a feminist project that is not focused on sex, lesbianism, or "mess and goo" (Binnie 1997, 228). It has been suggested to me that I am actually doing an analysis of shifting gender norms, but one can only see the shift from a breadwinner housewife model of the nuclear family to a two earner/two lover model as about only gender and not sexuality if one naturalizes and universalizes 1. heterosexuality 2. monogamous lifelong coupling among heterosexuals, 3. love, romance, and intimacy as the partnering principle among lifelong heterosexual couples, and 4. privatized provision of social reproductive labor among loving, monogamous, lifelong partnered heterosexuals. None of these arrangements is in fact "natural" in the sense of being apolitical, universal, always-already pre-discursive, or outside of social construction. However for those resistant to the first denaturalizing move (perhaps most of the political science field), one can in logically-consistent principle believe that heterosexuality (broadly conceived) is universal but still use the concept of heteronormativity to explore ways in which normative arrangements of straightness vary across time, place, and so on – as anthropologists interested in kinship structure and historians interested in changing family formation have done for decades. This principle does not (or should not) hold in a feminist context; for a feminist audience one can easily argue that resistance to denaturalizing heterosexuality is embedded in what Butler (1990) has called a functionalist frame whereby gender relies for its coherence and stability on a heterosexual (or

heteronormative) matrix of intelligibility (see also Delphy 2000; Wittig 2000; Guillaumin 2000). But one does not necessarily need to be ready to dismantle dichotomous sex/gender models to benefit from the insights of heteronormativity as an analytic concept – although it helps.

[xlv] I am not sure that the term "outside" captures the complexity of the dynamic at work here, however, for two reasons. Firstly, it is questionable whether anyone can be fully "outside" of such a powerful, taken-for-granted system of power, especially given that gender is unintelligible outside a heteronormative frame. As Butler put it: "whether "before" the law as a multiplicitous sexuality or "outside" the law as an unnatural transgression, those positionings are invariably "inside" a discourse which produces sexuality and then conceals that production through a configuring of a courageous and rebellious sexuality "outside" of the text itself" (Butler 1990, 98). Secondly, one must be careful not to deny the privilege that is still accorded to many of these non-normative straight bodies by other actors (poor women's motherhood may be demonized by the welfare office and media, but it may receive in-community validation and support in a way that lesbian existence may not). That said, however, Cohen's insistence on the need to question the totalizing gestures of White queer theory by pointing to such demonized heterosexual bodies is vital.

[xlvi] Terry 1999; Wittig 2000; Delphy 20000, Guillaumin 2000, Hawkesworth 1997; Warner 1993; Berlant 1997

[xlvii] Feminists are themselves implicated in this error, particularly through replicating the "sex as biological, gender as cultural" trope still being taught in many women's studies classrooms in the US, or by engaging in what Oyeronke Oyewumi terms "gender attribution on a global scale," "even in cultures that originally eschewed gender in their conceptual framework" (1997, 1055).

[xlviii] See also Carabine 1996/2000; Berlant 1997; Puri 1999; Warner 1993; Haney and Pollard 2003.

[xlix] Cooper also notes that state action generated dissent and active resistance, producing struggle in addition to consent, and her work serves as a model for non-deterministic, anti-functionalist approaches to sexuality and social policy.

[l] Several observers argue that non-normative sexuality is scape-goated for the effects of globalization and the decline of the nation it engenders. Prostitutes, lesbians, and gay men were thus criminalized in the adjusting Bahamas, while in Venezuela single mothers have come under attack from a state trying to revalorize women's nurturing role in the heteronormative family (Dalla Costa 1995, 109). Meanwhile in Zimbabwe the crisis of adjustment has intensified repression of the domestic gay and lesbian community. However, although Alexander argues that when economic reform weakens state power it often leads to a state legitimation crisis that is made played out on the site of sexuality (1994, 7), she does not argue that structural adjustment and the institutions that implemented it "created" homophobia or heterosexism. These discourses have their own, more internal, trajectories which are often unrelated to economics. In the case of the Bahamas, for example, the ideal of heterosexuality expressed in the nuclear family was a colonial import, related more to racist denigration of "native" sexuality than to the requirements of production. She also points to the role of heteronormativity in discourses of Black nationalism, wherein women's role as citizens is to reproduce for the motherland (1994, 6). This heterosexual imperative of citizenship can not be reduced to its economic functionality; it has its own history, and its own interactions with race, gender, and class dynamics. Discourses of heteronormativity – themselves in flux - are therefore not *produced* by economic restructuring; rather the two complex sites interact with each other, in ever-more complex ways (Gibson-Graham 1996, 27). THIS is the insight I wish to develop, rather than the (admittedly interesting) one of scapegoated minorities.

[li] See also Williams 1999, Gibson-Graham 1996, Shore and Wright 1997; Ferguson 1994, Crush 1995; Schram 1995.

[lii] One of the reasons James Ferguson's account of Bank lending in Lesotho remains so compelling is that it links analysis of the Bank's policy literature at the D.C. and country level to project lending in this way. Likewise, in one of the best critical studies on the Bank in recent years, Susan George and Fabrizio Sabelli argue, "In the social science community today, the sport of Bank bashing is mostly considered passé and vulgar, the academic equivalent of mud-wrestling . . . There is no need to 'bash' an institution *whose own documents and practice* do the job so thoroughly in the scholar's stead" (George and Sabelli 1994, 3 emphasis added). Not only do they manage to craft a devastating critique of Bank lending as based on blind faith in the market while remaining generously spirited in their recognition that Bank staff are often motivated by genuine concern for poverty, but they also pay attention to "documents and practice" – to policy texts and concrete money; this is one of the reasons their study is so powerful.

[liii] Protesters in India and Nepal have directed considerable attention to project-based loans for dam construction, for example (Fox and Brown 1998, 3), and many feminist critiques of the Bank focus on lending in population, health and

nutrition projects. Similarly academic critique of the Bank often focuses on project-based loans; see Ferguson (1994); Escobar (1995), Williams (1999) and Caulfield (1996).

[liv] Measuring collective protest in four countries between 1989 and 1994, they found widely varying levels and repertoires of protest in countries undergoing similar "turbulent political transformation and...comprehensive economic adjustment programs involving a substantial level of disruption and social cost" (Ekiert and Kubik 1998, 553). Moreover, those hardest hit by market reforms (the unemployed or homeless, for example) were often absent from protests (558). Given that there was no correlation between the type of economic reforms undertaken and the magnitude of protest evident, in explaining collective action they point to the importance of cultural and historical factors such as "'traditions' of contentious action", and the resources available to protest groups.

[lv] For example Haggard and Kaufman (1995) differentiate between the actions taken by new democratic regimes that took over from authoritarian governments during crisis, and those that took office in pacted, non-crisis transitions. In non-crisis-induced transitions, authoritarian governments had already undertaken economic reforms and built a coalition of beneficiaries, but it was difficult to sustain them. However, in crisis-induced transitions (such as Argentina, Brazil, Bolivia and Peru) new democracies had incentives for new policy, but implementation was hard and they faced severe distributive demands for short-term relief (153). As a result, many new democratic governments in Latin America pursued "unsustainable" economic policies, and reform was partial. Although Kubik and Ekiert (1998, 58) did not find that modes of regime breakdown explained protest in the East European cases on which they focused, Latin American evidence appears to point to this as an important factor.

[lvi] Indeed one must take seriously the Bank's objection that it is often unfairly held responsible for policy failings caused by states – this is the essence of the institution's rather defensive answer to the FAQ of why it is the target of so much international criticism: "critics have tried to blame the Bank for any number of perceived problems associated with globalization. Of course the Bank isn't perfect, but it also isn't to blame for all the shortcomings in the world." http://web.worldbank.org/WBSITE/EXTERNAL/EXTSITETOOLS/0,,contentMDK:20147466~menuPK:344189~pagePK:98400~piPK:98424~theSitePK:95474,00.html#role I concur, and thus I am concerned to explore the role of the state in the policy debates to which I devote attention.

[lvii] Hunter and Brown open a recent article on the Bank's Latin American lending in Comparative Politics with the line "do international financial institutions significantly affect the development strategies their borrowers pursue or do domestic forces prevail over IFI influence" (2000, 113). This framing of the question appears to rule out an answer of "both, sometimes."

[lviii] see particularly Stigltiz's approach, summarized in a review on the Bank in 1999, and the Bank's recent document on aid effectiveness prepared in part for the 2002 Monterey conference on development (World Bank 2002).

[lix] Brown and Hunter 2000, Shafer 1994, Haggard and Kaufman 1995, Kahler 1992; Teichman 2004

[lx] Bank's basic data on Ecuador website (www.worldbank.org/ec)

[lxi] See chapter 7 for more on the complexities of counting ethnic categories in Ecuador.

[lxii] Without meaning to complicate matters unnecessarily, one can make an interesting case that the Bank gives money to many entities that are not technically considered "borrowers" given that much Bank money never leaves the Rich World, but is instead transferred straight from D.C. to consultants, companies, and development specialists who implement the projects for which the Global South is economically liable. Indeed when searching for "entities to which the Bank gives money" one's case selection need not necessary focus on the Global South at all.

[lxiii] Some estimates suggest 25% of the country's total population has emigrated in the last two decades, most frequently to Spain, Italy and the US (North 2004, 203). By the early 1990s Ecuadorians were the largest migrant group in New York City 1990s (Colloredo-Mansfeld 1999, 11), which was then Ecuador's third largest city by population (Weismantel 2003, 331). In 1992 President Sixto Duan-Ballen proclaimed a July holiday "The Day of the Absent Ecuadorian," in recognition of emigrants (Kyle 2000), and citizenship rules have been changed to allow them to vote.

[lxiv] In its latest (2001) policy paper on gender, the Bank recommended that all countries attach a gender component to their country assessment strategies (which are designed to give an overview of the development problems to which Bank lending should be directed). This component can either be a section of the country strategy report itself, or a separate and more elaborate document. Few countries have to date met this goal.

[lxv] Compare this to the 1998 gender report on Argentina, Uruguay and Chile in which all three countries are covered together.

Chapter 1: Tracing the World Bank's Efforts to Get Women into Work.

Introduction.

By the mid 1990s, women's lack of participation in the formal labor market had been defined as *the* overarching problem in the Bank's gender literature. In the current context, the need for gender policy is now justified through reference to work, examples of success and failure focus on work, interventions are evaluated in terms of their impact on work, and employment is considered such a "familiar marker of gender equality" (World Bank 2001, 35) that it can be used as a measure of such in the Bank's most recent policy paper on gender, as evidence that women have gained rights. In this chapter I chart the prioritization of employment by analyzing formally-cleared Bank texts on gender produced between 1979 and 2001, to assess both why and how work emerged as the central concern of the institution's WID/GAD staff. Given that there were a range of potential policy priorities available to the Bank, I ask why the employment solution was chosen above rivals. I identify three factors as particularly important: 1. the linking of work to growth, efficiency, and productivity, and the associated framing of employment as "not really a policy" whereby the Bank denies its own role as an intervenor in the market 2. the framing of work as a way to achieve other development goals, whereby policymakers incorporated previous priorities (poverty reduction, education, and fertility reduction) into the work focus and ensured new initiatives (violence prevention) relied on work-related solutions; and 3. the promotion of employment as empowering. These factors coalesced to ensure that employment appeared the best policy choice for the institution, fulfilling the requirements of mainstream technocrats interested in efficient development and progressive staff who use the language of empowerment. Employment subsequently emerged as a key signifier of GAD policy success, a commonsensical development "good" even when the evidence was messy or inconvenient, and even when work was no longer connected to other goals such as reduced poverty or lower fertility.

An Overview of the Prioritization of Employment.

In 1979 the Bank published *Recognizing the Invisible Woman in Development: The World Bank's Experience*, its first booklet assessing the impact Bank projects have on women. Prefaced by then-President Robert McNamara, this aimed to illustrate "some of the approaches the Bank has adopted to improve opportunities for women to participate in development" (McNamara in World Bank 1979a, iii). Women's need to get into employment was certainly important in this document, in its own right and as an intervention linked to other development objectives. For example, the Bank justified efforts to improve the health and education of mothers on the grounds that they improved the "quality of the future labor force." Drawing on the framing of the WID problem used by pioneers such as Ester Boserup, the report also argued that women were pushed out of jobs by men as modernization advanced, and that they were denied access to opportunities in modern labor markets. Education projects were criticized for their failure to offer girls vocational training, and women's concentration "in low-productivity jobs that require relatively little training" (12) was defined as a problem requiring development intervention.

However work initiatives did not feature prominently in the projects reviewed. "Projects that most commonly have important effects on women" (2) included all education projects, but only some interventions in rural development, urban development, tourism, and industry. As Josette Murphy noted when summarizing the 1979 pamphlet, most of the projects it cited were in the human resources and agriculture sector, and in standard social sectors associated with women such as nutrition and maternal health (Murphy 1995, 40). Moreover employment was not regarded as a priority for all women; when heavily emphasized the policy was associated with those who lacked access to male wages. For example lack of vocational education for girls was highlighted as a particular problem for Lesotho, "a country where over 60 percent of the male labor force is in migrant staus, forcing women to play a significant role in all sectors of the economy" (World Bank 1979a, 5). Likewise male emigration in Morrocco and Botswana was seen to create female headed households in urban areas, and the report marked their unemployment as a serious concern (10). Thus although work was important in this document it was not the Bank's key policy concern, and it was priority only for women unable to depend on male wages.

By 1990, work had become more central to the Bank's vision of gender policy. The 1990 *Progress Report on Women in Development* lending, based on an internal evaluation of Bank projects and country studies, emphasized the need to increase women's employment in order to raise productivity, promote economic efficiency, and reduce poverty. As the opening paragraph explained, the overarching rationale for WID intervention was focused on employment, since "in general, the Bank is focusing on increasing women's economic productivity by investing in human capital and improving women's access to productive resources and the labor market" (World Bank 1990, 1). Lack of access to employment was thus repeatedly marked as a problem; women's seclusion was criticized because it limited their ability to labor (4), and women's "difficulty earning money or breaking into the formal sector" was highlighted as a matter of concern (v; 5). The Bank was itself faulted for failing to address the issue in the past, with early WID efforts understood to focus excessively on health and schooling (1). Following this framing of the gender policy problem, increased female labor force participation rates were presented as "promising" (9) markers of progress, and the section headed "future directions" claimed that the institution would "increase its attention to women's participation in the labor force" (13). Employment also emerged as central to the Bank's vision of good WID policy in the specific project- and country-focused examples given to prove success. 26 project examples were included in chapter two of the report, 17 of which concerned efforts to get women into work or to broaden the basis of their employment, and nine of the 13 case studies focused on increasing women's productivity and income-earning potential. Summaries of country-relevant information included in this report also emphasized work (27); for example "the report on reconstruction in Sri Lanka recommends measures to provide employment for women in the reconstruction of housing;" "the 1989 country economic memorandum on India recommends measures to help poor women find employment;" and "the report on employment in Pakistan recommends ways to increase women's income."

By 1994, when the Bank issued its first official policy paper on GAD, employment had been successfully entrenched as the lynchpin of the institution's policymaking efforts. This report focused on "expanding women's participation in the labor force, expanding women's options in agriculture, and providing financial services to women," while concentrating more on gender as it affected economic and sector work (Murphy 1997, 14). President Lewis Preston's foreword noted that wage labor was one of five actions known to work in "turning around" the "gender gap" (World Bank 1994, 7); two other strategies (expanding women's productive role in agriculture and improving their access to credit to support entrepreneurship) were also heavily focused on work. Again, an emphasis on women's lack of employment as a problem and a restriction on the right to participate in development emerged from this document. The opening "overview" chapter highlighted gender gaps in employment by noting with concern that "between 1970 and 1985 the percentage of economically active women declined in Sub-Saharan Africa and in South Asia" (19), and legal and regulatory barriers to women's employment were repeatedly criticized (38; 11). Examples of policy failure also privileged work, with particular concern expressed over women's unemployment in transition countries (19; 32), and the Bank again criticizing itself for its own failure to deal with the issue (10). Given this framing of the GAD problem, increasing female labor force participation rates and facilitating women's "mobility from low-paying, low-productivity activities to activities of higher economic value" (22) could be framed as evidence of policy success. The chapter summarizing "some promising approaches to overcoming the barriers to improving women's status and productivity" (39) included many employment-related initiatives, including a silk worm effort in India, agricultural training for women in Yemen, and an Employment and Training Project in Turkey.

The increased emphasis on employment evident in the 1994 policy report was replicated in Josette Murphy's 1995 internal evaluation of Bank gender lending. This argued that gender policy was relevant to poverty alleviation and economic development because:

> "worldwide, women represent well over one-third of the labor force, and in Africa and Latin America, they account for more than half of the informal sector. During the

> 1980s, the formal employment of women increased everywhere, yet women continue to have less access to education, resources, and services than men. They are paid less, and remain more likely to have incomes below poverty level" (Murphy 1995, 22).

This work-focused definition of the policy problem was extended in the summaries of regional GAD efforts; the section on Europe and Central Asia "highlighted the implications of employment regulations and legal frameworks for women," and the summary of policy in Latin America and the Carribbean drew attention to "labor markets, and equal pay" (53).

Furthermore, Murphy again criticized the early focus of WID lending on traditional social sectors, for neglecting productive activities and "reinforcing traditional domestic roles" (Murphy 1995, 27). She noted disapprovingly that "a 1977 issues paper in Ghana on women and employment was an isolated case" (38), and she criticized the 1979 pamphlet because "the focus was on women's reproductive roles rather than their productive roles" (41). Her report claimed that the Bank had not moved fast or far enough in reorienting its projects towards new sectors, despite good empirical evidence "that decisions in infrastructure, industry regulations, and urban services affect labor opportunities for men and women differently" (63). The evaluation also highlighted examples of policy failure focused on work, mentioning a Mexican retraining project which was unsuccessful in moving women into jobs (62), and identifying women's unemployment as an unresolved gender issue in transition economies (66). Conversely, measures to increase women's work were marked as examples of success. In citing evidence that "significant progress has been made" in the Bank regarding GAD issues, Robert Picciotto (Director General of Operations Evaluations and author of the foreword to the 1995 study) claimed: "projects now focus on women's productive as well as their reproductive roles, and search out new opportunities to enhance women's access to employment and vital services." (quoted in Murphy 1995, xi). A "new cluster" of projects approved in the late 1980s reflected this reorientation towards developing women's skills as productive workers, with increasing attention being paid to entrepenurial advice and "efforts to help women gain access to private sector employment" (63).

The trope of increased attention to employment as policy improvement was replicated in the two documents put out by the Bank to showcase its gender efforts for the UN's 1995 Conference on Women in Beijing, *Towards Gender Equality* and *Advancing Gender Equality*. James Wolfensohn's foreword to the former used women's growing labor force participation rates as evidence that efforts to reduce gender inequality had worked (World Bank 1995c, vii); indeed statistics on women's increasing employment were frequently used to demonstrate "encouraging trends" or to help prove "progress to date" in this way (19; 47). The Bank also proved the *continued* need for policy intervention through reference to work. The opening summary to *Towards Gender Equality* listed three reasons that "nevertheless, inequalities between men and women persist in many important areas" (2): mortality and morbidity rates, women's concentration in low-productivity and low paid jobs, and women's lack of decision-making power in employment and policymaking. The report included a ¾ page graph entitled "women everywhere are less likely than men to be in the labor force" (17) as evidence of the persistence of inequality. Discrimination and interrupted labor market participation were also marked as problems, and macroeconomic reform measures in transition countries were criticized on the basis that they could aggravate women's unemployment (54). These patterns were repeated in *Advancing Gender Equality* (1995):

the growth of women's unemployment was considered cause for concern (World Bank 1995a, 38; 54), wage disparity was criticized, and the report highlighted the need to change discriminatory labor laws "to facilitate women's participation in the labor force" (7). Increasing labor force participation rates were regarded as evidence of success, and projects to "bring women into the mainstream of economic life" (13) by getting them into work were prominent, with 12 of 14 case study examples of Bank assistance containing reference to employment.

The Bank's post-Beijing progress reports on gender also highlighted employment. The 1996 evaluation of Bank gender policy gave five "examples of projects with a direct impact on women" in Europe and Central Asia - three concerned work. The report also considered work-related projects on "Integrating Women into Economic Development" to be evidence of the institution's commitment to "participatory methods for gender analysis" (World Bank 1996b, 3), and examples of the successful involvement of NGOs in policy formulation highlighted entrepreneurship and employment projects (7). Again, the Bank was urged to move beyond a focus on "traditional sectors" (7) and to endorse microenterprise initiatives that encouraged entrepreneurship and income-generation (8; 10). These patterns were replicated in the second progress report, in 1997.

The 1997 official evaluation of GAD lending, *Mainstreaming Gender in World Bank Lending*, reiterated many of these concerns, criticizing the continued focus on traditional sectors and urging increased attention to women's productive roles. Examples of policy failure emphasized employment; a text box on "missed opportunities" focused again on the Mexican retraining project which did not get women into jobs (Murphy 1997, 24), and as evidence of "sectoral bias" the report highlighted a Guinean country assistance strategy that failed to link gender concerns to "general issues in employment," even while acknowledging "that women constitute a large majority of Guinea's rural labor force" (41). Again, increased attention to work was framed as policy progress. A text box on "promising practices" focused on a Sri Lankan poverty alleviation initiative "to increase income-generating opportunities" and involve women in microenterprise and credit activities (30), while the highlighted example of a WID assessment that influenced state policy was a Chinese anti-poverty initiative "which contains extensive measures to increase women's labor mobility" (37). Indeed all of the five examples given in the discussion of "promising practices: gender issues in sector work" concerned employment (38-9).

Work was also central to the vision of gender and development policy set out in the Bank's 1999 review on mainsteaming gender, written by Caroline Moser and other gender staff. This highlighted employment in all of its summaries of the Bank's country gender studies (Moser, Tornqvist and von Bronkhorst 1999, 24-5), and in four of the six summaries of the Bank's regional action plans on gender (27-29). The summary of the four gender policy texts reviewed in the report also concentrated heavily on employment; the overview of *Advancing Gender Equality* (1995) provided in Moser's report gave one example of "constraints on women's opportunities," for example, focused on work (22).

This emphasis on work was again evident in the Bank's 2000 report on gender, also (confusingly) entitled *Advancing Gender Equality*. Once more, the Bank's institutional story of WID/GAD policy emphasized the shift from "traditional sectors" to areas of lending in which employment is more important (World Bank 2000a, 9), and examples of policy success were overwhelmingly focused on work. Both of the examples provided to prove that post-1997 adjustment lending addressed gender issues emphasized measures to increase women's labor force participation (16-17). The report included a text box on microfinance describing an Albanian urban employment project to get women into work (7), and later the Bank highlighted its role in grassroots initiatives teaching "entrepreneurial skills, including keeping accounts, accessing and managing credit, preparing business plans, and improving savings and profits" (28).

Finally, work-related strategies saturated the Bank's second policy research report on gender, *Engendering Development Through Gender Equality in Rights, Resources, and Voice*. Five of the 11 tables listed on the contents page were focused on work, and increased female labor force participation was one of three pieces of evidence cited in the summary to show that progress had been made in reducing gender disparities (World Bank 2001, 3). The first of four proposed "active policy" suggestions mentioned in the summary was "promoting gender equality in access to productive resources and earnings capacity," to secure "fair and equal access to employment opportunities" (22). The opening chapter, giving an overview of gender inequality, contained a four and a half page section on employment and earnings, reiterating the "problem" of low female labor force participation, occupational segregation, and wage differences. This was more than the space devoted to education, and more than double the space given to inequalities in "voice" (women's ability to influence decisions in the home and in society).

Particularly interesting is the centering of work in the report's discussion of economic restructuring. Again early structural adjustment initiatives were criticized for their negative employment effects, and early social protection programs were faulted for failing to employ women (227; 264). The report also highlighted work when charting the effects of the East Asian crisis, focusing on gendered disparities in unemployment, wages, and working hours (211). Human welfare concerns (such as the impact of the crisis on school enrollment and nutritional levels) were raised later, and received less text space (212). This pattern was repeated in the Bank's narrative of problematic transition in Eastern Europe (220-222). Proof that "adjustment benefits gender equality" was also work-focused, with the Bank arguing that restructuring raised women's labor force participation rates, especially in export manufacturing (214).[i] Indeed the shift to a market economy in Vietnam and China was framed as successful, in GAD terms, because it opened up "new nonfarm employment opportunities" for women in areas such as electronics, textiles, and apparel (222). Thus transition experiences in the Former Soviet Union and Asia were differentiated in terms of their impacts on employment, since in the former:

> "Labor has borne a disproportionate share of the cost of change in downsized sectors, although neither women nor men have a monopoly on the losses. In contrast, in the transition countries in Asia-where the economy is expanding rather than contracting - there is room for more winners and women are benefiting, mostly by taking new jobs in a modernizing economy. Their experience illustrates the positive side of economic development" (225).

Whether women gained or lost during transition was therefore determined solely in the realm of employment and earnings.

In short, then, employment started out as one among many solutions for the WID policy problem, and ended up being the center piece of the Bank's gender lending efforts. This shift occurred gradually, but had been firmly institutionalized in official documents by the time of the UN's fourth international conference on women in 1995. On a straight code count, for example, later documents contained more words associated with a work focus than earlier texts - using one very broad definition of the work focus which includes misspellings, the 1979 text registered 156 hits, versus 1985 for *Engendering Development*[ii]. As demonstrated in the pie chart below (chart 1), the 1995 *Towards Gender Equality* text contained 10% of the references to the work measured in this way, but the vast majority (44%) occured in the 2001 policy paper. On a second, narrower measure of the work focus including far fewer terms (employment, jobs, labor, wages, work, and workers), a similar picture emerges (see table 2 in appendix 2, and chart 2 below) - 83 hits for the 1979 text versus 1076 for the 2001 policy paper. The percentages of text in each document taken up by these work-related comments remain relatively steady, but again clear peaks are evident with the 1995 *Towards Gender Equality* and 2001 *Engendering Development* reports, which devote more relative text space to work-related comments than other documents.

Given that crude statistical counts of keywords give a rather superficial overview of the importance of a particular concept or theme to a document, however (see appendix 1), they can be complimented with close reading strategies focused on how a term is deployed, involving manual coding to ascertain the emphasis placed on employment. As explained above, this demonstrates that the problem of GAD was defined, in large part, as a problem of work. Indeed the need for gender policy is now justified through reference to work, examples of policy success and failure focus on work, interventions are evaluated in terms of their impact on work, and employment is considered such a "familiar marker of gender equality" (World Bank 2001, 35) that it can be used as a measure of such in *Engendering Development*. It remains to analyze why this shift occurred. The remainder of this chapter will be devoted to exploring three factors that

Total Hits in Work Cluster By Document (%)



% of Text in Work Cluster 2 by Document



(Document 1: 1979 Recognizing the Invisable Women in Development; 2: 1990 WID Progress Report; 3: 1994 Enhancing Women's Participation (first policy paper); 4: 1995 Murphy Gender Evaluation; 5: 1995 Wolfensohn Beijing speech 6: 1995 Promoting Gender Equality report 7: 1995 Towards Gender Equality; 8: 1995 Advancing Gender Equality; 9: 1996 Implementing the Bank's Gender Policies; 10: 1997 Implementing the Bank's Gender Policies; 11: 1997 Mainstreaming Gender (Murphy); 12: External Gender Consultation Group report; 13: 1998 Mainsteaming Gender (Moser et al); 14: 2000 Precis discussion of gender; 15: 2000 Advancing Gender Equality; 16: 2001 Engendering Development (second policy paper).

appear particularly important in this regard: 1. the linking of work to productivity and market growth in a way that denies the Bank's own role in promoting it 2. the framing of work as a way to achieve other development goals, and 3. the promotion of employment as empowering.

Why it Works (i): Employment Enhances Productivity, and Will Occur Without the Bank

The first – and arguably most important - component of the Bank's successful mobilization of work as the key policy ingredient in WID/GAD efforts was the equation of employment with increased productivity and efficiency, ensuring that the policy fit the Bank's long-standing institutionally-conditioned emphasis on "efficiency rhetoric." As explained in the introduction, in this institutional context value is given to interventions that increase productivity, growth, productivity, and efficiency, and that are "proven" via quantitative research showing "demonstrable costs" to the market (World Bank 1994, 64). This often leads policymakers to frame their actions as technocratic non-political measures designed to secure growth. Work succeeds as a policy priority in GAD in part because it fits the requirements of this institutional context extremely well. Indeed in many respects the higher employment-higher productivity claim is a beautifully simple one for feminist policy entrepreneurs to make. The benefits are stunningly easy to prove, since any policy that keeps women out of the labor force can be shown to have costs. What gets counted as productive in the versions of mainstream economics upon which Bank staff draw means that, put bluntly, getting women into "work" cannot help but increase productivity. Paid labor in the market place usually gets into GDP statistics, unpaid labor usually does not, and work thus *Enhanc(es) Women's Participation in Economic Development* by default. Indeed all Bank gender documents claim that raising the female labor force participation rate will increase growth, and that getting women into work will raise productivity; these claims stand as legitimate because their tautological nature is elided.

The emphasis on employment as a productivity enhancer was evident from the earliest WID documents. The 1979 review noted with concern, on its first page, that "economic change has often altered the traditional division of labor at women's expense, pushing them out of their traditional economic activities and widening the productivity gap between their labor and that of men" (World Bank 1979a, 1). Discriminatory development efforts were seen to increase such discrepancies in productivity, with new agricultural techniques being taught to men, or focused on crops that men controlled (6-7). The overarching problem, therefore, was that women "tend to be concentrated in low-productivity jobs that require relatively little training. Low skills, low productivity, and low wages reinforce each other to keep women at the bottom of the economic scale" (12).

The 1990 WID progress report revealed a stronger and more coherent emphasis on work as a strategy designed to raise productivity. Productivity enhancement through employment was linked to growth and poverty reduction, and framed as part of an effort to expand women's opportunities and earning potential (World Bank 1990, 1). Although work offered productivity-related benefits for all, "women are an important target group for employment policy, on grounds of equity and because constraining their access to the wage labor market creates significant inefficiency in the economy" (29).

The 1994 policy paper intensified this emphasis on "the payoffs to investing in women" and the need to reduce "the inefficiencies of inequity" (World Bank 1994, 11). President Conable's foreword noted that "women's productivity remains low - both in income-generating work and in home production. Improving women's productivity can contribute to growth, efficency, and poverty reduction-key development goals everywhere" (14). Productivity enhancement was thus made the key rationale for labor force participation; indeed the section headed "Increasing Women's Participation in the Formal Labor Force" stated: "the main strategies here include increasing the productivity of women, reducing the constraints women face while participating in the labor market, and improving the efficiency of the labor market" (47). The need to help countries ensure gender equality through increasing female labor force participation rates was hereby framed as an issue of productivity enhancement, and the Bank promised that it: "will assist governments in their efforts to reform and establish a strong legal and regulatory framework in order to tackle the access problems for women and improve their productivity" (57). While the Bank acknowledged that these attempts to increase access to productive activities for women might seem controversial, because they aim to change the position of men and women in society, it suggested that objections could be overcome "by focusing on strong economic arguments showing that women can and must play a full role in the economic development of their countries" (15). In this way gender policymakers appealed to efficiency discourses to render their employment-promotion activities apparently apolitical.

The definition of the GAD problem as one of inefficiency and low productivity, and the emphasis on employment as the preferred solution, was repeated in the Beijing documents and subsequent evaluations of gender lending. Wolfensohn's foreword to *Towards Gender Equality* claimed that "persistent inequality between women and men constrains a society's productivity and, ultimately, slows its rate of economic growth" (World Bank 1995c, vii). Low productivity employment in the service or informal sector was marked as a particular problem, and women's participation in export manufacturing jobs was encouraged (16). *Advancing Gender Equality* (1995) repeated the claim that: "improving women's productive capacity can contribute to growth, efficiency, and poverty reduction-key development goals everywhere" (World Bank 1995a, 2). Again, there was a perceived need to shift women into high productivity work in certain sectors: the case study on Indonesia framed women's concentration in informal sector work negatively, for example, with problems of long hours, poor working conditions, weak legal protection, and unsteady incomes (28). Conversely the 1997 progress report gave favorable mention to an Indian initiative to increase women's productivity by "diversifying women's economic activities" (World Bank 1997c, 9) to encompass commercial agriculture, agro-processing, textiles, and handicrafts.

The "work as a productivity enhancer" discourse was especially central to *Engendering Development*. This reiterated the efficiency approach to GAD by arguing in the first line to the preface that "gender inequalities undermine the effectiveness of development policies in fundamental ways" (World Bank 2001, xiii), specifically by "reduc(ing) productivity in farms and enterprises and thus lower(ing) prospects for reducing poverty and ensuring economic progress" (8). The summary claimed that "higher productivity and new job opportunities often reduce gender inequalities in employment" (2), and the section headed "Inefficient Allocation of Labor" focused on how traditional gendered divisions of labor "have negative consequences on production" (85). Indeed *Engendering Development* repeatedly argued that gender equity involved judging people based on productivity rather than prejudice, "so that productivity rather than gender (or race or age) is the primary criterion for employment and compensation in labor markets" (108). Thus if markets operate properly getting women into work will increase productivity, growth, wages, and women's opportunities.

Many of these claims linking work to higher productivity are tautological, although they at least avoid egregious errors such as measuring productivity by wages.[iii] For example *Advancing Gender Equality* (2000) claimed that the forthcoming policy paper proved gender equality benefits development since:

> "In all countries, but particularly in the poorest, giving women and men the same rights, allowing them equal access to education, jobs, property, and credit, and fostering their participation in public life produces positive outcomes. These outcomes include decreased child mortality, improved public health, a decline in population growth, and a strengthening of overall economic growth." (World Bank 2000a, 30).

The link between getting people into jobs and increasing economic growth is simply circular given the way that the Bank counts, but as framed here it reads as proven by research in the policy paper. *Engendering Devlopment* itself argued that gender equality – one measure of which is getting women into work - is good for growth by citing studies that measure growth as GDP per worker (World Bank 2001, 88); these claims prove, in effect, that getting women into work gets them into work.

However, although the deployment of this bundle of concepts seems easy I wish to contest assumptions that feminists can always utilize efficiency discourses without trouble. Tensions frequently emerge in gender texts over the claim that work is the ultimate pro-growth, anti-poverty strategy, not least because it is apparent to most development specialists that poor people work. For example Murphy's 1995 review argued that GAD policy is linked to poverty alleviation because it can increase women's productivity (and by implication their wages), but she also noted that in a Mexican training project women worked more hours but did not increase monthly earnings (Murphy 1995, 62). Moreover:

> "During the 1980s, the formal employment of women increased everywhere, yet women continue to have less access to education, resources, and services than men. They are paid less, and remain more likely to have incomes below poverty level" (22).

Likewise *Advancing Gender Equality* recognized in its case study of India that "the poorer the family, the more it depends for survival on the earnings of a woman" (World Bank 1995a, 41).

Most recently, *Engendering Development* had to make extensive efforts to disprove a 1994 study that found a negative relationship between equality and growth, based on the fact that female secondary schooling and economic growth were negatively correlated. A text box "establishing that gender equality affects economic growth" cited other studies which turned the relationship positive, in part by excluding many of the key negative cases,[iv] and in part by "us(ing) a different specification of the growth regression....*(These studies) find that the effect of female education on output per worker is significantly positive*" (World Bank 2001, 89 emphasis added). Again worker output was measured as growth, in keeping with other work-related measures of productivity used in this chapter such as framing schooling as "an indicator of the skills of the future workforce," and measuring "output lost as a result of prejudice in the labor market" (83). Reliance on these productivity measures allowed the Bank to claim definitively that "faster progress in closing gender gaps in schooling would accelerate economic growth" (91), because "female illiteracy and low female education hurt productivity and earnings - for women and for the economy" (84). However even after these data manipulations authors conceded that their findings proved very little. In a footnote to a bar graph designed to prove that "where rights are more equal, gender gaps are smaller," the report stated: "given the limitation of the data, it is not possible to determine whether this is a causal relationship" (146). Readers were directed to an appendix on the methodology by which the regression model was constructed (297-300) – it says nothing about the causal relationship between rights and gender inequality.[v] These observations help demystify the expert status of Bank research, and they reiterate a point raised in the introduction that efficiency discourses are not always easy to "prove." Work is chosen in part because it can, by default, be shown to raise productivity in standard, economistic, quantitative terms; however it remains an important policy priority even when the data are messy and the causal relations are too complex to be represented in a bar graph. This is a crucial reminder of how difficult it is for policy entrepreneurs to use efficiency discourses, a necessary corrective to the over-simplified notion that framing one's arguments using economistic truth claims is discursively easy, if politically dangerous.

A connected reason why work is so central to Bank gender efforts is that it can be framed as a non-policy, since increased labor female labor force participation is understood to occur without the Bank's intervention. It thus represents a market adjustment, an inevitable, natural response to shifting patterns of productivity and profitability. This allows the institution to frame itself as a non-intervenor in the market, or as a handmaiden of a change that would occur more slowly by itself were the market left to freely respond to productive incentives. This framing of work is expressed in its fullest form in more recent gender policy texts, where the Bank argued that increasing female labor force participation rates are an almost automatic consequence of development. As *Advancing Gender Equality* put it: "because firms operating in competitive environments treat women more fairly in terms of hiring and pay than do firms operating in protected environments, making markets more competitive - and fair - can help promote gender equality" (World Bank 2000a, 31). Thus "economic development that increases productivity and creates new job opportunities often benefits women more than men" (31).

This argument – contained in an annex to the 2000 report – was central to the second policy paper on gender, which devoted a 50 page chapter to the question of free markets, economic development, and gender equality. Again, getting women into work was used as a key justification for neo-liberal policies. Asking "How do competitive forces, strengthened by open and freer markets, affect gender disparities?" the Bank's two-page answer focused solely on work and the effect of trade openness on wages, with seven studies cited on the issue (World Bank 2001, 196-198). The first gendered benefit of economic development was understood to be the breaking down of rigid, inefficient traditional divisions of labor, since growth leads to "more labor market opportunities for women" in new sectors of the economy (186). Industrialization was framed as a process that inevitably, inexoherably increased women's work opportunities, first in factories then in the service sector (103-4), and open markets were understood to increase wages (196-198). Arguing that "a more vibrant economy can increase gender equality through several pathways" the report mentioned work first, on the following basis:

> "economic development expands job opportunities and raises worker productivity in labor markets - and leads to the emergence of labor markets where none has existed.

> These improvements can eliminate some economic inefficiencies, make it more costly for those not employed to remain unemployed, and send signals to households and individuals about the benefits of greater economic participation by both men and women" (182).

Open market, neo-liberal policies will thus reduce labor market discrimination, since "when markets function openly they facilitate information exchange and embody a powerful set of incentives for making choices on the basis of productive efficiency rather than gender, ethnicity, or age" (144). In contrast discrimination:

> "is easier where markets are relatively closed or undeveloped. In fact...firms operating in more competitive markets appear to engage in less gender discrimination in hiring and pay practices than do firms with significant market power operating in less competitive markets. More generally, policies and investments that deepen markets, redress gender inequalities in access to information-combined with sanctions on those who discriminate-all help strengthen incentives for gender equality in the labor market" (241).

By 2001, then, the Bank was clearly arguing that free markets increased female labor force participation rates, in a seemingly natural process that did not require policy intervention.

Again, however, this connection between work and efficiency is more complex than it at first appears, and not only because the Bank concede in footnotes that it may be disproved by its own evidence.[vi] After all, if the market will increase female labor force participation, why is work still the priority in gender policy – why intervene at all? Policymakers negotiate this tension through the concepts of time and information. The free market will indeed increase women's labor force participation and break down inefficient traditional gendered divisions of labor – in time, and with full information. Bank intervention can speed this process up, and supply full information about productivity so that employers are no longer reliant on inaccurate prejudices when allocating jobs. The market thus needs a helping hand to ensure it functions efficiently;

policy interventions are both marked as non-policies and justified in a narrow, neo-liberal sense on this basis.

Consider firstly the time argument, central to *Engendering Development's* summary of Ester Boserup's claims about women's role in economic development:

> "That the relationship (between economic growth and gender equality) may be nonlinear was recognized three decades ago when Boserup (1970) argued that development has to reach a certain threshold before gender gaps close with further economic growth. In her book, *Woman's Role in Economic Development,* Boserup suggests that in the initial stages of development greater urbanization and industrialization tend to intensify the gender division of labor in the home and the workplace. Further expansion of markets begins to erode these traditional gender structures. Tighter labor markets put pressure on employers to relax the exclusion of women from wage activities, and eventually households take advantage of greater labor and consumption opportunities and encourage women to work outside the home" (World Bank 2001, 202).

This passage provides a nice example of how gender equality is made synonymous with increased female labor force participation, and it also demonstrates how neo-classical economic reasoning about household bargaining, the inevitably progressive nature of free markets, and the triumph of efficiency has been imputed to Boserup's work. Boserup *actually* argued that development institutions and their sexist policies blocked women's entry to modern sector jobs; *this* made the relationship between development and women's expanding opportunities nonlinear. However in this peculiarly linear framing of non-linearity the market will indeed get there. However because the positive effects of economic development are not immediate the Bank has a role as the handmaiden of a process that would occur more slowly by itself.

The Bank also preserve a policy role in promoting a shift that is supposed to occur inevitably as a consequence of market success through reference to information. The inefficiencies of "misallocating" resources due to traditional gendered divisions of labor (World Bank 2001, 86) are not necessarily apparent to people – this "market failure" should be corrected through Bank policy (231). Once farmers in Cameroon realize that women would be more productive if they worked on men's rice plots, behaviour will shift; the Bank's role is thus to provide information to ensure that efficiency determines labor allocation rather than "biases", "norms" and "prejudice." The Bank has a dual role here, as a careers service to women and a dispeller of stereotypes for employers. As *Advancing Gender Equality* (1995) understood it:

> "Information is crucial for taking advantage of services, lowering the cost of searching for work, making labor markets more efficient, and improving productivity. Employment and training programs supported by the Bank are making better information available to women about job markets" (World Bank 1995a, 10)

Examples of such activities listed in *Engendering Development* include providing careers information to women so that they can gain from opportunities in the labor market,[vii] and launching community education campaigns to convince parents of the job opportunities open to educated girls.

In summary, then, work was privileged in GAD policy texts in part because it was connected to productivity. Women's low productivity was defined as the development problem to be solved, and getting them into work, or moving them from low-productivity work to more efficient employment, was the core solution. This connection was made due to the institutional character of the Bank, and the not-insignificant advantages of endogeneity in terms of what gets counted as productivity. That said, however, the reliance on efficiency discourses to "prove' the need for employment policy was never straightforward, and the neo-classical "evidence" on which the claims rest was often messy. Furthermore, work was positioned perfectly at the crux of the tension between the need to free the market and to design policy interventions, which is precisely where the Bank itself – as a development institution and a Bank, a market facilitator and a humanitarian agency – is also located. This tension is resolved, albeit imperfectly, through references to time and information provision, both of which fit neo-liberal parameters of policy interventions as justified to the extent that they compensate for market failures. To clarify, I am *not* arguing that its "fit" with prevailing discourses of efficiency and productivity is the *only* reason work has "won" as a policy solution in the Bank, since efficiency rationales occur alongside other policy justifications, especially in a post-Beijing context. However I start out with efficiency because, as feminist critics of the institution have long argued, a policy can not succeed in the World Bank *unless* it is justified in efficiency terms – while this is not sufficient to guarantee its success it is necessary for it to compete effectively with rivals.

Why it Works (ii): Work as a "Keystone" Strategy Through Which To Achieve Other Goals.

Having justified attempts to increase women's labor force participation on the grounds that it raised productivity and sped up an existing market development, Bank policymakers also effectively incorporated other priorities into the work focus, positioning employment as a keystone through which multiple development goals could be achieved. According to the Oxford English dictionary, a keystone is both "the stone at the summit of an arch…looked upon as locking the whole together" and "the central principle of a system, course of action, etc., upon which all the rest depends,"[viii] making it a particularly apt term for the way in which employment is framed in Bank gender policy. Keystone strategies are already familiar to scholars of WID/GAD policy, because women themselves have been successfully positioned as the keystone – or "missing link" (World Bank 2000d, 1) - on which development success hinges. Including women in development lending will, according to various Bank texts, alleviate poverty, ensure food security, reduce population growth, improve labor force quality, help the environment (World Bank 1990, 32), "promote economic performance (and) family welfare" (5), raise living standards (1), improve child health and learning (13), "lay the groundwork for …greater labor productivity, a higher rate of human capital formation. and stronger economic growth" (World Bank 1995c, 6), overcome corruption, stop bribery, reduce HIV/AIDS, and ensure "better governance" (World Bank 2001, 13). As *Engendering Development* puts it, "the world cannot forgo salutary effects as remarkable as these" (27).

In turn, getting women into work is positioned as a keystone strategy within this overarching policy framework, and it is linked to a range of outcomes besides higher productivity and stronger economic growth. In this section I concentrate on the three most important rivals to employment as master mobilizing frames for women in development policy in 1979: poverty reduction, education, and population control. By 2001 all were either successfully incorporated into the employment-focused agenda or displaced in other ways as central framing devices in their own right. Finally, through an investigation of the Bank's "discovery" of violence against women I trace how new a policy concern was introduced through a work focus, positioned from the start to fit the emphasis on employment as the cure-all for development ills.

Employment as a poverty-reduction strategy.

> "Women represent a seriously undervalued potential in the development process. And to prolong inequitable practices that relegate them exclusively to narrow traditional roles not only denies both them and society the benefits of that potential, but very seriously compounds the problem of reducing poverty" (Robert McNamara, in his final address to the Bank's Board of Governors, 1980, quoted in Murphy 1995, 34).

The popularity of anti-poverty as an organizing frame for early WID policy resulted from the basic needs approach of Robert McNamara. McNamara identified poverty alleviation as the Bank's new emphasis in his annual meeting speech in Nairobi in 1973 (Murphy 1995, 28), and he argued in the 1979 WID booklet that: "as the World Bank's strategy has been redirected toward alleviating conditions of extreme poverty and increasing the well-being and productivity of the poorest segments of populations, so has its awareness been sharpened of the role of women in development" (World Bank 1979a, 1). The first rationale for WID policy provided in this text was women's disproportionate representation among the poor. Employment was included as an anti-poverty strategy here, and the project review linked employment, productivity, and anti-poverty together through the concept of higher wages, since "low skills, low productivity, and low wages reinforce each other to keep women at the bottom of the economic scale" (12).

The 1990 WID progress report also emphasized poverty reduction as a key development goal, and it framed employment as a way to secure it, by assuming a simple higher productivity-higher wages connection revealed through sentences such as: "changes in policy...will enable women, particularly the poor, to produce and earn more" (World Bank 1990, 13). This connection was made central to the 1994 policy report through a prioritization of work as the ultimate anti-poverty strategy. Indeed by 1994, in part due to the shift to a neo-liberal development approach, the Bank's anti-poverty agenda had been subsumed under an employment focus, narrowing McNamara's basic needs approach considerably. The policy rationale for gender initiatives was now framed thusly:

> "Improving women's productivity can contribute to growth, efficency, and poverty reduction-key development goals everywhere. *Investing in women…is an integral part of the Bank's overall strategy for poverty reduction that calls for broadly based, labor-absorbing economic growth and improved human resource development*" (World Bank 1994, 14 emphasis added)

The new anti-poverty strategy involved stimulating growth to provide income-earning opportunities for poor people, and improving access to education and health care to help them get the newly-available jobs. As the policy paper noted, "both components are designed to develop and use effectively the poor's most abundant asset – their labor" (26). Getting the poor into work thus emerged as the key component of GAD policy *and* anti-poverty policy.

In addition, the connection between "less productive and less remunerative" (10) employment was established (or assumed) far more frequently in *Enhancing the Participation of Women* than before, a link that positioned modern sector employment as the ultimate anti-poverty strategy. Without this connection between productivity and wages, work can not function as an anti-poverty strategy on an individual level. Indirect arguments can be made that raising productivity raises growth, which in turn provides trickle down benefits to all, but this is not the Bank's claim – rather they make a highly individualistic argument that more productive people are less poor, requiring a direct connection between personal productivity and wages. Consequently the link between higher productivity and higher wages is typically unquestioned, explaining why women's "traditional" tasks, considered as having low-productivity, are so poorly rewarded. Thus in 1994 the link was made between "low-paying" and "low-skilled" activities (10), or between "raising the productivity and incomes of poor women" (26). Several examples were also given of projects that increased women's employment and reduced poverty (26), and the report claimed that: "encouraging the entrepreneurship and self-employment of women is proving to be a self-directed and targeted poverty reduction strategy."

When poverty reduction re-emerged as central to the Bank's development mission under the presidency of Wolfensohn and his dream of a world without poverty, and when gender lending became more important after the 1995 Beijing conference, agendas converged to re-center work as the ultimate anti-poverty and pro-gender policy. As the executive summary to *Advancing Gender Equality* (2000) noted:

> "Recently, the Bank has renewed its focus on poverty reduction as its primary mission and adopted a broad definition of poverty that includes empowerment, opportunity, and security as well as income as necessary to the fight to end poverty. These changes have set the stage for the Bank to sharpen its focus on gender equality" (World Bank 2000a, vi).

This refocused mission had key organizational implications, with the Bank's gender work moved to the Poverty Reduction and Economic Management Network "to facilitate the integration of gender issues into the central business of the Bank" (21). Staff also created a Bankwide gender and poverty network to ensure the continued focus of gender lending on addressing "women's roles...within the larger policy framework of poverty alleviation" (Murphy 1995, 27). Poverty reduction was thus re-defined as "the overarching objective of our activities" (report of the Bank's Task Group set up to consolidate the Bank's social development agenda, quoted in Moser, Tornqvist and von Bronkhorst 1999, 12), and gender equality was included therein.

Again, work was central to the anti-poverty agenda based on the assumption that employment increased income, in a direct, individual sense. Both of the Bank's Beijing documents argued that "because women are disproportionately represented among the poor, targeting women can be an effective strategy for reducing poverty" (World Bank 1995c, 6), and both assumed that productivity and earnings were automatically connected. The 1997 progress report also claimed productivity and income were inherently related through references to "strengthening the productivity and incomes of female farmers," (World Bank 1997c, 24), or to the fact that "working women are concentrated in low-paying , low productivity job sectors" (25). Likewise the chapter in *Engendering Development* proving that economic development is good for gender equality hinged on the link between work, productivity, and poverty reduction, since "economic development betters the lives of the poor - *by increasing incomes and income-earning opportunities*" (World Bank 2001, 181 emphasis added).

In short since 1995 poverty reduction has been recentered in the Bank's activities, and gender policy has been connected to this development goal very strongly. In turn, work is central to the poverty focus, at the heart of a perceived link between the efficiency discourses that appeal to mainstream economists and the human welfare concerns of Bank staff dreaming of a world free from poverty. The coherence of this cluster of keywords (gender equality, productivity, efficiency, work, income, wages, and poverty reduction) rests on the claim that the market rewards productivity through higher income – thus getting women into work (the ultimate productivity strategy) also gets them out of poverty.

Education as a work-facilitator.

Another rival to employment as a master mobilizing frame for WID policy in 1979 was education; indeed this was privileged above work in early texts, and it remains a core concern of gender policymakers. As Murphy notes, education (and population control) were the key policies emphasized by McNamara when WID was first put on the Bank's agenda in the 1970s (Murphy 1995, 26). This is confirmed by attention to the 1979 project review, which considered *all* education projects relevant to the new WID officer, while only some projects in agriculture, urban development, and Population Health and Nutrition were identified as having "important effects on women" (World Bank 1979a, 2). Although higher productivity and employment levels were crucial justifications for education they were not the only ones, since population and health benefits were also emphasized. Moreover the section entitled "intersectoral concerns" argued that "account generally has to be taken of an interdependence among sectors to ensure that the benefits of intervention are fully realized. For example, women's access to education is critically important – for their earning power, for determining the number and spacing of their children, and for the well-being of their children" (19). School, not work, was the privileged policy site through which to achieve a multitude of other development desirables here.[ix] This is not to argue that women's education was never linked to employment and higher productivity, but rather to point out that schooling was more central to WID initiatives in early policy than it became in subsequent years. Indeed in 1980 McNamara again noted the "immensely beneficial impact from educating girls" (quoted in Murphy 1995, 33), and education peaked as a focal point for gender lending in FY79-81 (39).

The 1990 WID progress report retained an emphasis on education as a keystone strategy that improved child health and reduced fertility. For example, high priority fields were designated as "education; population, health, and nutrition; and agriculture" (World Bank 1990, 11), and the report noted that: "in the long run, the greatest effect is likely to come from investment in human capital - in education and in health and family planning" (5). In addition, repeated references were made to the link between education and contraceptive use (27). However the report also framed the employment-education relationship as reciprocal, since better education increased labor force participation and productivity, while employment possibilities altered opportunity structures such that parents encouraged girls into school. For example the report noted the need to increase access to education to enable women to produce and earn more (12), and it stressed the value of vocational training for modern sector occupations such as tourism in India, Turkey, and Nepal. On the other hand, by using neo-classical arguments about human capital policymakers claimed that increasing employment led to more girls being educated, due to the incentives created by prospects of wages. As the 1990 report framed it, "parents are often more reluctant to educate daughters - or even to provide them with health care or food - perhaps because women have (or are expected to have) fewer income-earning opportunities than men" (4).

These neo-classical human capital arguments – crucially mediated by employment – became far more important to the Bank's justification for education policy in the 1990s. For example the 1994 policy paper summarized the approach with its claim that "improving women's educational attainments contributes to their mobility from low-paying, low-productivity activities to activities of higher economic value" (World bank

1994, 22). Education was important because it led to employment, especially in technical and industrial sectors (27), and because it generated "economic gains" in terms of wages; every year of education increased wages by 20% according to one Pakistani study cited (42). Educated women were understood to be more likely to participate in the formal labor market themselves (31), and to encourage the same of their offspring, as the section on "helping future generations" explained (27). Getting women into work therefore got more girls into school, since if girls had employment prospects parents would be more likely to educate them. Such arguments generated support for a "package approach" to education policies involving initiatives to raise community awareness of the work-related benefits of female education, and efforts to "provide occupational skills related to market demand and suitable for wage employment or self-employment, including job counseling and placement."

By 1994, then, work had become at least as important as education as the key "mutually supportive factor" through which to address the "intersectoral concerns" raised by GAD. This was in part a deliberate choice by gender policymakers, who pushed the Bank to reorient lending from "traditional sectors" to women's productive roles. Education was thus marked, particularly in the early 1990s, as an old-fashioned, conservative priority. For example Murphy praised a 1984 report on population as "the first to include a statistical table on women and a framework for discussion beyond education" (Murphy 1995, 35); aside from demonstrating the importance of quantifiable knowledge claims for policy entrepreneurs this also clarifies how insider advocates wished the Bank to move beyond education in gender lending. The broadening scope of WID assessments was often proved through the merging of employment with education concerns, as when Murphy mentioned a Turkish report which "included...findings on education (especially for vocational, technical, and tertiary training), but discussed these problems in the broader context of labor laws and regulations and the civil code" (58).

That said, however, crucially education was also *recentered* in Bank gender policy as a result of the Beijing conference, Wolfensohn's presidency, and the shift to a more human welfare oriented approach to development – but it was increasingly justified through its effects on work. Wolfensohn put girls education at the center of his speech at Beijing, framing it as "a key to the future" that had "a catalytic effect on every dimension of development" (Wolfensohn 1995, 4). However schooling must ultimately lead to employment for it to succeed as a development strategy, since "we must also give students the opportunities to utilize their education - for without such opportunities, interest in education on the part of both parents and students cannot be maintained. We need a systemic approach to development" (5). The "systematic approach" referred to here framed education as important because it leads to work. Again this approach rests on the neo-classical notion that families assign resources based on perceived economic benefits; they will not invest in girls if girls do not earn wages. This policy justification recenters employment, even as the Bank endorses education as a core plank of its gender lending.

The dual emphasis on education and employment is evident in every post-Beijing document. For example the summary of *Towards Gender Equality* highlighted education as the most important public policy intervention to ensure equal opportunities for men and women "as it is the catalyst that increases the impact of other investments in health, nutrition, family planning, agriculture, industry, and infrastructure" (World Bank 1995c, 1). Likewise the opening chapter, designed to demonstrate that "gender inequalities persist," started with education not work (9), and the first public policy recommendation was a reorientation of spending to support female education. However education initiatives were justified through appeals to improved productivity, growth, labor force participation rates, and wages (42), and the report claimed that "wage differentials between women and men in the market are closely linked to educational levels" (3). Likewise educational inequalities were understood to result in lower productivity and reduced economic growth (42; 68), and education policy was considered important because it "expands (women's) choices in labor markets and other income-generating activities and increases the rate of return on a household's most valuable asset - its labor" (3). Similarly "the productivity gains associated with a better-trained labor force" were used to justify higher education subsidies (57). *Advancing Gender Equality* (1995) also focused on perceived "complementarities" between education and employment (World Bank 1995a, 9), arguing that "the low educational attainment of women…reduces their capacity to work productively, an economic loss today that continues to curb growth into the future" (4). Having asserted that "education and training are one of the most potent means of empowering women," the report explained that "through education, women gain the knowledge and skills to participate fully in development and to create opportunities to increase their income and productivity" (9).

The work-related rationale for schooling was reiterated in the Bank's more recent gender policy texts. Wolfensohn's foreword to *Advancing Gender Equality* (2000) argued that education was important in part because it increased women's employment (World Bank 2000a, iv), and a text box on "innovation in girls education projects" highlighted a

Bangladeshi initiative that provided occupational skills training to get women into work (5). *Engendering Development* asserted that "female illiteracy and low female education hurt productivity and earnings - for women and for the economy" (World Bank 2001, 84), and it framed child schooling as "an indicator of the skills of the future workforce" (83). Thus schooling was the first "potential entry poin(t) for intervention" to promote gender equality in access to productive resources and earnings. Likewise employment policies were reframed as in part education policies, since "if parents consider it unlikely that their daughters will join the labor force and earn income as adults, they may see less justification for sending their daughters to school" (152). This connection rests on the claim that: "where labor markets are open to women, they raise the expected rate of return to women's human capital, strengthening incentives for families to invest in the knowledge and skills of girls" (108). Employment policies were thus reframed to appear crucial to educational policy and vice versa.

Two points deserve further elaboration in this analysis. Firstly, I am not arguing that education has disappeared as a policy priority – since 1995 it has been important in all gender documents and the Bank continue to emphasize it heavily.[x] Rather I am arguing that between 1979 and 2001 work displaced education as the *key* priority in GAD lending, and that education itself became increasingly justified through work rationales, such that getting women into work could be framed as a policy to get girls into school by the late 1990s.

Secondly, again the cluster of terms being invoked in this policy discourse - education, work, productivity, wages, and anti-poverty – is tension ridden, since the neo-liberal human capital arguments upon which the work rationales for education policy rest are still unproven, if not disproven in some cases. For example *Enhancing Women's Participation in Economic Development* recognized in a study on Latin America that "less than 25 percent of differentials in gender earnings during the period 1985-90 is related to human capital variables" (World Bank 1994, 19), while women suffered discrimination in socialist bloc countries despite their high levels of education. Likewise *Towards Gender Equality* acknowledged that "women's levels of human capital are equal to - and sometimes higher than - those of most men" in many industrial countries, and that only "about one-quarter of the gender wage gap is explained by differences in educational levels, labor market experience, and other "human capital" characteristics" (World Bank 1995c, 17). The summary of *Engendering Development* agreed, pointing out that: "...only about a fifth of the wage gap can be explained by gender differences in education, work experience, or job characteristics" (World Bank 2001, 5). More seriously, this policy report included a table on gender differences in earnings and human capital measuring the percentage of "unexplained pay" that contains several figures over 100 - as a footnote makes clear, these mean that women are actually more qualified than men (306), yet get paid less. The figures were buried in the third appendix on page 306 of the report – displayed rather less prominently than the multiple claims that improving human capital will improve wages – but nonetheless they confirm the importance of questioning the ease with which neo-classical efficiency discourses can be utilized to demonstrate development truths.

Employment Leads to Fertility Reduction.

Population control constituted another prominent rationale for WID policy in the late 1970s; indeed it was the first rationale used, under Robert McNamara, to explain the Bank's attention to women. An operational statement on population produced in 1977 linked women's education and employment with lower birth rates (Murphy 1995, 28), and McNamara's 1977 Population Address "advocated educating girls and 'rais(ing) the status of women socially, economically, and politically' as a means of lowering fertility" (Murphy 1995, 34). The 1979 report contained a section on rapid population growth, and the need to cut birth rates was framed as a core objective of WID interventions. Several fertility control policies (including the promotion of breastfeeding and the training of midwives) were justified purely in terms of their success in reducing birth rates, understood to be a legitimate development objective in its own right. Elsewhere the objective was linked to employment, through the assertion that lower birth rates result in higher labor force participation rates. For example the report claimed: "Bank research confirms the impact reduced birth rates have on women's employment, especially in jobs outside the home that are not compatible with having young children" (World Bank 1979a, 14). Measures to encourage "alternatives" to childbearing were also highlighted; these included women's cooperatives, literacy programs, and vocational training (15).

The Bank continued this emphasis on fertility reduction well into the 1980s. For example President Clausen (not renowned among Bank staff for his support of WID issues), said at a 1983 annual meeting of the Governing Board that "'at the Bank, we see the enhancement of the status of women and their role in development as a most important contribution - if not the most important contribution, to the solution of many social development problems, *including the population problem*'"' (quoted in Murphy 1995, 35 emphasis added). Conable also focused on population and maternity, promising at the 1987 Safe Motherhood Conference to double lending for Population Health and Nutrition by 1990 (45). The WID unit became a division in the Population and Human Resources department when the Bank was reorganized under his leadership (46). Consequently, the 1990 Progress report reflected the centrality of population control rationales for WID, framing fertility reduction in a standard instrumentalist manner. In the introductory chapter, the report argued that women's ability to realize their economic potential relied on the elimination of barriers to participation, and the first such barrier was identified thusly:

> "Excess fertility can damage the mother's health and, therefore, the welfare of her family. It can also limit her earning capacity by making it more difficult for her to leave the home for training or to buy or sell goods" (World Bank 1990, 3).

Lowering fertility was hereby framed as a way to increase women's labor force participation, and was made a central concern of the document.

Crucially, however, this emphasis on population decreased in the early 1990s. As the Bank's own narratives of WID policy make clear, external pressures were key in this reorientation. In particular, debates around the UN's Mexico City and Cairo conferences called into question narrowly-focused population control agendas, and the Bank was soundly criticized for its approach to women's fertility (Murphy 1995, 30). The development community embraced a broader "reproductive health" approach which made an instrumentalist prioritization of population control untenable. This redefinitional impulse is nowhere better illustrated than in Murphy's table of "key areas of concentration" in the Bank's WID work between 1979 and 1994, where a concern with "population health and nutrition" in 1979 became a concern with "health and nutrition" in 1994. Additionally, factors inside the Bank encouraged a shift away from fertility control, since health was declining as a focal point for gender policy in the 1990s and all of the Bank's gender evaluations criticized the concentration of lending in "traditional sectors."[xi]

Consequently, the 1994 policy paper contained far less emphasis on population control, and where mentioned fertility reduction was linked to broader health concerns such as nutrition and HIV/AIDS. Increased labor force participation rates were still framed as a way to achieve lower population growth, but the causality used in the 1990 report was complicated. For example, in one of the few explicit references to fertility reduction the report claimed:

> "...since women's income-generating activities compete with childbearing and childcare, increases in women's participation in the formal labor force are associated with smaller family size more than are increases in men's participation rates. In Brazil and Colombia - where labor force participation rates and earnings for men and women have been converging - fertility has been declining sharply" (World Bank 1994, 22).

This policy rationale implied an important resource shift, away from stand-alone Population Health and Nutrition projects and towards income-generation initiatives that will lower fertility.

Such references to the fertility-reducing effects of employment became increasingly prominent in subsequent Bank work. For example Murphy's 1995 evaluation of Bank gender lending included several quotes from older documents which prioritized this link (Murphy 1995, 36). None of these references was included in the 1990 WID progress report, suggesting a concern to re-draft the narrative of WID in a way that highlights the perceived impact of employment initiatives on fertility. This policy reorientation was reiterated in the Beijing documents. *Towards Gender Equality* placed population control within a broader reproductive health framework, and it emphasized the productivity-enhancing benefits of better health in a distinctive way – rather than arguing that reduced fertility leads to work or vice versa, the report asserted that better health improves worker productivity (and vice versa) (World Bank 1995c, 25). Elsewhere the causal emphasis was shifted to argue that working women and their families are healthier; for example the Bank argued that:

> "Prospects for gainful employment...influence women's well-being. The survival chances of female children in India appear to increase as the employment rate for women rises" (26).

This pattern was replicated in *Advancing Gender Equality* (1995). A case study on an integrated health initiative in Bangladesh framed the need to "enhance (women's) opportunities to earn income" as part of the country's health strategy (World Bank 1995a, 31), and project highlights included vocational training. As evidence of success, the report noted that "some (women) have found jobs in the garment and leather industries, and some are now self-employed. Contraceptive use is much higher than the national average among women who have participated in the training and production activities" (33). Fertility reduction is mentioned here, but in a secondary, subsidiary way, and getting women into work is considered a health strategy.

The shift from narrowly focused population control initiatives continued in later documents. The 1996 review of progress in implementing GAD policy mentioned a project in Senegal (ostensibly a population, health and nutrition project) which included measures to support women's income-generating initiatives (World Bank 1996b, 11). In total three of the five Population Health and Nutrition projects mentioned in this section included measures to do with work. Similarly *Advancing Gender Equality* (2000) employed a broader notion of health that was less focused on population control, and that privilged work; its section on "nutrition" also mentioned the Senegalese project to support women as entrepreneurs (World Bank 2000, 6).

Coverage of fertility was sparse in *Engendering Development*; the issue received only one page in a nine page section on the costs of gender inequality to well-being, for example, far less than AIDS and nutrition. Moreover the importance of fertility as a development issue was not framed as self-evident; the section opened by conceding that: "the impact of population growth on development varies across the world. But in the poorest countries - threatened by hunger, housing shortages, and environmental degradation - high fertility can exacerbate the adverse effects of poverty on children." (World Bank 2001, 82). Population control was thus defined as an issue of poverty reduction and child health, and displaced entirely as a keystone strategy in its own right.

Several links between work and reduced fertility were made, however, resting on neo-classical assumptions about utility-maximization and individual control of sexuality. For example, the summary argued that "interventions that increase education, wages, and labor market participation - coupled with adequate access to basic reproductive health and family planning services - all strengthen women's role in making reproductive decisions" (23). In considering "pathways to giving women more say in reproduction," the concluding chapter also privileged work as its primary strategy: "...interventions that increase women's bargaining power in the household by improving their control of resources and earnings enhance women's role in making reproductive decisions. Higher levels of female autonomy, education, wages, and labor market participation all tend to increase contraceptive use and reduce fertility" (261). Even when the empirical evidence cited by the Bank directly contradicts these assumptions, the findings were reframed to support the work model. As the report recognized:

> "...strengthening women's bargaining power and reproductive choice may not always lead them to choose smaller families. While access to microfinance empowers women, evidence from Bangladesh suggests that it can lead them to desire more children under some circumstances-say, when they are chiefly engaged in home-based, self-employment activities (as opposed to labor market work) and perceive additional children as compatible with - or even assets to - their enterprises" (261).

Elsewhere the Bank acknowledged that these findings on the impact of female borrowing on contraceptive use and fertility "may seem counterintuitive," but neo-classical reasoning was ultimately salvaged through the claim that "low-income women in Bangladesh may see additional children as assets capable of assisting them with what are often home-based, self-employment activities" (161). So entrenched is the work-related commonsense that more convincing explanations (that women may not control fertility decisions, that childbearing is not a sphere wherein narrow cost-benefit calculations determine action) were not even entertained.

In summary, population control, framed in narrow terms, had become less important as a WID/GAD policy rationale by 1994, and when mentioned it was more often linked to employment than had been the case in 1979. After 1995 it was displaced as a stand-alone development objective, and a broader concern with health emerged as a key justification for gender policy. This too was reframed to center employment, again using neo-classical assumptions about utility maximization and productivity which are currently central to Bank gender work.

Employment Reduces Violence.

So far in this discussion I have charted the reframing of policy objectives that potentially rivaled work as justifications for WID/GAD initiatives in 1979. In this example I trace how a new policy initiative emerged as successful based on its connection to the employment rationale. Once the legitimacy of GAD efforts had been established, policy entrepreneurs could more easily launch new initiatives that included gender from the start. This was recognized by some participants in the Bank's recent discussions on GAD policy, who concluded: "mainstreaming may work best in new or emerging fields, such as violence reduction or support for microenterprises, where learning is going on and there is more openness to new ideas" (World Bank 2000d, 2). I focus on anti-violence policy, and the centrality of work therein, in this respect.

The Bank has recently discovered violence against women and prioritized it within health policy. In 1993 the institution commissioned a discussion paper on violence, which framed the issue as " a profound health problem for women across the globe" (Heise 1994, ix) requiring immediate Bank intervention. The problem was rapidly mainstreamed into general women's health literature, with a 1994 report on women's health mentioning violence in the abstract (Tinker et al 1994, xi). Violence was emphasized in higher level Bank policy texts from this point onwards. The word does not appear at all in the 1979 pamphlet, for example; it is in *Engendering Development* 92 times. Violence got into the foreword of *Towards Gender Equality*, with Wolfenhsohn's claim that "much still needs to be done" to achieve gender equality "proved" by the fact that "most discouraging of all, hundreds of thousands of women each year are subject to gender-related violence" (World Bank 1995c, vii). Wolfensohn also mentioned violence in his foreword to *Advancing Gender Equality* (2000), accompanied by an efficiency rationale: "we know that domestic violence disables women, leads to a loss of income, increases what society spends on health care - and unwittingly teaches children to find violent rather than peaceful solutions to problems" (World Bank 2000a, iv). The closing chapter to this report provided examples of Bank research with a strong gender focus; *all* of the examples of country studies concerned violence (27). *Engendering Development* also mentioned violence as one of five areas of legal reform necessary for gender equality to be achieved (World Bank 2001, 239). In all cases, domestic violence was seen to have "deleterious effects on the well-being and productivity of women" (World Bank 1995c, 25), with "negative outcomes" that included "lower productivity, more absence from the workplace, increased homelessness, greater demand for medical and community support services, and larger expenditures for police and judicial services" (World Bank 2001, 78).

Not surprisingly, the Bank attempted to measure these negative outcomes. *Engendering Development* focused on the effects of violence on women's earnings, for example, although the more typical "rhetoric of factuality" (Porter 1995, 77) was the Disability Adjusted Life Year (DALY) figures. The DALY statistics are a measure of the global burden of disease, developed as part of a multi-agency research operation that aimed to produce objective, scientific assessments of mortality and disease. One of the study's key advocates, Christopher Murray, argues that DALYs aimed to "decouple epidemiological assessment from advocacy" (Murray and Acharya 1997, 704), in a good illustration of the way in which the statistics were intended to bypass accusations of bias through neutral application of the scientific method. They were also intended to help in the design of cost-effective health policy interventions, by indicating where the burden of disease lay, and where resources could be efficiently allocated. The statistics use a scale to rank ill-health running from 0 to 1; 0 is perfect health, and 1 is dead. DALYs are an estimated measurement of the time people lose in their lives from ill-health, now from disability and in the future from premature death. Thus, as Sudhir Anand and Kara Hanson note in a critical analysis of the figures, “by definition, DALYs are a ‘bad’ which should be minimized” (1997, 686). However not all days lost are equally bad. Years of life are weighted differently depending on age, since people contribute more to society at certain stages in their lives, and thus their ill-health is more costly. Consequently a year lived at age 2 is worth 20% of a year lived at age 25, and a year lived at age 70 is worth 46% of a year lived at age 25 (691).

As savvy policy entrepreneurs, femocrats in the Bank got violence included in these figures by estimating how much of the productive time lost due to different illness conditions was attributable to rape and domestic violence.[xii] As noted in one methodological appendix, “an analogy would be estimating the proportion of disability resulting from emphysema, lung cancer, and heart disease that can be attributed to smoking” (Heise 1994, 48). The statistics thus include rape and domestic violence as risk factors for disease conditions that increase the healthy years of life lost to women aged 15-44, and that thereby lower productivity (17). These figures were cited in several of the Bank’s key gender policy texts after 1994, in order to “prove” the need for intervention in familiar efficiency-based terms – violence is a problem because it lowers women’s productivity, and the Bank attempt to impute market-derived values for prevention policies, in order to make them worthwhile in economistic terms (Waring 1999, xx).

Again, this task was not easy, since as *Engendering Development* conceded "these costs are difficult to estimate" (World Bank 2001, 78). Moreover the illness conditions included in the figures are highly idiosyncratic and seem to have little utility in a policy context - one can reasonably ponder the value of calculating the proportion of bipolar depression explained by rape in health systems overwhelmed by HIV/AIDS, malaria, and economic restructuring.[xiii]

Debates about the rigour, accuracy, or utility of the statistics notwithstanding, however, the turn to productivity they represent importantly influenced resource allocation decisions. For example DALYs only measure the impact of domestic violence and rape on women aged 15 to 44 – the years of maximum productivity. Thus violence against girls and older women is decentered, as are policies that could prevent it. In addition, violence causes more harm to men than women when measured using DALYS:

> "Alcohol use, road traffic accidents, and violence together account for about 27 percent of men's DALYs in developed countries and 16 percent in developing countries. None of these three is in the top 10 for women in developing countries" (World Bank 2001, 48-9).

Moreover, DALYs only calculate how much rape and domestic violence contribute to the overall disease burden of a country. Thus they seem less important in a poor country with lots of diseases than in a rich country with a good health care system. Violence against women accounted for 20% of the healthy years of life lost to women aged 15-44 in established market economies, and 5% to women in developing countries (Heise 1994; Tinker et al 1994). All authors take pains to point out that the proportions are different because the overall disease burden is greater in developing countries not because Rich World men are more violent, but it is more likely that the statistics will be used to justify a lack of attention to violence in the health care systems of the developing world.[xiv]

Most importantly for the purposes of this analyis, however, the use of productivity as the reference point from which to derive an assertion that violence is a policy problem permits the Bank to posit employment as the solution, for both violent men and abused women. Male unemployment is understood to cause violence, with non-working men framed as profoundly unsafe. The claim that wounded masculinity leads poor, specifically unemployed, men to abuse women reflects and reinforces hierarchies of race, class, and region familiar to development scholars. Drawing on earlier discussions of the neo-colonial tropes evident in liberal WID policy on women (Mohanty 1991, Narayan 1997; Spivak 1999; Saunders 2002), GAD researchers have recently focused on how poor men are framed in development discourse, and they identify similarly troublesome patterns. For example, as Michael Kimmel notes, colonial administrations often problematized the masculinity of the colonized, viewing some groups as weak and effeminate and others as hypermasculinzed, violent and uncontrolled (Kimmel foreword in Cleaver 2002, xiii; see also Connell 2000). The trope of violent, abusive brown men victimizing powerless brown women is thus deeply embedded in the colonial context (Mohanty 1991; Narayan 1997; Center for Women's Global Leadership 1992; Spivak 1999), with Suzanne Bergeron arguing that it serves as justification for the Bank to continue its paternalistic policies towards the "backward" Third World (Bergeron 2003, 168). Similarly in a recent overview of different approaches to integrating men and masculinities into development Frances Cleaver (2002) discusses the danger of framing poor men in poor countries as "lazy natives,"[xv] terms which echo colonial discourse in frankly unpleasant ways.

These framings are not only offensive, however; they also ignore central insights of masculinity studies regarding the multiple standards by which men judge manliness. Robert Connell's oft-cited notion of hegemonic masculinity (1995; 2000) must be analyzed in this context, as one involving fluid, contextual, contested shifts in who gets to be a real man. To assume that poor men judge themselves against standards of middle class masculinity, find themselves lacking, and either commit suicide or act out their wounded manliness against poor women is massively over-simplified, and it ignores that poor communities forge their own definitions of masculinity which may, or may not, contest hegemonic ones.[xvi] Karin Rosemblatt has identified such contested visions of masculinity in her research on the Chilean working class in the 1930s and 40s.[xvii] Although some political and union leaders privileged a family-focused definition of responsible working class manhood connected to breadwinner roles, temperance, sexual monogamy and so on, many working class men preferred a homosocial, nomadic definition of manhood, "articulating a "wilder," less civilized masculinity" that was expressly anti-capitalist in its rejection of the idea that men will dutifully report for work and sacrifice autonomy for married life (Rosemblatt 2000a, 269). Drinking for these men contributed to a sense of shared class identity (283), and going to bars after meetings was a way to forge class consciousness, not an expression of self-hatred or wounded masculinity.

In its discussion of violence, however, the Bank wholeheartedly embraces the pathologization of poor, particularly unemployed men, framing them as inherently more abusive, sexist, and irresponsible than their richer, employed brothers. The institution is unable to conceive of standards of masculinity outside hegemonic ones, since if employment is central to Western middle class definitions of masculinity it must be central to all men's, and the only way to respond when it disppears is through abuse. Increasing domestic violence is marked as a problem in many transition countries, for example, and linked to the loss of status stemming from unemployment. Wolfensohn argued that "gender issues and stereotypes also affect men" by highlighting male unemployment and its link to alcoholism and male mortality (World Bank 2000a, iv), while *Engendering Development* claimed that "intimate partner abuse" is "associated with poverty, male unemployment, and patriarchal control of household financial resources and decisionmaking" (World Bank 2001, 49), since

> "traditional gender roles in society, though valuable in many respects, also entail expectations and social pressures that are punishing for men, for women, and for their families. During economic shocks, such as those in the transition economies of Eastern Europe, rapidly worsening unemployment has produced such high anxiety (especially among men) that alcoholism, suicide, domestic violence, and the dissolution of families have risen considerably. These, in turn, have their own impacts on women and children" (73).

The policy report also claimed that for men a "'sense of emasculation and failure often leads to a host of physical ailments and sharply increasing mortality, alcoholism, physical abuse of wives and children, divorce and abandonment of families'" (77).[xviii]

In addition, the Bank claims that women's unemployment makes them vulnerable to male violence, and less able to leave. Consider, for example, the framing of the relationship between violence and the market contained in *Towards Gender Equality*:

> "Physical and mental abuse can...have deleterious effects on the well-being and productivity of women. *Violence agaainst women is widespread in all cultures and cuts across all age and income groups*...Domestic violence appears to be an example of how the relatively weaker bargaining power of women and *the paucity of options for them outside the home* can affect the intra-household distribution of welfare" (World Bank 1995c, 26 emphasis added).

Here rape and domestic violence are problems because they are inefficient, and intervention is justified on the basis of improving productivity. Initially this inefficiency seems to be universal, but later the authors assert that it is due to a lack of opportunities outside the home. The solution is thus to expand opportunities through employment, the topic of most of the rest of the document. Likewise the 1997 progress report highlighted an anti-poverty initiative in Jamaica focused on violence which argued:

> "For young males, no work, frustration and idleness often result in gang involvement, violence and encounters with police. For women, lack of income tends to increase female dependency on males (often in the form of pregnancy) which in turn results in domestic violence directed at both partners and children" (World Bank 1997c, 4).

Links between poor men's unemployment and abuse, and between poor women's lack of work and susceptibility to assault, are central to the Bank's framing of the violence problem here, links which rest on extremely troubling assumptions about inherently violent poor men and inherently victimized poor women.

In addition, the policies promoted to resolve these problems of gender violence rest on a neo-classical model of household bargaining which leads, again, to the promotion of work. This reasoning was made explicit in *Engendering Development*.[xix] The report urged legal reforms "that make violent behavior more costly to the abuser" (World Bank 2001, 239), and a text box on "Factors Influencing Bargaining Power" focused on violence by arguing that: "in many developing countries children, the elderly and women have only limited ability to leave even abusive relationships - both because they are financially dependent on a (male) breadwinner and because gender norms restrict their "exit" options." Thus:

> "people's social or economic "fallback" options influence their bargaining power in the household. This includes the extent to which gender norms either allow or proscribe women's or men's economic activities. It also includes the nature of economic

> opportunities available in the economy and such factors as parents' wealth and social status" (156).

To recap then, violence is a problem because it reduces productivity. Policymakers can solve it by getting women into work. The Bank has some poor quantitative evidence to prove the first point, and none at all to prove the second - none of these documents provides clear evidence that employment reduces violence against women. The research paper "Terror as a Bargaining Instrument" cited in *Engendering Development* as evidence of the above statement did not even include employment as a variable, so there is absolutely no way of knowing whether work is correlated with abuse. The policy report on gender similarly offered no evidence to support its claim that lack of work outside the home is linked to violence. In fact the relationship may run the other way – *Engendering Development* acknowledged in a footnote that microcredit initiatives in Bangladesh might *increase* violence, since "violence can erupt when men try to take control of their wife's credit resources or refuse to contribute to loan payments after they have used their wife's loans" (12). Evidence on the link between domestic violence and work is similarly "mixed" (12), as a sentence buried in a paragraph on economic growth and changing gender roles conceded: "working women face greater risk of violence, sexual harassment in the workplace, and occupation-related health risks and stress" (204). In truth, as a recent survey of literature on gender-based violence concludes, there is no evidence to support a cross-cultural assertion that women who work are less likely to be assaulted by their partners than women who do not. "Researchers have only begun to explore the possible impact of domestic violence on women's labor force participation and earnings, and *studies yield inconsistent conclusions*" (Population Report 1999, 25 emphasis added). As in other cases, then, there is a distinct lack of evidence available to "prove" the claims being made about work; they function so successfully only *in part* because they lend themselves well to quantifiable arguments about productivity. Their success also rests on other factors – the broader institutional context of the Bank, the fact that work is at one and the same time an inevitable market-led adjustment and a deliberate Bank policy, and – as I will argue in the following section – the fact that work functions as an unquestioned good both to economists *and to progressives who see it as central to new empowerment approaches to development.*

Why It Works (iii): Work Empowers Women.

The final reason why work emerged as the priority in GAD policy between 1979 and 2001 was its connection with empowerment. Importantly, women's labor force participation had been linked to their empowerment by liberal feminists before it gained the attention of the Bank. For example Boserup argued that women were being deprived of the opportunity to participate equally in development projects, and thus were failing to benefit from modernization. The majority remained illiterate, unskilled, unemployed, marginally productive, and relegated to backward sectors of the economy. Without interventions to improve their skills and increase their employment in the modern industrial sector, they were "bound to be inferior workers who contribute little to the national product despite their hard toil in many traditional tasks of low productivity" (1970, 220).

Empowerment also became an increasingly important component of Bank policy in the 1990s, as the institution shifted from the narrow efficiency rationales of the 1980s (Murphy 1995, 38). Gradually the language of empowerment – "a chimera than lets everyone feel comfortable – a "motherhood" term with a warm, cuddly feeling" (Parpart

2002, 52) - entered the Bank's policy discourse, as part of a new "eclectic approach" (Moser Tornqvist and von Bronkhorst 1999, 10) drawing on multiple rationales for intervention. Wolfensohn's speech to the Beijing conference, for example, contained several references to empowerment and women's human rights, framing the Bank as "a partner in the fight for equity," committed to "achieving not only economic advance, but also social justice" (Wolfensohn 1995, 5). Indeed *Engendering Development* explicitly contested the purely efficiency-based rationale for gender equality used in previous years, arguing that "foremost among the costs of gender inequality is its toll on human lives and the quality of those lives" (World Bank 2001, 8). With its dual emphasis on growth and rights, this policy report linked efficiency-based rationales for gender policy with human development approaches (21), and the language of productivity and growth was connected to that of empowerment, oppression, and rights throughout, in a significant shift from earlier years. This eclectic approach to policy justification raises potential problems for the Bank, since as Caroline Moser notes one must ensure that rationales do not directly contradict each other (Moser Tornqvist and von Bronkhorst 1999, 10). Work provides the perfect bridge between the efficiency and empowerment approaches in this sense; indeed the link between economic growth, getting women into work, and "giving women greater control over ther own destinies" (World Bank 2000a, 6), or "rais(ing) women's social status" is a core reason why employment functions so successfully as a master mobilizing frame for GAD policy.

Early Bank texts were in fact ambivalent about the empowering effects of employment on women, with many recognizing the exploitative nature of waged work and the desperation that forced women into it. Although McNamara argued that "expanding the social, political, and economic opportunities of women beyond their traditional roles of motherhood and housekeeping enables them to channel their creative abilities over a much broader spectrum of activities" (McNamara in World Bank 1979a, iii), the 1979 report was unsure about about the emancipatory benefits of wage labor, and it included a photograph of women engaged in textile labor accompanied by the caption "many women are isolated in "female employment" (12; see image 1). This claim received elaboration in the surrounding text: "when women are isolated in "female" employment, they are effectively barred from enjoying new opportunities brought by development, and from cultivating attitudes toward work that modernization requires" (12). The attitudes to work cultivated by proper employment were not explained, but examples of the benefits of development were given, with unionization and social security mentioned as opportunities that women in "female employment" currently lack. This is a fascinating passage, both for its endorsement of benefits that were to become unspeakable as the Bank switched to structural adjustment lending, and for its recognition that waged work could be detrimental.

Some later Bank texts repeated this claim that some forms of employment were more emancipatory than others, and professional work or self-employment, especially if understood to break prevailing gender stereotypes, was typically privileged.[xx] For example *Enhancing Women's Participation* criticized the fact that "gender streaming" in school prepares girls for "predominantly feminized professions such as teaching," and recommended training them "in applied scientific fields such as agriculture, forestry, fishing, scence, and engineering" (World Bank 1994, 18).

However, from 1994 employment *in general* was increasingly presented as an empowering strategy. The 1994 policy report argued that "there is also evidence that as women gain access to income, they shift their social position both inside and outside the family. *To this extent, women's entrepreneurship is an "empowerment" strategy"* (27 emphasis added).[xxi] The report later recommended Ugandan measures to improve women's position: "they include the support of legal reforms and the promotion of legal rights and protections that enable women to benefit from their own labor and to have greater access to and control of economically productive resources, *thereby raising their status*" (59 emphasis added). Elsewhere *Enhancing Women's Participation* defined employment – generically - as a strategic gender interest, meaning that it "challenges women's subordinate status in the society" and "help(s) women achieve greater equality relative to men." Policymakers ultimately equated work with empowerment by pairing productivity with status and self-reliance, such that – in an interesting Marxist irony – waged work becomes the ultimate sign of independence (Fraser and Gordon 1994).

The Beijing documents revisited the tension between framing all work as empowering and emphasizing the emancipatory benefits of modern formal sector work over "traditional" labor. For example in a section on the benefits of the Grameen Bank (a Bangladeshi microfinance organization that is hyper-visable in GAD literature) *Towards Gender Equality* recognized that "much of the wage employment open to women in rural areas is very poorly renumerated and can be quite exploitative," and thus the Grameen Bank was a positive development because it encouraged self-employment (World Bank 1995c, 36). It also noted that growing landlessness and poverty force Indian women into

Many women are isolated in "female" employment.

Photo: P. Muncie

Image 1: 1979a.

rural wage labor (34), a point made in *Advancing Gender Equality* (1995) regarding Bangladesh (World Bank 1995a, 31). However elsewhere employment was framed as generically emancipatory. *Towards Gender Equality* linked women's income-generating activities to "opportunities…to assume leadership positions within their peer groups" (World Bank 1995c, 65), in another version of the claim that employment will empower, and *Advancing Gender Equality* (1995) was highly contradictory in its preference for high-level professional jobs; in the same paragraph it praised an agricultural project for creating causal work in cotton harvesting and agro-industry (World Bank 1995a, 25). It also endorsed a project that "overturned traditional occupational classifications by involving women in fish farming":

> "The stories of Jin Mei and Wu Ping illustrate how women have gained more opportunities and income under the Guangdong fish farming project. Both women became involved in fish pond production through the project, Jin Mei as part of the labor force and Wu Ping as a manager. From a poor farm family of ten, Jin Mei found work in prosperous Guangdong province with a local fish farmer under the project. The income she earns has enabled her to send money home, buy clothes, and open a savings account. Wu Ping has a high school education, which has enabled her to assume a managerial role in the fast growing fish farming industry. She took advantage of training in commercial accounting and business management offered through the project. By 1992 Wu had learned to assess and respond to changing market demand. By switching the production mix from fish and duck eggs to fish and meat ducks, she was able to generate significant increases in the returns for all nine households in her group" (24).

Although these women are empowered through income, they are also empowered through training, consumerism, and the inculcation of modern habits of saving and business planning. Work is thus at the center of a cluster of positive empowering attributes, a cluster that is broader than mere access to money; it also involves the cultivation of key market mentalities that liberate people from backward thinking.

Moser's 1999 evaluation of Bank gender policy also framed employment as empowering. Work was understood to fulfill women's Practical Gender Needs ("needs women and men identify in their socially accepted roles in society") because it improves living conditions, and their Strategic Gender Needs ("needs formulated from the socially structured subordinate position of women to men in society") because it can change the gender division of labor, improve women's status, and "chang(e) women's position" (Moser Tornqvist and von Bronkhorst 1999, 18). Likewise work was central to the vision of empowerment included in *Advancing Gender Equality* (2000). The report contained many photographs of women working (World Bank 2000a, 8; 11) to highlight their productive roles – these women are always smiling and were included to demonstrate the success of Bank interventions (image 3). For example one chapter closed with a photograph of an older woman in a market weighing food onto a scale – she is smiling and working, a visual representation of the empowered small-scale entrepreneur (8; image 2). The report also stressed the empowering effects of employment through its discussion of credit; arguing that it "has emerged as an important means of combating poverty and empowering women" (7).

Image 2 (World Bank 2000a, 8)

Image 3 (World Bank 2000a, 19)

Engendering Development extended this emphasis on empowerment and connected it very strongly to employment. The report offered work-focused empowerment strategies for HIV/AIDS, arguing that "to slow the epidemic where it has begun to spread outside the groups at greatest risk, governments must also institute policies that improve the relative status of women - policies that narrow the education and urban employment gaps between the sexes and that open jobs to women in large urban areas" (World Bank 2001, 76). Employment was also used to differentiate between the more oppressive and empowered parts of South Asia:

> "Women in Southeast Asia are often expected to play important economic roles in the family by working outside the home, managing family finances, and providing support for their elderly parents. This higher status results in greater mobility and higher family investments in females" (111).

Likewise the chapter on how power, incentives, and resources in the household affect gender relations noted in the introduction that "excess female mortality is lower where female labor force participation rates and female earnings are relatively high" (147). In short the Bank's current gender policy texts unequivocally consider work to be empowering – this was not the case in 1979.

The success of the "work as empowerment" claim now central to Bank GAD policy rests on two factors: the redefinition of anti-poverty projects as empowering, and the neo-classical argument that status hinges on productivity. As Wolfensohn put it in his foreword to *Advancing Gender Equality* (2000):

> "The definition of poverty has broadened to address empowerment, security, and opportunity as well as income growth. In this development environment, the empowerment of women-and of men-has become a central element in the World Bank's strategy for poverty reduction and growth" (World Bank 2000a, iv).

With poverty reduction itself defined as empowering, it follows that work – the key anti-poverty strategy – is framed as an empowering initiative.

In addition, the success of the appeal to employment as empowering rests on the neo-classical reasoning that more productive people are also more valuable – and valued – family members, and thus that workers (and those who promise to be workers) will emerge better-off from the household bargaining process than those who do not bring in an income. This reasoning was made explicit in the Beijing documents, which argued that work improves women's status because it increases income, in turn giving women more bargaining power within the family. *Towards Gender Equality* used this framing of employment to predict the realization of many other policy goals:

> "Domestic violence appears to be an example of how the relatively weaker bargaining power of women and the paucity of options for them outside the home can affect the intrahousehold distribution of welfare. Prospects for gainful employment, as well as the availability of basic social services such as water supply and sanitation also influence women's well-being. The survival chances of female children in India appear to increase as the employment rate for women rises and the earninigs differential between men and women decreases" (World Bank 1995c, 26).

Similarly as evidence of the success of a Bangladeshi vocational training initiative, *Advancing Gender Equality* (1995) claimed that: "some (women) have found jobs in the garment and leather industries, and some are now self-employed….There is also some evidence of an improved status for these women within their families" (World Bank 1995a, 33; see also 1).[xxii] Elsewhere the report argued that the relatively higher social staus of Sri Lankan women and their decision-making power within households (compared with other women in the region who face barriers of purdah and son preference) is related to women's higher labor force participation rates (54).

The neo-classical household bargaining model central to this framing of employment was set out explicity *Engendering Development*, the summary of which contained a section on "voice" that opened: "limited access to resources and weaker ability to generate income - whether in self-employed activities or in wage employment - constrain women's power to influence resource allocation and investment decisions in the home" (World Bank 2001, 5). Thus:

> "Access to productive resources - including education - and earnings capacity are critical to women's and men's ability to participate in and contribute fully to development. They are also central to transforming power relations between women and men" (25).

The report contained a six page appendix listing 25 studies that question the "unitary household" model assuming shared spending preferences between husbands and wives and income pooling, and that instead show the differential impacts of income given to men and women (307-312). Policies to foster growth and promote equal rights can be "mutually reinforcing" by linking income-generation to empowerment within the household in this way, since "greater resource control by women...leads to expenditure patterns and outcomes that strengthen women's well-being and status in the household." (158). In relation to China, for example, *Engendering Development* argued that nonfarm employment opportunities have benefited women because "remittances to parents have increased daughters' status in the family, giving them a greater sense of control of their lives" (223-224). Likewise:

> "In Bangladesh, with the rise of the export-oriented garment industry and the resulting increase in wage opportunities for young women, families have overcome social resistance to women's work outside the home and are sending women to garment factories... The higher employment of women in the country has changed the view of women's economic sphere and has, it is said, increased women's social prestige, their control of income, and their decisionmaking power in the family" (187)

This passage is part of the Bank's persistent claim, especially prominent in *Engendering Development*, that poor countries and communities are more oppressive to women than those with higher incomes. While the 1990 WID report noted, relatively mildly, that "barriers (to women's equality) are worse in conditions of poverty, but they persist even in industrial countries" (v), by 1995 the Bank claimed that "the lives of poor, uneducated rural women tend to be more circumscribed than those of the urban, educated elite" (World Bank 1995a, 1). The 2000 *Advancing Gender Equality* text bluntly stated: "societies that discriminate on the basis of gender tend to experience more poverty, slower economic growth, and a lower quality of life than societies in which gender inequality is less pronounced. The effects are especially strong in the poorest countries, where the quality of life is often the lowest" (World Bank 2000a, 3). Likewise *Engendering Development* argued that gender disparities can be particularly acute for "specific subpopulations, such as the poor" (World Bank 2001, 22), and that "as incomes rise, gender equality tends to increase." Since "gender disparities are more pronounced in poorer households than in nonpoor ones" (2001, 63), the policy paper operates "by interpreting the gender gap as a measure of economic backwardness" (178).

The neo-colonial race and class-based hierarchies embedded in this claim are immediately apparent. Homogenized poor women function as the "other" to modern, educated, employed Western women (Parpart 1995, 255; Watts 1995, 54), and the Rich World is offered up as the example for the ever-oppressed Third World Woman to follow. Here the South is framed as backward because its women do not participate in the capitalist marketplace, while "we" are understood to have achieved both gender equity and development, because "we" work. The Bank explicitly takes upon itself the task of educating backward governments about the benefits of employing women (World Bank 1997g, 15), and helping them over-come their "patriarchal traditions" (World Bank 1994, 32) and "cultural norms" (1997g, 15) in this respect. However the policy rationale also stems from a neo-liberal bargaining model of the household, which privileges income – and income alone - as determinative of status. Thus any policy to increase income necessarily empowers, making work the ultimate strategy of liberation for poor women.

Once again, the Bank's positioning of neo-liberalism as a strategy of feminist empowerment is contestable on many levels given that, as Frances Cleaver notes, "policy and research suggest some confusion over whether paid work is empowering or oppressing for men and women" (Cleaver 2002, 16). The one-sided framing of garment worers as liberated through waged employment cited above is particularly inadequate[xxiii]. Once more, however, the equation of work with independence, empowerment, and autonomy is not necessily supported by the institution's own research. For example, in reference to an income generation project in Bangladesh *Towards Gender Equality* noted:

> "The study finds that it is difficult to infer that increased borrowing alone improves women's bargaining power because in many rural Bangladeshi households the question of who controls the resources is quite complex... Nevertheless, the possibility of receiving credit (or, similarly, of working for wages) may give women greater bargaining power within the household" (World Bank 1995c, 36).

There is no evidence provided to support this possibility; nonetheless it is central to the "work as empowerment" argument out forward by this policy text. Indeed *Engendering Development* conceded in paragraph buried on page 210 that evidence on the issue is mixed, at least in relation to East Asia, since

> "...newly found work opportunities did not necessarily give young women greater personal autonomy. Many parents tightened their control of daughters and expected remittances as repayment for the investments in them... In the home the traditional division of labor remains sharp" (World Bank 2001, 210).

The report also stated in a footnote that:

> "Additional household income can lead to increased demand for human capital in the family, but the effect on gender disparities is determined by a variety of social and institutional factors... *There is no automatic process whereby increased household resources reduce gender disparitie*s" (228 emphasis added).

As with previous arguments about productivity, poverty reduction, human capital, and violence prevention, the quantitative evidence often fails to prove the Bank's point in its own terms. Moving such data holes from the footnotes to the centre of Bank policy discussions is thus an important step in contesting the reputation of Bank research as preeminent in the development policy arena, and in questioning the specific policy rationales that research allegedly supports.

Conclusion: Work as a Commonsensical Development Good

By 1995 work was no longer primarily a survival strategy, and waged employment was less likely to exploit. Instead labor force participation had been framed as emancipatory in its own right, a signifier of development even when unconnected to other social goods such as reduced poverty or lower fertility. The connection of employment – generically framed – to empowerment increased significantly, and work was linked to improved status in the household, choice, opportunity, and participation more than to survival or economic need. Indeed one of the reasons work is so prominent in GAD policy is that it appeals to technocrats interested in efficient development and to progressive development actvists who use the language of empowerment; nowhere is this better illustrated than in the use of neo-classical household bargaining models to connect employment to emancipation. Again, however, on closer interrogation one finds that few of the claims made about work are supported by satisfactory evidence, and many of them involve explicit references to concepts that are clearly political, such as empowerment. One is thus faced with a dual rationale for the work focus. Work is emphasized as an efficient, apolitical, technical solution to a widely accepted problem of productivity, *and* it is understood to fulfill broader goals of empowerment and gender equality within a newer social development approach that continues to privilege rich world nations as the model to be followed, that frames men in poor countries as pathologically oppressive, and that understands Third World Women as ever-victimized. This connection between growth and empowerment was a crucial reason why work could be so successfully framed as an unquestioned, commonsensical "good" whose links to progressive human development and feminism could be assumed rather than proven by a range of policy makers, even in an institution that is framed by most observers as driven by quantitative data. Work has in fact become embedded in the institutional commonsense to such a degree that it does not need proving, and will not be regarded as controversial, even when it is associated with the apparently political language of empowerment and changing gender relations.

In an intriguing connection, some policymakers express a desire to make gender policy commonsensical and above/beyond the politics of knowledge production and economistic justification in this way; this is part of what entrepreneurs are aiming at through "mainstreaming." As Precis defines the term:

> "Something is said to be mainstreamed when it is so routine that it provokes neither conflict nor comment. Computerization of office work, the numbering of streets, and sending six-year-olds to school are all illustrative of the concept of mainstreaming" (World Bank 2000d, 2).

It is in this sense that the document frames mainstreaming as potentially paradoxical, since "success often renders the issues less visible" (2).

It appears that work has become the ultimate mainstreaming success in these terms. There are hundreds of examples in the Bank's formally cleared texts demonstrating that work is seen as a commonsensical development good in need of no further justification, particularly after 1994. For example statistics on women's labor force participation are referred to as "straightforward" indicators of development success in *Enhancing Women's Participation* (World Bank 1994, 56), and the report asserted that: "across the world, significant improvements have been made in women's education, health, and access to labor market opportunities" (16). It is framed as commonsensical that getting women into work should count as a development good alongside interventions such as keeping them alive or making them literate, and working women repeatedly feature as a symbol of development success alongside educated women and healthy women in this way. The introduction to *Advancing Gender Equality* noted that progress had been made in narrowing gender differences, since "illiteracy among women is declining, fertilty rates are fallng and women are entering the labor force in ever-rising numbers" (World Bank 2000a, 1). Moreover, *Engendering Development* announced in a celebratory tone that "today not only are many more married women joining the labor market, but they are also working more weeks a year, more hours a week, and are staying active for longer " (World Bank 2001, 104). Indeed labor force indicators are by now so obviously a development good that they can be listed with schooling and health as "our usual development markers" (27), in a perfect reflection of the "commonsensicalization" of employment as indicative of good development.

I devote the remaining chapters of this dissertation to complicating that common sense, and to interrogating the tensions that emerge from the prioritization of employment as the ultimate feminist development strategy by turning to an analysis of the social reproduction problem embedded in the Bank's work policies. However at this point I wish simply to register the shift that has taken place in Bank policy such that these claims are possible, and to clarify the reasons why it occurred. By 2001 higher employment was considered such a "familiar marker of gender equality" (35) that it could be used without explanation as evidence that women have gained rights; this was not possible in 1979. I have argued that work emerged as the key ingredient in GAD policy in this manner for three reasons: 1. it nicely "fit" the Bank's institutionally conditioned, apolitical focus on productivity and efficiency; 2. it successfully eclipsed potential rivals, emerging (through a mixture of insider tactics and external events) as the crucial keystone through which other development goods could be secured; and 3. it was successfully linked to broader concerns with empowerment and participation, thus securing the support of progressive development activists. I have thus sought to question the assumption that GAD policy entrepreneurs within the Bank simply "proved" their claims using efficiency discourses - this fails to recognize that *some* claims do not need empirical justification, and are not held to account by demands for factuality. In particular, claims that getting women into work will empower them sometimes need no evidence – they are commonsensical, because work functions successfully as an unquestioned development good.

i See chapter 5 for a more extensive discussion of export promotion, employment, and gender.

ii The terms included in this expansive cluster are listed in table 1, appendix 2.

iii Some Bank texts do not avoid this error; see for example Khandker 1991, 37

iv Precisely how the "outlier" findings – mainly East Asian countries which had high growth but low female education rates - can be legitimately excluded based on the fact that they are "apparently puzzling" is unclear (World Bank 2001, 89).

v Causality aside, the Bank did claim that: "Controlling for GDP per capita (in natural logarithm, with a quadratic term, to capture the nonlinearity in the relationship), the multivariate analysis finds a significant positive association between gender equality in rights and gender differences in schooling, life expectancy, and parliamentary representation" (World Bank 2001, 117). Data on labor force participation was simply ignored here, in an extremely curious and apparently inexplicable omission. It is unclear whether there is no relationship between rights and labor force participation, or whether the relationship can not be tested at all because the Bank use women's employment as a marker of rights, a measure of gender equality, and sign of growth.

vi With the main text arguing strongly that "more competitive hiring practices reduce the scope for gender wage discrimination" in China (World Bank 2001, 197), a footnote in this chapter conceded: "There is an ongoing debate among Chinese researchers about changes in women's relative status in the labor market since the onset of economic reform. Some researchers suggest that the reduction of government involvement in the labor market means greater scope for the reemergence of traditional values that would encourage greater gender discrimination in the labor market. Other researchers suggest that increasing competitive labor markets should enhance women's economic standing by "penalizing discriminating firms and rewarding nondiscriminators" (Maurer-Fazio and Hughes 1999). While there is general agreement that increasingly competitive markets are working to limit the scope for gender discrimination, empirical evidence is still mixed on which of the two forces-traditional values and increased competition-are having a greater overall impact on labor market outcomes" (World Bank 2001, 228). ANOTHER footnote, following a text section that claims "real wages are higher in the private sector than in the state owned sector" (World Bank 2001, 224) in China, notes: "Evidence on changes in wage discrimination, as measured by the portion of the wage gap that is unexplained after controlling for education and work experience, is mixed. Some evidence shows that the largest unexplained wage gaps are in the private sector, while the smallest are in the state sector (Maurer-Fazio and Hughes 1999), suggesting that gender wage gaps are likely to increase as private sector employment becomes increasingly important. Other evidence suggests, however, that the relative share of discrimination in the overall gender wage differential declines substantially from the state to the private sector (Liu, Meng, and Zhang forthcoming)." (World Bank 2001, 230).

vii Aside from the multiple ironies of framing the Bank – which has appointed 2 women as vice presidents in its 50 year history – as a leader in employment equality, this framing of the Bank as a careers service involves assumptions about how people get jobs (by formally applying for specific positions that are openly advertised, for example) that do not stand up to critical scrutiny when considering working class peope in Rich World donor nations (see f or example Willis 1977) – it is equally misguided as a basis for employment policy in the Global South.

viii (http://dictionary.oed.com)

ix Interestingly a 1986 video on women in development put out by the Bank also privileged education, arguing that better family health was the first benefit to be gained from schooling women, for example. Indeed the narrator explicitly denied that increasing women's labor force participation was the overarching rationale for the education initiative:

"Educating girls is one the best investments any country can make in its economic growth and welfare, even if the girls never enter the labor market. Most girls eventually become mothers, and their influence will be extended through their children for generations to come." (Escobal 1986)

x I acknowledge this although "new Bank lending commitments for education have been declining in recent years" (World Bank 1997a, 20).

xi Subsequent Bank reviews of GAD efforts reveal an important disjuncture between rhetoric and money in this respect; although GAD staff were busy reorienting gender policy away from traditional sectors, "Over the past decade, Bank lending for population, health and nutrition (PHN) and education has increased steadily in both absolute terms and as a proportion of total lending." (World Bank 1996b, 9).These documents reveal a time lag problem, since the projects they include were approved long before the new policy orientation took effect: thus the 1996 evaluation refers to a poplation project in Egypt designed: "to stimulate demand for family planning and for smaller family size in areas where fertility levels remain high" (World Bank 1996b, 13) a year after the Beijing documents promised a shift to reproductive health initiatives. However as the 1997 progress report makes clear, although PHN spending is rising it is still atiny percentage of the Bank's overall lending commitments; average lending for these sectors in the late 1990s was around US $ 2,000 million per year (World Bank 1997c, 20), compared to projected Bank lending of over $2 billion for education in FY 98-9.

xii Although this discussion focuses on how insider-activists used DALYs to get support for anti-violence policy, it is worth noting that enthusiasm for a statistical methodology for estimating the global health burden from gender violence was not limited to Bank staff; other feminists also regarded it as an important rhetorical device in gaining support for anti-violence initiatives. For example Simone Diniz argued at a Center for Women's Global Leadership meeting that feminists needed to generate statistics on women's death from pregnancy, childbirth, and battery to show the toll of violence on women's lives (Center for Women's Global Leadership 1992, 30/1). This "epidemiology of violent death" would convince development practitioners of the need to intervene. Other feminists focused on the need to prove, quantifiably, how violence against women restricted their participation in development programs and affected their work performance (Carrillo 1992; Pypops in Center for Women's Global Leadership 1992, 24). There is also a rapidly expanding literature on the economics of violence, from studies on the costs to HMOs of spousal assault (Population Reports 1999, 19), to efforts to simulate the effects of childhood sexual abuse on income (Heise 1994, 24). Thus although the Bank has gone furthest in its attempts to calculate the productivity-impairing effects of abuse, feminists from a variety of fields have been using quantification in their efficiency-based policy appeals.

xiii Indeed the version of the DALYs included in Engendering Developent contains some truly obscure definitions of illness conditions, whereby unipolar major depression and bipolar disorder make it in to the top 10 for men and women in developing and developed countries, schizophrenia makes it in the top 10 for men in developing regions, and obsessive compulsive disorder and schizophrenia feature for women in developed regions alongside "war", in perhaps the most bizarre "illness condition" so far.

xiv Such a de-centering of violence prevention is evident in Tinker's report on women's health which promotes a two-tier model of health policy containing essential and expanded services. The first tier includes interventions with such widespread benefits that they justify public funding, even in the poorest countries and even in a restructuring context when states are supposed to be cutting social spending. The second tier of expanded services includes additional policies available to middle income countries, and to "poorer countries to the extent resources permit" (Tinker et al 1994, xi). Of policies concerned with violence-prevention, only the elimination of female genital mutilation (FGM) makes it into the first tier of services, ostensibly because it later affects the productivity of women of reproductive age. In fact Lori Heise's methodological appendix makes it clear that FGM was not included in DALY measures of the impact of rape and domestic violence on the global health burden (Heise 1994, 48), and thus the Bank have no data on its productivity-impairing effects. In reality, of course, the focus on FGM speaks more to racialized tropes about victimized Third World Women than it does to productivity. See Mohanty (1991), Narayan (1997) and the Center for Women's Global Leadership report on violence (1992) for a discussion of the racialized nature of much development discourse about violence. In contrast the second tier of services includes increased policy dialogue to reduce violence, and increased attention to the health problems of women beyond reproductive age (a group who are not in the essential package because improving their health has less to offer in terms of productivity). Tinker claims this approach offers a "rational basis" to improve women's health that works within the constraints faced by developing countries, by showing them how to redirect scarce resources to the most cost-effective interventions (1994, xi). However such framing of the policy problem is highly troublesome; it privileges women of certain ages over others for market-derived reasons that are at best ethically dubious, and it frames violence prevention as an "extra" service only available to countries with sufficient resources.

xv see also Whitehead in Jackson 2001

xvi For example, Connell notes, "class deprivation generates ugly expressions of masculine supremacy as the British experience of football crowd violence and skinhead racism goes to show. Yet class deprivation leads to other things besides alienated violence" (1995, 237). Strikes and lockouts have, for example, often been sites for progressive gender politics – this is simply inconceivable in a model of wounded masculinity that pathologizes poor men. Similarly Stanley Brandes' research on alcoholics anonymous in Mexico City found that newly sober men both invoked and critiqued traditional definitions of masculinity, arguing that tears were a sign of honor, for example, or than recovery bred "real men" (Brandes 2003).

xvii See also Gutmann 2003, a recent anthology on Latin American masculinity; especially the essay by Mallon on Chile.

xviii Again the Bank is not alone in this diagnosis of the development malaise. This notion of a "crisis of masculinity" is prevalent in development policy with several analysts highlighting the "demasculinizing" effects of poverty and economic change, particularly the undermining of breadwinner wages (Cleaver 2002, 3-4; Chant 2001; Jackson 2001; Cleaver 2002).

xix The most blatant calls for women's employment as a violence prevention strategy are evident in Bank research that explores the economic basis for violence inside the household, in discussionpapers that are not analyzed here. Such research uses econometric techniques to model how violence is used within the household as a way to transfer resources between members. For example, a recent Bank discussion paper on dowry murder in India entitled "Terror as a Bargaining Instrument" uses game theory to simulate the way in which husbands use violence to extract resources from their wives' families. The report concludes with a call for the provision of employment for women, since "the main opportunities for women outside the marriage market would be in the labor market" (Bloch and Rao 2000, 21).

xx The Bank's 1986 video on "Women in the Third World" (Escobal 1986)took a similar approach, designating certain forms of labor key to the realization of development but hardly framing all work as emancipatory. Although women's "back-breaking" work in agriculture and domestic production was understood to be "a central component in the economic life of any country," it was framed negatively. However "professional" labor was constructed as a source of pride for some women interviewed. While the labor of poor women – in rural and urban areas – was framed as a product of necessity; the work of professionals (always urban, and always English-speaking) signified choice, empowerment, and development.

xxi Needless to say, this evidence is not cited.

xxii Again, this evidence is not cited.

xxiii See Zaman 1999.

Chapter 2: The Bank's Recognition of the Social Reproduction Problem.

> "there is growing recognition that work no longer can signify the exhaustive source of self-sufficiency that it never was but once could claim to be" (Schram 1995, 179).

Introduction.

In the last chapter I asked both why and how employment became the Bank's priority in GAD policy, and I identified three factors as particularly important: 1. the linking of work to productivity, 2. the framing of work as a way to achieve other development goals, and 3. the promotion of work as a common-sensical development "good" that empowers poor women. Given this prioritization of employment, in this chapter I consider a related policy problem that requires answers from the institution: how continued requirements to provide caring labor are to be met when women get into work. Contesting assumptions that the Bank ignore this issue by endorsing a default "exhaustion solution" to the social reproduction problem that over-burdens women, I identify clear recognition of a policy dilemma, and the need for concrete interventions to resolve it. Indeed in chapter three I argue that the Bank's gender policymakers have developed clear solutions of their own to this dilemma, deserving explication and critique. However these measures have been overlooked in literature that remains focused on the exhaustion solution. In this chapter I attempt to correct this oversight through attention to the Bank's recognition of social reproduction issues in relation to women's multiple roles, their work in food production, childcare and elder care, and the need for "work-family balance" reform inside the Bank itself. In arguing for Bank intervention, GAD staff sucessfully claimed that the social reproduction problem should be a policy priority because it limits women's participation in development. Specifically, it hinders girls' participation in school and women's participation in employment. Feminist insiders thus explicitly critiqued mainstream economics and the definitions of work and productivity embedded therein, and they rejected the exhaustion solution to social reproduction implicitly endorsed by early structural adjustment efforts. In this regard they troubled the Bank's push to get women into paid work, and legitimized the concrete policy solutions to the social reproduction dilemma analyzed in chapter three.

The World Bank's Recognition of the Social Reproduction Problem.

It may appear that the Bank's emphasis on work as the cure-all GAD policy replicates an assumption common to conventional economics that universal competitive individualism in the capitalist marketplace is the only route to development, in whereby women's achievement of what Gayatri Spivak terms female individualism is emphasized (1985, 799). In order to be incorporated into the market on socially male terms, one may expect that women's caring responsibilities would simply be erased; hence George and Sabelli's point that the Bank "has no grand design beyond the casting of all economies in the neo-classical mould and the re-fashioning of all men and women as Homo economicus" (1994, 8). Everyone is regarded as a rational, autonomous economic actor, no one is dependent on anyone else, no one is altruistic; in effect, we are all workers now.

However the most cursory reading of formally cleared Bank policy texts on WID/GAD reveals a clear awareness of the social reproduction problem, one that increased significantly in the 1990s. Documents are full of references to "triple roles," "the "double burden" on women of production and reproduction" (World Bank 1990, 13), "caring for the sick, house maintenance, and such vital work as caring for children, preparing food, and fetching firewood and water" (1994, 9), "women's roles in the economy as well as in the reproductive sphere" (1995a, 22), "the type of nonwage work women typically carry out within the household, such as child care, food preparation, and, in low-income countries especially, subsistence farming and the collection of fuelwood and water" (1995c, 3), "Household and Labor Market Linkages" (1995c, 29), "work in the "survival sector" (Murphy 1997, 40), "women's labor time burden" (World Bank 1997c, 27), the need to "creat(e) a more gender equitable division of labor in the household" (Moser Tornqvist and von Bronkhorst 1999, 26), "reducing the personal costs to women of their household roles" (World Bank 2001, 23), "women's dominant role in raising children and maintaining the household" (2001, 86), and "a strikingly consistent gender division of labor, in which men work more in the market and women more in the home" (2001, 152). A table (table 3) is included in appendix 2 showing the references, by document, to a cluster of keywords associated with social reproduction; this cluster included terms such as domestic, childcare, housework, cooking, triple, subsistence, and so on. The raw number of these references to social reproduction increased as the volume of Bank gender policy text rose (see chart 3) – from 136 references in the 1979 pamphlet to 1437 in *Engendering Development*. The social reproduction cluster constitutes 9% of the total word hits across all documents, but it is more central to certain texts – notably the 1979 document, the 1990 *WID Progress Report*, the 1995 *Towards Gender Equality* text, and the 2001 policy paper (see chart 4). These four texts are crucially important ones for the Bank, and are arguably more central to its gender policy articulation than the internal evaluations containing fewer references to social reproduction as a percentage of the total text. This suggests that social reproduction concerns are particularly visible in publically-oriented Bank gender policy.





Document 1: 1979 Recognizing the Invisable Women in Development; 2: 1990 WID Progress Report; 3: 1994 Enhancing Women's Participation (first policy paper); 4: 1995 Murphy Gender Evaluation; 5: 1995 Wolfensohn Beijing speech 6: 1995 Promoting Gender Equality report 7: 1995 Towards Gender Equality; 8: 1995 Advancing Gender Equality; 9: 1996 Implementing the Bank's Gender Policies; 10: 1997 Implementing the Bank's Gender Policies; 11: 1997 Mainstreaming Gender (Murphy); 12: External Gender Consultation Group report; 13: 1998 Mainsteaming Gender (Moser et al); 14: 2000 Precis discussion of gender; 15: 2000 Advancing Gender Equality; 16: 2001 Engendering Development (second policy paper).

The general concern with social reproduction can be further illustrated by a focus on three themes of specific importance that emerge from these documents: 1. a concern with women's multiple roles, 2. a recognition of work in food production/preparation, childcare, and elder care, and 3. a concern with the social reproduction problem as it relates to women employed by the Bank itself. Through discussing these issues, policy entrepeneurs claimed that the social reproduction problem was a policy priority because it limited women's participation in development, leading them to an explicit critique of a work-focused agenda for ignoring unpaid caring labor.

Multiple Roles, Subsistence Agriculture, Care for Dependents, and Work-Family Balance in the Bank – Evidence that Social Reproduction Matters.

Officially cleared Bank texts on gender focus, above all, on household dynamics. The first policy paper promised that "the Bank's future analytical work will focus on…the factors underlying the structure of gender relations within households" (World Bank 1994, 12), and it listed "investigating how patterns of intrafamily resource allocation can reduce or enhance the effects of public policy" as one of the institution's "specific priorities" for future analysis (68-9). Likewise *Towards Gender Equality* claimed that "in recent years, attempts to explain persistent gender inequalities in the accumulation and use of human capital have focused on the key role of household decisionmaking and the process of resource allocation within households" (1995c, 21). Murphy's 1995 evaluation contained multiple references to household activities (as highlighted later by Moser Tornqvist and von Bronkhorst 1999, 23), as did the 1997 policy review, which defined "effective gender analysis" as "analyz(ing) intrahousehold decision processes" (Murphy

1997, 43). This led to persistent demands for gender disaggregated data at the household level in order to develop good policy.

The chanelling of gender analysis into household analysis was particularly central to Moser's 1999 evaluation of Bank gender policy; this framed "intrahousehold dynamics" as the first component of a gender analysis of social institutions, on the following basis:

- The household is a system of resource allocation...
- Any development intervention that affects one member of the household will positively or negatively affect all others.
- It is important to understand these interdependent relationships-the rights, responsibilities, obligations, and patterns of interaction among household members" (Moser Tornqvist and von Bronkhorst 1999, 19).

Although Moser recognized that individuals make larger, non-household groupings, the first "alliance for survival" highlighted was the household. Her table summarizing approaches to gender analysis taken in Bank country studies also emphasized their coverage of households (24-6).[i]

Within this broader focus on households, Bank texts on gender make frequent references to women's multiple roles, key to a recognition of the social reproduction dilemma. Indeed these references are required for a document to qualify as an example of good gender analysis. These references are not new – the "equity" approach to WID used in the 1975-85 UN debates was in part defined through attention to women's multiple roles (7), and a key feature of the Bank's early training on GAD was a focus on "activity analysis," charting "information on the roles of women and men with respect to socioeconomic activities namely: the production of goods and services, the reproduction and maintenance of human capital, and social functions" (Murphy 1995, 100). When the Bank's first WID advisor started producing "Notes on WID" in 1978, they "included discussion of intra-household labor, and community roles of men and women" (29), and early efforts to include women noted that "through their reproductive, productive, and community roles" they were already involved in many development projects (40). Later, Moser's triple role framework was used as the defining feature of a good gender analysis, and recognition of the interconnection of productive, reproductive, and community management roles was made central to Bank work. For example the 1994 policy report included a text box on "the Gender Analysis Framework" drawn from Moser, which argued that appropriate policy interventions required awareness of women's and men's different tasks (both paid and unpaid):

> "For example, in most rural low-income households in developing countries, the primary role of men is to earn income. Women, in contrast, have a triple role: they are responsible for reproductive work (childbearing, childrearing, and household welfare activities); for productive work (crop planting and processing, livestock raising, handicrafts, and so on) and for community managing (the provision and maintenance of community services such as healthcare, nutrition,and water supply). Understanding these roles in a specific context would imply that an agricultural extension program needs to be designed around women's schedules and meeting places to elicit their participation, as they have to balance these three roles" (World Bank 1994, 67).

Likewise Murphy's 1995 study discussed triple roles in the first chapter (Murphy 1995, 22), as did the 1997 policy evaluation. The latter criticized early projects for failing to utilize this framework (Murphy 1997, 22), but it noted approvingly that "thirty-three of the recent projects included high-quality gender analysis that documented the productive, reproductive, and community roles of women and men in the project area and used this evidence to identify needs and appropriate strategies" (27). This notion of "adequate gender analysis" (22) as requiring awareness of triple roles was replicated – word for word – later in the study, where "the importance of looking at both men's and women's roles" and "the need to look beyond productive activities to family and community tasks" were listed as guidelines for effective policy planning (Murphy 1997, 43).

Not surprisingly given her own work on gender-aware planning, the clearest manifestation of the concern with roles is in Moser's 1999 evaluation of Bank gender lending; 10 of the 13 word hits for "triple" occur in this text (see table 3). Her review highlighted different methodologies used in gender aware planning; they all referenced women's multiple roles and the need to expand analysis beyond a narrow definition of productive activities. Moser also used the triple role framework as a starting point for her attempt to get the Bank to "agree on common concepts and language" to help achive the "systematic clarification" required of good gender analysis (Moser Tornqvist and von Bronkhorst 1999, 18), as demonstrated in the following definitional text box:

"Box 3.3 Definitions: Gender roles, needs, interests, and approaches

Gender roles define what a society considers to be appropriate for a man or a woman, reflecting a division of labor. Both women and men play multiple roles in society; while men play their multiple roles sequentially, women play their roles simultaneously, and must balance competing claims on limited time for fulfillment of each.

Productive role. Work done both by women and men for pay in cash or kind; includes both market production with an exchange value and subsistence/home production with actual use value, but also potential exchange value

Reproductive role. Child bearing/rearing responsibilities and domestic tasks required to guarantee the maintenance and reproduction of the labor force; includes not only biological reproduction but also the care and the maintenance of people living in the household

Community roles. Voluntary activities contributing to the welfare, development, or political organization of the community"

Both *Précis* and *Engendering Development* used the triple role framework in a similar fashion, although they do not necessary use the term (World Bank 2000d, 6). The frequency with which these references to multiple roles occur is clear evidence that femocrats within the Bank acknowledge the importance of social reproduction.

In addition, recognition of the importance of women's work in substistance agriculture, water provision, cooking, and food preparation has always been central to Bank WID/GAD efforts. For example the 1979 document noted in its section on agriculture and rural development that "men can use their cash incomes from cash crops to improve their productivity, whereas women earn little or no cash from farming, since they produce primarily for family consumption" (World Bank 1979a, 7). The 1994 policy report also recognized that "a gender division of labor causes women to remain in the unpaid subsistence sector" (World Bank 1994, 58), and that women have important roles as farmers "to meet...subsistence food needs" (35).

Acknowledgement of women's important role in food preparation and production is also illustrated in the Bank's claim that women – unlike men - will work for food rather than wages. The recommendation of this self-selection mechanism for means testing benefits not only acknowledges the importance of non-cash renumeration for labor, hereby disrupting Bank perceptions of fully marketized, monetarized economies, but it also recognizes that women are responsible for family food provision. The 1994 report also argued that women's responsibility for food provision leads to their greater concern for the environment, since:

> "Women also have a vested interest in conserving natural resources because of their deep concern for the quality of the ecosystem. *This concern is rooted in their daily reality, their experience as persons primarily responsible for obtaining fuel and water in much of the developing world, and their role in managing the consumption patterns of the household.* It is also rooted in their concern for the future generations they bear" (World Bank 1994, 28 emphasis added).

Likewise the Beijing reports framed food production and preparation as women's reponsibility, with *Advancing Gender Equality* (1995) noting in relation to a Ugandan poverty assessment that:

> "Women are responsible for producing 80 percent of the country's food and provide about 70 percent of agricultural labor. They work for the most part in the unpaid subsistence sector" (World Bank 1995a, 19).

This point was reiterated in Murphy's 1995 study (Murphy 1995, 22), and in *Advancing Gender Equality's* recognition that "women are the primary collectors, users, and managers of household water supplies in developing countries" (World Bank 2000a, 11). In short the issue of women's unpaid work in securing family survival was (and is) central to formally cleared gender policy texts – one can not sustain a claim that the Bank is unaware of the social reproduction problem on this basis.

The Bank also recognizes the necessity of care for dependents, hereby disrupting claims that employment will cure all development ills. This recognition is particularly evident through discussions of children and the need to achieve work-family balance in order that their needs can be met. The 1979 document recognized women's important role in childrearing by acknowledging on the first page that they should be included in development because they are responsible for preparing children for life (World Bank 1979a, 1). Likewise the 1994 policy paper noted that: "women in the reproductive years are exposed to dangers associated with pregnancy and childbirth, and they experience the heavy nutritional demands of reproduction and lactation at the same time that their work loads in the marketplace and household are heaviest" (World Bank 1994, 33). Similarly both Beijing documents recognized the importance of women's work in childcare. *Towards Gender Equality* highlighted the social reproduction dilemma in relation to children when criticizing the Bolivian prison system for incarcerating people who bounce cheques; 40% of female inmates are imprisoned for such debt-related crimes, and "in many cases children must live in prison with their mothers" (World Bank 1995c, 68). *Advancing Gender Equality* (1995) also drew attention to the difficulty of balancing childcare with employment (World Bank 1995a, 29), and several reports raised concerns about the restructuring of childcare provision in Eastern Europe.[ii]

This emphasis continued in more recent policy texts. *Précis* used the fact that "women provide most of the child care" (World Bank 2000d, 1) as a rationale for gender policy, and the summary of *Engendering Development* made that fact central to its definition of gender. Acknowledging that socially constructed roles for men and women vary across cultures it nonetheless claimed that "...there are also some striking similarities. For example, nearly all societies give the primary responsibility for the care of infants and young children to women and girls, and that for military service and national defense to men" (World Bank 2001, 2). The need to balance paid work and childcaring labor was also explicitly marked as a problem associated with economic growth and the movement of women into formal employment; this was the first specific problem mentioned in a summary of "a new set of concerns for women, men, and their families" (104) in *Engendering Development*. In short the Bank demonstrates a clear and consistent awareness of women's responsibility for childcare, and this again troubles its prioritization of women's employment – absent any efforts to resolve social reproduction tensions - as a cure-all development strategy.

Another way in which a concern with the social reproduction problem is evident in formally cleared policy texts is through the Bank's comments on dependent adults, notably the sick and elderly. As the 1990 progress report put it: "beyond their work in the formal and informal labor force, women usually have the primary responsibility for the care of children and the elderly and for many household chores" (World Bank 1990, 2). Later *Towards Gender Equality* recognized that:

> "children are not the only reason for interruptions in women's labor force participation; caring for ill or aged family members is often a woman's responsibility. A study from Hungary estimates that half of all absenteeism by women workers is the direct result of the need to care for sick relatives... Thus women's labor market outcomes can be substantially poorer than those of men because women's employment opportunities are constrained by social arrangements at the family or household level" (World Bank 1995c, 30).

To prove that the AIDS epidemic imposes high costs on women, men, children, and society, *Engendering Development* claimed that women's economic status suffers even if they are not infected, since "because women are the primary caregivers for children and bedridden adults, the epidemic will rob healthy women of wages by pulling them out of the labor market to care for AIDS patients and orphans" (World Bank 2001, 75). The concluding chapter to this report included a section on "emerging issues" that "require greater attention from a gender perspective by policy makers and policy reaserchers;" the first was:

> "The graying of the world's population. With birth rates declining and people living longer, the world's population is aging and the number of elderly-especially widows-worldwide will increase substantially during the 21st century. The labor force choices of elderly men and women are also becoming more similar. What do these changes imply for social protection, health, and other areas of public policy?" (272).

Given demographic trends the policy paper warned that "potential support ratios" will decline, with the focus of caregiving shifting from children to ageing parents. This will require a reorientation of social services towards older people's health, pension issues and so on (68). The social reproduction dilemma is thus defined, by the Bank's own gender staff, more broadly than a concern with children – it also encompasses the need to care for other "vulnerable" groups whose dependencies pose a problem for a policy agenda focused solely on self-reliance through employment.

The Bank's approach to pensions and social security is particularly interesting in this regard. *Engendering Development* devoted three times the space to old-age support systems as to childcare policy, arguing that "informal community and family arrangements are the mainstay of social security in most developing countries," and that women are more dependent on these "private" intrahousehold transfers for support than men given that women are more likely to lack access to formal social security systems based on employment. This whole debate hinges on recognition that women's labor market experiences and reliance on male income leave them vulnerable to poverty – a situation in part caused by women's disproportionate responsibility for social reproduction. Thus "market failures" arise, in which the different circumstances of men and women are not taken into account when designing social security systems. Consequently *Engendering Development* singled out widows and elderly women as a group vulnerable to poverty based on their different labor market experiences, and on this basis it recommended pension reform to incorporate a component not based on work (264-268). It also criticized the Chilean pension reform program (in part designed by the Bank), involving a contribution pillar and a redistributive public pillar with a minimum pension guarantee for all eligble workers, since women's pensions will *fall* relative to men's (and in absolute terms) because they will be harmed by the greater emphasis on the contributions pillar. The section thus concluded with the rather pessimistic summary: "for the majority of women, lower earnings and fewer work years will still translate into lower pensions" (136). There is a clear critique of neo-liberal pension reform models here, for perpetuating a model of work which ignores care, and which does not reflect women's labor market experience. Indeed the broader prioritization of this policy problem reflects a clear awareness that women can not be relied upon to provide care for other dependent adults or even for themselves, given their different labor force participation experiences – rather social policies must be actively developed to resolve tensions between paid work and caring labor in this regard.

Concerns with the social reproduction problem also surface in discussions of gender *inside* the Bank.[iii] For example when writing of initiatives to increase the number of women in senior management jobs the 1996 evaluation focused on "work environment and culture change," and the first item in a list of measures taken to address gender discrimination inside the Bank read:

> "Work-Family: A Work-Family Agenda was adopted, and several Vice Presidencies have experimented with flextime and other arrangements. Funds to cover hiring consultants to replace staff on leave and other costs associated with maternity leave have been established in a number of Vice Presidencies" (World Bank 1996b, implementing).

The same point was highlighted in the progress report the following year, given that "in October 1996, the alternative work schedule (nine days on, one day off), which can help balance work and family responsibilities, became a Bankwide policy option" (World Bank 1997c, 34). Similarly in a section headed "overcoming institutional resistance to gender analysis," *Précis* noted:

> "Most organizations are structurally biased toward men's interests or are exclusionary along critical dimensions that perpetuate gender inequality - the separation of work and family, for example, or the split between paid work and family life. The assumption that work has the first claim on an individual does not fit women, who are mainly responsible for family and community work. It devalues women's interests within the organizations that could support their family roles and the restructuring of family responsibilities, and it is perpetuated in such management and control processes as job evaluations" (World Bank 2000d, 3).

The need to "help staff balance work and life responsibilities" was also mentioned in the executive summary to *Advancing Gender Equality* (2000) as part of an effort to improve the representation of women on the Bank's staff (World Bank 2000a, vii). The Bank's report on its shareholders discussions of promoting gender equality also revealed a clear concern with caring labor as it affects Bank employees. One of the questioners from the audience asked:

> "I would like to know: what is the Bank going to do to look at women consultants within the Bank? I am fairly new here. However, there are a lot of hurdles. I am a mother also... And it is a constant struggle dealing with daily duties within the Bank and also at home. So how are the consultant issues going to be dealt with when we talk about women issues (sic) within the Bank?" (World Bank 1995b, 20).

As argued in the introduction, reforms to promote gender equality inside the Bank are importantly connected to externally-oriented policies designed to improve development outcomes – and in both arenas documents reveal a clear, consistent recognition that the social reproduction problem exists and requires concrete policy solutions.

The Necessary Next Step: The Social Reproduction Dilemma Is a Policy Problem Because It Hinders Participation in Development

As argued in chapter one, it is not enough for the World Bank to recognize that a policy problem exists – for it to formulate and implement solutions staff must prove that the problem effects development. This next step is taken in all of the texts evaluated for this research. They claim that the social reproduction problem requires Bank attention because it hinders girls participation in school, and women's participation in work. This framing is crucially related to the fact, also analyzed in chapter one, that current GAD policy has prioritized women's work as the central component in their emancipation, and has privileged education as a work-related strategy; thus proving that social reproduction requirements hurt labor market participation and school enrollment is an extremely effective strategy for securing attention and resources.

When assessing the reasons for girls underachievement in education, the social reproduction problem was the first issue raised in the 1979 pamphlet: "some factors that bear on school performance may often have stronger effects on girls than boys; their domestic duties often take precedence over homework or similar learning obligations" (World Bank 1979a, 4). Similarly the 1990 report suggested that parents were unwilling to educate daughters because "girls are expected to do more household chores" (1990, 4), while the 1994 report claimed that:

> "Parents also incur opportunity costs because they lose their children's availability for chores and wage earnings. These opportunity costs vary by sex...In general, girls perform more chores at home than boys do: girls cook, clean, fetch water and wood, and care for younger siblings. Between the ages of 10 and 15, girls may work up to 8 to 10 hours a day on activities inside and outside the home... A poor family cannot afford to forgo such help" (1994, 29).

Towards Gender Equality also argued that "household responsibilities affect the likelihood that girls will remain in school" (1995c, 10), since: "opportunity and travel costs call discourage parents from enrolling their children, especially daughters" (60). This is why several reports advocated school scholarships to compensate parents "for the loss of their daughters' time" (World Bank 1994, 42).

While recognizing that families may keep girls out of school "because they are not expected to have to work for pay in the labor market," *Engendering Development* also claimed that schooling may be avoided "even if it simply takes girls away from work and care activities at home" (2001, 111). In another recognition of the negative effects of the social reproduction dilemma on development, the report stated:

> "When girls reach adolescence they are generally expected to spend more time on such household activities as cooking, cleaning, collecting fuel and water, and caring for children. Meanwhile, boys tend to spend more time on farm or wage work. When young children get sick, teenage girls, not boys, tend to increase their time providing care-often at the expense of their schooling... Meanwhile, boys are increasingly engaged in market work, preparing to become the main breadwinner of their own household" (152).

This section of the policy paper demonstrated a clear awareness that women's disproportionate responsibility for caring labor hinders their education, which in turn hinders their employment.

Again, the Bank's gender policy texts have long argued that the social reproduction problem negatively impacts women's labor force participation. The 1979 report recognized that "because of the(ir) household and maternal responsibilities, (women) may also lack they mobility and flexibility required for (modern sector) jobs. Women, therefore, tend to be concentrated in low-productivity jobs that require relatively little training" (1979, 12). The 1990 progress report framed women's "mothering role" as a barrier to employment (1990, 4), while the 1994 policy paper claimed that the social reproduction problem hindered women's entrepreneurship, since "heavy responsbilities for care and provisioning in the household restrict women's working hours and mobility in ways that affect their choice of sector and of business practices" (1994, 36). *Towards Gender Equality* put the case most strongly when it asserted: "there is no doubt that women's entry into the labor market and other spheres of the economy is directly affected by the extensive amounts of time they traditionally devote to household maintenance and family care" (1995c, 4). Wage differences were also understood to be in part caused "by women's lower participation in the labor market - a consequence of domestic and other demands on their time" (17). *Advancing Gender Equality* made the same argument: that "women typically have household and childcare duties that make it difficult for them to engage in paid activities outside the home" (1995a, 7). Thus photographs which aimed to show that women were an underutilized development resource often showed women who are either pregnant or with small children, carrying out "burdensome" social reproduction labor without technological intervention or infrastructural support. For example the chapter entitled "Gender Inequalities Hamper Growth" in *Towards Gender Equality* was illustrated by a photograph of a pregnant barefooted brown-skinned woman walking over a muddy field (image 4). The image was negatively coded in several ways: the non-mechanized agriculture in the picture had already been termed unproductive drudgery by the text; the woman was walking, ever a sign of backwardness to the Bank, and she was pregnant, unproductive in terms of narrowly defined economic gains, a drain on resources, and a symbol of the need for development intervention. However she also became an emblem of "limits to productivity" (1995c, 21) because her burdensome labor marked her as oppressed, as lacking access to the liberating employment of the modern sector.

The recognition that the social reproduction problem damaged women's labor force participation was also central to *Engendering Development*, suggesting that it is similarly central to the Bank's contemporary understanding of gender policy. The section on economic institutions, which was almost entirely focused on work, included a discussion of "family support" that opened with the sentence: "women spend much more time in nonmarket and care activities than men - and these activities impose costs on

Image 4: “Gender Inequalities Hamper Growth” (World Bank 1995c)

their leisure, health status, paid employment, and autonomy" (2001, 131). Indeed the summary of the report framed the argument perfectly, claiming that "household responsibilities often require long hours of work that limit girls' ability to continue their education and constrain mothers' capacity to participate in market work" (23). There is a clear awareness here that if the Bank's policy priority is to get women into work, the institution must deal with social reproduction dilemma; otherwise its development agenda will be harmed.

The Outcome (i): An Explicit Critique of Hegemonic Definitions of Work and Productivity

The documents analyzed for this research also explicitly critiqued dominant models of economics and productivity that ignore women's unpaid labor. Implicitly, of course, recognition of the importance of subsistence agriculture and food production inherently troubles the idea that "work" is characterized by cash payment or location in the formal market, and it acknowledges the economic importance of unremunerated labor. Likewise the Bank implicitly recognizes the difficulty of imposing strict boundaries between work and non-work, productive and unproductive labor through their discussion of women's multiple roles. However the formally cleared gender policy texts analyzed here go beyond this, repeatedly contesting standard economic definitions of productivity and work in an explicit attempt to disrupt mainstream methods of counting.

The first sentence in the section on employment and income-generating activities contained in the 1979 pamphlet made this intentional disruption very clear; it read:

> "Women in many developing countries tend to be economically invisible. Worldwide, women's domestic and childrearing activities are generally not valued for national

> income accounting. Moreover, their contributions to subsistence or cash agriculture as unpaid family workers are not separately accounted for. Although, in many countries, women represent some 70% of the agricultural labor force, statistics on economic activities in these same countries classify a large portion of women as 'economically not active'" (World Bank 1979a, 11).

Later the report recognized that because so much of women's labor is unvalued in economic terms, and because women often work part time to juggle social reproduction responsibilities, they lose out on social security and unemployment benefits (13).

This disruption continued into the 1990s, even as the Bank's gender texts endorsed efficiency discourses. Interestingly the cover photograph to the 1990 progress report on WID (image 5) featured a woman carrying a large metal container on her head, and a small child on her back. She was smiling, and may thus have been intended to represent a simplistic vision of successful WID policy in which women "work" and take care of social reproduction responsibilities at the same time – the classic exhaustion solution. However, a closer reading of this document reveals a far more conflicted, complex portrayal of social reproduction and a clear recognition that it presents a problem for a narrowly focused employment agenda. Firstly the photograph itself was asymmetrical and off-centre with the child, whose face was serious, drawing attention away from the woman's huge smile and the attempted portrayal of success. Moreover, several efforts were made in the text to complicate mainstream definitions of work and productivity. For example the first page summarized women's economic contribution; a paragraph on their role in food storage, cash crop production, and industrial labor was followed by two paragraphs on their non-market work. These began:



Image 5: cover to World Bank 1990

> "The economic contribution of women goes much further. Beyond their work in the formal and informal labor force, women usually have the primary responsibility for the care of children and the elderly and for many household chores. Women often spend several hours a day fetching household water and fuelwood (which constitutes 90 percent of the household fuel used in Africa).
> Because much of women's work is done at home or outside the formal economy, it is not fully recognized in official statistics or by policymakers. But studies in Nepal and the Philippines suggest that, when women's production is valued properly, rural women contribute about half of the family's income" (World Bank 1990, 2).

The report went on to note that: "because much of women's work is done at home or outside the formal economy, it is not fully recognized in official statistics or by policymakers (3), and it described Pakistani official figures on women's employment as "implausibly low" on this basis (29).

This disruption of prevailing discourses of productivity was replicated in the 1994 policy report, which qualified a claim that the percentage of economically active women declined in some regions by stating: "this finding needs to be interpreted with caution because in some countries women's economic participation and economic activities may be substantially undercounted, especally in rural areas" (World Bank 1994, 19). Admittedly this caution was not sufficient to justify removal of the graph on women's labor force participation rates, which took up half of the next page, but the critique of partial framings of work was later extended to a recognition that women work more than men. The report also cited a study which "suggests that when the time spent on home production is valued and included in the computation of full household income, women contribute between 40 and 60 percent of household income" (21).

Both Beijing documents repeated this questioning of hegemonic approaches to work, recognizing the importance of both informal sector employment and unpaid household labor. *Towards Gender Equality* noted that: "rural household labor accounts for a disproportionately large share of employment among the poor and an even larger share among women" (World Bank 1995c, 34), for example, and it asserted equivalence between unpaid and paid work by claiming in a section on "Employment and Work" that "the time women spend on paid and unpaid work is typically greater than the time men spend in the labor market" (15). Official statistics on labor force participation were repeatedly criticized for ignoring unpaid family work, for showing "exaggerated" gender differences because they "fai(l) to capture many aspects of women's work," and hence for being "deceptive" (15). The report also recognized the difficulty of differentiating work, productivity, and care by acknowledging that it is hard to measure women's employment given its "overlap" with subsistence-oriented household or community-based activities (33). Similarly *Advancing Gender Equality* (1995) defined unpaid family laborers as economically active people (World Bank 1995a, 43), and it recognized that "women work longer hours than men in nearly every country, much of it in unpaid labor" (7). It framed women as a "key, but largely invisible, economic resource" on this basis (15), "undercounted in official statistics" because they are often family or unpaid workers (27). In short:

> "since the centrality of women in economic production is largely invisible, evaluations of economic outcomes are incomplete. They fail to account for women's contributions and mask critical linkages within the economy, especially between the paid and unpaid activities in which women are engaged" (15).

This reads more like lesson in feminist economics than an endorsement of the exhaustion solution to social reproduction.

The contestation of standard definitions of work and productivity was replicated in the Bank's evaluations of its gender lending. For example Murphy's 1995 study noted that "the productive role of women is invariably greater than is reported in formal labor statistics" (Murphy 1995, 23), while the 1997 progress recognized: "in all regions women's contribution to agriculture is under-valued due to the continued under-estimation of the value of women's unpaid labor" (World Bank 1997c, 24). Moser's 1999 evaluation also emphasized the household economy (Moser Tornqvist and von Bronkhorst 1999, 24), and the perceived "invisibility of working women" (27-29).

Contestation of standard economics is also evident in the Bank's most recent documents. For example *Advancing Gender Equality* (2000) included a photograph of a woman weaving inside a house or courtyard, interestingly blurring boundaries between work and home (image 6).

Image 6: Woman Weaving in Courtyard (World Bank 2000a, 25)

The claim that economics is gendered due to the neglect of social reproduction was also made very explicit in *Précis*. This referenced four efforts at macroeconomic modelling that take into account multiple roles (World Bank 2000d, 6), while the section headed "Is Economic Policy Gender-Neutral?" opened as follows: "several participants noted that macroeconomics is not gender-neutral; it is blind.... only paid work is considered productive, so most women's work does not count toward the gross national product" (3).

Finally, standard definitions of work and productivity were also questioned in *Engendering Development*. This included figures showing "Men Work More in the Market, Women More in the Home" (World Bank 2001, 153), and "Women Work More, Especially in Nonmarket Activities." The report also acknowledged that: "since much of women's work in developing countries is unpaid and done inside the home, it is often "invisible" and not accounted for by policymakers" (153). The contestation of manstream economics enacted by the second policy paper was particularly evident in this explanatory footnote, which cited feminist economists:

> "By virtue of being outside the monetized economy, women's economic contribution tends to be undervalued (Elson 1992; Folbre 1998). For example, a much smaller proportion of female work than male work is captured in national income accounting systems. And the asymmetries, by gender, appear to be considerable. In industrial countries about two-thirds of men's total work time is spent in activities that are captured and valued in national accounts; this compares to about a third of women's total work time (UNDP 1995). In developing countries the gap is larger. More than three-quarters of men's total work time is spent in activities captured in national accounts, compared to about a third of women's total work time" (178).

Another recognition of the partial, inadequate way in which productivity is counted occurred in a section designed to prove that gender equality is good for economic growth. Having argued (with difficulty) that female education is correlated positively with growth, the report went on to claim:

> "Gender inequality in other dimensions besides education is associated with lower growth rates. *Greater employment opportunities for women may increase national output - at least the part measured in national income accounts. Employment outside the home will lead to a substitution of unrecorded female labor within the home for*

> *recorded female labor in the formal economy that is captured in standard national income accounting. This will enhance the visibility of women's labor and increase measured output - even if true output (recorded and unrecorded) is unchanged. To the extent that this substitution involves an increase in productivity, actual economic output and growth will increase as well*" (91-2 emphasis added).

Here the Bank explicitly acknowledges that women's move into paid work may *show* an increase in productivity where none occurs, simply because their labor becomes visable. This reflects a clear acceptance of many of the fundamental tenets of feminst political economy, including those that challenge the Bank's own approach to economic growth and development.

Outcome (ii): An Explicit Rejection of the Exhaustion Solution, Particularly as Evident in Early Structural Adjustment Policy.

The afore-mentioned attempt to disrupt prevailing discourses of productivity and value is paired with an explicit rejection of the exhaustion solution to social reproduction. This is particularly evident in concerns regarding work burdens. For example the 1994 report cautioned, in relation to water and sanitation projects, that:

> "the proposed interventions should not unduly increase women's workloads. For example, although improved water systems that are conveniently located may reduce the amount of time women spend collecting water, they may create new demands for women's work relating to maintenance, management, and financing" (47).

The Bank's rejection of the exhaustion solution was also evident in the vision of GAD presented to the Beijing conference by Wolfensohn. As he understood it, "the challenge before us" concerned the prospects for a baby girl he met in Mali; among her likely problems, she will be overworked, regardless of whether she earns money (Wolfensohn 1995). The language of burdens was also used by *Towards Gender Equality* when commenting on Russian women and their dual responsibility for paid work and care, again contesting the notion that paid labor can be carried out without any effect on social reproduction: "Some analysts argue that women - who do most of the household work in Russian households and also have high participation in the formal labor market - cope with the burdens imposed on them by taking less demanding work and devoting less time to advancing their careers"(World Bank 1995c, 33). Likewise *Advancing Gender Equality* (1995) recognized the overburdening of poor women who "have always shared equally in wage work in addition to having full responsibility for household subsistence farming and domestic work" (World Bank 1995a, 43).

Josette Murphy also expressed concern that project interventions could alter divisions of labor to the deteriment of women. She cited a 1978 study on project design showing how the introduction of high yield crops, intensive mechanization and other agricultural development methods "may.. entail changes in...*the division of labor within the famiiy, with possible negative consequences for women and children*" (quoted in Murphy 1995, 36). Her 1997 evaluation of gender policy also cautioned against overburdening women by insisting on the finite nature of their capacity to work:

> "Men and women everywhere usually have different responsibilities, undertaken with various degrees of flexibility and different priorities. If the labor demand timing, or priority of one task changes, either the restructured task must not conflict with other tasks or all the tasks must be modified. Effective project design must include a review of both men's and women's roles and responsibilities that is detailed enough to identify potential conflicts and identifies project strategies to resolve them" (Murphy 1997, 21).

Projects which do not assesss shifting burdens of work in this way were criticized as inadequate (22). Furthermore, consider Moser's description of the "efficiency" approach as:

> "the third WID approach, adopted particularly since the 1980s debt crisis. Its purpose is to ensure that development is more efficient and effective through women's economic

> contribution, with participation often equated with equity. It seeks to meet practical gender needs/priorities *while relying on all three roles and an elastic concept of women's time*" (Moser Tornqvist and von Bronkhorst 1999, 7 emphasis added).

This makes precisely the criticism found in much feminist structural adjustment literature: that participation does not equal equity, and that women can be overburdened unless their multiple roles are taken into account.

Engendering Development also recognized that women can be overburdened if pushed into the labor market without account being taken of social reproduction needs, and it refered to the need to avoid "adding excessive hours to women's work" (World Bank 2001, 186). Later the policy paper warned that without a clear understanding of household roles:

> "policies that increase demand for female labor may not elicit the expected supply response if women cannot reduce their time on household maintenance or care activities. Or girls may be taken out of school to cover for mothers who enter the labor force... Understanding how households allocate time and other resources by gender can thus provide the basis for more effective policies - and policies that generate fewer unintended and undesirable consequences" (153).

This passage clearly identified the dangers posed by urging women into employment without dealing with social reproduction responsibilities, and it rejected the notion that their time and capacity to labor are infinitely elastic.

Crucially, gender policymakers in the Bank extended this general attempt to disrupt dominant framings of work and productivity to concretely critique structural adjustment policies, albeit mildly, for their failure to take into account the social reproduction problem. GAD staff are thus aware that economic restructuring has caused a social reproduction crisis, one that has fallen largely on women as a result of their responsibility for family survival. For example the 1994 policy paper argued that "the beneficial effects of adjustment policies may be slow in reaching women," in part because they can not shift their labor to respond to changing market incentives was easily as men given their family responsibilities (World Bank 1994, 68). These criticisms of adjustment became more explicit in later documents. Wolfensohn's Beijing speech acknowledged that the Bank had been criticized for the negative effects of restructuring on women, and he promised a shift in approach:

> "A priority concern must be to ensure that women are not hurt by structural adjustment programs. I am well aware of the wide criticism of the Bank on this subject. I believe that a macroeconomic plan is crucial to development, but I will be vigilant and more sensitive to arguments which relate to disproportionate adverse social impacts on women" (Wolfensohn 1995, 4).

Towards Gender Equality went further, conceding that price increases "often have an uneven effect on the way men and women spend their time and can increase the demand for goods produced at home using unpaid labor" (World Bank 1995c, 29). Likewise in trying to explain why reform efforts have failed in many countries, *Advancing Gender Equality* (1995) claimed:

> "The capacity to respond to economic opportunities is influenced by gender-based constraints, particularly imbalances in the division of labor and in control over economically productive resources...The choices and tradeoffs people face in allocating their time reflect the interdependence between the "visible" and "invisible" economy, as both make competing claims on women's time but not on men's. Consequently, women's ability to contribute to expanded economic opportunities is unlikely to be fully tapped, and women share less in the benefits of successful reform" (World Bank 1995a, 15).

Leaving aside the assumption that structural adjustment benefits men or offers better economic opportunities in an aggregate sense, these critiques are clearly grounded in an awareness of the social reproduction dilemma and a desire to shift policy away from assumptions that women can take on paid employment with consummate ease.

Subsequent reports reiterated this fundamental acceptance by gender policymakers that feminist critiques of structural adjustment were essentially accurate.

For example in a discussion of the need to use participatory methods to explore poverty, the 1997 progress report noted that "women are shown to be the providers of last resort and it is assumed that they will be the first to give up other activities (such as education or employment) in order to find the extra time needed to find fuel, water or food during times of crisis" (World Bank 1997c, 26). Likewise it drew attention to "the coping mechanisms which women use to ensure the survival of themselves and their children in the face of economic crisis" (4). The starkest recognition of the problem is contained in the *Précis* report on Bank GAD policy, which asserted:

> "Structural adjustment hurts poor women more than it hurts poor men. Under structural adjustment, governments cut the budget to achieve fiscal equilibrium, but savings in the *productive* sector create more work in the *reproductive* sector, where women are overrepresented" (World Bank 2000d, 3 emphasis in original).

Finally, *Engendering Development* devoted considerable space to the economic reform debate, and structural adjustment was assessed to consider how restructuring impacts gender. Attempting a "balanced" discussion the Bank cited research on how adjustment harms and benefits gender equality, but it demonstrated a concern with social reproduction throughout. For example, the report noted that inequalities "in economic mobility associated with household responsibilities and gender roles impede women's ability to participate fully in longer-term economic opportunities associated with adjustment" (World Bank 2001, 213). The summary also acknowledged that "social protection policies that recognize gender differences in market-based and household work and in risks are also important to protect women (and men) from economic shocks or prolonged economic downturns" (20). Efforts to "cushio(n) the effects of (economic) reform on the vulnerable" were criticized if they failed to take into account these social reproduction problems; for example the report mentioned a cash-for-work program in

Zambia which overburdened women, leading them to delegate household work to their daughters (227). On the basis of these claims, any assertion that Bank policymakers do not acknowledge the social reproduction dilemma embedded in efforts to get women into work is clearly untenable.

Conclusion.

GAD policymakers within the World Bank recognize that a social reproduction dilemma exists, and that a straightforward prioritization of formal paid employment is likely to make the problem worse. The "policy problem" as it is presented here is not just about getting women into the labor force – it is about dealing with the tension between work and care, individualism and human dependency in a way that recognizes both the importance of unpaid labor, and its gendered nature. Indeed policy entrepreneurs have been remarkably successful in their framing of the social reproduction dilemma as a serious policy issue deserving concrete policy interventions; it is recognized at the highest levels of the institution, in the Bank's most public presentations, as an issue that threatens to undermine the organization's core development goals. Thus it is no longer accurate to assert that the Bank ignores women's unpaid labor or that it endorses an exhaustion solution to the tension between paid labor and unpaid care. I emphasize this point only in part to suggest the need for more generously-spirited attention to the efforts of insider bureaucrats within the institution. Far more importantly, I argue that the broader feminist failure to acknowledge this crucial reframing of the Bank's approach to social reproduction leaves us unable to critique and resist the concrete policy solutions that emerge from it – solutions that threaten to become hegemonic in international development policy, and which have profoundly dangerous implications. It is to these solutions, and their critique, that I turn next.

[i] For example she mentions the Bank's 1991 gender report on India by highlighting what it said regarding the "household as (a) collective; site of intrahousehold, gender-based power variations and motivations" (Moser Tornqvist and van Bronkhorst 1999, 24). She also mentioned the household in her summaries of Bank gender strategies in India (24), Bangladesh, Kenya (25), Turkey, El Salvador (26), and Nigeria. I am not including these country studies in my own analysis of Bank policy because they are not formally cleared/they do not represent unified institutional policy – Moser concurs and that is why she separates them from official texts on Bank policy. I am not claiming that the India report highlights households – I am noting that Moser thinks this issue of households is sufficiently important to put in her own summary of the India country study, and that tells us something about the social reproduction problem, and the attempt to resolve it at the household level.

[ii] See for example Murphy 1997, 18 – but see the discussion of childcare policy in chapter 3 for more on this.

[iii] See the introduction for an explanation of the connections between inside and outside strategies when analyzing femocrat strategies in this institution – efforts to improve conditions for female employees and to get externally-oriented development policies changed to incorporate GAD concerns are inherently interlinked.

Chapter 3: The Bank's Proposed Policy Solutions to the Social Reproduction Dilemma.

Introduction

In the last chapter I demonstrated that the Bank's gender policymakers are aware of the social reproduction dilemma. I also explained their argument that the institution should help to resolve it in order that the attempt to get women into employment succeeds as a development strategy. In this chapter I map out the three concrete solutions proposed to the policy problem in Bank gender literature, and I explore which "succeed" and which "fail" – which are privileged and prioritized by the institution, which are sidelined, and why. The three solutions proposed to the social reproduction dilemma are: 1. saving time through restructuring schedules, new technology, and infrastructure, 2. restructuring heternormativity to encourage more loving partnerships between men and women, and 3. providing state supported maternity leave and childcare. The success or failure of these proposals can be explained through reference to the factors that, in turn, accounted for the success of the work strategy as a solution to the broader WID/GAD problem: the linking of work to productivity, the framing of work as a way to achieve other development goals, and the promotion of work as a common-sensical development "good" that would empower women. "Successful" – as in institutionally preferred - solutions to the social reproduction dilemma are those that can demonstrate productivity benefits, that can be framed as market adjustments, that are tied to many other development desirables already prioritized by the institution, and that appeal to progressives interested in empowerment. "Failed" solutions – those that are instituionally marginalized - lack these attributes. On this basis, time management and restructuring heteronormativity are endorsed unequivocally by the Bank; state-supported maternity leave and childcare are not. Again, I make this argument only in part to correct an oversight in broader feminist development literature which still assumes that the Bank endorse an exhaustion solution to the social reproduction problem. More importantly, I argue that the failure to recognize these concrete policy solutions results in a failure to critique them and their potentially negative development impacts. Specifically, I note that "time management" solutions to the social reproduction dilemma may still over-burden women, and I express concern that they be more successful in generating profits for development contractors than in transforming relations between paid and unpaid work. Most importantly, however, I am profoundly troubled by the Bank's attempt to reprivatize responsibility for social reproduction onto restructured couples wherein men love better and women work more, and I argue that it rests on assumptions about women, men, and households that are sometimes contradictory and often inaccurate. The solution pathologizes poor men, requires (and attempts to coerce) heteronormative attachments as a definition of autonomy, and is grounded in a frankly frightening vision of good gender analysis that empowers noone. That it is so prominent in the Bank's contemporary attempts to resolve the social reproduction dilemma is thus cause for considerable concern.

Policy Solution 1: Assisted Time Management through Reorganization, Technology, and Infrastructure.

> "Public policy can address inequalities in the household division of labor by supporting initiatives that reduce the amount of time women spend doing unpaid work" (World Bank 1995c, 4).

One of the most important means through which the Bank tries to resolve the social reproduction dilemma embedded in its efforts to get women into paid employment is through better time management. Time constraints are identified as a key policy problem, and solutions focused on reorganizing time are prominent. As *Advancing Gender Equality* (1995) explained it:

> "In addition to facing legal and regulatory barriers to participation in the labor force, women typically have household and childcare duties that make it difficult for them to engage in paid activities outside the home. The principal strategy for removing such barriers is to ease the constraints on women's time" (World Bank 1995a, 15).

In its crudest form this policy simply emphasizes more efficient use of time, through multi-tasking, for example, or schedule rearrangement. In this respect it resembles the "exhaustion solution" to social reproduction, wherein policy costs are born by individual women expected to take on extra responsibilities, albeit with more efficiently arranged schedules and work habits. This policy preference is particularly popular as a solution to girl's school attendance, understood to be in danger given their responsibility for domestic chores. Several documents advised rearranging school hours to permit girls to fulfill social reproduction requirements. For example the 1994 policy paper recommended a Bangladeshi educational project that offers flexible schedules in an attempt to increase female participation (World Bank 1994, 62), since "flexible hours (allow) girls to complete home chores before or after school" (11). This adjustment – alongside self-paced distance learning - is represented elsewhere as supremely easy and commonsensical, with the Bank asserting: "another way to reduce the opportunity cost of girls time to parents - at no cost - is to adjust school hours so that girls can more easily combine schooling with chores" (43). Later this notion of "simple changes" in flexible delivery was extended to nutrition projects, with an example from India showing that service provision increased when supplements were delivered outside hours when women were working (60).

The Bank's Beijing documents also referred to these efforts to adjust time use, again in reference to schooling in order "that women can combine their domestic responsibilities with training" (World Bank 1995a, 40); see also 1995c, 60). Similarly the 1997 progress report on GAD mentioned measures "allowing communities and schools greater authority to set the school calendar to accommodate children's work requirements" (Murphy 1997, 39). Indeed in arguing that markets can discriminate against women *Engendering Development* framed the social reproduction problem as one requiring changes to work schedules given that "mothers…need flexible hours" (World Bank 2001, 124). Later a preference for multitasking solutions was expressed; the chapter proving that economic growth reduces gender inequality pointed to the reemergence of home-based work as a positive trend that allows women to combine their multiple roles, for example, since "for married women with children the jobs can be attractive, as the spatial arrangement may allow them to combine paid work with traditional duties" (188).

Importantly, however, policies to adjust time use do not stop with the suggestion that women schedule better. The Bank also promotes far more active interventions to resolve the social reproduction dilemma by saving time, and these have become increasingly important in recent years.[i] One of the most important elements of Bank policy in this respect is the attempt to save time using technology. Better tools are framed as magic bullets that condense time with minimal cost, being repeatedly framed as simple, easy, obvious, and commonsensical interventions. Early efforts focused on securing access to the perceived benefits of agricultural extension, seen as denied to women by sexist development planners who failed to appreciate their important role as farmers. For example the 1979 report highlighted a project in Cameroon to give women access to improved agricultural services in order to raise their farming productivity and to reduce the time they spend working using "traditional methods" (World Bank 1979a, 7). Likewise the report mentioned efforts to improve tools for grinding grain in Senegal, to improve the efficiency of stoves in Burundi (9), to introduce cassava graters in Ghana, to develop ovens for drying food in Kenya, and to increase the availability of palm oil presses in Sierra Leone (19-20). As the pamphlet understood it, the problem of past development efforts was their failure to use technology to prevent over-burdening women in this way. Claiming that: "not enough attention has been given in the past to reducing the burden of women's work in developing countries, particularly in the household" (9), the report argued that "many efforts to improve women's status have been hampered by a failure to recognize that these very efforts are making greater and competing demands on women's time and energy, without giving attention to labor-saving or efficiency-promoting techniques for those domestic tasks women must continue to perform" (19/20). Technological innovations were hereby privileged as the preferred solution to the social reproduction dilemma, understood as a way to save time in order that domestic work could be performed more quickly.

The 1990 Progress report also emphasized technology as a way to increase the efficiency of unpaid labor, endorsing a Tanzanian project to extend agricultural extension efforts to female cashew producers and help them in home processing of by-products

(World Bank 1990, 21). Another highlighted project, to improve agricultural processing in Nigeria through the promotion of better tools, was intended to "increase value added, generate income for women, improve nutrition, reduce drudgery, and free female labor for other tasks" (20). Similarly the Bank's first policy paper on gender mentioned the need to "develo(p) appropriate technologies (for example, light transport facilities for fuelwood, improved stoves, and the like) to reduce time women spend in collecting water and fuel" (World Bank 1994, 28). In her summary of WID policy in the "reactive years" (1967-85) Murphy noted how:

> "Several early cases focused on the effects of new technology on women's agricultural or other employment opportunities. Traditional women's concerns (stoves, vegetable gardens, household food-processing technology) were also mentioned" (Murphy 1995, 38).

This not only demonstrates a long term interest in women's work in the domestic and market realms, but also a preference for technological solutions to tensions between those realms. Likewise the 1996 report on implementing the Bank's GAD policies – which contained little specific policy advice – gave prominent mention to the technology solution in a section on the need to institutionalize a client orientation in Bank projects:

> "Women-friendly technologies are being promoted in many parts of Africa. In Uganda and Kenya the Bank's support to agricultural research includes improved techniques for growing vegetables near houses; simple tools for weeding and harvesting that are designed for use by women, i.e., they are lighter; and improved village-level food processing techniques" (World Bank 1996 7).

The same examples were used in the progress report the following year (World Bank 1997c, 24).

Importantly, the technology solution to the social reproduction dilemma is particularly prominent in recent policy texts, suggesting that it is central to the Bank's contemporary vision of gender-aware development. For example *Advancing Gender*

Equality (2000) gave two project-based examples to demonstrate the Bank's post-Beijing gender aware energy policy; both endorsed a technological solution to the social reproduction dilemma (World Bank 2000a, 14).[ii] The emphasis on technology was also prominent in agricultural projects, with the report highlighting a Nicaraguan attempt to "provid(e) technical information on home gardens cultivated by women" (10). The opening chapter to *Engendering Development* made precisely the same argument about technological intervention as the Bank's first pamphlet on WID: women have less access to agricultural extension advice, and thus are less likely than men to utilize new technologies, fertilizers, and so on (World Bank 2001, 52).

A closely connected, but analytically distinct, variation of the time management solution to the tension between caring labor and formal employment is the promotion of better infrastructure, by which the Bank's policymakers mean basic infrastructure such as water services, electricity, roads and so on. Again this policy preference was evident in the earliest WID texts, with the 1979 pamphlet arguing:

> "To the cost in time of getting to and from the house, child care facility, work place, and the market one must add the cost in time of collecting water. It is not uncommon for the urban poor to have to stand in line to purchase or collect water, a task often assigned to girls. Attention to the location of standpipes and to simple design details can improve women's lives and their effectiveness" (World Bank 1979a, 11).

Later the emphasis on infrastructural development was extended to roads, in order to reduce the time women need to transport their products to market (22). Infrastructural investments – particularly in water provision – were less prominent in the 1990 progress report, in part a reflection of the Bank's shift to neo-liberal development lending wherein private provision was privileged. Indeed the word "infrastructure" was not used at all in this report. However the policy solution reemerged in the mid 1990s, and has remained crucial ever since. The Bank's approach to infrastructural development was reframed within a neo-liberal context, and services were justified on the basis that they overcame market failures and were essential to growth. Thus the 1994 policy paper promoted water provision as a way to get girls into school and women into paid work (World Bank 1994, 35), and in a discussion of women's dual responsibilities the report noted:

> "In many settings, the absence of piped water or readily available cooking fuel makes it necessary to spend many hours obtaining them, tasks most commonly considered by society to be women's responsibility. After meeting these and other time-consuming household responsibilities, many women have little time or energy to devote to income generating activities" (37)

Towards Gender Equality put the argument particularly clearly in its claim that "rural electrification can...ease the time constraints on women who must balance household and productive work" (World Bank 1995c, 59). The 1997 progress report urged attention to transport projects and road construction on the same basis (World Bank 1997c, 7).

Once more, the use of infrastructure to mediate between promotion of employment and recognition of women's existing labor is particularly prominent in the Bank's most recent gender policy texts. *Advancing Gender Equality* (2000) mentioned a Moroccan water provision project that attempted to increase girls school attendance, for example (World Bank 2000a, 12), and the annex explained infrastructural development thusly:

> "Economic development that results in improved infrastructure for water, energy, and transportation also has a profound and positive impact on women. In most developing countries, women work longer hours than do men, partly because poor infrastructure makes many of their responsibilities fetching water, gathering cooking fuel, and producing food for family consumption extremely time-consuming. As infrastructure improves, women have more time to devote to other activities, including earning additional income and participating in community affairs" (32).

The contents page to *Engendering Development* also mentioned this solution to the tension between caring labour and paid work, citing Bank evidence that "Investments in Water and Fuel Infrastructure Can Significantly Reduce the Time Cost of Collection Activities." The summary noted that "investments in basic water, energy, and transportation infrastructure help reduce gender disparities in workloads" (World Bank 2001, 2), and infrastructural development was one of the four concrete policy interventions listed to resolve the problem posed by women's domestic workloads, "freeing girls to attend school and women to undertake other activities, whether related to income generation or community affairs" (24-5). Clearly, then, time management – particularly when assisted by better technology and improved infrastructure – is a key component of the current Bank's attempt to mediate between caring labor and paid work. It remains to analyze why this solution works so well, and has achieved such prominence in the institution's formally cleared texts.

Why it Works (i): Productivity, Quantification, and Market Advances.

The time management solution works in part because it is linked to productivity, efficiency, and growth. In this way the disruptions to mainstream economics highlighted in chapter two are left ultimately unresolved. This is particularly true of the first variant of the policy solution, one emphasizing shifting time use with no other interventions. As argued above, gender policymakers in the Bank explicitly contest the notion that unpaid labor has no value and that women's capacity to work is infinitely elastic, but when discussing the first variant of the time adjustment policy this contestation often disappears. Consider for example the claim in the 1994 policy report that flexible schedules allowing girls to combine schooling with domestic chores offer development benefits "at no cost" (World Bank 1994, 43). This assertion means that the policy has no monetary cost to the state, and that parents incur no opportunity costs; they do have to "pay" in lost domestic help. However girls still have to pay costs here – their labor time is being redistributed in order that governments and parents emerge unscathed from the attempt to negotiate the complexities of the work-social reproduction nexus. The notion of the time management solution as simple and costless thus rests on a re-privileging of dominant models of economics even as policymakers try to take social reproduction into account. Indeed in this way the policy comes closest to (re)endorsing an exhaustion solution to the tension between paid work and care, undervaluing domestic labor in a way that threatens to overburden those responsible for it.

However the claim that productivity can be increased by shifting patterns of time use from domestic labor to paid employment is also made elsewhere, including when time management is linked to technology and infrastructural improvement. The 1979 pamphlet asserted that: "to enable women to benefit from…training opportunities (in agricultural extension), the efficiency of their regular tasks in agriculture and in the household must be improved" (World Bank 1979a, 9), hereby framing changing time use patterns as a simple matter of reorienting attention from unproductive to productive tasks. As Murphy's 1995 evaluation argued: "Although women's potential productivity - particularly in food production and trade - is high, lack of essential services and heavy burdens on their time by nonproductive tasks are keeping their actual productivity abnormally low" (Murphy 1995, 22). Interventions to shift time use through technology, the promotion of "more efficient implements for women's tasks" (61), and better infrastructure were thus framed as ways to increase productivity. *Towards Gender*

Equality recommended an effiency rationale for infrastructural investment on the same grounds:

> "Lack of time is often a primary reason for women's weak response to economic incentives, especially in rural areas. The case for making public investments in infrastructure would be stronger if gender differences in the use of projects and services, as well as the potential effect of such investment on productivity and social development, were taken into account" (World Bank 1995c, 59).

Indeed *Advancing Gender Equality* (1995) referred to this bundle of initiatives to shift time use through technological inputs, "labor saving technology," and infrastructural improvement as a "productivity package" (World Bank 1995a, 20), in a nice example of how neatly this policy solution fits institutional context. With the policy framed as one aiming to "improve(e) women's productive efficiency" (World Bank 1997c, 20), "free up many hours for more productive activities"(World Bank 2000a, 12), "fre(e) girls to attend school and women to participate in more productive activities" (World Bank 2001, 264), and "strengthe(n) the productivity and incomes of female farmers" by removing constraints (World Bank 1997c, 24), it appeals to the Bank's overarching interest in growth and efficiency, and thus can be endorsed by mainstream technocrats. The option hereby ultimately reendorses the very models of standard economics critiqued by the Bank's own gender staff in chapter two, suggesting that GAD policy rests on an inconsistent treatment of productivity which recognizes the economic importance of some forms of unpaid caring labor, but not too much.

An associated reason why time management succeeds in the Bank is that it has been quantified, particularly in recent years. Recent gender texts include substantial data on time use, for example, and productivity-enhancing claims regarding time management policy are often represented in quantified form. For example *Towards Gender Equality* "show(ed) that relieving certain time constraints in a community of smallholder coffee and banana growers increases household cash incomes by 10 percent, labor productivity by 15 percent, and capital productivity by 44 percent" (World Bank 1995c, 30). The 1997 progress report listed Bank research programs on "key gender policy issues" which included studies on "women's time-use…and the appropriateness of including time-use as a dimension of poverty assessment" (Murphy 1997, 8).[iii] The evaluation of the same year also highlighted counting, citing evidence from the Ghana Living Standards Study:

> "that members of rural households spend 37 minutes per day fetching water (in 1992). In Rural Savannah, they are obliged to devote 48 minutes each day to this activity…Females in Rural Savannah spend on average 70minutes per day collecting water" (World Bank 1997c, 27).

However the impulse to represent domestic labor burdens in numbers receives it most powerful elaboration in the Bank's latest gender texts. *Engendering Development* measured average potential time savings per household per year if water and woodlots were available closer to homes (World Bank 2001, 20), and it included an entry in its glossary of terms explaining "potential average time saving" based on these investments in infrastructure (318). For example it estimated that closer energy supplies would save up to 984 hours a year for households, "equivalent to half a year's work for a person working eight hours a day, five days a week" (177). To reiterate, this turn to numbers is inkeeping with the Bank's institutionally-conditioned privileging of quantitative evidence, and it was an important reason for the success of employment as a priority in WID/GAD policy. Numbers remain the ultimate rhetoric of factuality in this institution, and the ability of policy entrepreneurs to represent time management solutions to the social reproduction problem in statistical terms is a key reason for their success.

Finally, policymakers argue that infrastructural improvement is an inevitable consequence of economic development, and thus it seems less a deliberate policy intervention than an adjustment to the market. This claim received its clearest elaboration in *Advancing Gender Equality* (2000) and *Engendering Development*. Somewhat confusingly the former contained an annex summarizing findings from the latter, including a graph on income, time use, and gender (image 7). The graph, its title and footnote are fascinating truth claims, for several reasons. On the most basic level they demonstrate how seriously the Bank take time analysis, considering the minutes worked per day by men and women to be a good development indicator. Secondly, they demonstrate an attempt to massively expand the definition of "productive activities," to include non-market work, self-consumed production and subsistence agriculture as well as childcare. Finally, however, they frame changes in time use – particularly the saving of time – as an inevitable market development associated with growth; thus interventions to secure it are simply commonsensical.

Engendering Development explained this argument in greater depth. In the chapter on how economic growth increases gender equality, the policy paper highlighted infrastructure on the following basis:

> "By providing an impetus for increasing the level and quality of infrastructure, economic growth provides opportunities for lightening the burden of household work on women and girls. The improvements in infrastructure, so vital to sustainable economic development, directly affect the efficiency of home production, reducing time spent in household work and releasing time for other activities. There is tremendous potential for this in poorer countries" (World Bank 2001, 186).

Thus "investments in infrastructure for water, transportation, and fuel that typically accompany development - as well as the deepening of markets - are important for reducing female workloads and facilitating girls' education." (242). As the summary – a site for only the most important arguments in any Bank text – put it:

Figure 3: Economic development is particularly beneficial to females. As average per-person income rises, the number of minutes that males and females work each day goes down—and becomes more equal.



Note: *The data points are countries. The time-use data pertain to minutes per day worked by adults in productive activities, both market and nonmarket. Market activities include work outside the home and subsistence and self-consumed production. Nonmarket activities refer to household maintenance and care, schooling, and voluntary community work.*
Source: Data from United Nations Development Program. 1995. *Human Development Report* 1995. New York: Oxford University Press.

Image 7: Graph on Time Use (World Bank 2000a)

> "Economic growth is typically accompanied by an expansion of investments in infrastructure - for safe water, roads, transport, and fuel. This too tends to reduce the time women and girls need to dedicate to household maintenance and care activities" (19-20).

Once more the Bank is framing itself as a handmaiden of market development, intervening to secure shifts that would occur anyway, more slowly, due to economic adjustments. Contemporary neo-liberal models of development allow for policy intervention within such limited parameters, if they are justified through market failures or the need speed up inevitable market processes.

If the time management solution works in part because it recenters existing definitions of productivity, can be easily quantified, and is framed as a market adjustment, it also works because it generates costs in all the right places, in ways which themselves add to productivity. Crucially, there *are* right places for cost generation here. It is perfectly acceptable that *some* social reproduction responsibilities are marketized, provided publically, and shifted from the invisible private family sphere to "the economy," and it is perfectly possible for this to occur within a productivity argument. Indeed solutions to the social reproduction dilemma that generate costs in terms of technology and infrastructure are more than legitimate in the Bank – they are actively encouraged. Thus there is a massive and stunningly undertheorized disjuncture between the willingness – indeed requirement – that some activities (notably water collection, transport, and fuel collection) generate costs, and the Bank's treatment of other services marked as "private" (notably childcare), one that once more relates to the institutional context within which these policy options are being debated.

On an ideological level, of course, the preference for the technological or infrastructural "quick fix" is an oft-cited component of dominant development policy,[iv] and it neatly fits an institution committed to promoting the benefits of Western-derived technological solutions to social problems. Thus the private collection of water or fuel is evidence of a development lack, a marker of the need for investment and improvement in a way that frames development interventions as about Western expertise and better science, and that fundamentally (re)produces modernist and (neo)colonialist narratives of backwardness.

Notwithstanding the importance of this critique, however, there is also a material dimension to this institutional context. In explaining the curiously inconsistent boundaries between what must be provided free or on the cheap and what can generate legitimate costs for which massive loans can be granted, it is crucial to recall the intimate association, highlighted in the introduction, between costs and profits in the World Bank. Put bluntly the Bank and its richest members make money when developing countries invest in infrastructure, and the "costs" generated here are acceptable in part because they also generate profits. For example, a search of the World Bank's contracts awarded 2002-3 produces over 2200 results, worth $3325.35 million – a sample is included in the following table. Infrastructural investment is a massively profitable enterprise, for the Bank and the countries that control its development polices; this institutional context is an important reason for the policy preferences at issue in its gender texts.

CONTRACT DESCRIPTON	SUPPLIER CONTRACT AMOUNT (US $ millions)	TOTAL CONTRACT AMT (US $ millions)	DATE APPROVED	PROJECT NAME	PROJECT COUNTRY	SUPPLIER NAME	SUPPLIER COUNTRY
SUPPLY OF ONE 4X2WD SKIP LOADER REFUSE TRUCK (LOT 1)	0.061	0.061	July 2002	Urban Project	Ghana	JOHN HOLT (PHC)	United Kingdom
MICROCOMP 345(1000MHZ),29(1,5 GHZ); MONOCHROME LASER PRINT 6(32PPM),34(10PPM); 1 COLOR LASER; 345 COLOR INKJET; PLOT. 24(36")&1(54")	0.833	0.833	January 2002	3rd Land Management Project - Sao Paulo	Brazil	RITRON INTERNATIONAL INC	United States
PAVEMENT REHABILITATION	2.103	2.103	June 2002	Port Access & Management Project	Poland	DEUTSCHE ASPHALT GMBH	Germany
ENGINEERING DESIGN AND CONSTRUCTION SUPERVISION SERVICES	0.933	0.933	April 2002	Cambodia: Flood Emergency Rehabilitation Project	Cambodia	BCEOM	France
TECHNICAL ASSISTANCE FOR STUDY OF CONSTRUCTION INDUSTRY TRAINING	1.076	1.076	May 2002	Eastern Indonesia Region Transport Project	Indonesia	DORSCH CONSULT / PT. HASFARM DIAN	Germany

CONTRACT DESCRIPTON	SUPPLIER CONTRACT AMOUNT (US $ millions)	TOTAL CONTRACT AMT (US $ millions)	DATE APPROVED	PROJECT NAME	PROJECT COUNTRY	SUPPLIER NAME	SUPPLIER COUNTRY
TECHNICAL ASSISTANCE FOR ROAD MAINTENANCE REFORM/EXECUTION OF MAINTENANCE PROGRAM	0.05	0.05	July 2002	Transport Sector Adjustment Investment Credit Project	Cote d'Ivoire	JEAN CLAUDE COURAU	France
DESIGN OF REHABILITATION OF ROAD EN1 BETWEEN EN 212 VILANKULO AND RIO SAVE	0.283	0.283	October 2002	Roads and Coastal Shipping Project	Mozambique	ROUGHTON INTERNATIONAL	United Kingdom
ROAD MAINTENANCE EQUIPMENT	0.465	0.465	August 2002	Henan Provincial Highway Project	China	TOTEM EQUIPMENT LTD.	Canada
ROAD MAINTENANCE EQUIPMENT	0.127	0.127	August 2002	Henan Provincial Highway Project	China	SYSTEQ INSTRUMENTS CANADA, INC.	Canada
ROAD MAINTENANCE EQUIPMENT	0.068	0.068	August 2002	Henan Provincial Highway Project	China	TOTEM EQUIPMENT LTD.	Canada
ENVIRONMENTAL MONITORING INSTRUMENTS & EQUIPMENT	0.143	0.143	March 2002	GUANGXI URBAN ENVIRONME NT PROJECT	China	TIC TECHNOLOGIES INC.	United States
RECONSTRUCTION OF LOZICA AND DUBOVA BRIDGES	2.311	2.311	August 2002	Urgent Road Project	Kosovo	FREYSSINET	France

CONTRACT DESCRIPTON	SUPPLIER CONTRACT AMOUNT (US $ millions)	TOTAL CONTRACT AMT (US $ millions)	DATE APPROVED	PROJECT NAME	PROJECT COUNTRY	SUPPLIER NAME	SUPPLIER COUNTRY
PAVING AND IMPROVEMENT WORKS	0.159	0.159	June 2002	Decentralized City Management Project	Benin	MANUCOM	Benin
GENERATORS AND SWITCHGEAR	5.258	15.932	June 2002	Power Rehabilitation Project	Zambia	ABB SWITZERLAND LTD. CONSORTIUM	Switzerland
GENERATORS AND SWITCHGEAR	5.258	15.932	June 2002	Power Rehabilitation Project	Zambia	ALSTOM POWER HYDRAULIQUE	Switzerland
GENERATORS AND SWITCHGEAR	5.417	15.932	June 2002	Power Rehabilitation Project	Zambia	ALSTOM HYDRO PROJECTS LIMITED	United Kingdom
SUPPLY OF 6 UNITS MOTOR GRADERS	0.466	0.471	July 2002	North-East Irrigated Agriculture Project	Sri Lanka	MITSUBISHI HEAVY INDUSTRIES LTD.	Japan

Data from World Bank contracts database, accessed Nov 10 2004.

Why it Works (ii): Keystone

Clearly, then, infrastructural development has long been a Bank priority, in part because of the material benefits (profits) it secures for contractors in Rich World nations. Gender policymakers can tap into this existing interest to argue for their own initiatives. That said, however, the time management solution is also successfully linked to many other development goals besides infrastrucural improvement; these include health, rural development, environmental sustainability, and education. For example the 1994 policy paper connected improved stoves to lower deforestation rates and improved school enrollments (World Bank 1994, 44). Similar links to school attendance were made in relation to projects providing tapped water. *Advancing Gender Equality* (1995) argued that a water supply and sanitation project "improve(ed) household health" (World Bank 1995a, 56), while the 2000 version claimed that improving access to clean fuel had beneficial environmental impacts (World Bank 2000a, 12). The promotion of women's involvement in charcoal production and the manufacturing of solar lamps to communities without electricity was also tied to microenterprise initiatives, and was recommended because "it trains rural women to organize into group-owned microenterprises, helping them move away from domestic agricultural production to technology-based consumer production" (14). In short the time management solution to the social reproduction dilemma not only improves productivity; it also achieves a variety of other development goals in areas as diverse as education and rural electrification, and this is one of thre reasons it succeeds so well as a policy option.

Why It Works (iii): Empowerment

The time management solution to the social reproduction dilemma also involves a framing of women's existing labor as characterized by drudgery, thus allowing technological interventions and infrastructural developments to be presented as empowering. Liberal WID development discourse has long been characterized by this distinction between traditional, oppressive labor and modern, empowering employment, one that maps in predictable ways onto gendered, racialized, and classed hierarchies. The non-marketized work of rural, poor women is characterized as traditional and burdensome (World Bank 1979a, 7), and as drudgery (World Bank 1994, 48), and policy texts contain multiple references to their "heavy workload" (59) and the disproportionate burden they bear for labor (World Bank 1997c, 27). Women's lack of access to "the benefit of labor-saving technology or adequate social service and transport infrastructure" ensures that they are unable to "escape the drudgery of many of these activities' (World Bank 1994, 48). For example the 2000 *Précis* edition on gender policy includes a photograph of a woman carrying a large jar on her head accompanied by the caption "woman carrying water, Burkina Faso" (image 8). This represents women's social reproduction labor as an oppressive burden, from which women can be liberated through investment in technology and infrastructure.

Image 8 Woman Carrying water (World Bank 2000d, 2.)

However the claim that better time management will empower women was particularly prominent in *Engendering Development*, given its emphasis on empowerment more generally. The policy paper contained a discussion of "Investments in (Time-Saving) Infrastructure" that opened: "selected investments in basic infrastructure, particularly infrastructure that helps women and girls save time, can increase progress toward gender equality in access to resources and in economic participation" (World Bank 2001, 175). Investment in infrastructure was understood to "reduc(e) the burden of housework" (182) for women, and it empowered still more if it subsequently "free(d) them for income-earning activities" given the claim that "greater earning capacity, in turn, can promote a more equitable balance of power between women and men within households" (177). The link between work and empowerment within the household was thus reiterated, but it required an intervention first to fix the social reproduction problem – investment in infrastructure to free up women's time. In this way "these investments…can lighten women's nonmarket work and allow them more opportunities for paid work and leisure, helping to break down rigid gender divisions of labor" (182).

In summary, the time management solution succeeds as a policy option in the World Bank for many reasons: in its crudest versions is looks utterly simple and is "costless" in ways that threaten to once again made women and girls work harder to sustain social reproduction responsibilities alongside paid employment. However the Bank also intervenes more actively to secure better time management, through technology and infrastructure; indeed this is currently one of the institution's most popular policy preferences. I argue that its popularity is tied to several factors: it is linked to productivity discourses; it has been successfully quantified; it generates expenses in the right places; it is tied to many other development desirables already prioritized by the institution; and it has been framed as empowering in recent years, since it involves standard notions about the empowering effects of technology, modernization, and employment that constitute part of the WID/GAD commonsense. Although text-focused analysis can not ascertain whether the solution will work on the ground as a policy solution, it should nonetheless generate a certain skepticism over claims that this "quick fix" to the social reproduction dilemma will deliver all that it promises. The option ultimately reendorses the very models of standard economics critiqued by the Bank's own staff in chapter two, and it rests on a profoundly inconsistent treatment of productivity which attempts to recognize the economic importance of some forms of unpaid caring labor, but not too much. It also replicates modernization narratives in all their (neo)colonial glory, and is linked to dominant lending initiatives that generate massive profits for contractors and huge debts for borrowers. On this basis, concerns that it has become a prominent solution to the social reproduction problem are at least understandable.

Policy Solution 2: The Restructuring Heternormativity Solution: The Bank's Promotion of Two-Partner Model of Love and Labor, Where Women Work and Men Care

The second intervention proposed by Bank staff to resolve the social reproduction dilemma embedded in their efforts to get women into employment is to restructure normative heterosexuality. The institution no longer assumes a breadwinner housewife model of social reproduction wherein men "work" and women provide unpaid social reproduction labor, but neither does it endorse a default exhaustion solution which implies that women should simply take on extra burdens. Instead it advocates a two-partner, sharing model of love and labor in which women work more and men care better, hereby attempting to (re)privatize responsibility for social reproduction by adjusting the way in which love is expressed in the family.

This (re)privatization strategy rests on a prior legimitation of the inclusion of men in gender policy efforts, an inclusion which has increased significantly since 1979 as the Bank shifted to a definition of GAD that hinged on it. References to men and husbands increased in raw terms and as a percentage of total references in the texts studied (see table 4, appendix 2), reaching a height in *Engendering Development*; this report contained over half of the total references. In addition, the Bank defined good gender analysis as including men to achieve partnership, complimentarity, equity, and balance. This approach was clearly evident in Conable's foreword to the 1990 Progress report, in which he said: "I call on all governments, nongovernmental organizations, and development agencies to work toward the common goal of equal opportunity for all people - male and female - and to help transform this goal into a reality" (in World Bank 1990, 106-109). Indeed the first policy paper on gender differentiated WID from GAD on the basis of male inclusion, making a distinction that became central to all subsequent texts:

> "The World Bank's early "women in development' programs tended to treat women as a special target group of beneficaries in projects and programs. The policy framework is now broadening to reflect the ways in which the relations between women and men constrain or advance efforts to boost growth and reduce poverty for all. This focus characterizes the "gender and development" approach - which the Bank will promote to enhance women's contributions to development" (World Bank 1994, 12).

The "broader" approach required analysis of the roles of men and women, and of "the likely effects of proposed actions on women and men in all analytical and project work (9) in order to "clos(e) the gender gap, through emphasis on participation and ownership that includes both women and men" (71-2).

This imperative stemmed from Moser's approach to gender-aware planning, as recognized by Murphy in her 1995 evaluation. In a footnote defining gender training, for example, Murphy noted that:

> ""Gender" is preferred because it focuses on the roles of both women and men, not just women alone. In all gender training, gender refers to the social construction of men's and women's roles as distinguished from sex which refers to biological definition of men and women. There is some variation in how the word 'gender' is used....In the Moser/Development Planning Unit (London)/Institute for Development Studies (Sussex) model and many others, more emphasis is put on the relational aspect of gender, the relations between men and women, with women usually

> subordinate. Using this definition, planning more explicitly addresses the possibility of improving that subordinate position" (Murphy 1995, 108).

The Moser model of gender analysis that the Bank adopted in the 1990s therefore put particular emphasis on relationality, encouraging a privatized vision of gender policy which focused on intra-household roles. Indeed "effective gender analysis" was defined as "looking at both men's and women's roles," and ensuring that "both men and women in equal partnership take the responsibility to define the development agenda, set the vision and goals, and develop strategies" (Murphy 1997, 43). This definition is particularly evident in Moser's 1999 evaluation, intended to help "create a Bankwide consensus" on gender analysis (Moser Tornqvist and van Bronkhorst 1999, v). This praised the Latin American and Carribbean gender strategy, which "sets out a program to promote gender-responsive development ... that is, development that considers gender differences and constraints, and works towards reducing gender barriers" (8). It also endorsed El Salvador's country gender strategy, which aimed to "creat(e) a more gender equitable division of labor in the household" (26). The report contained a box defining WID and GAD which reinforced the notion that good gender policy is relational and inclusive of men:

> "While WID identifies women as a special, or separate, interest group, GAD identifies gender as an integral part of a development strategy. Under GAD the situation of women is no longer analyzed independently of, but rather in relation to, that of men" (3).

An analysis of projects and policies designated as "failures" is also instructive in this respect; since those that ignored men were highlighted for criticism. For example the 1989 Kenyan gender study was criticized for "treating women as a separate group rather than examining their roles in relation to those of men" (8), while Moser argued that:

> "there is still a widespread tendency to "mix," or confuse, approaches. For example, the World Bank's 1994 Gender Policy (1994a) starts by identifying GAD as its framework, but frequently refers to *women* as a separate target group, rather

> than identifying women's priorities or needs in terms of men's; in addition the term *gender* is used interchangeably with *women*, such that the distinction between the two is not clear and the terms are often confused. The accompanying Operational Policy (1994b) identifies policies in terms of *gender*, but target groups in terms of *women* as a separate group...Similarly, it proposes *"gender-sensitive"* policies, but as a means of improving *women's* access to assets and services" (6 emphasis in original).

In this sense the difference between good and bad gender analysis looks very much that the latter includes men, in a complimentary way emphasizing partnership, equity, and heteronormative balance.

This framing of gender policy leads the Bank to understand its role in GAD efforts as "helping in-country agents who are working to change gender relations" (World Bank 2000d, 5) in particular, sharing directions. As the first paragraph of Wolfensohn's foreword to *Advancing Gender Equality* argued: "the Bank...believes that helping women and men become equal partners in development, and giving them equal voice and better access to resources, are important development objectives in their own right" (in World Bank 2000d, iv). The Bank does not simply recognize "the cultural background that determines the division of labor between men and women" (World Bank 1979a, 6), in a way that has long been a staple of WID/GAD planning; it advocates concrete policy interventions to change that division. Examples include attempts to include men in population control efforts, and recommendations for tax reform, changes to marriage law, and social security reform aimed at increasing sharing in the family.

The attempt to use policy instruments to get men into the family is illustrrated by *Advancing Gender Equality*, which listed "increasing men's responsibility for contraception" as a key mechanism through which family planning services could be improved (World Bank 1995a, 32). Likewise *Engendering Development* encouraged the involvement of men in family planning (World Bank 2001, 251; 23-4), and *Towards Gender*

Equality recommended that governments change the tax system to encourage women into the labor force and to convince couples to share responsibility for childcare, by "ensur(ing) equal treatment of workers within the household and (enforcing) a marginal tax rate on the earnings of additional workers in the household low enough to avoid creating a disincentive to women's participation in the labor force" (World Bank 1995c, 49).

The Bank also urged legal changes in order to grant married women access to the labor force and to compel men to care better for their families. For example the 1997 gender evaluation highlighted a Ugandan initiative in which: "laws relating to domestic relations are being amended….These laws affect the rights of women, their position within society, and their ability to engage independently in commercial and economic activity" (Muprhy 1997, 30). Likewise *Engendering Development* argued that states and development institutions can identify "appropriate policy levers" to "influence the allocation of household resources and in doing so doing promote greater gender equality in workloads, in investments in children, and in command over productive resources" (World Bank 2001, 165). In a discussion of how to reduce disparities in pension income in the Chilean system, the policy paper recommended a requirement that "husbands…purchase a joint annuity when they retire or …withdraw their savings over their own expected lifetime plus that of their wife" – this would raise a woman's pension income to 60% of her husband's if she does not work, and 89% if she does (268). This attempt to legally compel the sharing of income is based on the recognition that the state, or supra-sate development agencies, need to actively intervene through concrete policies to change the way that couples care for each other and their dependents. In short the world's largest development institution is involved in a range of efforts to get men to pick up the slack of social reproduction as women move into work, and to encourage (or compel) more sharing among male-female couples. It remains, once again, to consider why this solution is so successful within the institution.

Why It Works (i): Productivity

One of the most important reasons why this solution to the social reproduction dilemma has garned supported within the Bank is that policymakers have successfully linked it to efficiency discourses focused on productivity. In essence, including men will increase project success. As the first policy paper understood it, Bank efforts should focus on: "link(ing) the activities of men and women more effectively within the project with a view to ensuring optimum overall project benefits" (World Bank 1994, 66). As explained in relation to population:

> "If long-term change in the conditions of women is to be achieved, the actions and atttitudes of men must change, and it is important that men be brought along in the process of change. For example, family planning information campaigns should be aimed at men as well as at women because it is when men and women are able to make joint informed decisions on family size, child spacing, and appropriate methods of contraception, that these programs are most successful" (15)

In keeping with this emphasis on mutual benefits and increased project effectiveness the 1996 evaluation gave favourable mention to a pilot project in the East Asia and Pacific region on "Men and Women Working Together" (World Bank 1996b, 16), a scenario which was understood to increase efficiency and generate win-win gains for all involved. Similarly the 1997 progress report noted a shift to an "equity rationale" in project design (World Bank 1997c, 19): "that is, ensuring that women as well as men benefited from project activities" (28). The report also mentioned the need to "ensur(e) equal access by both sexes" to project consultations (5), again in order to ensure that projects meet the needs of both sexes (46). Murphy's evaluation of the same year referred to the need to "promote greater coordination and synergy" in gender policy (Picciotto in Murphy 1997, xii), in order that "women as well as men benefited from project activities" (1997, 28), and it recommended "making sure that performance indicators measure results separately for women and men" (2) in order that such beneficial impacts could be ascertained with rigor. The *Precis* report also urged "examin(tion of) the Bank's role in improving global public policy on gender…in producing results that benefit men and women equitably" (World Bank 2000d, 1).

The claim that including men can improve development results was particularly central to *Engendering Development*, with the summary arguing that "promoting gender equality is… an important part of a development strategy that seeks to enable all people - women and men alike - to escape poverty and improve their standard of living" (World Bank 2001, 1). The report promoted "a policy approach that focuses explicitly on both men and women" in anti-violence initiatives, for example, arguing that treatment programs for men complement efforts to protect women (265). The policy paper also argued that increasing the representation of women in government will broaden perspectives, since "if the partnership between men and women were to increase in politics and society, politics would better meet the needs of society" (96).

In addition to the general emphasis on male inclusion as leading to increased project success, the Bank also frames non-sharing, non-complimentary, "traditional" models of gender as inefficient. This allows policymakers to argue that restructuring domestic relations to ensure greater sharing between men and women will raise productivity and benefit the market. This argument has long been evident in Bank texts, although in a scattered and inconsistent manner. *Towards Gender Equality* claimed that "traditional" gender roles "aris(e) from convention rather than from comparative advantage" (World Bank 1995c, 29), for example, and as noted in chapter one the Bank argued throughout the 1990s that gender divisions of labor harmed growth. However the claim that restructuring gender relations will benefit the market is made most clearly, and consistently, in the Bank's most recent policy paper. This claimed that households which do not pool resources or share risk generate inefficiencies, which in turn "impose high costs on household production and income" (World Bank 2001, 162). Examples to prove this point focused on the misallocation of labor resources to unprofitable crops; in one study "total household production could be increased by as much as 20 percent if some of the production inputs used on men's plots were reallocated to women's plots" (162).

That said, however, the Bank does not simply argue that changing gender relations will benefit the market; in a key intervention it also argues the reverse, framing its own role as one of assisting an inevitable change brought about by economic development. In this sense sharing, loving couples are a market development, allowing the Bank to conceal its own role in forging them. In part this argument reflects standard modernization narratives concerning the perceived impact of economic development on gender relations. However importantly the introduction to the 1979 pamphlet argued that these impacts were not necessarily positive, since "changes in traditional systems of social organization and of production have frequently disrupted a complementarity between the roles of the two sexes and a sharing of responsibilities between them" (World Bank 1979a, 1). Thus, as explained later in the text:

> "the process of development is altering aspects of the traditional division of labor, in which the tasks of men and women had complemented each other to ensure the survival of the community. Women tended to perform tasks within or near the household. As production has moved into larger units, many of the customary tasks of women, from which they derived both standing in their community and some economic security, are no longer available to them" (12).

Crucally, this framing of economic development as potentially disruptive to gender complimentarity disappeared from Bank texts after 1979. However the claim that the market changed gender relations in an inevitable, universal way did not; indeed it got far more important to gender documents in the 1990s. In particular, policymakers used the classic (and dubious)[v] second wave feminist distinction between sex as biological and gender as malleable to argue that the market is transforming roles. For example, the first policy paper argued that biological sex provides the "base" on which gender roles are designed, since "gender characteristics, activities, and roles have been shaped over time by sociocultural and economic factors. Since gender…is socially and culturally constructed, gender roles can be transformed by social changes, induced by economic transformation, incentives, and legal and regulatory reforms" (World Bank 1994, 67). The malleability of gender roles thus became a key mechanism through which the Bank insisted on its own neutrality and non-interference in controversial domestic issues; policymakers simply claimed that gender roles were already being radically changed by the market. The executive summary to Murphy's 1995 evaluation of gender lending summed up this approach in the following way:

> "Gender issues are complex and culturally defined. Interventions that could entail changes in gender roles are therefore sensitive. Yet such changes often occur spontaneously and quickly, as economic and technological conditions evolve." (Murphy 1995, 3).

Thus is it perfectly legitimate for borrowers and the Bank itself to "purposefully induce" changes (23), given that they are in effect caused by economics in the first place.

Once more this argument was laid out in greatest detail in *Engendering Development*. The policy paper restated earlier arguments regarding the inefficiency of non-sharing models of partnership and the malleability of gender roles:

> "Gender roles and relationships evolve out of interactions among biological, technological, economic, and other societal constraints. Some social scientists argue that gender roles originally reflected efficient survival strategies and sexual divisions of labor, but that as societies have advanced technically and economically these gender asymmetries have become both inefficient and limiting-as gender norms have changed more slowly than the factors that created them... But evidence also shows that while gender norms may take time to change, they are far from static. In fact, they can change quite rapidly in response to socioeconomic conditions" (World Bank 2001, 34).

Once again, economic development was understood to change gender roles automatically, but this time in universally positive directions. The Bank argued that growth "increase(es) demand for female labor - and slowly but surely chang(es) gender roles and relations in the process" (204). Hence free markets "can improve gender equality in a variety of ways" (229), and can "help break down traditional gender divisions of labor within the household and the economy, provide incentives for more equal investments in human capital, and reduce discrimination in the labor market" (229). The neo-classical version of this argument explained that households make decisions about the gender division of labor following signals from the economy (18). On this basis:

> "Economic development introduces incentives and opportunities that can break down entrenched gender roles in the economy - allowing females to participate as males do in the market economy (and not just during economic recession) and males to share in care activities. Economic growth can lighten women's work burden at home, giving them more leisure time and the choice of engaging in market work. And it can allow men

> to lighten their own market work and induce them to engage in more nonmarket activities" (183).

This is a beautifully concise summary of the Bank's argument that heteronormativity is being inevitably, inexorhably restructured by the market – women are being led into work and men are being led into care, and the only actor inducing any change is the market itself.

In some cases this policy argument implies that the Bank should simply sit back and watch as complimentary partnerships emerge to resolve social reproductions tensions in (re)privatized ways. Consider for example the comparison of two Ecuadorian studies on whether adjustment has hurt or benefited women in *Engendering Development*:

> "One study, of a low-income neighborhood in urban Guayaquil, Ecuador, concludes that cuts in government expenditures on public services forced mothers to increase their time on household and community care activities at the expense of leisure (Moser 1989). Daughters were similarly compelled to reallocate time, taking away from their schooling. The conclusion is that adjustment harmed women and girls. The second study, of the cut-flower industry in rural Ecuador, credits an adjustment-induced boom with expanding the demand for female labor, raising women's incomes relative to men's, and increasing women's leisure time (Newman 2000). *Men in cut-flower producing areas increased their time in home maintenance and care activities compared with men in other areas. The study concludes that adjustment has benefited women*" (206 emphasis added).

Adjustment is indeed a problem if it overburdens women by withdrawing state support for social reproduction activities such that their workload increases. However it benefits everyone if it gets women into work through the promotion of export-oriented agriculture, and men to step in and pick up the slack of caring labor.[vi] The Bank's preference for privatized solutions to the social reproduction tension based on men loving better and women working harder is perfectly demonstrated in this example, although the institution itself does very little. Labor patterns shift inevitably due to changing patterns of profitability and productivity, and the social reproduction dilemma is thus ultimately resolved by the market.

Elsewhere, however, the Bank salvages a non-policy policy role for itself amidst this celebration of the liberatory role of the market, promoting active measures to encourage complimentarity even though the market itself causes such changes. Indeed as noted above without concrete policies in pensions, tax reform and so on to encourage (or coerce) appropriate sharing, normative couples will not function successfully as a solution to the tension between paid work and social reproduction. The advocacy of these concrete policies of course raises crucial questions regarding the degree to which this can be regarded as a strategy of (re)privatization at all – it can appear as such only because efforts by political actors to restructure intimate relations between straight people are not marked as sexualized or public.[vii] However such advocacy also raises potential problems for the Bank's justification of its own role in gender policy, since it appears to contradict an emphasis on complimentarity as market-caused. Again this tension is negotiated through the concept of time. In short:

> "economic development and income growth tend to promote gender equality. But the positive effects of economic development can take a long time to play out. And they are not sufficient to eliminate gender disparities. Nor are they automatic. For these reasons governments and development organizations need to take a more integrated approach to promoting gender equality" (231).

Policymakers also argue that they should act to secure change for some particularly oppressed groups, whose gender relations need to be specifically targeted for reform because they are especially unequal. As *Engendering Development* argued:

> "Because the combined effects of institutional reform and economic development usually take time to be realized, active measures are often warranted in the short to medium term. …Such measures accelerate progress in redressing persistent gender inequalities and they are useful in targeting specific subpopulations, such as the poor, for

whom gender disparities can be particularly acute" (22).

Once more, then, the poor are framed as particularly sexist, and policymakers are concerned that it will take more time for efficient heteronormative models of partnering to trickle down to them. Thus policies should be forged in the interests of accelerating already-inevitable change.

The framing of the market as "necessary but not sufficient" to ensure sharing models of partnership secures a small but vital space for the institution to play a role as a policy actor. In essence the Bank, in classic neo-liberal fashion, can intervene in the event of "market failure" to produce sharing couples. Thus in justifying the need to "tak(e) active policy measures" to restructure loving relations, the Bank again positions itself as the handmaiden of a process that would happen more slowly without its help. The institution claims to not be acting politically, or controversially, by changing gender relations in this fashion; it is merely speeding up a process that will happen anyway as households shift to more efficient models of sharing partnership in response to market incentives. This is a variation of the argument used to justfy intervention in getting women into work, and to shift time use through better technology and infrastructure – and in all three cases it helps explain why these policies have proved successful with the institution.

Why it Works (ii): Empowerment

The second reason why the Bank's attempt to restrucure heteronormativity functions so successfully as a policy option within the institution is that it has been framed as empowering, hereby fulfilling the objectives of the Bank's new, more progressive interest in human development. In short, sharing models of heteronormative partnership in which women work and men love are not only efficient – they are also liberatory to both parties.

The emphasis on mutual empowerment was particularly evident in Wolfensohn's speech to the 1995 Beijing conference, in which he issued "a challenge for women – and men too" (Wolfensohn 1995, 2). This:

> "will require not just the liberation of women, but also the liberation of men - in their thinking, attitudes, and willingness to take a fairer share of the responsibilities and workloads that women carry on their shoulders. To bring about real improvement in the quality of women's lives, men must change. And action must begin at home. For each of us, change lies in the kind of household we live in, the society we help to build, and the institutions we work for" (3).

Although Wolfensohn is rather notorious for his highly personal approach to development issues[viii], the notion that Bank staff should themselves restructure their intimate interactions also surfaced in the discussion on how to "Promot(e) Gender Equality among Shareholders," where one employee commented:

> "I am getting very personal, but having a family, having children, trying to make life work, being tough and strong and effective -- and at the same time, loving, caring and considerate -- is not something which always is so very easy to combine. The cliches, the expectations, the demands on you -- they are still all there. And there is nothing wrong with them. I am not saying they shouldn't be there. But they at least should be shared equally between men and women. What I am trying to say is that equality works both ways. Gender equality implies that women should be given access to all that men traditionally have, be it jobs, health, education, influence, careers, et cetera. But the roles of men… must also change. It is a double issue….And I think this is a struggle which has to be kept on" (World Bank 1995b, 7).

This struggle to promote empowering harmony is beautifully illustrated through the visual images used in Bank gender texts. These frequently depict success by showing individual men and women together, partnered in a complimentary fashion that not only increases productivity, but which symbolizes human wholeness, harmony, and liberation more broadly. One popular graphic, used in several gender texts and on the Bank's gender website, depicts half a male and half a female face together to make one whole person (image 9), reinforcing a notion of wholeness and empowerment through heteronormativity evident in several other graphics and photographs (image 10; 11; 12). Consider for example the cover photograph to the Bank's 1999 mainstreaming review (image 13). This shows a man ploughing a field followed by a woman sowing seeds. The woman is carrying a small child on her back, and the three figures function as a symbol of "mainstreaming gender." Again, "gender" is illustrated through a representation of a male-female couple, but this time a young child is represented too, in an unusually positive way. The image can be read as positive because the woman is "working;" she is supporting her man in his productive labor, while literally carrying the burdens of social reproduction on her back.

However elsewhere men and women are shown engaging in productive activity without children, as in the entrepreneurial photographs included in *Advancing Gender Equality* (2000; images 14 and 15). Both photographs feature two women and one man working together, and in both cases the couple are made central to the image, their working together representing balance, partnership, and gender equity through equal participation in labor. In essence, then, the vision of empowerment on offer in the Bank's gender texts is based on a highly contradictory approach to "autonomy" that rests on necessary attachment to others.



Image 9: cover to Engendering Development (World Bank 2001)



Image 10: Heteronormativity as Complementary Balance



Image 11: Heteronormativity as Complementary Balance



Image 12: Heteronormativity as Complementary Balance



Image 13: cover to 1999 Mainstreaming Gender review

Image 14 Women and Men Working Together (World Bank 2000a, 18).

Image 15: Women and Men Working Together (World Bank 2000a)

On a cursory reading the Bank's attempt to restructure intimate relations between men and women invokes a familiar notion of empowerment as individual autonomy. Certainly the institution has repeatedly criticized legal systems which deny women autonomous land and property rights, or which tie those rights to marriage. For example the summary to *Engendering Development* noted that:

> "In a number of countries women still lack independent rights to own land, manage property, conduct business, or even travel without their husband's consent. In much of Sub-Saharan Africa, women obtain land rights chiefly through their husband as long as the marriage endures, and they often lose those rights when they are divorced or widowed" (World Bank 2001, 4).

Indeed the second policy paper used data on women's "equal rights as to marriage, during marriage and at its dissolution" (70) as a measure of gender equity. Likewise both examples of how international support helped domestic activists achieve gender equality focused on legal reforms to break women's dependent ties to men – the first concerned changes to citizenship laws in Botswana that privileged fathers, and the second was a Guatemalan initiative to end provisions in the the civil code that discriminated against married women (143). The policy paper directly claimed that dependence on male relatives reduces women's autonomy (75), defined as "their ability to control their lives, to have a voice in matters concerning themselves and their families, and to make and implement decisions" (83). The Bank also recognized – critically - that single women without access to male wages are vulnerable to poverty (64), and that divorce, separation or death of a spouse "has a more negative effect on the living standards of women than on those of men because women are more dependent on spousal support" (275). Likewise the report highlighted how economic institutions can reinforce gender inequalities in social security and health insurance systems by "forc(ing) women to rely primarily on male relatives for support in old age" (124). In all of these respects the institution's formally cleared policy texts suggest a straight-forward vision of empowerment as individual autonomy.

However closer attention to these arguments around restructured couplehood reveals a more complex framing of empowerment and individual autonomy, wherein both are defined through necessary attachment to specific others. Evidence of an unresolved tension between empowerment as individual autonomy and empowerment as sharing partnership is prominent in all Bank policy texts on gender; I focus here on discussons of land titling, marriage as an anti-poverty strategy, pensions, and the "breakdown" of the family. In relation to land titling, the Bank leave the tension between sharing empowerment spectacularly unresolved. The second policy paper stated: "land reforms that provide for joint titling of husband and wife or that enable women to hold independent land titles can increase women's control of land where statutory law predominates" (World Bank 2001, 23). There is a enormous difference between the vison of autonomy embedded in independent land rights and joint spousal titles; this is simply ignored in the text. Similarly, the policy paper criticized Ugandan legislation that gives equal rights to divorce but does nothing to address questions of women gaining access to land through husbands, leaving divorced and widowed women dependent on male relatives for access to land (117-8). When so-mediated by male goodwill, "these rights are precarious, contingent on a woman's marital status" (120). However on the same page the report endorsed a shift to joint land titling in Colombia.

This tension-ridden definition of empowerment is beautifully represented by a text box on GAD concepts included in Moser's 1999 gender evaluation. This listed six types of WID/GAD policy; welfare, antipoverty, equity, efficiency, equality, and "empowerment/autonomy" (Moser Tornqvist and van Bronkhorst 1999, 3). The running together of "empowerment and autonomy", separated with a slash, speaks directly to a core tension in the Bank's framing of empowerment as it relates to restructured gender roles, involving a merging of the "empowerment' and "equality" perspectives that leaves several issues unresolved. Consider Moser's description of these two approaches:

> "Empowerment The first post-WID approach, articulated by women in developing countries. Its purpose is to empower women through greater self reliance. It recognizes the triple role, and seeks to meet strategic gender needs/priorities indirectly, through bottom-up mobilization of practical gender needs.
> Equality The most recent GAD approach, emerging from the Fourth World Conference on Women (Beijing, 1995), and widely adopted by governments and aid agencies. It introduces equality as a human right, and emphasizes that power-sharing and more equitable partnerships between women and men are political, social, and economic prerequisites for sustainable, people-centered development" (7).

Here empowerment is associated with autonomy as self-reliance, while equality is defined through reference to equal partnerships with men. The Bank's post-Beijing GAD policy is based on mix of efficiency, empowerment, and equality rationales (11). Thus the contradictory framing of empowerment as achieved through necessary attachment stems from a core unresolved tension in the multiple policy rationales currently in use in the institution. If anything one can predict increased emphasis on heteronormative restructuring as empowering as the equity rationale increases in the Bank vis a vis the efficiency approach.

Further evidence that the Bank understands sharing partnerships, rather than autonomous individuals, as emblematic of empowerment is provided by discussions of marriage as an anti-poverty – and sometimes as survival - strategy. A footnote in *Engendering Development* made the benefits of marriage very clear in this respect:

"A demographic study from India suggests that widows age 45 and above have mortality rates nearly double those of married women of the same age" (World Bank 2001, 72). The Bank subsequently suggested ways to facilitate marriage as part of an empowerment approach. For example, in a discussion of the socio-economic implications of ill health, the 1996 discussion of Bank gender policy recommended measures to cure onchocerciasis on the grounds that "stigmatization is even more pronounced for women, as the skin disease can adversely affect their prospects for marriage and, thus, can have significant implications for their socioeconomic security" (World Bank 1996b, 9). Similarly, consider this comment from *Engendering Development*, contained in a discussion of how older women are more vulnerable to poverty than men:

> "In some societies widows face cultural constraints that limit their ability to ensure a basic standard of living in old age. In much of India, for example, customary restrictions on remarriage, employment, place of residence, and inheritance and ownership of property all limit their abilities to provide for themselves" (World Bank 2001, 67).

The claim that changing customary laws on remarriage enables one to provide for oneself is a very curious definition of autonomy.

The conflicted framing of empowerment as requiring marriage is particularly evident in a discussion of increased labor force participation rates in East Asia; this argued:

> "Because of more schooling and higher labor force participation, the transition period between schooling and marriage and parenthood lengthened, enabling more young women to earn income and enjoy some autonomy. In Hong Kong young women saw paid employment before marriage as a temporary reprieve from their responsibilities at home and from future responsibilities to their own families" (210).

Women only receive a "temporary reprieve" from marriage here, gaining "some autonomy" but not enough individual empowerment to disrupt the inevitable life path transition from childhood to marriage to parenthood. Indeed the Bank's gender policies are so firmly embedded in a complimentary gender model that "autonomy" is imagined *within* a couple, a radically different notion of autonomy than that for which neo-classical economists are usually criticized (i.e. the "masculinist" rational actor model wherein no ties to others can be recognized).[ix] This is a perfect illustration of Wendy Brown's point that "women's right to be an individual is curtailed by her identification with the family" (Brown 1995, 160). "Autonomy" is restricted to that which can be secured within putatively equal partnerships, and the end result of indivdual empowerment is "the happy heterosexual family" (Tobin 1990, 64).

The Bank's recent discussions of pensions reiterate the notion that women should be attached to men in order to receive the empowering benefits of economic development – in essence, that marriage should be the ultimate anti-poverty strategy (Mink 1998, 78). For example *Engendering Development* recognized in the summary that pension systems often leave elderly women poor, in part because they are designed around male earnings patterns. As a solution, the Bank endorsed a multipillar pension system wherein "widows…will gain because they are protected by the joint annuity that their husbands must provide, in addition to their own pension" (World Bank 2001, 136). Again, the dangers of dependency on men disappear here, since the law will now ensure that marriage will work to keep women out of poverty.

The attempt to resolve the pension problem by coercing men to support their wives in a privatized system is part of the Bank's understanding of the broader "gender problem" at issue. The institution is not so much concerned that people are forced into partnerships to survive, but rather it is worried that those partnerships will breakdown. Thus the problem is not a development model that can not provide for necessary human dependencies such that individuals can truly support themselves and choose their own attachments freely – it is the disintegration of the family. As with all development problems, "the language of 'crisis' and disintegration creates a logical need for external intervention and management" (Crush 1995, 10), justifying Bank activity in the intimate realm. However again these interventions often remain utterly unmarked, in part because heterosexuality is depoliticized and policies that relate to it are not recognized as policies. Gender policymakers consequently end up arguing that families need to be strengthened, and when interventions to achieve this are marked at all, they are framed as empowering.

The Bank have long been concerned about family breakdown and its perceived negative development impacts. The 1979 pamphlet argued that men's ownership of land was a problem when they *left*, as "such dependence on men is a particular handicap for women's agricultural efforts where there is large-scale migration by men" (World Bank 1979a, 8). While this text focused on "a project to provide for agricultural training to the wives of male emigrants" (8), later texts concentrated on keeping men around, to prevent family breakdown and hereby empower both partners. Several documents expressed concern over the dissolution of families in Eastern Europe as men responded to the stress of unemployment, for example, and Bank staff often comment on the breakdown of the normative family unit. According to Nancy Birdsall, a Bank consultant included in a 1996 review of gender issues in the institution, "female headed households, where there is no nurturing father, are only the most extreme signs of a pathology that needs to be addressed" (Nancy Birdsall, Bank consultant, quoted in Buvinic, Gwin and Bates 1996, 92). In the Bank's Association of Women in Development forum in November 1999 Sven Sandstrom (a Bank managing director) voiced more concerns about women's flight from marriage, noting that there had been an increase in domestic violence and family breakdown as women had taken jobs outside the home. In response, he urged the Bank to look at all projects with regard to their impact on "the family", specifically by expanding economic opportunities for women "while seeking to keep women and families whole".[x]

Engendering Development also highlighted family breakdown as a problem. The chapter on how gender inequality harms development noted that "the dissolution of families ha(s) risen considerably," hurting women and children (World Bank 2001, 73). More interestingly, in an attempt to show that gender roles differ the report compared two groups in Burkina Faso:

> "In both groups women receive land rights predominantly through marriage. But because marriage institutions are more stable among the Mossi and land tenure is more secure, agricultural productivity is significantly higher on plots farmed by women in Mossi than in Bwa areas" (112).

The Mosssi appear to "win" this competition. Although they oblige women to work on their husband's land (which one presumes is a "development bad" since it would seem to reduce women's autonomy), Mossi women have more secure land rights because their marriages last (leading to higher productivity). Once more, the "problem"here is not so much compulsory partnerships that reduce individual autonomy as partnerships that break down. These definitions of wholeness through lasting heteronormative attachment severely limit the space available to argue for policies that disrupt normative family units, and they curtail discussions of empowerment focused on individual autonomy.

Women's (Still) Limited Rationality

Another important feature of the Bank's argument that restructured partnerships are empowering is its inconsistent framing of neo-classical economics in reference to women. As noted in previous chapters, the Bank has endorsed a "bargaining" model of households in which individual rational actors attempt to maximize utility. Yet within an apparently individualistic rational choice bargaining model of human interaction women's choices will be structured by their concern for their children and families such that they will automatically share the benefits they secure through increased access to employment. Their rational action thus rests on irrational altruism that men are simply not expected to share; indeed as discussed below men are often so pathologized in this policy option that their ability to love at all is in doubt. However women's love for their families is assumed alongside their rational action in the market, in a paradoxical approach to individual utility maximization and other-oriented altruism that is resolved only through naturalized assumptions about feminine care.

The inconsistent and profoundly gendered merging of neo-classical economics with residual, required selflessness is evident in every Bank text since the first policy paper, when the bargaining model became central to Bank gender work. Standard "welfarist" arguments that assume women's selfless caring exist alongside references to individual bargaining and empowerment through access to resources, with the 1994 policy paper citing studies "that show that income controlled by women is more likely to be spent on household needs than income controlled by men" (World Bank 1994, 9). Other documents claim that women's access to economic resources has a positive effect on household welfare; that "access to income-generating activities for women do(es) much to lower infant mortality and to improve child nutrition and survival" (1994, 23), and "is bound to contribute to better family nutrition, especially for the women's children" (23); that "investing in women farmers also has important welfare effects as there is strong evidence that women spend their additional income on food, clothing and essential services for their family, thus having potentially greater immediate and long-term impacts on poverty reduction than increased earnings for men" (World Bank 1997c, 24); that "providing access to credit through targeted programs enables poor women to increase family incomes" (Murphy 1997, 18); that "women are more likely than men to spend the income they control on basic welfare" (World Bank 2000d, 1); and that "access to water and to microcredit can transform women's lives, and thereby their families" (3).

The disjunct is particularly evident in the Beijing documents, which as Moser notes emphasized the bargaining household model more strongly than previous work, yet which also understood women as acting out of altruistic love for family members. Consider, for example, the claim in *Towards Gender Equality* that "the possibility of receiving credit (or, similarly, of working for wages) may give women greater bargaining power within the household. This bargaining power can be used to improve child health and nutrition and may increase the likelihood that children will attend school" (World Bank 1995c, 36). Likewise *Advancing Gender Equality* argued that "including women in development activities can improve both the quality of women's own lives and the quality of life for generations to come" (Choski in World Bank 1995a, v), without ever letting this assumption of altruistic resource transfer trouble the neo-classical bargaining model used throughout the text. Indeed *Towards Gender Equality* celebrated women's motherhood in terms that seem more apt for culturalist feminists than economists: it included a graphic (used frequently to illustrate the Bank's commitment to GAD issues[xi]) depicting a White woman with long flowing hair holding a shaded baby to her breast (image 16). A tall shaded figure stands behind her and the child, with large muscled arms that suggest manliness. Both figures have their hands up, and are supporting half the

I am the woman who holds up the sky
The rainbow runs through my eyes
The sun makes a path to my womb
My thoughts are in the shape of clouds
But my words are yet to come.

Poem of the Ute Indians

Image 16: Poem of the Ute Indians (World Bank 1995c) planet above them, perhaps in reference to a proverb often cited in GAD literature that women hold up half the sky; presumably the man behind her is holding up the other half. However in addition to celebrating normative couplehood the image also privileges women's caring maternity, through the inclusion of the "poem of the Ute Indians."[xii]

The contradictory vision of loving, maternal women securing family survival through rational action in the marketplace was also central to James Wolfensohn's vision of gender policy as expressed in his Beijing speech. He started this by noting:

> "I need no persuading that women are absolutely central to sustainable development, economic advance, and social justice. Like so many others, I owe a huge debt to my own mother for her guidance and support. My family tradition and cohesion are built around the role of women. I know its strength - for myself, and for my children. It is no abstract concept" (Wolfensohn 1995, 1).

Later he returned to the theme of women's altruistic love for the family, framing it as the linchpin on which efforts to integrating women into development rest:

> "women themselves are key to development -- the primary agents of change in their communities. I am impressed by the spectacular results for millions of families when the economic potential of women is released. A Bank study of successful micro-credit programs for women in Bangladesh, for example, has shown that -- with a loan as small as $100 to a poor woman to develop her own business -- she helps to double family income and, indeed, can lift her family out of poverty after five years" (2).

Eduaction policy is justified on the same basis, since

> "As the African proverb tells us: "If we educate a boy, we educate one person. If we educate a girl, we educate a family - and a whole nation" (4).

I do not necessarily dispute the fact that educating women "has a catalytic effect on every dimension of development;" I merely note that these effects should at the very least puzzle the neo-classical bargaining model of the household on which the Bank's contemporary gender policy rests. However this inconsistency is never addressed; in contrast, Bank policymakers *rely* on assumptions about women's altruistic love for their efforts to resolve the social reproduction dilemma through restructuring love and work in the privatized family to succeed. In this sense women's rationality is encouraged, but only to a point; their irrational loving attachment to families – both to children and husbands – is also required.

The Bank's most recent policy paper on gender also emphasized the altruistic connection between women and families, in multiple ways. The report extended assumptions about feminine altruism to its new interest in corruption, arguing that "there may be *intrinsic differences* in the behaviors of women and men that lead to cleaner government" (World Bank 2001, 93 emphasis added) aside from those caused by differences in schooling, experience in the workforce, and so on. It cited studies that "suggest that men and women differ in behaviors that have to do with corruption, the general conclusion being that women are more community-oriented and selfless than men" (93), and it concluded that women entrepreneurs are less likely to accept bribes than men (94). *Engendering Development* also claimed that women in political office see themselves as advocating a more conciliatory, mediating approach to politics than men (96). Returning to more familiar territory, the summary reiterated the fact that:

> "higher household income is associated with higher child survival rates and better nutrition. And putting additional incomes in the hands of women within the household tends to have a larger positive impact than putting that income in the hands of men... Unfortunately, rigid social norms about the appropriate gender division of labor and limited paid employment for women restrict women's ability to earn income" (9).

The policy problem here is not the gender norms encouraging women to give up their income to enhance other's welfare; it is the norms restricing access to that income in the first place.

The disjunct between women's autonomous self-interested individualism, reflecting a bargaining model of neo-classical economics, and women's altruistic devotion to those they love is also nicely illustrated in the chapter on households, which argued against "traditional" accounts assuming households pool resources and have unified preferences. Instead the paper insisted that "household resources are allocated in the face of competing preferences and unequal bargaining power among members" (148). Thus "policies that alter the distribution of resources among household members shift the balance of power among those members" (148) – this is the standard rationale behind why employing women empowers them, and it was reiterated in a standard way. However the report went on:

> "A growing body of evidence indicates that more resources in the hands of women mean greater household allocations to children. These effects can be substantial....For child survival the marginal effect of female income is nearly 20 times larger than that of male income. And for child nutrition, the effect is four to eight times larger (Thomas 1990, 1997). Together these factors make a strong case for targeting programs toward women and girls to increase their command over resources" (148).

There is no transition between women's own empowerment and that of children, and no explananation as to why women will love better than men, or why fathers lack preferences for child welfare.

Interstingly, *Engendering Development* attempted, at least indirectly, to reconcile the tension at issue here, and it ran into predictable problems. Having argued forcefully that putting resources into women's hands benefits children, it claimed in a small section buried towards the end of its chapter on household resource allocation that researchers should understand "the specific nature of gender relations within a given context – and how social institutions affect intrahousehold resource allocations in that context" (163). Thus women may favour son's education over daughters in some countries, given "social norms and practices" that encourage parents to see boys as more desirable – for example the fact that boys are more important for old people's social security than girls, such that they represent "an investment strategy" for women (164). On this reasoning *every* country in which a wage gap exists will invest more in boys education – this is not an issue of "context" but had previously been marked as a universal mainifestation of gender inequality. In short the attempt to explain women's investment in children through neo-classical models ensures that their behaviour makes less sense than ever – the policy framing still cannot work without the notion that women will love irrationally.

Irresponsible Men in Need of Domestication.

If the Bank's apparently "empowering" attempt to resolve the social reproduction tension embedded in its attempts to get women into employment through restructuring arrangements of love and work rests on continued assumptions of women's irrational care, it also rests on some profoundly disturbing assumptions about men. While women's unexplained loving altruism will ensure household survival, men are pathologized as irresponsible, frivolous, and selfish, and they are offered redemptive liberation through loving attachment to families in order that they pick up the slack created by women's shift to paid employment.

As noted above the framing of poor men in developing countries as lazy, violent, and unloving is disturbingly prominent in Bank gender policy. The 1994 policy text, for example, argued that:

> "The transaction costs in obtaining credit - for transport, paperwork, time spent waiting, and so on - may be higher for women because of higher opportunity costs

> from forgone activities. In rural Kenya, the distance to a bank is a significant determinant of women's probability of obtaining credit, but it does not affect men's borrowing behavior" (World Bank 1994, 36).

Contra Marilyn Waring, this implies that *men* are sitting around with nothing to do, while *women* are too busy for frivolous journeys. The implication became an explicit argument in *Advancing Gender Equality* (1995), which contained the following text box on "Gender":

> "In North Sumatra where I was born," reminisced Dr. Washington Napitupulu, the father of Indonesia's literacy campaign, "when you plant the rice, the women do that. When you clean the rice fields, the women do it. They also build the roads, the houses, and carry stones from the river. The men are in the shops playing chess, drinking beer or coffee. The women, especially in North Sumatra, in Java, in Bali, often work harder than the men in the rural areas." "We found that the girls are smarter than the boys," says Romo Mangun, an Indonesian Catholic priest and advocate for the poor. "in our society boys are princes, so a boy can do anything. But girls have all sorts of duties-they have learned responsibility from early childhood. The work's done by the women" (World Bank 1995a, 27).

This claim that men are lazy and do not engage in social reproduction work is reinforced by *Advancing Gender Equality* (2000), which opens with a photograph of three women hauling a bucket of water – a man is shown in the background staring at the camera (image 17). Likewise the executive summary to this report contained a photograph of a group of women preparing food around a table – a boy is shown playing in the background (image 18). Men are thus presented as outsiders to the family, engaged in neither caring labor nor productive employment. Evidence to the contrary is ignored – for example research cited in *Engendering Development* showing that the presence of young children reduces women's labor force participation also showed that "if anything (children) have a postive impact on fathers' labor supply" (World Bank 2001, 169). There was no discussion of this findings, and certainly no effort to interpret it as evidence of men working because they love their families.

When men and families/households are linked together, it is usually in a way that poses men as agents of harm. For example Murphy's 1995 evaluation cited a Kenyan project study which found that men were being paid for work that women did; "The report discussed how the consequences of large payments to men could be used to increase the size of household (more children, polygyny) and keeping children out of school (sic)" (Murphy 1995, 42). Here the implication is that by giving men more money families will break down – men will buy more wives and children will be forced to work. This is a completely pathological framing of male behaviour, devoid of any love and absent even the most basic sense of future-oriented self-interest; the most mainstream of neo-classical economists will argue that using added income to take children out of school is irrational in the long term.

These references occur alongside others linking male unemployment to alcoholism and violence (World Bank 2000a, iv; 2001, 73), and to men draining family income through purchases of alcohol and cigarettes (World Bank 2001, 159). This discourse is not applied equally to all men; just as poor countries were framed as more oppressive in relation to the discussions of work policy in chapter one, poor men are framed as particularly iresponsible, sexist, oppressive, violent, drunken, and unloving here. Unemployed men are considered more violent and drunken, for example, and their spending habits are framed as particularly irresponsible. Indeed without meaning to deny that some people can be irresponsible with cash, or to minimize problems caused by the centrality of alcohol to expressions of masculinity in some communities, this preoccupation with drinking seems to reflect a dangerous impulse to blame the poor for their indulgent spending habits.

Image 17: Three Women Hauling Water (World Bank 2000a, ii)

Image 18: Women Preparing Food (World Bank 2000a, vii)

Sometimes poor men appear unredeemable in these discussions – their behaviour is naturalized and the Bank's preferred solution is to transfer resources to more loving, responsible women. Thus to "significantly increas(e) the share of the budget their households allocate to food and reduc(e) the share spent on alcohol and cigarettes" (World Bank 2001, 81), the Bank should "increase(e) women's share of cash income in the household," hereby framing men as, in effect, a lost cause. Similarly the Bank endorses policies that put resources into women's hands, citing the UK's shift to giving mothers rather than fathers control of child benefit (159). Thus *Engendering Development* explained in a footnote that:

> "women and men often have different social values and preferences. For example, women and men often have different views on what they consider justifiable and unjustifiable social behaviors.... Similarly, women and men often have different preferences that translate into different patterns of household expenditures and investments, depending on the extent to which women or men control income or assets... For instance, resources controlled by women tend to be invested more heavily in

> children (at the margin) than resources controlled by men. So, women and men may well make different choices and pursue different outcomes in an environment of equal rights, opportunities, and voice" (70).

Women's altruism and men irresponsibility are considered intrinsic gender differences here, likely to remain after societies have been restructured to achieve the liberal equality promoted by the policy paper.

However these options are not particularly prominent in Bank texts, because they do not include men and thus do not appear "equal" or in-keeping with the definition of good gender policy as encouraging equity through complimentary balance. Thus important attempts are made to redeem men through tying them more closely to the family and offering them empowerment through love. Writing of the "negative externalities" of gender inequalities, through which individuals or groups indulge their prejudices at the expense of others, *Engendering Development* wrote of fathers thusly: "if individuals or groups internalize this harm they will be more invested in ending or reducing gender inequalities. This is the case when men who have daughters become more aware and concerned about abuses against women." (101). If fathers are less likely to be sexist, they are also more likely to be "liberated," to use Wolfensohn's terminology, "in their thinking, attitudes, and willingness to take a fairer share of the responsibilities and workloads that women carry on their shoulders" (Wolfensohn 1995, 3).

This claim that men will benefit from more loving roles is confirmed in the visual images used in the Bank's more recent gender texts, in which photographs are far more prominent than in early work. When represented positively, men are often shown with children, for example – *Advancing Gender Equality* (2000) included a photograph in the opening chapter of an older adult man with 3 younger boys (image 19). In essence, then, men should "be given the opportunity to be part of the traditionally feminine sphere of being loving, considerate, participatory, listening, having patience, understanding, learning, caring" (World Bank 1995b,6-7).



Image 19: Man and Boys (World Bank 2000a, 3)

These positive representations of men's caring behaviour are supported by concrete policy suggestions that attempt to tie men into the family, in order that their redemption through domesticity can occur. These examples are particularly prevalent in *Engendering Development*. For example, a text box on "Factors Influencing Bargaining Power" encouraged measures to strengthen women's ability to threaten exit from the household, yet it suggested efforts to tie men *into* the family, making it harder for them to leave: "if enforcement of alimony and child support payments makes divorce more costly to men, women should have more power within marriage" (World Bank 2001, 156). Again this policy frames men as devoid of love, inherently more inclined to abandon their partners and children, and the attempt to coercively tie them to households by increasing the costs of exit is a stunningly overt intervention into a supposedly privatized realm in order to shore up caring arrangements. Other examples of policy success included Canadian legal changes that made divorce easier for women and gave them greater access to enforceable alimony settlements (118), and protective orders against violent men that "allow judges to remove an abuser temporarily from the home and to order him to seek counseling, get treatment for substance abuse, *and pay maintenance and child support*" (119 emphasis added). These punitative efforts to change men by using state resources to enforce their perceived responsibilities to their families offer them empowerment in a coerced fashion that does little to challenge perceptions of them as ultimately irresponsible and uncaring. While the world's largest development institution has now taken an interest in making men love better, this attention is certainly not flattering.

In addition, these measures rest on a partial understanding of development problems that renders individual men culpable for outcomes that are better explained – and resolved – at the suprahousehold level. As noted above, the Bank's definition of gender analysis involves an identification of intrahousehold dynamics as the key causal factor explaining gender inequality; this is one of the reasons that changing gender roles in the family is understood to work so well as a policy solution. This ubiquitous diagnosis of the gender problem as lying in private interactions in the household between men and women leads the Bank to endorse privatized policy options focused on changing men even when they make little sense. For example *Engendering Development* gave the following example of how "a detailed understanding of gender systems may prevent interventions from having unintended and adverse consequences":

> "a recent project in The Gambia aimed to increase productivity of rice cultivation (traditionally women's work) and, in so doing, increase women's share of household income. While rice yields increased under the project, the commercialization of rice associated with the project shifted control of cultivation from women to men. With this shift men gained greater claim over female labor, as women were obligated to contribute labor to crops controlled by men. Moreover, women's share of household income declined.... An early understanding of the asymmetric rights, obligations, and relative bargaining power of women and men might have enabled policymakers to design the program to achieve both its goals... More generally, a thorough understanding of local gender systems is often critical to ensuring that programs are designed and implemented in ways that indeed foster greater gender equality" (2001, 164).

This example raises far more questions about work, income, and gender relations than it answers. Women's work in rice production had already been ascertained, and thus commercializing it made sense on a neo-classical model of household bargaining that aimed to give women more control over resources, and that saw cash as empowering in a simplistic manner. Yet the effort failed – commercialization shifted control of cultivation to men and thus women's share of income fell. It is unclear how a better understanding of local gender roles would have stopped this happening, fundamentally because the local scale of intimate interaction between couples in the household is not the primary gender frame at issue here. Arguably what was needed was a better understanding of how the commercialization of agriculture can increase and *produce* inequalities between men and women. Instead, however, the Bank placed causal emphasis on supposedly pre-existing intrahousehold inequalities, despite the fact that a supra-household analysis would make more sense.

Far from being simply evidence of a badly chosen example, this discussion demonstrates a fundamental weakness in the Bank's analysis regarding its preference for changing gender relations inside the household over the identification of causes - and hence solutions – in supra-household spheres. For example, another interesting example of the attempt to increase men's caring role in the family as a solution to the social reproduction dilemma is evident in a discussion of "the Nordic model" whereby Sweden increased women's labor force participation while successfully dealing with their responsibilities for caring work. The Bank highlighted the state promotion of loving fatherhood in this respect:

> "The state encourages men to take responsibility for the household and children. Between 1994 and 1996 government agencies gave training to recent fathers and fathers-to-be aimed at increasing their understanding of an active father's role and how to combine professional and family life, and encouraged fathers to take more parental leave to care for sick children" (205).

The key point here is that this was one of six policies to resolve the social reproduction dilemma - others included state-supported childcare, generous state pensions that "effectively abolis(hed) children's obligation to care for their parents and reliev(ed) the pressure on women," expanded home help services, changes in the tax system to abolish dependent status and tax everyone as an individual, and strong equal opportunities legislation. The Bank's neo-liberal development priorities rule out state-provided childcare (see below), generous pensions, and strong state monitoring of employers. The Bank support *joint* tax codes that encourage men and women to see their common interests in the household and to support each other and their children in a coupled model of partnership (see above). This leaves the state promotion of caring fatherhood as an option supported by the Bank but stripped of all the other supports, a perversion of "the Nordic model" that effectively privatizes the problem of social reproduction and resolves it by encouraging men to love better.

To make a parallel point, in a typically astute and damning critique of the 1995 Cairo conference on population (welcomed by many progressive development activists for shifting narrow, instrumentalist population control agendas to broader concerns with reproductive health), Gayatri Spivak noted that the discussions still placed "the blame for the exhaustion of the world's resources between the legs of the poorest women of the South" (1999, 416). In its definition of the gender problem as lying in the household, and its definition of gender analysis as relational research into private partnerships, the Bank's current gender texts in effect put the blame for the world's problems at the feet of the poorest men in the South, framing them as lazy, irresponsible and in need of empowering domestication. While I do not intend to romanticize poor men's masculinity by criticizing this policy discourse, I do wish to contest its pathologization, particularly when used to blame them for maldevelopment. This approach privileges privatizing solutions to policy problems that focus on changing personal relations rather than those that hold macro level institutions culpable for gender inequality, and there is ample reason to be concerned at its current popularity in the "pacesetter" of development policy.

The Unresolved Problem of the Household

Finally, the Bank's claim that restructuring partnerships empowers people rests on a deeply flawed and inconsistent approach to the family. The institution is unable to explain individual behaviour within the household without reinvoking idealized models of sharing, mutually beneficially families, even as it claims to endorse a neo-classical approach.

In many respects, the Bank recognizes that families take many forms, and that the nuclear ideal is far from reality in a development context. The 1979 report acknowledged the importance of extended families, for example, and framed nuclear units in urban areas as characterized by isolation (World Bank 1979a, 10). This was also recognized in *Advancing Gender Equality* (1995), which described women's "dual role" as "all the more difficult in urban areas, where the extended family arrangements common in rural areas cannot usually be reproduced" (World Bank 1995a, 29). Similarly the discussion of how to define a household in *Engendering Development* acknowledged that some households do not live together, that some marriages involve more than two people, and that "as migration has become increasingly prevalent across developing countries, members not linked to households through proximity may be linked functionally through remittances" (World Bank 2001, 150). In a discussion of the need to direct agricultural extension advice directly to women, the policy paper noted that women often get information from friends, neighbours, and other relatives rather than husbands (175), and it cited evidence from Ghana that "women appear to pool their risk with other women" (158). The report also mentioned multiple studies showing that assumptions abut the unitary household model are unfounded, and that individuals behave selfishly inside the family.

Given this recognition – one that mixes neo-classical models of bargaining inside the family with standard anthropological and historical acceptance that family forms vary across time and place – it is incongruous that the institution continues to frame families as characterized by cooperation, partnership, and balance, with shared interests in women's (limited) empowerment. For example the 1994 policy paper noted that "in almost all cases (gender) disparities handicap women rather than men," but it nonetheless described GAD efforts as "aimed at achieving complementary goals for men and women" (World Bank 1994, 15). There is no recognition here that preferences are likely to clash, or that conflict will probably result from efforts to change women's position in the family. Likewise, having claimed that Bank studies "demonstrate the key role of redistribution in ensuring that the benefits of growth are widely shared," the 1996 implementing report proceeded on the very same page to argue that "poor women can be expected to benefit from general improvements in the economic welfare of their families as a result of economic growth and the introduction of sound macro-economic policies" (World Bank 1996b, 4). This assumes altruistic loving resource transfer within households that benefits all members equally, an approach that had been supposedly rejected in favor of the neo-classical "bargaining" model.

Typically, given her interest in competing theories of gender and development, Moser directly identified the core tension at issue here: efficiency approaches "d(o) not implicitly assume that gender inequality is an issue; therefore, (they are) not seen as confrontational," whereas with equity approaches "the key objective is to reduce gender-based inequality and thus to achieve greater inclusion and social justice" (Moser Tornqvist and van Bronkhorst 1999, 16). The latter is of course more likely to generate intrahousehold conflict. However the tension between these rationales is left unresolved, with Moser arguing simply that "ultimately an approach that combines efficiency and equality as the necessary basis for sustainable development may be the most appropriate rationale for the World Bank" (16).

Similarly, *Engendering Development* emphasized the mutual benefits of gender equality to men and women, and it once more failed to deal with the inevitably clashing preferences that result from consistent application of neo-classical models of household bargaining. For example, the report noted that "since women and men may have different preferences for family size and contraceptive use, family planning services need to target men as well as women" (World Bank 2001, 23-4), with no discussion of whose preferences are to take precedence in the event of conflict. Rather dual targeting is presented as a solution in itself, in keeping with the notion of good gender policy as balanced incorporation of men. Similarly the section proving that gender inequality has Costs to Productivity and Growth "for people's well-being - for today's men and women as well as for future generations" (83) contained no reference to benefits of inequality, implying a mutual interest in change. Wolfensohn's foreword to the policy paper also emphasized balance and male inclusion in a way that denied the inevitability of conflict over changing gender roles; he argued simply that "identifying what works requires consultations with stakeholders - both women and men - on key issues and actions" (xii). The Bank made several unconvincing efforts to show that men are hurt by gender inequality in this respect. Consider for example this passage showing that "Both Women and Men Bear the Costs" of gender inequality:

> "Although women, especially poor women, often bear the brunt of gender disparities, men cannot escape the consequences. Unequal rights to own land or apply for credit deprive women of resources for their livelihood and for security in old age, leaving them more dependent on male relatives. Wide gender disparities in schooling produce correspondingly different abilities for women and men to acquire and process information and to communicate. The gender imbalance in resources and power has consequences for the relative autonomy of women and men and their influence in household decisionmaking. The resulting dependence and stereotyping are a common source of oppressive anxiety and helplessness for both men and women, leading to even worse outcomes" (75).

It is unclear why men are harmed, made anxious or helpless in this scenario – or why they would want to change it.

When conflict between men and women *is* recognized, the Bank tends to gloss over it. For example when writing of the role of government policy in overcoming gender inequality, *Engendering Development* argued:

> "There are certainly win-win scenarios in improving gender equality... But it would be naive to expect that everybody wins when discrimination is prohibited. For example, redesigning the delivery of public health services to give rural women better access is probably a win-win change. But fortifying laws against sexual harassment in the workplace is not-the government has to make a judgment about who will bear what proportion of the cost of redressing gender-related abuse" (101).

This passage recognized that measures to end gender-related violence may provoke conflict, but the judgement call was then passed back onto states, in a classic ruse of power used by the Bank when dealing with issues marked as confrontational. The institution still failed to substantively deal with the likelihood of clashing preferences and conflict within the household, ultimately re-endorsing a model of the unified, loving family that it claimed to have rejected.

In short, then, restructuring love and work within male and female partnerships succeeds as a policy option in the World Bank because it appeals to both productivity and empowerment arguments. I have not found evidence that this policy has been framed as a "keystone," and the fact that it succeeds regardless is arguably evidence that the merging of efficiency and empowerment matters most here – without that, policy solutions are unable to gain ground in the institution. Specifically, restructured partnerships have been framed as productivity enhancing, and as an inevitable market adjustment, hereby allowing the Bank to present its own actions as "non-policy" interventions that merely speed up economically-driven change. In addition, "changing gender roles" has been legitimized as empowering.

Furthermore, I argue that Bank's attempt to resolve the social reproduction dilemma embedded in its employment policies by restructuring initimate relations in the family such that women work more and men love better is profoundly disturbing, on multiple levels. Aside from its grounding in inconsistent and tension-ridden applications of neo-classical economics, the policy is underpinned by naturalizing assumptions regarding women's altruistic care and men's pathological irresponsibility. The institution is unable to resolve clashing preferences in the household, and it insists that men will adapt to women's changing roles with equanimity rather than resistance. Moreover empowerment for the World Bank is not about individual autonomy, even given its shift to neo-classical household models. Women's economic empowerment through development requires their necessary attachment to men, and men's liberation through love requires punitative interventions to deal with their perceived irresponsibility. Notwithstanding the savvy nature of these rhetorically appealing references to complimentarity, balance, and inclusion, this policy rests on, and reinforces, a profoundly disturbing approach to gender analysis. On the most basic level the approach renders many efforts to enhance women's autonomy through enabling them to break attachments to men unspeakable, and its constant emphasis on good policy as benefiting both halves of the heteronormative whole is inherently depoliticizing, making power relations and benefits of inequality invisable. However this policy is also dangerous for poor men – it pathologizes them and (re)produces insidious class and race based discourses in the process, legitimizing coercive attempts to tie them into families, and making them culpable for development outcomes that should be analyzed – and resolved – completely differently. To frame this tinkering with intimate arrangements of labor and love as empowering is to endorse a tremedously narrow, privatized, and limited definition of the term, then, one that ultimately harms both men and women.

Policy Solution 3: Communal Provision for Childbearing and Rearing.

To close this discussion of the Bank's proposed solutions to the social reproducution dilemma I wish to consider a "failed" policy – one that has never achieved the centrality accorded time management or restructured heteronormativity in formally cleared texts, despite being frequently mentioned in a range of ways. References to communal provisioning for child bearing and childcare are evident in all Bank texts, but they are far less frequent than references to other solutions, and in most cases they do not even take up a full .01% of the total words (see table 5, appendix 2)[xiii]. That said, however, the importance of these relatively sparse references can be ascertained in relation to three broader themes of interest to the Bank: women's labor force participation, girls' school attendance, and the post-communist transition experience in Eastern Europe and the Former Soviet Union.

All Bank texts analyzed for this research mentioned childcare provision in terms of caring responsibilities that restrict women's participation in paid work. For example the 1979 report noted that: "In Brazil, firms are required by law to provide child care, but in one documented case, the legal obligation was met by contracting with a center so distant that both the time and cost of getting there rendered the facility useless to the employees" (World Bank 1979a, 10). Employer-provided childcare was presented as a perfectly legitimate solution to the social reproduction dilemma, and the case was criticized because it did not fulfill its objectives. Similarly an El Salvadorian microenterprise project was criticized because "a major problem is (women's) need for childcare and other services that would enable them to devote more attention to production" (14).

The emphasis on childcare provision as a way to facilitate women's entry into the labor force was replicated in both the 1990 progress report on WID policy, which mentioned "shortages of child care" as a probem faced by female-headed households (World Bank 1990, 28), and the first policy paper in 1994, which argued that affordable childcare is one of "the keys for enhancing women's participation in formal labor markets" (World Bank 1994, 12). Indeed *Enhancing Women's Participation* devoted significant attention to this issue; half of the references to the term "childcare" occur in this text (see table 5). The report explained the policy concern at length in a discussion of "Women's Dual Roles at Home and in the Marketplace":

> "Women frequently have to withdraw from the labor market because of the demands of marriage and children. Women are therefore more likely to choose jobs that allow them greater flexibility in hours worked. This often brings a drop in earnings, often associated with a shift from wage work to self-employment in the informal sector. Women also lag behind men in the accumulation of human capital as a result of discontinuity in employment. Practical constraints impede women's work outside the home and restrict women from securing higher-paying jobs. The lack of cost effective childcare is a major barrier for working women in developing countries. In a survey in Egypt, 92 percent of the women were of the opinion that more women would join the labor force if better childcare facilities were available. In the absence of affordable childcare facilities, working women have no option but to alter the amount and type of market work they engage in so that they can to balance it with household responsibilities. For example, a study in Lima found that women without children or with one child tend to work in the wage sector, while women with two or more children are likely to be self-employed. As the number of dependent children increases, women tend to drop out of the labor force, demonstrating a tradeoff between market work and childcare" (World Bank 1994, 37).

The policy rationale was presented with particular clarity here: failure to provide childcare damages the Bank's attempt to get women into work.

Similarly Josette Murphy's 1995 evaluation of gender lending mentioned a Turkish initiative to develop a National Day Care Center Project (Murphy 1995, 59), in part a response to a Bank's WID assessment. *Towards Gender Equality* noted that maternity and paternity leave can influence wages and labor force participation, and it suggested that the Bank study wage differences "across three categories of women workers: women without children: women with children but with no interruption in employment except for statutory materinity leave, and women with children and with interrupted employment" (World Bank 1995c, 67). Likewise *Advancing Gender Equality* (1995) gave favorable mention to an integrated childcare project in Bolivia focused on "removing barriers to women's employment" which "frees women to seek employment or training, while also providing employment for more than 20,000 caregivers, most of them women" (World Bank 1995a, 29-30). Childcare policy was also repeatedly proposed as a way to resolve the social reproduction dilemma inside the Bank itself. For example increasing the "capacity to provide onsite child care" was one of the policies developed in the institution's 1998 attempt to "make the work environment at the World Bank more supportive of women and more flexible for all staff" (World Bank 2000a, 21).

Of all the texts assessed for this research, however, the concern with childcare is most prominent in *Engendering Development*, demonstrating its current importance in the Bank's vision of gender policy. Again the initiative was connected to women's labor force particpation. The report contained figures showing that "Lower Child Care Costs Put More Mothers in the Labor Market," and childcare provision was the second of four concrete suggestions provided in the summary to overcome the social reproduction problem, on the grounds that "providing public support for out-of-home child care services can reduce the costs of care, enabling greater economic participation for women" (World Bank 2001, 24). The report clearly showed that the presence of young children reduces women's participation in the labor force, and that:

> "the availability of low-cost, out-of-home child care increases the probability that mothers will enter the labor force. In poor neighborhoods of Rio de Janeiro, Brazil, the supply of publicly provided child care facilities is the single most important determinant of mothers working outside the home, either part-time or full-time (Deutsch 1998). In a range of settings-Canada, Kenya, Romania, the Russian Federation, and the United States-reducing the price of out-of-home child care raises demand for such care and enables mothers to enter the labor force... In Russia subsidizing out-of-home child care can be more cost effective than such approaches as wage subsidies in bringing mothers into the labor market and raising maternal (and household) incomes" (170).

Finally, the report included a table on "labor market policy" recommending maternity and paternity leave (251; 23-4), again indicating the clear tendency within the Bank to frame communal provisions for childbearing and raising as connected to women's labor force participation.

Childcare provision was also discussed as a way to raise, or maintain, girls' school attendance. As the first policy paper noted, girls often have to care for siblings, and thus "establishing child care centers" in schools can increase their participation (World Bank 1994, 42; see also 37). *Towards Gender Equality* also recommended a project which "provid(ed) child care for younger siblings" in order that girls could go to school (World Bank 1995c, 60). The contents page of *Engendering Development* listed evidence showing that low-cost child care meant "more girls in school," and later childcare provision was listed as one of two policy measures that "strengthe(n) incentives for equal investments in human capital," in part because it "allows older daughters to devote more time to schooling" (World Bank 2001, 192). The need for intersectoral interventions was justified through reference to girls' school attendance being constrained by childcare responsibilities, and thus the report recommended "selected investments in time-saving infrastructure or public support for out-of-home child care (to) ease these constraints and, in turn, ...make direct efforts to increase girls' schooling more effective" (253). Indeed private solutions to the childcare problem were specifically rejected on the grounds that they keep girls out of school:

> "Labor supply studies also indicate that having "mother substitutes" in the household - usually girls or other women who can provide child care-significantly increases the likelihood that mothers will work outside the home... But as noted earlier, increases in wages or demand for female labor that draw mothers into the labor force often reduce older girls' school attendance" (170).

Thus the policy lever of choice here was very clear – provision of child care.

The third site for references to childcare provision within formally-cleared Bank gender policy texts is in relation to transition experiences in Eastern Europe and the Former Soviet Union. Obviously this was not evident in the 1979 and 1990 reports, but it was highly visable in subsequent documents. A text box on "profiles of women in Eastern Europe and the Former Soviet Union" contained in *Enhancing Women's Participation* argued that "since transition, the existing forms of female disadvantage have, if anything, intensified," and as evidence it highlighted the fact that:

> "Prior to transition, women participated fully in the labor market, and childcare facilities were provided by the enterprise. Women now make up 70 to 80 percent of the total unemployed, and they stay unemployed for longer periods of time than men do in some countries. Childcare facilities are threatened by enterprise restructuring and privatization...The closure of traditional childcare institutions during transition puts an especially heavy burden on single mothers. Younger women are consciously forgoing career opportunities in favor of maternal duties" (World Bank 1994, 32).

Both Beijing documents repeated this emphasis on childcare in relation to the post-communist transition experience. In proving that "public policies matter" to gender equality, *Towards Gender Equality* noted that due to restructuring women in Mongolia now have to care for children in their homes, "which restricts their ability to participate in the labor market" (World Bank 1995c, 61). Similarly *Advancing Gender Equality* (1995) argued that "women in Kazakhstan have long been an important part of the labor force," in part because "a well developed system of childcare and maternity leave made work outside the home compatible with raising a family." However "transition has created challenges for the government to meet the needs of women in the labor market, in particular the need to keep up the support services that enable women to take up paid work" (World Bank 1995a, 38). Concerns about childcare and employment in a transition context also featured in the 1996 report on implementing gender equality, as examples of "issues arising from economic reform…that directly impact women" (World Bank 1996b, 5).

Once more, however, this issue is particularly prominent in the Bank's most recent policy paper on gender. In its discussion of whether economic restructuring has benefited women in transition economies, *Engendering Development* claimed that:

> "Before the transition the central mandate of redirecting the family's energies and loyalties from the private to the public domain helped women achieve a level of parity with men…Women were expected to work full-time, and the state supported them with lengthy paid maternity leave and child care services" (World Bank 2001, 220).

However this situation has now drastically changed, since "a dramatic reduction in the provision of child care services affected not only women's employment but also their overall work burden" (222). In short every post-transition Bank gender document recognizes the decline in communal provision for childrearing as a legitimate "policy problem," just as all texts accept that failure to provide such services undermines women's labor force participation and girls' school attendance.

Crucially, however, these discussions of parental leave and childcare repeatedly fail to produce concrete policy solutions. The Bank either ends up endorsing (re)privatizing solutions that contradict its own evidence, or it passes the issue back onto states, claiming that evidence is insufficient or that policy choices are a matter for domestic debate. This ambivalent response is evident in the 1979 report, which emphasized the need to provide services to informal community groups by mentioning a project in Botswana in which "day care services organized by local women's groups for the children of working mothers will be given space in a community center constructed with the aid of Bank funds" (World Bank 1979a, 11). Note that the Bank did not pay for the day care services – it provided the building. Similarly, a discussion of childcare in *Enhancing Women's Participation* mentioned both a community day care program in Colombia and the need to "sit(e) childcare centers at or near schools," but it closed with the following policy advice:

> "Childcare problems of women are often accentuated by divorce laws that do not provide adequate financial support from fathers and by lack of access of poor women to the courts to enforce such support. Clearly, it is important to reduce such legal barriers" (World Bank 1994, 43).

There is a vast difference between this legalistic attempt to enforce private provision for childrearing – one connected to the attempt to restructure loving partnerships noted above – and the communal provision of childcare services; the Bank ultimately endorsed the former. Finally, childcare policy received least text space of the three initiatives considered in the section on family support in *Engendering Development*, 1/3 that devoted to old age support systems (World Bank 2001, 133-4), and the Bank asserted that it was a matter for domestic policymakers. Although several simulations on childcare were discussed, no concrete solutions were actively advocated, and the section closed without a clear policy recommendation. Indeed having argued that "a dramatic reduction in the provision of child care services affected not only women's employment but also their overall work burden," the very same paragraph ended with the claim: "the long-term impact of the change in the provision of child care on women, their children, and gender roles has yet to be examined" (222). This assertion is absurd given the repeated references to studies showing that women's employment and work burden have been affected by the withdrawal of communal provision for childcare, and it reveals the ambivalent framing of childcare provision in this text and in the Bank more generally. The policy is never unambiguously advocated, and it ultimately fails to emerge as central to the Bank's GAD policy agenda, in contrast to the two other solutions covered above. In the remainder of this chapter I ask why this disjuncture occurs, pointing in particular to the difficulties policymakers face when trying to connect the communal provision of childbearing and rearing services to productive efficiency and empowerment.

Why It Does Not Work (i): No productivity/efficiency

Childcare policy fails to garner widespread support within the Bank in part because policymakers find it very difficult to connect to efficiency discourses. Thus although the Bank succeeds in proving that failing to resolve the caring dilemma affects women's labor force participation rate and girls school attendance, it is unable to show that the concrete policy solution at issue here – communal provision for childbearing and rearing - will increase productivity and efficiency in the economy. There are arguably two reasons for this failure: 1. childcare policies are inefficient when assessed on standard "cost benefit" measures, particularly when compared to privatized solutions, and 2. the Bank has framed the market as leading inexohorably to the decline of communal provision for childcare, and thus the policy is marked as an intervention that goes against market trends.

The Bank faces a fundamental problem when trying to prove that childcare provision will add to productivity in the economy, because previously "costless" activities are being added to the market. The obvious response to this dilemma is to argue that failure to provide the service restricts productivity, as is done repeatedly in these texts. Consider for example this claim from *Enhancing Women's Participation*:

> "The need to balance home and market responsibilities is a major constraint on women's earnings, productivity and accumulation of human capital. The lack of affordable childcare forces women into jobs with flexible hours and locations but the consequences are often lower earnings, discontinuities in work, limited mobility, and lower levels of skill" (World Bank 1994, 11).

Likewise, *Advancing Gender Equality* (1995) argued that providing low-cost, accessible daycare could raise earnings and productivity, "giv(e) women more options in the labor market and…free time for them to improve their education and skills. It also has the potential of increasing the productivity of self-employed women and those engaged in agriculture" (World Bank 1995a, 29).

However, policymakers can not sustain these cost-benefit arguments when private provision for social reproduction labor is available, since in this case women can still work and no costs at all get added to the market. Privatized provisioning will always win here – it is always more efficient, because it is "free." Thus *Enhancing Women's Participation* qualified its argument that women are forced to tradeoff between market work and childcare by conceding immediately afterwards that:

> "This barrier is less onerous in countries where extended families predominate. In many African and South Asian economies, children are not a major barrier to the female labor market participation, and childbearing does not reduce the potential duration of the working life of females relative to males" (World Bank 1994, 37).

The recognition that extended families can pick up the slack of social reproduction was repeated later, with the claim that: "providing childcare can reduce the household constraints that working women face, particularly in urban areas where the extended family often is not available to help" (48). If there are unemployed adults around to provide childcare such that women can enter the marketplace (and given the Bank's abandonment of full employment policies as a realistic development objective there inevitably will be), their free labor will always be a more efficient solution to this dilemma than paying for communal provision; this is simply a consequence of the way the institution counts.

This fundamental tension over productivity is perfectly demonstrated in the Bank's contradictory treatment of a Colombian day-care project. The 1990 progress report gave favorable mention to this community-based effort, through which childcare was provided for 400,000 people in poor urban areas (World Bank 1990, 27). The project was worthwhile because it allowed mothers to work outside home, a vital step for poor single women. The text, following a 1988 Bank report that first covered the initiative, refered to women who provided the childcare in their homes as "volunteer" community mothers. Four years later, *Enhancing Women's Participation* discussed the initiative thusly:

> "The Community Childcare project in Colombia provides for the nutrition, health, and early-childhood development needs of children aged 2 through 6 in low-income urban communities. "Community mothers," chosen by parents, care for about fifteen children each in their homes. The service support component of the project provides training to the community mothers and helps upgrade their homes to reach minimum standards for providing childcare. It increases the productive potential of mothers by offering alternative childcare arrangements, *but its cost-effectiveness has yet to be evaluated*" (World Bank 1994, 48 emphasis added).

The cost-effectiveness of the initiative was in fact greatly comprised by the fact that it paid people to care for children. The "volunteer" mothers were actually trained and paid a stipend by the state-funded organization coordinating the project, as the 1990 report noted: "the agency implementing the program provides the community mothers with orientation, helps them obtain loans to upgrade their homes, supplies essential furniture and equipment, and pays them a small fee" (World Bank 1990, 27). Although these facts were not considered sufficient reason to abandon the signifier "voluntary" in 1990, by 1994 there was clear concern that the project was far from free in market terms. Thus at first the Bank enthusiastically endorsed a re-privatized solution to the social reproduction dilemma: if providing free childcare in the isolated family restricts women's entry into the labor market it should be provided on a voluntary basis by community groups, ensuring that the market emerges unscathed. However if the provision is not free - if it is done by state-funded employees not volunteers - the policy rationale is in serious trouble, since poor women's move into the labor force will incur costs, and these will always be lower if a privatized solution is endorsed.[xiv]

Engendering Development revisited this tension between childcare and efficiency, and again it ended up unable to unambiguously support communal provision because it raised productivity problems. The report cited Russian studies in which childcare policy was evaluated on an efficiency-based cost-benefit calculus focused on how much extra money women can earn per ruble spent by the state, for example. This evaluatory framework is virtually destined to damn the policy, because the costs will never outweigh the benefits when compared to privatized provision (World Bank 2001, 133). Similarly in a footnote on pensions the policy paper raised the possibility of considering women's childrearing labor "work" in the context of pension contributions, only to dismiss it as "fiscally unsustainable" and to offer no solution at all for the remaining problem of how to prevent women's destitution in systems based on men's ideal working patterns (146). Moreover the report argued, based on U.S. and Brazilian evidence, that private childcare providers were of higher quality than public ones, and that "the costs of running government facilities are high relative to the subsidies that would be required to expand private provision. So…subsidies for private care (say, vouchers) would be more cost-effective in raising female labor force participation and incomes than direct support for public facilities" (262). Indeed difficulties in using the productivity argument ultimately led policymakers to turn away from it in the concluding chapter on concrete policy measures. Again the efficiency benefits of childcare were emphasized, but this time on the grounds that it "gives children a better start than family care alone" and can "improve their academic achievement and cognitive development, nutrition and health status, and earnings potential in the future" (262). These efficiency benefits relate to children, not to women and their labor force participation. The costs do not outweigh the benefits with respect to the latter – the Bank has a productivity problem that prevents policy entrepreneurs from using their key rationale, and thus they turn to others.

The Bank's disquiet over whether communal provision of childcare is actually efficient is related to debates over "special protections' for women workers, a term referring to labor laws that, for example, "protect women's time with newborns after childbirth," limit women's exposure to hazardous chemicals, restrict women's ability to work overtime, and exclude women from mining and construction (World Bank 2001, 129-130). The evaluation of the efficacy of these measures stated:

> "Whether a special protection mandate benefits women depends on several things. Foremost is who bears the cost of the mandate. In labor markets the degree to which the cost is borne by employers or can be shifted to the government or to women themselves determines the size of its potentially negative employment effect. If wages

> can be adjusted downward to reflect the cost of the mandate to employers, the cost of employing the targeted group does not have to increase -and there should be no adverse employment effect. But if the primary intent of the mandate is to promote gender equality by shifting some of the cost of childbirth away from women, the wage adjustment subverts that intent" (130).

In short if the costs of childbirth and childcare are passed onto employers, unemployment will increase – the policy thus becomes inefficient, and even more costly to the market. In the same section on how to respond to women's non-market and care activities, *Engendering Development* noted that "many countries now have legislation that supports the reproductive roles of women, although it is sometimes ineffective and sometimes has adverse effects on women" (131-2). Although maternity leave has recognized health benefits for mothers and newborns and "helps women avoid exiting the workforce temporarily and later having to find new employment," the policy may also "entai(l) costs for women," since employers may lower wages or refuse to hire women of childbearing age (132). In terms of concrete solutions to this problem, the Bank compared government-funded initiatives and privatized provision by insured couples. Although the former did not increase unemployment when implemented in Costa Rica, it did lead to reduced wages. Thus:

> "Another option would be to share costs by expanding insurance coverage to pay for at least a fraction of maternity benefits. While this would likely increase the health insurance premium paid by men and women (since most married couples are likely to share a family plan), it would also lighten the cost incurred solely by women" (133).

The Bank reiterated this preference for funding maternity leave through insurance schemes in a discussion of concrete "formal labor market policies intended to help women combine employment and motherhood" (262 –3). Again, shifting responsibility for social reproduction onto partnered men and women who adjust boundaries between love and work themselves was framed as a better option than communal provision, given that "special protections" are inefficient. Again, the apparent dangers of women's economic dependence on individual men disappeared as a policy concern because efficiency discourses make privatized solutions such a perfect "fit" for this institutional context.

The second reason why policymakers find it hard to successfully utilize productivity arguments in relation to the communal provision of childcare is that the market is understood to be leading policies in the opposite direction, towards private solutions rather than state-supported ones. In this sense the notion of "transition" as an inevitable adjustment to the market is important, since it frames governments as having little choice in their divestiture. For example, the 1994 policy paper argued that "cost-effective options for childcare" is now an "issu(e) of relevance to women" in former communist countries (World Bank 1994, 31), since they:

> "are beginning to face obstacles in the labor market similar to those elsewhere. In these countries, prior to transition, there were extensive creche facilities for working mothers, who were also entitled to take leave to care for sick children. Since restructuring, some creche facilities have closed because governments or state enterprises can no longer afford to operate them, and this situation adversely affects employment prospects for women" (37).

As *Advancing Gender Equality* put it: "now, with privatization proceeding apace, governments in the region need to devise a strategy for transferring these 'social assets' from the enterprises" (World Bank 1995a, 39). Thus "the targeting of child allowances" and "the facilitating of social asset divestiture from enterprises, including child care" (World Bank 1996b, 5) were presented as market-directed developments rather than as active policy choices.

The argument that the market dictates against communal provision for childrearing and care is particularly evident in *Engendering Development*. The summary argued that private marketized solutions would prevail, since:

"Economic development leads to the emergence of labor markets where none has existed. In so doing, it not only creates or strengthens market signals about the returns to labor but also eliminates some economic inefficiencies. For example, where active labor markets exist, hired labor provides a substitute for female family labor, whether on farms or in household maintenance and care activities. This allows households to use time more efficiently, perhaps reducing women's workload. Where labor markets are absent or do not function well, such substitution is not possible" (World Bank 2001, 19).

Thus in a properly-functioning market, with efficient labor markets (exactly what the Bank claims to be promoting through structural adjustment), there will be no need for communal provision of childcare. Rather "the development of markets for substitute labor" will be an inevitable consequence of modernization (182), of the emergence of "vibrant economies" promised by neo-liberalism (186).

There a frankly screaming disjuncture here between the way that the Bank treats different attempts to collectize responsibility for social reproduction; some efforts (the state-supported provison of infrastructure to reduce burdens of water collection and so on) are actively encouraged, and others (the state provision of childcare) are actively discouraged. This is in part because the former taps into productivity arguments so well, but it would be an over-simplification to regard those productivity arguments as having no place for the generation of costs. Some costs are acceptable, indeed encouraged, a situation related to the broader institutional context of the Bank itself. In this sense the productivity discourse at issue here is a highly complex and nuanced one allowing policymakers scope to argue for certain collectivized provisions – if they generate the right costs. For example, as noted above the Bank understands that infrastructural improvement will inevitably occur, but it needs a kick start through development interventions to resolve short-term market failures. Yet the Bank persistently fails to apply these arguments about market failure, kickstarting investment, and public-private partnership to childcare provision – they are simply absent. Thus while the institution notes that:

> "Even the presence or absence of certain markets can make a tremendous difference for women and their families. Where markets exist for water or fuel or child care, they reduce the domestic workload and facilitate economic participation outside the household, especially for women and girls" (World Bank 2001, 108),

it intervenes only to establish markets for water and fuel, endorsing a default solution of private provision for childcare. The contrast is simply stunning.

Again, this has much to do with the Bank's broader strategies and policy options. Even aside from the absence of a large multinational business interest in nursery provision, or a long record of profitable development contracts in kindergartens, the Bank's version of neo-liberalism rules out the childcare option. For example, *Engendering Development* recognizes that some states have stepped in as part of the "monetarization" of the household sector, and the key example provided is of state provision of childcare in "the Nordic model" (World Bank 2001, 205). Crucially, however, this solution has been repeatedly ruled out by the Bank's broader policy orientation. The costs it invokes (paying people to care for children) are troubling; there is no recognition of the legitimacy of a state role in childcare in the first place (unlike with infrastructural provision), and these interventions have been marked as inefficient, destined to be replaced as the state is forced to adapt to the market.

Why It Does Not Work (ii): No empowerment

Communal provision for childbearing and childrearing also fails as a policy solution because policymakers are unable to argue that it is empowering. In contrast, interventions are marked as disempowering to women, in addition to being inefficient for the economy. This is in part because, as argued above, empowerment has been framed as equity and gender neutrality. This ensures that any policies seen to treat men and women differently – such as those that provide maternity leave – are automatically suspect, since they seem to go against the imperative to create "a level institutional "playing field" for women and men" (World Bank 2001, 15). For example, *Towards Gender Equality* discussed two types of safeguards for women workers:

> "The first includes measures intended to end discrimination in the labor market by requiring equal pay for work of equal value or by prohibiting the exclusion of workers from certain jobs because of gender. The second type protects women in their role as mothers by requiring employers to pay the full cost of maternity leave and provide childcare facilities, restricting night work, and limiting work categorized as dangerous or hazardous" (World Bank 1995c, 47).

The former was criticized as hard to enforce, especially in the informal sector, and as insufficient. In addition, the report claimed, "complementary measures are needed to increase women's chances of entering the labor force," including "the creation of an appropriate regulatory framework that encourages the establishment of day-care centers, private nursery schools, and kindergartens for the children of workers in both the formal and informal sectors." However the second type of legislation was framed as disempowering to women, on the basis that "while well intentioned, these laws…can reduce women's employment options by raising the employer's cost of hiring women and perpetuating the notion that women workers are less flexible than male workers." In negotiating this "difficult balancing act" between protecting workers and stigmatizing women, the Bank made the following comment on maternity and childcare policies:

> "Standards relating to maternity leave and child-care benefits are common. To ensure that such standards do not raise the costs of female labor unnecessarily, employment legislation should avoid having employers pay benefits directly. Maternity benefits should be funded through general revenue taxes."

Here childcare is awkwardly positioned between the two types of protective legislation – the “good” equal opportunities type and the “bad” disempowering kind. However in both cases states are urged to avoid pushing costs on employers directly, leaving public provision through general taxation as the preferred option. In 1995, of course, this was no option at all within the Bank – the notion that the institution was seriously proposing raising taxes and urging the state to take on responsibility for funding childcare provision would go against every piece of policy advice issued by the Bank in the 1990s. Thus there was in effect no solution offered, in part because policymakers were unable to unambiguously claim that communal provision for childbearing and rearing empowered women.

Engendering Deveopment also mentioned the well-intentioned but potentially disempowering effects of certain state interventions in social reproduction arrangements through its persistent references to the 1950 Marriage Law in China. This was its chosen:

> “example of how legal reform brought rapid change in traditional norms for the family... With the law the government sought to eliminate arranged marriages, polygyny, bride-price, and child-marriage. Women were given the right to choose their partners, demand a divorce, inherit property, and share control of their children. They were urged to enter the labor force in great numbers - and to make this possible collective dining halls and nurseries were established to relieve women of some household chores. This legal reform is regarded as having played a major part in increasing gender equality in China, but not without cost. Eliciting violent resistance from male peasants and older women, the law is said to have led to several tens of thousands of suicides and murders of women within a few years'” (World Bank 2001, 118).

This is a fascinating passage for what it reveals about the perceived interaction between empowerment and state measures to resolve the social reproduction dilemma. The government’s efforts are framed as excessive, overly-ambitious, and thus disempowering in the most dramatic way, resulting in dead women. By way of comparison, note that there is no equivalently dramatic framing of how credit provision to promote women's entrepreneurship can leave people dead – this is not marked as an excessive policy intervention since it fits so neatly with the rest of the Bank's lending agenda. However childcare provision and another associated communal interventions to deprivatize social reproduction are rendered highly dangerous.

In addition, *Engendering Development* collapsed a variety of measures under the generic notion of "special protection" and framed them as disempowering, and once again this led to a rejection of communal provisioning for childbearing and rearing. Having noted that employers have prejudiced opinions that "all women workers will eventually leave the labor force to get married or have children - or always allow family responsibilities to interrupt their work" (World Bank 2001, 125), the report went on to consider concrete policy measures to:

> "addres(s) gender discrimination in the labor market through special protection measures and affirmative action. Many governments have labor laws that protect women's time with newborns after childbirth and limit women's exposure to strenuous or hazardous activities. While these laws may have benefits, their costs are often borne by the same women they protect. By raising the cost to employers of hiring women, they reduce women's employment or wages" (129).

These measures are thus not only inefficient, they are also disempowering, threatening to reduce women's access to the very benefit (paid work) that will secure their broader liberation. This argument got into the summary of the policy paper, with the Bank warning that benefits can harm women if they are too generous, or if they impose costs on employers. Framing such policies under the title "protective labor market legislation," the report described them as:

> "a two-edged sword, generating costs as well as benefits for women working in the formal sector. For example, when firms bear all the costs of maternity leave, they may bias hiring decisions against women. When women bear all the costs, the incentives for

> women to continue work are weakened. Measures that help spread the costs of maternity and other care provisions across employers, workers, and even the state can raise the benefits relative to costs for women and their families" (24).

Certainly, the Bank does not wish to see women bear the costs alone; this is clear from its persistent recognition of the social reproduction dilemma in the first place. However again the advice it offers is so vague as to be virtually useless – having argued that the institution needs to deal concretely with who should pay for these services policymakers are simply ambiguous and inconsistent. By way of contrast, note that the fourth and final suggestion on how to help alleviate women's household roles so that they can enter the labor market – on investments in infrastructure to reduce domestic workloads – contains no reference *at all* as to who should pay. State investment in this area is always-already legitimate, always-already empowering, needing none of the complex maneouvering required for childcare. Indeed, the Bank is utterly unambiguous in its claim that improved time management through technology and infrastructural provision empowers women; it is utterly muddled in its attempt to apply this discourse to maternity leave and childcare provision. Thus the policy fails to garner support from progressives interested in women's liberation, just as it fails to convince mainstream technocrats due to its troubled relationship to cost benefit analysis.

Conclusion.

In this chapter I have charted three solutions to the social reproduction dilemma explicated in chapter two, and I have attempted to explain the winners and losers through reference to the explanatory factors that in turn led to the success of the work policy in GAD efforts more generally. Better time management and restructured heteronormativity succeed within the institution because they are linked to productivity, they are framed as inevitable market adjustments, and they are presented as empowering. Childcare and maternity leave fail because they lack these attributes. The Bank's gender policy preferences are thus determined by the ability of policymakers to merge efficiency and empowerment concerns. In addition to identifying these causal factors, I have also suggested that the Bank's affinity for better time management and restructured heteronormativity should seriously concern development scholars. While attempting to avoid simplistic assertions that infrastructural development or technological interventions are necessarily "bad" policy, I question the privileging of this solution given its connection to the Bank's ideological and material investment in modernization approaches, and ask why this assumption of communal responsibility for social reproduction is acceptable, when so many others are not. I am also profoundly troubled by the Bank's attempt to reprivatize responsibility for social reproduction onto restructured couples wherein men love better and women work more; this pathologizes poor men, requires necessary attachment to certain other people as a definition of autonomy, involves a tension-ridden approach to households as units of competitive individualism and altruistic love that refusal to acknowledge conflicts likely to stem from proposed policy interventions, and is grounded in a frankly frightening vision of good gender analysis that empowers noone. I have thus attempted to do more than demonstrate a clear recognition of the social reproduction problem in Bank texts, to chart the solutions proposed, and to explain the success or failure thereof through causal factors identified in chapter one. I have also tried to highlight the dangers posed by the hegemony of rearranging time and restructuring heteronormativity as solutions to the tenion between unpaid care and employment – dangers that I subsequently trace to concrete policy interventions in the remaining chapters.

[i] I distinguish the different versions of this policy argument, although the Bank often runs them together: see for example (World Bank 1994, 12; 60). I separate them for analytic clarity, and also because although they are often collapsed and presented together they are importantly different – particularly given that the first version is very easy to critique for its retention of many problematic aspects of the exhaustion solution. Failing to make distinctions like this will may critique – the Bank can easily say they have developed more sophisticated responses than the "play with time" one by pointing to technology and infrastructure.
[ii] One concerned women's involvement in charcoal production and one concerned women's production of solar lamps.
[iii] Again in part this emphasis was a response to external feminist pressure; the report notes that the Bank was pressured by the External Gender Consultative group to use time use surveys as part of an effort to engender Poverty Assessments (World Bank 1997c, 25) - see chapter 1 discussion of violence and the external feminist push to quantify harm to get funding
[iv] Escobar 1995; Mitchell 1994; Crush 1995; Appfel-Marglin 1996/2000; Hartmann 1995; Mohanty 1991; Spivak 1999; Staudt 2002; Shiva 2002.
[v] See introduction
[vi] See chapter 5 where I deal with this research in a discussion of social reproduction and women's work in the flower industry
[vii] see introduction
[viii] Fidler 2001
[ix] Elizabeth Shrader, an employee in the Bank's gender unit and the recent author of a Bank paper on measuring the gender dimensions of crime and violence, criticizes the use of crime victimization surveys that report victim's characteristics on the grounds that:

> "Risk factors need to be modifiable for policy interventions to work; it is therefore not useful to find that, for instance, women in union are at greater risk for spouse abuse than are men in union or women not in union. As an absurd extreme, the relevant policy interventions would recommend that victims change their sex or change their marital status" (2000, 10).

If leaving husbands is an absurd an extreme as getting a sex change, clearly getting women empowered is not supposed to get them out of marriages.
[x] Notes from Association of Women in Development Conference, November 1999.
[xi] This graphic was the front cover of the Bank's brochure for the November 1999 Association of Women in Development meeting (World Bank 1999b). It was also on every one of the Bank's sector handouts on gender distributed at that conference, including those for transport and agriculture and rural development.
[xii] The inclusion of this poem is curious, since the Bank have a questionable record with regard to respect for indigenous rights. In 1978, the institution lent the military dictatorship in Guatemala money to build a dam; in demonstrations by indigenous people against their forced evictions, the military fired on the crowd (Caulfield 1996, 207). The Bank also lent massively for Suharto's "transmigration" policy in East Timor (206). Moreover between 1986 and 1993 the Bank approved 200 projects that required people to leave their homes and property; they dislocated 2.5 million people in this period (262), including a disproportionately large number of indigenous people. Indeed as Jonathan Crush notes, this poem is a perfect illustration of the dangers of modernist appropriations of indigenous people's histories, since "romantic images of indigenous societies and their authentic knowledges do not push beyond modern relations of domination and threaten to reinscribe them in their most violent form" (Crush 1995, 19).
[xiii] This table measured "childcare" as one word – it thus underdounts references to child care in *Engendering Development*, which separated the words. Given that close reading and manual coding made this clear, however, the measure is still helpful for charting differences in earlier documents wherein childcare was spelt as one word.
[xiv] See also Fúlvia Rosemberg's (2003) analysis of Bank childcare recommendations in Brazil, which also favored low cost informal arrangements.

Chapter 4: The World Bank's Role in Ecuador.

Introduction

In the previous three chapters, based on an analysis of formally cleared policy documents on GAD produced by the Bank's Washington D.C.-based gender specialists, I demonstrated a prioritization of women's employment as the core policy concern of GAD policy entrepreneurs, a connected recognition of the social reproduction dilemma, and the existence of concrete attempts to resolve it focused on infrastructural and technological improvement, and restructuring loving partnerships between men and women. In the remainder of this dissertation I focus on Bank gender activities as debated, proposed, and enacted in a specific country. I devote this chapter to introducing the Bank's overall development efforts in Ecuador. I summarize the attempts made in Ecuador to secure neo-liberal reform and I argue that these attempts should be seen, at least in part, as Bank policy. This does not mean that the state can be ignored as a policy actor. Indeed I argue that domestic political and business elites have embraced neo-liberal reform, welcoming the enrichment opportunities it grants. However the restructuring policies enacted in this country also reflect the interests and desires of the IFIs to which the state is indebted, and the Bank has a key role in this respect. Using data on the Bank's lending in Ecuador I examine the institution's diagnosis of the "development problem" with which the country is afflicted, and I chart its preferred cure. The Bank's proposed restructuring agenda for Ecuador is typically presented as government-led, supportive of domestic priorities, and reflecting social consensus - the institution itself appears to have a minimal role as an independent policy actor here. However closer interrogation of its activities in the country reveals a far more conflicted approach to reform, one which recognizes lack of support for restructuring, and which praises administrations for overriding opposition. I explicate this approach, arguing that it proves the Bank is an important actor in Ecuadorian development policy with its own priorities and means of securing them.

Neo-Liberal Reform in Ecuador.

When the oil boom of the 1970s ended in Ecuador and new sources of international credit dried up, the country embarked on an austerity program that has lasted for over 20 years. In an attempt to stabilize the economy and restore growth numerous administrations have advanced restructuring agendas. In 1982 interest rates were liberalized, tariffs were reduced from an average of 43% to 28%, export taxes were cut, prices controls were removed on some goods, and the country adopted a market-oriented exchange rate (Moser 1997, 22). Ecuador started formally implementing structural adjustment under an IMF package in 1983 (Treakle 1998, 221). These reforms were consolidated under the right-wing Presidency of Leon Febres Cordero (1984-8), a man with a strong personal ideological commitment to the free market economics of the so called "Chicago boys" who had already transformed Chile's economic system in the neo-liberal mould. He launched what one observer termed "Andean Thatcherism" in the country (Carriére 2001, 141). Public spending was reduced, restrictive monetary policies were enacted, trade liberalization was intensified, state subsidies on basic food were cut, and minimum wage increases were limited (Cockcroft 1996, 445-6; Ferraro 2000). These measures were continued, although in a stop-go fashion, under subsequent administrations - many of Febres Cordero's policies were continued by the more leftist

Borja administration (1988-92), for example, which also liberalized trade, restricted labor rights (Cox Edwards in World Bank 1996a, 269) and liberalized financial sector operations (Beckerman 2002, 29-30).

More consistent application of neo-liberal reform was achieved under Sixto Duran Ballen (elected in 1992), who raised utility and gas prices, further cut public spending, froze public hiring, and liberalized the banking sector. As one observer put it, "by the early 1990s, Andean neoliberalism, or "the other path," became the breathless mantra of Quito technocrats" (Lane 2003, 83). In 1994 an Agrarian Reform law made collectively-owned indigenous land available to private buyers, privatized water resources, put public grazing land and forests up for sale, and gave a huge tax break to new agro-industries (Treakle 1998, 24); this was subsequently altered due to protest, but other neo-liberal policies were maintained. Between 1995 and 2000 public spending on social services and social programs fell by over one third (Parandekar Vos and Winkler 2002, 129), with education and health spending particularly hard hit - in the 1980s education spending averaged 6% of GDP, but by 2000 it was just 2.7% (Fretes-Cibils and López-Cálix 2003, liv). In the 1990s food prices increased fivefold, and fuel prices doubled between 1990 and 1997 (Eckstein and Wickham-Crowley 2003, 13; 19). Trade liberalization was also reinforced, with Ecuador becoming a member of Andean Community of Nations (a regional free trade area), MERCOSUR (a southern cone market), and, in 1996, the World Trade Organization. President Jamil Mahuad, who took power in 1998, attempted to further deepen restructuring through subsidy reductions, deregulations, and price increases. Reliant on a cadre of "Harvard boys" (mostly "distinguished gringos with IMF connections" (Whitten 2003, 29) he reinforced reform, "turn(ing) uncritically to the magicalities and fetishes of the reified and decontextualized "market" to absolve Ecuador's persistent poverty and escalating debt" (29).

Despite these reforms (or perhaps because of them), the Mahuad administration proved unable to stop the severe economic crisis that afflicted the country in the late 1990s, and the country in effect achieved economic meltdown in 1998-9.[i] In 1999 Ecuador had the highest inflation rate (60%) in Latin America (Kyle 2000); towards the end of that year prices were rising nearly 30% a month. High inflation in turn led to pressures to devalue the currency (the sucre), which between mid-1998 and January 2000 lost three-quarters of its value (World Bank 2003a). The state froze bank accounts and defaulted on both private debt and Brady Bonds in August 1999, causing the Fund, Bank, and Inter-American Development Bank to withhold loans, and in effect the banking system collapsed. The crisis destroyed 20 banks holding 40% of bank deposits (López-Cálix 2003, 4). Middle class people (less likely to have their assets in off-shore accounts) were hardest hit – many saw their life savings disintegrate. The crisis also "had a devastating effect on employment levels, poverty, and income distribution" (Fretes-Cibils and López-Cálix 2003, xxxiiv).[ii]

In response, in January 2000, Mahuad announced that the country would dollarize. He was forced to resign shortly thereafter due to an attempted coup, but dollarization continued. Power was handed over to his Vice President who secured the passage, in March 2000, of the Economic Transformation Law, a legislative package that put in place the new currency and associated neo-liberal reforms such as limits on the fiscal deficit and increases in public spending, privatization of the telecommunications, electricity, and hydrocarbons industries, and a law allowing workers to be hired at a minimum salary of $0.50 an hour (López-Cálix 2003, 6). The country began repaying its Brady Bond debt, and bank accounts were gradually opened. The army colonel who participated in the coup attempt, Lucio Gutiérrez, won the spring elections with the backing of the country's indigenous and leftist opponents of restructuring, but his administration has continued adjustment measures. In June 2002, for example, Ecuador's Congress approved a Fiscal Responsibility Law which limits public expenditure increases, prevents municipalities from running deficits, and pledges to reduce the debt-to-GDP ratio by 20 percent over five years (World Bank 2003a).

Reports are mixed about the current health of the Ecuadorian economy. The new Gutierrez government received a $205 million Stand-By Arrangement from the IMF in March 2003 (World Bank 2003a), in a signal to the investment community that the administration's policies were in line with IFI advice. GDP – driven up by increasing oil prices and huge remittances from migrants who left the country during the crisis - grew by 5.1% in 2001, and inflation fell to single digits by late 2002 (López-Cálix 2003, 7). Unemployment rates also returned to 1998 levels. However underemployment remains three times higher than pre-crisis levels (9), and real wages have still not recovered. Poverty and inequality measures are also higher than they were in the 1990s - the wealthiest 10 percent of the population earn 70 times more than the poorest 10 percent (World Bank 2003a), and yet 2002 social expenditures were lower than in 1980 (World Bank 2004e, xlvi). The country also remains massively indebted. The national debt quadrulpled between 1980 and 2000; total external debt is now $15.7 billion (64% of GDP), 71% of which is public. The government owes 88% of this public debt, and net debt service consumes about 35% of its budget (Tinsley 2003, 67), a rate the Bank concedes "is troublingly high" (70). The country has the second highest public debt burden in the region when measured as a percentage of GDP (Fretes-Cibils and López-Cálix 2003, xlv), and the heaviest debt burden of Latin America's ten largest economies.

Ecuador remains deeply divided over the appropriate response to these political-economic developments, a situation which contributes to political instability and further undermines already weak state legitimacy (de la Torre 2000; Carriére 2001). The country has an unenviable regional reputation for political chaos - there were five different presidents between 1988 and 1999 - but the weakness of the Ecuadorian state is in part an effect of neo-liberalism, as much as it is also used to push for further state-decentering policies. Given that all political parties have followed roughly the same policies - whether constrained by external forces or not – the incipient party system of early 1980s was discredited and destabilized (North 2004, 204). Although aspects of the reform agenda have been supported by domestic political and economic elites, these elites hardly represent latent majority interests in restructuring, and neither do they act to secure "state autonomy" from "special interests" – indeed the reverse. Ecuador is perceived as one of the most corrupt countries in Latin American (Fretes-Cibils and López-Cálix 2003, lx/World Bank 2003a), and public trust in government is very low – for good reason. The Vice President who succeeded Mahuad has been accused by opponents of misusing World Bank funds intended to help ailing banks, and he joined several recent colleagues in exile after he lost the election, fearing arrest (Whitten 2003, xvii). Many observers also point to the key influence of Guayaquil industrialists - a group Liisa North calls the "coastal plutocracy" – over state policy.[iii] Mahuad's campaign was largely financed by this group, and under their pressure Congress eliminated income taxes, provided 100%

public protection for all bank deposits, and rescued Filanbanco (owned by prominent Guayaquil industrialists) at a cost of roughly $700 million – equivalent to the education budget (North 2004, 201). Indeed the January 1999 deposit freeze "effectively confiscate(ed) the personal savings of several million Ecuadorians to shore up the financial institutions owned by a few dozen families" (202).

Domestic elites back further neo-liberal efforts to decentralize power, in part because restructuring has "improved their ability to pursue short-term gains and increased their access to the state, while the state's autonomy and regulatory capacity have significantly deteriorated" (Burt and Mauceri 2004a, 271). Indeed as North argues,

> "the capacity of Ecuador's rentier elites to pursue their short-term interests, rather than broader national interests, was facilitated by the market liberalization policies embodied in the SAPs (structural adjustment policies) of the "Washington Consensus." Imposed on a country where the state had never achieved a significant degree of autonomy vis-à-vis the dominant classes, deregulation, trade liberalization, and privatization policies led to public and political deinstitutionalization that increased elite capacity to extract resources from the state, withdraw capital from the country for saving and investment in safer havens abroad, and eventually provoke a financial meltdown" (North 2004, 204).

Ironically, the crisis actually helped this group escape further regulation, since the collapse was used as a justification for further decentralization and weakening of state institutions (203). In short there *are* domestic pressures for reform, and these have considerable influence over policy – but it is hard to interpret them as involving interests in "state autonomy."

On the other hand, there is massive discontent over restructuring, such that even Steve Forbes (who visited Ecuador in 2001) saw fit to remark: "countries like Ecuador (that follow IMF directives) are like a hemophiliac turning to Dracula in search of aid" (quoted in Whitten 2003, 3). Protest over neo-liberal reforms has been a key cause of political instability in the country, and it has often been met with state violence. Protest at the attempts of the center-right government of Osvaldo Hurtado in 1982 to implement economic reform measures almost toppled his government (Cockcroft 1996, 436), and Febres Cordero responded to massive protests against price increases – including numerous general strikes in 1986-7 - by using the police to violently to crush demonstrations, and by arresting many leftist dissidents and union organizers (Kyle 2000). Congress impeached Febres Cordero's interior minister for human rights violations over this and other (mis)uses of the state's security forces (Cockcroft 1996, 446). Similarly Sixto Duran Ballen responded to popular protest at his measures to implement neo-liberal reform by, among other things, sending troops to occupy Guayaquil (449). In February 1997 President Bucaram was forced from office in part due to large scale protests over monthly adjustments to energy prices, and Mahuad fled after an attempted coup backed by social protests against adjustment measures.[iv]

Continued protests were prominent, daily parts of both my fieldwork trips to Ecuador – in the summer of 2003 Quito was paralyzed by a national oil stoppage for a few days to protest plans to privatize services and increase prices, and I was tear gassed by police while trying to enter the Universidad Central in Quito to interview faculty, outside which students were (peacefully) protesting government spending cuts. Throughout the summer of 2004 pensioners occupied social security offices and launched hunger strikes to protest a plan to use pension reserves to pay off the national debt. Indeed in many respects the country is in a largely constant state of protest against government plans to implement reform programs.

Having briefly summarized the reform path undertaken by Ecuador in recent years, then, it is clear that the state is a key policy actor and that domestic political and business elites have embraced neo-liberal reform, welcoming the enrichment opportunities it grants. However the restructuring policies enacted in this country are opposed by large segments of the populace, and there is no evidence of a latent majority interest in deeper reform. Moreover, attempts to implement restructuring should be seen, at least in part, as Bank policy; in the remainder of this chapter I explain why.

The Bank's Role in Ecuadorian Development.

The Bank's resident mission in Ecuador is located in the World Trade Center towers in the modern part of Quito. This is headed by a country representative and includes several mainstream economists in addition to feminists and an indigenous development specialist. In all the World Bank has committed some US$3250 million to Ecuador over the last 50 years, funding a vast range of projects (see table 6 on total loans in appendix 3).[v] Initially focused on projects associated with a Keynesian development approach that supported state-led industrialization efforts and large scale infrastructural provision, Bank lending activity shifted during the late 1970s and early 1980s as Ecuador entered the period of debt crisis and neo-liberal reform that continue to characterize its development policy. In 1979, in a three volume analysis of *Ecuador: Development Problems and Prospects* designed to advise the government of the country's development potential, the Bank recommended a focus on agriculture, manufacturing industry, petroleum, and increased foreign investment (World Bank 1979b). This report reads as standardly Keynesian in its emphasis on state-led industrialization. By 1984, however, policy advice had importantly shifted. In 1984 the Bank put out *Ecuador: An Agenda for Recovery and Sustained Growth* analyzing the 1982 (debt-crisis-induced) recession and giving policy recommendations. The latter included changing interest rates to encourage saving, "greater efficiency in public programming reform, more appropriate pricing for public utilities, and greater care in public investment allocations" (World Bank 1984). The report also advised increased oil exports, reform in prices and labor law, and "a revision of trade policies to attenuate their present anti-export bias."

These policy recommendations subsequently became the core of the Bank's neo-liberal advice to the country, repeated in every official report on Ecuador issued from the resident mission office and shored up by concrete lending activities. For example the 1993 Country Assistance Strategy,[vi] which sketched out the Bank's lending activities in Ecuador and which was in place until 2003, identified Ecuador's development problems as resting on a failure to implement sustained reform. Similarly the 1996 *Ecuador Poverty Assessment* contained three core recommendations: improved basic health and nutritional programs, initiatives to strengthen the assets of poor, and measures to strengthen and stabilize labor demand (World Bank 1996a, ix). Specifically, the country was advised to eliminate subsides for electricity, cooking gas, and education, to attract higher foreign investment (Rama in World Bank 1996a, 324), to reform "cumbersome labor legislation" making it difficult and/or expensive to fire workers (World Bank 1996a, 44), to "rationalize" minimum wage policies by reducing government intervention (Cox Edwards in World Bank 1996a, 300), to "establish a set of labor laws compatible with markets" (305), and to better target social assistance to prevent "leakage" to non-poor groups.[vii]

In subsequent reports the Bank increasingly asserted that Ecuador was lagging behind in implementing such neo-liberal adjustments; in the institution's view this is at the heart of the country's development malaise. One report described the country's macro-economic setting by stating:

> "Ecuador was particularly hard hit by the (1998-9 economic) crisis because its economy had performed poorly since the early 1980s and because its structural reform efforts have lagged far behind those of some of its Andean neighbors. Inadequate structural adjustment is a large part of the reason why Ecuador proved so vulnerable to the shocks of 1998" (Correia 2000, 3).

The Bank's 2002 book on dollarization repeated many of these claims, arguing that Ecuador faced development troubles because it was massively endebted, regionally and ethnically fragmented, poorly governed, plagued by "pervasive corruption" (Beckerman 2002, 20) and populism, dependent on a few exports, and insufficiently committed to adjustment measures. Importantly, this report also argued that "an important cause of Ecuador's unsatisfactory economic performance is weak institutions" (Solimano 2002, 5), given high tax evasion, inefficient public spending, and lack of banking regulations. To remedy these problems the Bank again recommended tightened eligibility for social benefits.[viii] In addition, although not particularly enthusiastic about dollarization (Ecuador lacked the necessary prerequisites, and the decision involved little consultation with IFIs or, worse, U.S. federal reserve), the Bank expressed determination to preserve it, given its perceived stabilizing effects on the economy. However the report insisted that the deeper structural reforms that should have preceded it must now be put in place. Thus the Bank advised reform of the pension system, political and administrative decentralization, privatization of the telecommunications, electricity and hydrocarbons sectors, improved banking supervision, reform of the foreign trade regime to reduce tariffs, and reform of "highly inflexible…anachronistic" labor markets to increase flexibility, reduce state regulation, and limit job-related allowances (Beckerman 2002, 119). In short "further progress on liberalizing structural reform is crucial to reduce the economy's vulnerability" (118).

These priorities were carried over into the Bank's next major publication on Ecuador, the 2003 *Ecuador: An Economic and Social Agenda in the New Millennium.* Claiming that "as regards competitiveness, the country is a latecomer to reform" (Fretes-Cibils and López-Cálix 2003, xxxix), this outlined a new "Development Agenda," a three-part strategy to bring about recovery focused on: 1. promoting economic stability with fiscal discipline and growth; 2. boosting sustainable/equitable social development (involving a focus on basic education and health); and 3. improving governance and anti-corruption efforts (involving decentralization, judicial reform, and increased transparency). To achieve "the competitiveness agenda" the Bank stated that the country had to choose austerity (López-Cálix 2003, 3); it needed to spend less, collect more, lower interest rates to stimulate investment; make labor markets more flexible, open the economy to free trade (Fretes-Cibils and López-Cálix 2003, xxxv), increase private involvement in state-owned industry and infrastructural provision, and eliminate price distortions, all "with the appropriate "lifeline"-type protection for poorer households." Specifically the report recommended that the state limit its role to providing free maternity care and basic emergency services to retired and disabled people; other state-provided health services should be eliminated, and the Ministry of Public Health's role should shift to regulating private service providers (Bortman 2003, 302). In general social assistance services should be targeted to protect those marginalized people who can not benefit from accumulating human capital, otherwise eliminating labor market rigidities was prioritized as the key poverty reduction strategy (Fretes-Cibils and López-Cálix 2003, xxxvi). In an attempt to order the massive list of changes it recommended, the report gave advice on "sequencing" and "correct prioritization" – not surprisingly the country was urged to start with ensuring fiscal sustainability and meeting its foreign debt commitments (lxv). First stage priorities included an austere "national emergency" budget that froze salaries, started privatization efforts, gave up automatic wage indexing to "send early confidence-building signals," ended the gas subsidy, "adjusted" electric rates, and allowed increased private investment in oil (lxvi-lxvii).

The latest Country Assistance Strategy for Ecuador, approved by the Bank's board in 2003, replicated these priorities. The Bank claimed that Ecuador "has not fulfilled its potential" in terms of development, with unresolved problems of poverty and high debt (CAS Board of Directors summary, in World Bank 2003a, 1). According to this report Ecuador's development problems stem largely from its poor state decisions, "a culture of state paternalism toward both wealthy and poorer Ecuadorians," an unsustainable growth in public spending following the oil boom, and low tax collections, leading to persistent fiscal deficits and inflation. Although "Ecuador's macroeconomic conditions are stabilizing," with growing GDP, lower inflation, and reduced unemployment, "the recovery is fragile. The key sources of vulnerability are the fragile fiscal position, Ecuador's worsening competitiveness, and the lack of flexibility in domestic markets to respond to shocks, which is an even greater concern under dollarization." Now in a position to consolidate the gains achieved by crisis-induced adjustment, Ecuador is, as the CAS frames it, at a crossroads, having "a unique opportunity to reform the structure of its political economy" (World Bank 2003, np). To help it choose the correct path, the Bank promised a range of lending and non-lending activities oriented to three goals:

> "(1) Consolidate the macroeconomic framework and lay the foundations for diversified and sustainable economic growth and poverty reduction.
> (2) Increase opportunities and broaden access to economic resources, and make the needed structural reforms socially sustainable by mitigating the impacts on the poor and vulnerable.
> (3) Strengthen governance by helping the authorities build an accountable and efficient government" (World Bank 2003, np).

Specifically, and predictably, the report urged intensified labor market reform to reduce the cost of hiring and firing workers, tax reform, "improved expenditure management," "revenue stabilization," reform in basic infrastructure services, increased oil production in the "largely unspoiled Amazon interior," increased fuel prices, "downsizing" of the public sector, sale of public assets, and re-targeting of social benefits. These priorities were virtually unchanged in the 2004 *Ecuador Poverty Report*, the most recent text assessed in this research (World Bank 2004e).

Reforms as Necessary and as Reflective of Government Consensus.

In many respects, the Bank's framing of this restructuring agenda denies the institution's own role as a policy actor. The Bank argues that neo-liberal reform reflects government consensus, and that its role is merely to support priorities previously identified by domestic political actors who see reform as both inevitable, and as beneficial to the nation, particularly to the poor. It is thus a necessity and a normatively positive choice, but the Bank itself plays little role in its adoption. For example, in a recent history of Ecuador one Bank consultant claimed that when Hurtado took power in

1981 following the death of his more left-wing predecessor, he "began steering the economy into adjustment to the new macroeconomic realities" (Beckerman 2002, 27). Furthermore, although "the elected governments of the 1980s and 1990s differed ideologically…all were persuaded of the practical need for public sector reform" (34). Likewise, the Bank argued that dollarization was not a choice for the government, but reflected social consensus about the worthlessness of the sucre since "Ecuador's residents had already decided, in effect, that they no longer wished to hold the national currency" (Beckerman and Cortes Douglas 2002, 82).

The *Ecuador: An Economic and Social Agenda in the New Millennium* report similarly framed adjustment as both an inevitable government-led response to economic reality, and a normatively positive, pro-poor choice reflecting social consensus, a perspective shared by many political scientists who advocate restructuring.[ix] The Bank itself was merely an external observer brought in at the government's request to offer neutral development advice, to help the Gutierrez administration "from an independent point of view" (De Ferranti 2003, xix). The Bank thus thanked the government "for giving us the privilege of being partners in their countries quest for development" (xix-xx xix), and it insisted that the two actors shared a mutual recognition of the inevitability of reform, since "combining fiscal discipline with the implementation of structural reforms is no longer just an option" (López-Cálix 2003, 27). Elsewhere the Bank asserted unequivocally that "universal coverage for all benefits and for the entire population is for now impossible" (Bortman 2003, 313). Thus the targeting of benefits was framed not only as a government-led priority, but as a response to reality, leaving the Bank with a purely advisory, supporting role.

The 2003 CAS was particularly forceful in its claim that restructuring is a government-led initiative, maintaining throughout that "the Bank's assistance program is designed to address essential reforms required under dollarization and to respond to priorities expressed by Government and civil society" (World Bank 2003a, np). The report also stated that "there is broad awareness that the structural reforms needed in the economy to ensure growth are essential," particularly since dollarization:

> "The decision of the new Administration that assumed power in January 2000 to maintain dollarization made it clear that Ecuador could no longer look back. With or without dollarization, a series of structural reforms became essential in Ecuador to increase economic growth, share the benefits of growth more evenly, and to improve governance, making government services accessible to all."

That said, however, these reforms are receiving strong support from Gutierrez because his government "produced a shift in power towards poorer Ecuadorians," who will benefit from restructuring and who back his efforts to "promote economic recovery, and reduce poverty by improving economic justice." Thus according to the Bank, the Gutierrez administration has chosen a pro-poor reform agenda that not only received endorsement from itself and the IMF, but which reflects the wishes of the Ecuadorian public. In this respect the Bank points to Gutierrez's support for austerity measures and his launching of a National Dialogue around development priorities "that focuses on promoting economic growth through competitiveness, reducing poverty and exclusion, and fighting corruption." Thus the objectives of the CAS reflect government priorities – the government is trying to better target benefits, "the Government's strategy is anchored around fiscal consolidation and comprises reforms to promote competitiveness, improve basic infrastructure, strengthen financial markets, and create more flexible labor markets;" "the Government's priorities in production, commerce, and infrastructure are increased competitiveness and efficiency;" and so on. In short "the Bank Group's objective for this CAS is to help the Government achieve these major results by providing technical and financial assistance," making it appear illegitimate to analyze the institution's own role as an independent policy actor.

A Parallel Acknowledgement of A Lack of Consensus

Closer attention to Bank activities in Ecuador reveals a more complex relationship between reform, the state, society, and IFI preferences, however, one supporting my assertion that the Bank should be regarded as a key policy actor in restructuring efforts. The Bank is fully aware that there is no consensus in Ecuador around the necessity or normative benevolence of economic reform, despite its repeated assertions in print to the contrary. No conscious observer could miss the fact that the country is in a virtually persistent state of protest over adjustment measures, with governments being toppled, roads being blocked, pensioners on hunger strike, demonstrating students, and so on. Furthermore, the resident mission itself and the staff who work in it are frequently targets of protest against adjustment measures. During the 2004 regional social forum meetings in Quito several marches passed by the trade towers, and Bank staff watched from their office windows as indigenous, feminist, labor, environmental, gay, lesbian, bisexual, transgendered, and peace activists chanted anti-Bank slogans and called for the end to adjustment.

In addition, close reading of the Bank's own texts on Ecuador demonstrates a clear awareness that broad social support for restructuring remains lacking – indeed this is perceived as one of the country's major development problems. According to an evaluation undertaken in 1999 for the new CAS the Bank found that few of the objectives outlined in the old CAS were being achieved, and only half of adjustment operations had satisfactory outcomes (World Bank 1999a, 2). In April 1999 the Bank published a bleak diagnosis of the country's development problems, the summary of which read:

> "Ecuador faces an extraordinarily difficult economic situation. Many reforms are needed… The Bank's country assistance strategy presentation has been postponed. *The unsatisfactory record of Bank assistance to Ecuador highlights the risks of adjustment lending where there is no social consensus for reform*" (World Bank 1999a, emphasis added).

In addition, governments during the 1980s and 1990s were repeatedly criticized for their failure to follow through on reform, but the Bank also acknowledged that they faced serious opposition. For example the 2004 *Ecuador Poverty Report* noted that political instability led to "numerous attempts to apply fiscal stabilization measures, followed by periods of relaxation, leading to "adjustment fatigue" and loss of credibility" (World Bank 2004e, 14). Given this environment, administrations who forced adjustment through were praised for their courage and steadfastness, not their response to social consensus. For example one chapter in the Bank's report on dollarization praised Sixto Duran Ballen's 1992/93 efforts to modernize the state, arguing that "these were hard won reforms, secured in the face of broad political opposition" (Beckerman 2002, 35). The Bank also welcomed the new constitution on the basis that it strengthened executive authority, limited Congressional powers to increase taxes and public spending, and set minimum electoral support requirements for parties to be represented in Congress (53) – hardly a recipe for increased participation of the citizenry in governance.

Moreover, the institution had to cancel parts of its recent structural adjustment loan to Ecuador because of lack of support for reform. As the ever-diplomatic Bank explained it in 2003: "the experience with the $151 million structural adjustment operation was disappointing, with effectiveness delayed by one year due to difficulties in ensuring a sound macroeconomic framework after Board approval, and the cancellation of two floating tranches that supported important legal and tax reforms" (CAS 2003, np). Specifically:

> "conditions related to the disbursement of the two floating tranches were not attained, in spite of an intense effort with the legislative body. Recognizing the high political cost that would be associated with trying to secure these conditions, the previous and current Administrations decided to cancel the two floating tranches."

Although the new Gutierrez Administration subsequently completed the commitments for the release of the $30 million second tranche in March 2003, the Bank remained concerned at the lack of broad social consensus for reform. The CAS claimed that although restructuring is "expected to benefit a large share of the population," it can "hurt entrenched interests that could put up significant resistance either in Congress or in public demonstrations." Indeed in a fascinating summary of attempts to implement reform since 2000, the CAS stated:

> "Progress was slower than hoped due to difficulties in achieving a consensus on reforms. The previous Administration had limited support in a divided Congress and after two decades of "structural adjustment" and a severe crisis that drove up poverty rates sharply in the late 1990s, there was little public support for further adjustment. This in turn made it easier for special interests to block essential reforms (such as increasing the efficiency of public enterprises and the flexibility of public expenditures), leading in some cases to backsliding on commitments. Moreover, Ecuador has had six presidents over the past seven years, together with countless changes in Government Ministers, making it difficult to establish a dialogue and reach consensus. In practice, earlier reforms might have helped to avoid or mitigate the 1999 crisis, but this view is not universally held in Ecuador" (World Bank 2003a, np)

Although in some respects this passage framed the restructuring process in ways familiar to most advocates of reform, claiming that past adjustment efforts were not deep enough and that special interests blocked change from which latent majorities would benefit, it also accepted that there is currently no "minimum social and political consensus over the difficult measures to be adopted." The Bank recommended dual "carrot and stick" strategies to resolve this outstanding problem of lack of support for reform, involving 1. increased conditionality and tighter Bank control of government action, and 2. "partnership" with civil society to build consensus. I analyze these strategies below, arguing that they provide further evidence that the Bank should be regarded as an independent policy actor in this country's development efforts.

Increased conditionality.

One key strategy endorsed by the Bank in an attempt to ensure adherence to the reform agenda is familiar to critics of restructuring – increased conditionality. The Bank has of course been using conditionality to pressure reform for decades, withholding disbursement or canceling loans due to lack of privatization, lack of tariff reform, lack of progress on hydrocarbons reform, and so on. Although not the country's largest IFI creditor[x], the Bank is a crucial player in Ecuadorian debt politics in part because its actions are tied so closely to those of the IMF, ensuring that the two institutions act together to signal the perceived legitimacy (or otherwise) of state development policy. The Bank and the Fund both withheld money from Mahuad after he defaulted on Brady bonds in 1999, and the Bank postponed loans when he failed to privatize the electricity and telecommunications sectors (Beckerman 2002, 40).

However the designers of the 2003 CAS felt that these previous measures had been too soft. According to an evaluation undertaken in 1999:

> "the commitment of Ecuadorian society to reform was overestimated. (1993) CAS triggers relied on measures easily watered down or reversed. External shocks clearly played a major role in blunting the effectiveness of Bank assistance, but lack of commitment within Ecuador and the Bank's willingness to lend in the absence of the conditions needed for sustainability share responsibility for the poor results" (World Bank 1999a, 1-2).

Thus the section on "recommendations and lessons learned" advised the Bank to "verify that structural reforms have become entrenched before supporting them with adjustment lending" (2). Specifically, the Bank was "cautioned...against moving too quickly into a high lending scenario on the basis of poorly defined or reversible triggers" (World Bank 2003a, np). Rather "at a minimum, further quick-disbursing lending should be extended only when major reforms have reached the "sticky", hard-to-reverse stage" (Country Assistance Evaluation for Ecuador, Report No. 21825, World Bank (2001); quoted in World Bank 2003a, np). This advice was repeated in the Board of Directors summary for the 2003 CAS, which promised $50 million more in lending per year if Ecuador provided "improved macroeconomic management and project implementation." However no adjustment lending would be disbursed "under a low case scenario of limited reforms or weak implementation of Bank-supported projects," and the number and value of investment loans would be halved. (CAS Board of Directors summary in World Bank 2003a, 2). Likewise IFC involvement "will continue to depend on progress with economic reform, improvement in the regulatory framework, and macroeconomic and financial sector stability" (2).

The CAS was thus steadfast in its assertion that the Bank would impose conditionalities far more strictly than in the past. While praising the Gutierrez administration for its openness to reform willingness to force it through in the face of opposition, the Bank also had another plan if this openness faltered:

> "Ecuador's new Government has also demonstrated early on its readiness to implement unpopular measures if needed to stabilize the economy and promote fiscal consolidation, which it recognizes as essential for sustainable long-term growth. The planned CAS program enables the Bank to seize the current window of opportunity, but carefully hedges against the important risks by building up the relationship over time, and only if CAS performance triggers are met" (World Bank 2003, np)

Specifically the Bank identified one of "the principal sources of risk" to the CAS plan as "a possible reluctance on the part of all members of the ruling coalition to support reforms that may be perceived as externally imposed structural adjustments," and in response it recommended "a revised strategy" involving closer coordination with other lenders, and improved monitoring of funds through tranche dispersals of money to ensure adherence to reform commitments. The Bank also pledged to shift from multi-tranche loans (whose conditionalities are often unmet in later stages),[xi] to "a series of single-tranche operations with all commitments met prior to Board presentation" (World Bank 2003a, np). This takes conditionality further than in the past, aiming to increasing leverage over the state to ensure consistent application of reform and removing virtually all risk from Bank operations.

Civil Society Engagement and Knowledge Dispersal Activities.

In another attempt to build necessary consensus for restructuring, the Bank tries to engage Ecuadorian civil society. This is part of a broader, post-1995 shift to participatory development within the institution. The proportion of consultations for country assistance strategies and national policy reforms that included groups from civil society rose from 35 percent in 1995-96 to 75 percent in 1998-99 (World Bank 2000a, 18), and, as the 1997 progress report on gender notes, "while only some 6 per cent of Bank operations approved in fiscal 1973-88 involved the participation of NGOs in project design or implementation, since 1994 almost half of all Bank operations now involve NGOs" (World Bank 1997a, 3). In Ecuador, however, this engagement is of a particularly limited type. The Bank tries to use NGOs as conduits for social service provision given its attempt to roll back the state, and it wishes to disperse knowledge to civil society about the beneficial impacts of restructuring in order to remedy misunderstandings that lead to misguided protest.

The CAS set out this model of Bank-civil society interaction, and its perceived relationship to the reform agenda, very clearly. The Bank claimed that it had reached out to civil society in numerous ways, consulting with NGOs to develop country policy and participating with 22 countries:

> "in a global consultation effort to hear the voices of the poor, as an input into the World Development Report 2000/01. More than 500 men and women, of different ages and ethnic origins, living in urban and rural areas of half of Ecuador's 22 provinces, were interviewed" (World Bank 2003a, np).

The CAS also devoted considerable space to the Structural Adjustment Participatory Review Initiative (SAPRI – sometimes SAPRIN). SAPRI, started in 1996, was intended to provide a forum for a tripartite civil society–government–World Bank review of adjustment policies. The initiative was launched in Washington D.C., with the support of Wolfensohn and several prominent civil society critics of the Bank, including DEVGAP and groups involved in the 50 Years is Enough Campaign – over 1000 NGOs signed up to participate (O'Brien, Goetz, Scholte and Williams 2000, 30). Ecuador was one of six countries involved in this initiative. The civil society component was coordinated by IEDECA, a Cayambe-based group that works on local level development projects with indigenous people and campesinos. IEDECA tries to democratize public debate around economic policy, running workshops to explain structural adjustment for example.

The Bank maintained that these civil society actors were supportive of the reform effort, given that it benefited the disadvantaged. As noted above, the Bank argued that the Gutierrez administration was more supportive of reform than previous administration in part because it was more pro-poor. This is a truly audacious claim given the mobilizations of the disadvantaged against neo-liberal restructuring on an almost daily basis. Indeed the Bank's accounts of these civil society interactions can border on the fraudulent. In one particularly egregious example, the Bank claimed that its:

> "major avenues for listening to civil society are complemented by a continuous dialogue between the Bank's Resident Mission in Ecuador and a wide range of civil society representatives on both broader socioeconomic issues and specific Bank assistance to Ecuador. This dialogue has been facilitated by civil society staff and by gender and indigenous consultants located in the Resident Mission in Quito, who have also taken the lead on a number of important nonlending activities with civil society. For example, the Bank has promoted social accountability through nonlending support to develop guidelines on consultations for mining and hydrocarbons investments and community oversight of mining activities" (World Bank 2003a, np).

This passage refers to the controversy over the 1993 Ecuadorian Mining Development and Environmental Control Technical Assistance Project, a $14 million loan to attract new mining investment. Ecuadorian NGOs lodged a complaint and requested that a Bank inspection panel investigate the project in 1999. Specifically, the loan funded the production of maps of use to mining companies in protected territories in ecological reserves; NGOs claimed that indigenous groups living there would be harmed by the mining that resulted from the maps. The inspection panel criticized the Bank for its lack of consultation with local people – *this* is why staff in the resident mission now have to devote more attention to participatory approaches in mining-related operations.[xii]

Of more direct relevance to this discussion of state-IFI-society relations and restructuring, however, is the Bank's (mis)treatment of the SAPRI initiative, particularly the institution's claim that the civil society actors who took part in it agreed with the reform agenda outlined in the CAS. Many NGOs were involved in research for SAPRI, several reports were put out by scholars in universities in Quito and Cuenca, and numerous consultative meetings were held. These relied on IEDECA's extensive civil society connections and the trust the organization had build up with marginalized groups often suspicious of state and/or IFI development efforts.[xiii] Perhaps naively, those involved believed Wolfensohn – they saw the SAPRI process as offering them a genuine opportunity to produce research showing the negative consequences of adjustment, research which would change policy in a direct way. They were sorely disappointed. Those I interviewed with connections to the project felt angry and betrayed that the Bank had ignored their research and continued with an unchanged agenda despite concrete proof that restructuring was causing harm. One SAPRI participant claimed that the Bank simply refused to accept the research, which showed that flexibilization policies hurt workers and offered no increase in productivity, and which suggested that adjustment had led to more informality and poverty and less consumption. The institution offered no follow up and changed no policies – in contrast s/he perceived that the Bank was deepening structural adjustment in Ecuador. Another SAPRI participant recalled that all groups (including the World Bank) said that the results of the civil society dialogue were very interesting, but their real impact was unclear. In summer 2004, several years after the SAPRI exchange, some civil society groups were still so angry about it that they refused to talk to me until they were assured that I was not working for the Bank, and one interviewee asked me if I supported structural adjustment in Latin America before s/he would answer any of my questions.

Given this context, it is worth quoting the Bank's summary of SAPRI, taken from the CAS, at length:

> "The SAPRI process has permitted a series of dialogues since 1996. As an input to the SAPRI dialogue, two national universities prepared economic studies on structural adjustment, which clearly documented increases in poverty during the past two decades, together with the presence of a series of IMF- and Bank-supported adjustment programs. This has led to two opposing views arising on the issue of structural adjustment in the dialogue. The first view is that over the past 20 years there has been a continuous process of orthodox, neoliberal economic measures across a range of sectors, which although not deep, have been sufficient to deal a major economic blow to and further impoverish the weakest sectors of society, particularly through price adjustments that have eliminated subsidies and fuelled broader inflation. The second view is that while there have been a series of structural reform programs over the past 20 years, in practice the reform measures taken by the Government prior to dollarization have been limited at best, and have failed to resolve glaring inefficiencies in public enterprises, public service provision, and in the management of fiscal and monetary policies. The lack of deep structural reforms, under this view—which is shared by Bank Management—has resulted in the need for a series of stabilization measures that have added to adverse economic conditions for the poor.
>
> What is clear under either view is that very limited application of structural reforms as conducted in the past has not yielded the hoped-for results. On the other hand, there is a strong demand among civil society for a range of reforms in the way the Ecuadorian economy operates. This is confirmed both in the SAPRI process and in the CAS consultations. In particular, both processes have highlighted the increasing poverty and inequality; rising unemployment and migration; high prices; deteriorating competitiveness; an alarming lack of institutional capacity in public institutions; limited coverage and poor quality of public services ranging from health and education to water, electricity, and telecommunications; limited and nontransparent attempts at privatization in lieu of genuine solutions to improve the operations of public enterprises; increasing environmental degradation; rising crime rates; corruption; lack of genuine participation in political processes; and the gradual loss of social capital and social values.
>
> The Ecuadorian civil society has proposed several measures to remedy these problems. These include measures to prioritize reforms that increase access to and the quality of education and health; provide incentives to boost production and productivity by rural producers and microenterprises; improve access to credit and technical training; strengthen participatory planning processes to develop a long-term vision for the country; fight corruption by increasing transparency and accountability in the public sector to civil society; reduce bureaucracy and promote decentralization to ensure that more resources reach the community level; recognize and promote multicultural values and human values; and protect the environment through greater local participation. These recommendations have been shared with the Government and have been taken into account in the design of the lending and Analytical and

Advisory Activities (AAA) program developed in this CAS" (World Bank 2003a, np).

Several points deserve emphasis here: the Bank's insistence that the adjustment was actually not implemented, or not implemented properly, and thus that civil society anger is misdirected; the meaningless appeals to "consensus" grounded in the fact that everyone agrees poverty is a problem; and the attempt to confer ownership of the CAS to civil society groups. The Bank confirmed in its own scheduling of priorities that the country needs to focus on debt repayment, trade reform, and macroeconomic stabilization – education and health measures were delayed until the next year. This is aside from the fact that the Bank provided no evidence that "civil society" supported the specifics of the reforms being advocated in the CAS, such as increased targeting, reducing subsidies, increasing prices, and limiting the role of the state to one of facilitating private health care provision.[xiv] In fact IEDECA was opposed to the new CAS; IEDECA staff argued that in agreeing to it the Gutierrez government had chosen to favor bankers and businessmen, in a familiar union between elite and IFI interests. When learning that the CAS would deepen existing reform measures the NGO sent a letter to the Bank's country representative in Ecuador, reiterating the findings of its SAPRI research and asking why the results were not acted on. The Bank responded, again, by arguing that structural adjustment had not been implemented in sufficient depth; this was not the position taken by the SAPRI participants.

When the Bank was not claiming, untruly, that civil society organizations supported reform, it advised the government to educate this constituency to stop them resisting restructuring. It advocated "active engagement and dialogue with a broad range of Ecuadorian society" to "raise broad awareness of the difference between short-term stabilization measures which frequently impact the poor through price increases, and structural reforms, which are essential to meet the clear demands of Ecuadorian citizens for better access to services, and which if postponed result in worsening economic conditions and the need for stabilization measures" (World Bank 2003a, np). Given its support from indigenous groups, labor, and other social movements the Gutierrez administration had "a unique opportunity to build bridges between the Government and the broader population, including a greater understanding of the need for structural reforms to ensure long-term growth and well-being, and a better appreciation of the measures taken to mitigate the impact of the reform process on the poor." The Bank and the government thus adopted an educating role, dispersing knowledge to correct misunderstandings and to build appreciation for the pro-poor nature of restructuring. Likewise the CAS noted that the PROMEC loan associated with electricity privatization efforts "has a major social outreach component to build understanding and support for deeper reforms" (CAS). Indeed the Bank is committed to increasing popular participation in governance in this mould, and it believes that it can build support for restructuring in the process. Yet the participation on offer is extremely limited. Civil society is drawn into "partnership" such that the Bank can educate NGOs about the benefits of restructuring and reorient their activities from protest to service provision. In essence civil society organizations are targets of reeducation efforts regarding the pro-poor nature of reform rather than designers of the curriculum.

As noted in a recent study of civil society engagement with multilateral economic institutions such as the Bank, this process is not unique to Ecuador. NGOs representing global social movements often participate in Bank work in an attempt to change it while

Bank actors aim to maintain existing policy, seeking out civil society participation to facilitate its smoother operation (O'Brien, Goetz, Scholte and Williams 2000, 5). Thus there is an inevitability of conflict, since:

> "Bank rhetoric on NGOs stresses collaboration, mutual benefit and enhanced effectiveness. From the perspective of social movement activists the reality is often one of confrontation, conflict, and co-option" (121).

The Bank – which has gone furthest among IFIs in reaching out to social movement actors – also seeks to draw on the specialized local knowledge available to community-based NGOs, particularly in dealing with vulnerable sectors of the poor such as women. Their "comparative advantage" (28) in this area means that NGOs are being increasingly used as service providers, "contracted to provide targeted services to the poor to ease the impact of adjustment measures, without themselves having a chance to challenge the Bank's adjustment agenda" (30). Increased civil society participation, it is hoped, will also "make for smoother acceptance of an expanding governing role for the institutions" (20), influencing public opinion in favor of reform and hereby enhancing the social sustainability of Bank policies (28). Hence the authors warn that the Bank can demobilize and depoliticize civil society groups (58). Indeed, as Paul Nelson found in a recent examination of the Bank's engagement with NGOs for environmental initiatives, 'the actions of the World Bank are more often coercive than cooperative" (1997, 467), especially given that NGO interventions are often used "to broaden the bank's authority to regulate its borrowers' economic and environmental policies." Civil society involvement can thus, counter-intuitively, undermine democracy and increase Bank regulatory power.

Similarly Sonia Alvarez (1999) criticizes the increased use of Latin America feminist NGOs as "gender experts" by neo-liberal states and inter-governmental organizations, arguing that they are deployed as intermediaries in a way that undermines activism and marginalizes popular women's groups and non-professional feminists. Under the neoliberal imperative to target social programs and deliver services through decentralized bodies: "the technical-professional side of feminist NGOs hybrid identity consequently has been foregrounded and critical feminist advocacy potentially comprised, while NGOs empowerment goals and a wide range of movement-oriented activities are increasingly pushed onto the backburner" (1999, 182-3). Laura Tedesco also addresses these issues in a recent piece on NGOs, IFIs, and the state in Latin America. Under neo-liberalism the state now shares its role as an agent of development with NGOs (1999, 131), as part of the privatization of social services (140). This redefines the role of both parties. Specifically, she argues that NGOs developed in Latin America largely against the state, as political activist groups, yet they have now become service providers – principal implementers of public policy in some cases (137). They must now comply with the neoliberal rules of the game to access funds (136), especially given their financial dependence on international donors. In short my claim that Bank efforts to increase civil society participation may have negative consequences on NGOs, and do not by any means reflect a social consensus on the need for reform, is standard in many circles, as is the insistence that the Bank is a crucial, independent policy actor in the reform process, NGO engagement not withstanding.

Conclusion.

In this chapter I summarize the attempts made in Ecuador to secure neo-liberal reform and I argue that these attempts should be seen, at least in part, as Bank policy. This does not mean that the state can be ignored as a policy actor – indeed I argue that domestic political and business elites have often embraced neo-liberal reform. However the restructuring policies enacted in this country also reflect the interests and desires of the IFIs to which the state is endebted, and the Bank has a key role in this respect. Specifically, although the Bank's reform package is presented as government-led, supportive of domestic priorities, and reflecting social consensus, in reality the institution is fully aware of the distinct lack of support for restructuring in Ecuador. Indeed the Bank is sufficiently concerned about this lack of consensus that it proposes a dual coercion-reeducation strategy to resolve it. Conditionality is to be increased, giving the government far less ability to renege on reform commitments, and civil society is to drawn into "partnership" such that the Bank can educate NGOs about the pro-poor benefits of restructuring and reorient their activities from protest to service provision. This summary raises numerous issues of importance to debates surrounding IFI-state relations in reform, but on the most basic level it proves that the Bank is an important policy actor in Ecuador, with its own priorities and means of securing them. The following discussion of Bank gender policy as articulated and carried out in the country hinges on this fact.

[i] Made worse by economic problems in Asia, Russia, and Brazil, the Ecuadorian fiscal crisis was also caused in part by poor regulation of the banking sector, which allowed massive offshore holdings due to 1990s reforms. It was also promoted by a growing trade imbalance, caused by the rapid increase in imports stemming from neo-liberal trade reforms (World Bank 2003b; Hachette 2003).

[ii] The number of poor Ecuadorians grew by two million, and the 20% decline in poverty levels achieved between 1990 and 1997 was wiped out; poverty increased 17% between 1998-9 (López-Cálix 2003, 11). Between 1995 and 1999 the incidence of poverty increased from 34% to 56% of the population although rates were far higher in rural areas, especially in the highlands (4). Social development indicators such as the infant mortality rate and malnutrition levels also worsened (Fretes-Cibils and López-Cálix 2003, xxxiv).

[iii] See also de la Torre 2000; Hidrobo 1992.

[iv] Beckerman and Cortes Douglas 2002; Lind 2000; de la Torre 2000; Carriére 2001; Eckstein and Wickham-Crowley 2003, 12; Brysk 2001; Whitten 2003.

[v] This figure includes loans that were dropped or cancelled, and loans where money was not lent from the IDA/IBRD – for example some environmental projects use funds from the Bank's Global Environmental Facility and are included here. See table 6 for a more detailed breakdown.

[vi] The Country Assistance Strategy is in effect a "masterplan" for a country's short and medium term development. It is the most important document in the Bank's country-specific activities. Country Assistance Strategies involve consultations with governments, other donors, and increasingly with civil society. See discussion below, and appendix on text selection.

[vii] For example, the assessment suggested targeting cooking gas subsidies by marking containers to ensure "social blame" if the non-poor use them (World Bank 1996a, 17), or by designing containers so that they will only work with very basic stoves (Lee, Hentschel, and Hicks in World Bank 1996a, 222).

[viii] It particularly urged targeting of the bono solidario. This was set up in 1998 as a temporary emergency measure to compensate the poor for the elimination of subsides on cooking gas and electricity. It became a core plank of the state's social safety net - by early 1999 it covered roughly ½ the population (Parandekar, Vos, and Winkler 2002, 129).

[ix] Hunter and Brown, for example, claim in a recent article on the Bank's involvement in Latin American reform that "democratization in the region could be expected to have generated calls for redistributive reform by empowering poorer sectors of the population" (2000, 120). See Teichman (2004) for a counter-claim that reform is non-democratic in many respects. She argues, in a study of Argentina and Mexico, that "the process of structural adjustment with which international policy networks have been so intimately involved was corrosive to democratic practices in so far as (World) bank positions, policies, and the debates that occurred in international policy networks were not shared with congresses and the civil society of client countries" (Teichmann 2004, 65).

[x] This role is taken by the Inter-American Development Bank, with outstanding loans of $1.99 billion, equivalent to 50 percent of multilateral debt and 17 percent of total public external debt (World Bank 2003a, np)

[xi] according to the Bank "due to changing political circumstances that have quickly eroded support for reforms". This recognition is actually a crucial concession; their approach to neo-liberalism – and the approach of most advocates of reform – typically claims that support for reform will INCREASE over time and restructuring will get MORE support once its ever-elusive benefits become apparent and short term costs begin to yield results.

[xii] However the panel agreed with Bank staff that the maps are standard, environmentally neutral, and of no direct relevance to mineral exploration (making their production apparently pointless). Moreover, even if the maps were to help mining companies better orient exploration efforts, prospecting and extraction would only be allowed if permitted by law, and Ecuadorian law prohibits mineral exploitation in national patrimony protected areas anyway (World Bank Inspection panel report, 2001). To rely on Ecuadorian law to protect indigenous groups from the activities of export-oriented extractive industries may not be particularly sensible – see the experience of the Huaroani, for example, who have lost their land in the Amazon to Shell, Texaco, and logging companies. The Chachi (an indigenous group in Esmereldas) have also lost land to logging companies.

[xiii] See Colby 1995 for a description of some of the abuses associated withy developmentalism in this region – in his case study funadamentalist Christians, the Rockefellers, the CIA, USAID, the World Bank and domestic militaries went into the Amazon to "develop" it, at catastrophic human cost.

[xiv] My conversations with a range of feminist, rural development, indigenous and GLBTQ NGOs in Ecuador lead me to suspect that the Bank does not provide this evidence because it does not exist – I encountered no civil society groups who advocated this type of reform, and many who actively mobilized against it.

Chapter 5: World Bank Gender Policy in Ecuador

Introduction.

In the remainder of this dissertation, I focus on World Bank gender activities as debated, proposed, and enacted in a specific country. I devote this chapter to introducing the Bank's gender efforts in Ecuador. Using analysis of interviews with gender and development (GAD) staff and relevant documents put out by the Bank's resident mission in Quito, I identify the institution's gender policy priorities; subsequent chapters explore Bank gender efforts in specific policy-based and project-based loans. Specifically, I sketch out the institutional location of GAD policy entrepreneurs, tracing their complex and sometimes contradictory relations with Bank, state, and civil society actors. They are positioned as neither insiders nor outsiders in this respect, occupying a liminal space that renders their activities marginal and institutionally vulnerable. I consider how policymakers negotiate this institutional terrain, and I identify two types of appeal considered particularly important in this regard: productivity and complementarity/ inclusion of men. Once more I identify a concern with getting women into work as a key dimension of Bank gender efforts, and once more I argue that gender policymakers are concerned about the social reproduction problem and propose concrete measures to resolve it. The utilitization of institutionally-conditioned discourses of productivity and male inclusion encourages a focus on solutions involving technological/infrastructural improvement and the restructuring of private partnerships, particularly in relation to encouraging men to be more loving and caring. In this manner I trace how institutional context influences the Bank's gender policy advice in crucial, concrete ways, turning in following chapters to a grounded discussion of specific loans.

Gender Policy Entrepreneurship in the Bank in Ecuador: An Overview.

The Bank's gender lending activites in Ecuador take place in a country with a vibrant women's movement and a long history of women's participation in political life.[i] As in many countries in the region, state gender policy has been articulated mainly through women's offices. In 1980 the National Office for Women was established in the Ministry of Welfare; this became the National Directory for Women (DINAMU) in 1986, and the National Council for Women (CONAMU) in 1997. CONAMU is an autonomous entity under the Presidency of the Republic; its main goal is to institutionalize public sector policies for gender equity and to promote women's participation in development processes (Correia 2000). Although CONAMU staff initially helped manage and faciliate commmunity-based projects, privatization and decentralization trends have led to a shift in activities, and project management and implementation have now been delegated to other bodies. CONAMU staff thus now act more as "state interlocutors," helping to define how women are integrated into development but distanced from grounded interventions (Lind 2004, 65).

The World Bank's resident mission in Quito has also been an important site for feminist policy entrepreneurship, at a domestic, regional, and international level. Several feminists work for the Bank, and the mission recently hired an indigenous consultant "to work on gender and intercultural issues, including analysis of indigenous social capital, particularly as it relates to indigenous women's productive activities" (World Bank 2003a np). The Bank has also put out several important studies and documents on gender in an Ecuadorian context. Indeed Ecuador has long been marked an important country for Bank gender policymakers, since it was the site of Caroline Moser's well-known research into gender and household coping strategies under structural adjustment. Moser, a feminist development specialist, has published extensively on GAD issues both inside and outside the Bank, and she remains a full time Bank consultant. From 1978 to 1988 while an academic at the London School of Economics she conducted a pioneering study on household responses to poverty in Cisne Dos, a low-income housing settlement in Guayaquil (Ecuador's biggest city). This study was subsequently extended as part of a larger project on household vulnerability to economic change, funded (in part) by the Bank's Urban Poverty Management Program. The four volume report on this study, *Confronting Crisis*, was published by the Bank. The study was crucially important in drawing attention to the gender dimensions of poverty and adjustment and it is cited in much GAD literature, inside and outside the Bank.

More recently, the Bank funded a study on gender and time use focused on the Ecuadorian flower industry (see chapter 6), and the Bank's office in Ecuador put out one of the most comprehensive gender reviews[ii] of all countries in the Latin America and Caribbean region, wherein the country receives specific attention (unlike in the 1998 gender report on Argentina, Uruguay and Chile in which all three countries are covered together). Indeed the Ecuadorian gender review was highlighted as a best practice example in the *Engendering Development* policy paper. As described in the preface:

> "This report aims to bring to light the most salient gender issues affecting Ecuador's social and economic development today...It is important to note that the report represents a rapid review of issues across key sectors and is in no way comprehensive nor does it attempt to capture the richness of all the gender work carried out in

> Ecuador over the years by capable practitioners and researchers. It does, however, provide a picture of gender issues of the day, as a basis for discussion, debate and action. It can also serve as a tool for strengthening current development interventions and or designing future policies, programs and services with a gender focus" (Correia 2000, v).

In addition to the Bank's role in producing these gender-related documents, Ecuadorian feminists have been involved in a range of Bank activities in recent years. The Bank has funded national events for women's day, and has collaborated with domestic feminists involved in institutions such as FLACSO (a prominent and highly respected academic institution in Quito, with which the Bank has run gender and development activities), CONAMU, and Afro-Ecuadorian and indigenous women's groups. For example the Bank funded and published a guide to Afro-Ecuadorian women's groups in 2003 (Coordinadoras de Mujeres Negras Ecuador. 2003). Most of the Ecuadorian feminists with connections to the Bank have contacts with state bureaucracies. Typically, they worked for CONAMU (and/or its predecessor DINAMU), although as the Bank integrated indigenous and Afro-Ecuadorian concerns into its lending in the later 1990s feminists with connections to other domestic agencies were also drawn in as consultants.[iii]

In terms of concrete lending activities, the Bank has nurtured connections to feminists in its education loans, its justice loans, its rural development loans, and its indigenous and Afro-Ecuadorian development loans (see chapters 7 and 8), incorporating gender concerns into its activities and seeking out domestic femocrats as consultants. Many of these activities were initiated by the Bank's D.C.-based Latin American and Caribbean Gender Unit, initially by-passing the country's resident mission itself. The Gender Unit has sponsored regional meetings on gender, it has sent staff to assess loans for their gender activities, and it provides analytic and moral support to country-based employees doing gender work in national offices.

In this respect, the Bank's gender work in Ecuador was importantly strengthened through the PROGENIAL initiave, set up by staff in the regional Gender Unit. PROGENIAL was established in February 2000 with Japanese grant money to study the impact of gender in Bank projects in several countries in the Latin American and Caribbean region. In Ecuador the project was run out of the Bank's office in Quito (at first), and headed by a consultant with extensive experience with CONAMU and feminist development projects. The project had a special status inside the resident mission, and staff reported to the head of the Latin American and Carribbean Gender Unit in D.C. rather than to Ecuadorian managers. The initiative reflected a sense among gender policy entrepreneurs in the Bank's Quito office that gender remained largely at the discursive level, and that projects needed concrete results, tools for implementation, indicators and so on if they were to effectively integrate the theme into their day-to-day work. The head of the Latin American and Caribbean Gender Unit recruited CONAMU consultants who had worked on previous Bank loans (particularly those associated with education efforts to combat curricula sterotypes) for this initiative. PROGENIAL funds paid for two project coordinators, a series of project-specific consultants, and several loan-specific gender activities such as training workshops, production of videos, manuals and so on.[iv] Initially consultants focused on the integration of gender into a justice reform project which aimed to increase women's access to legal rights with respect to divorce and domestic violence. PROGENIAL was also involved in some education efforts oriented to curriculum reform and teacher training, and it organized some academic events in collaboration with FLACSO, including a discussion on masculinity in Ecuador. These activities were mentioned in the 2003 Country Assistance Strategy, the most important Bank document on Ecuador in recent years, as evidence of the Bank's commitment to civil society partnership (World Bank 2003a, see chapter 4).

Institutional Location: Liminal Spaces, Salaries, and Hopes for Change.

The gender policy entrepreneurs who work for the Bank in Ecuador occupy liminal spaces, as dual insiders and outsiders, as feminists and bureaucrats working for the world's largest development institution, as activists working for social change and staff employed to further neo-liberal restructuring. They do not look or speak like mainstream technocrats, and most are not economists by profession. When interacting with other Bank staff, one gender employee commented "some people saw us a little as foreigners, as strange."[v] Some gender staff worked for feminist indigenous development organizations for decades; some focused on national violence prevention efforts; some went to Beijing to demand inclusion of indigenous concerns; some worked with U.S. organizations on campaigns for the legalization of Ecuadorian immigrants; some teach courses at universities in gender and ethnicity; some are so respected by external feminist consultants and university professors that they are invited to academic discussions on gender and asked to give feedback on feminist book manuscripts. These are James Wolfensohn's people, his cadre of progressive recruits from NGOs and domestic development agencies. Thus many are known personally by a range of progressive social actors. For example, having harshly criticized the Bank in an hour long interview, one individual involved in the SAPRI initiative (see chapter 5) proceeded to give me the personal contact numbers for two Bank gender staff, and recommend that I mention his/her name in order to get an appointment with them. Similarly a prominent critic of the Ecudaorian flower industry and a strong opponent of the Bank's structural adjustment lending knew some of the Bank's gender specialists personally and had solicited comments on a manuscript about gender in the flower sector from one of them. These connections also apply in reverse – one Bank gender specialist had the home telephone numbers of many prominent Ecuadorian feminists in his/her agenda and s/he again recommended that I call them mentioning her name in order to get an appointment.

As Amy Lind points out in an overview of women's movements and neo-liberalism in Ecuador and Bolivia, this dual insider-outsider location can lead to what she terms a "crisis of identity" for women activists and/or bureaucrats (2004, 65). With the role of the state, NGOs, community organizations and international donors in flux, some opportunities are available for women who work for the state "and/or" the development community to be empowered as policymakers, while other women are targeted as recipients of neoliberal development policies (60). This can increase class (and ethnic) distinctions between experts and clients, and it "places organized middle class women in the contradictory position of working for social change, often with a critical vision, yet also finding themselves implicated in the web of power relations that the restructuring process has helped to institutionalize" (76). I consider this location in greater depth here, sketching out the complex institutional context in which Bank feminists find themselves working.

Links to the state women's council, CONAMU, are crucial to the Bank's gender activities in Ecuador. Thus feminist staff are both inside and outside the state, given their connections to a marginalized state agency, and inside and outside the Bank itself given their assessments of its institutional culture and their marginal location therein. The *Ecuador Gender Review* study was done in collaboration with CONAMU, as was the flower study (see chapter 6), and almost all of the consultants hired by the Bank to work on the PROGENIAL initiative – including the two working inside the mission office to coordinate the project - had connections to CONAMU. Several of the consultants hired to work with PROGENIAL were known to the Bank because regional Gender Unit staff had interviewed them for the *Review* when they worked at CONAMU; one interviewee stated that Unit staff "always saw CONAMU favorably." Another felt that CONAMU's work was a key reason the Gender Unit decided to launch the PROGENIAL initiative in Ecuador: "they found that it was possible to do the work in Ecuador because CONAMU was there, basically – because there was a women's movement." These close links were also demonstrated in the acknowledgements to the *Ecuador Gender Review*, which thanked several individuals in civil society groups: "in particular, Lolita Villaquiran and all the staff from the Consejo National de la Mujer in Ecuador (who) were instrumental in facilitating and assisting to carry out the review (sic)" (Correia 2000, vi). Lolita Villaquiran (then head of CONAMU) is the sister of a key staff member in the Bank's Resident mission in Quito. In another moment of insider/outsider complexity, the *Review* praised CONAMU for that fact that it "has demonstrated the capacity to collaborate with other government agencies in a constructive manner. Its innovative work with the Ministry of Education and Culture on gender stereotypes is a case in point" (8). This initiative was actually funded by the Bank through an education loan.

Importantly, the Bank's gender documents attempted to defend CONAMU from potential state cutbacks. The Bank's PROGENIAL grant included funds to strengthen CONAMU, and both the *Ecuador Gender Review* and a recent chapter on gender in the Bank's report on dollarization point to CONAMU as a civil society organization that has forged good relations with government (Correia 2000, 9; viii), given the strong civil society representation on its board and the lobbying undertaken to secure passage of measures such as the anti-violence law (Correia 2002, 192). Indeed the *Review* lists CONAMU as one of the most important recent advances in gender equity in the country, since:

> "Relative to its counterpart agencies in other countries, CONAMU is a strong performer. It has been successful in building important alliances in the public sector, which have resulted in innovative gender initiatives. Also, relative to other countries, gender appears to be much more mainstreamed in public programs" (Correia 2000, ix).

Specifically, the *Ecuador Gender Review* argues that CONAMU is successful because it "is apolitical and has no official link to the first lady of Ecuador;" it values "technical excellence" and rigourous research; it work constructively with the state; and it "exhibits positive entrepreneurial characteristics" in its ability to attract external funding (8). Given that "CONAMU finds itself in an uncertain situation" (8) due to government cutbacks and state restructuring, these attempts to protect the agency are important, although institutionally confusing. They seek to use the Bank to protect CONAMU from the state, itself pressured by the Bank to restructure and cut public spending. Relations like these demonstrate the pauacity of any account of the Bank that assumes institutional coherence or that denies space for insider mobilization to resist mainstream policy advice.[vi]

One reason these feminists ended up working for the Bank was money – this can not be underestimated as a factor complicating their institutional location as both insiders and outsiders. For example, one feminist consultant told me that she had become involved with the Bank's education efforts in part because CONAMU (with which she had previously been employed) was caught up in state budgetary crisis, and staff had their salaries cut. This woman – a single parent and the sole wage earner in her household – could not support her dependents on state feminist salaries; Bank consultancies paid four times more and the choice of employment was thus an easy one for her to make. Similarly several consultants hired to work with the PROGENIAL project took the jobs in part because the state was cutting back CONAMU funding and they could earn more working with the Bank. Bank consultants on other projects are often hired away from poorly paid state jobs in a similar way, as one interviewee explained in relation to an education loan (EB PRODEC) that included a gender component:

> "the people who worked in EB PRODEC were people who worked with good salaries. The people who work in the ministries have some very bad salaries, right? So there was a sort of competition, of resentment between the authorites…it was, I don't know how to explain it to you, but it generated certain discomforts."

S/he went on to argue that the best employees from the education ministry "were co-opted by EB PRODEC, so the ministry was left weaker."[vii] In short, many staff ended up working for Bank projects in part because of the instability and poor salaries of other jobs – a situation itself in part caused by economic restructuring.

In addition to being drawn to Bank jobs because they paid well in a context of economic crisis, however, these consultants also genuinely believed that they could seize space within the Bank from which to forge more gender-friendly policies. In this respect interviewees pointed to successes including the gender disaggregated data collected as part of the agricultural census loan (due to PROGENIAL intervention), the translation of the *Ecuador Gender Review* into Spanish so that Ecuadorian feminists could access it (also an initiative of PROGENIAL staff), and the recent launch of a Quichwa-language webpage on the Bank's Ecuador site. One policymaker, summing up his/her time in the Bank, stated:

> "but really I have learned so much, and to see with a vision from inside is something else. When you see from outside, its another reality…I have learned, and I have become familiar, and all of us here we have been part of the team, we have established a quite wonderful team – it is vital that I have to say this. We have helped each other mutually."

This staff member noted that the Bank was very open to female staff and to indigenous participation, for example. S/he was also concerned to counter misunderstandings about the Bank stemming from unfounded criticisms of external debt, giving groups data showing that the Bank was not the sole source of the country's debt problem for example, and insisting to me that the institution did not impose lending on governments.[viii] Some staff were thus content with their jobs and felt they could achieve positive change through their engagement with the institution.

That said, however, the sense of ability to forge change through the Bank was related to the perception that possibilities were limited in state-focused feminist efforts, given the weaknesses of CONAMU, instability within ministries and so on. One interviewee explained his/her decision to leave CONAMU to work as an independent consultant thusly:

> "I am being honest with you…work inside the state is hard, and in a state like ours that for years has been falling to pieces - we changed Minister of Eduaction three or four times in a year, and it was not just the policy of the government – it was (a different) policy with every minister, and you went on like this for a while - it was a little frustrating on one hand, no? Its work that wears you out after four years, I tell you"

When asked who had power in a Bank-funded education project containing a gender component, one policymaker replied that "in the end" the Bank had more power than the relevant ministry in many cases, given the weakness of the state and the multitude of problems it confronted. Thus staff felt that their ability to forge change within the Bank was itself related to the weakness of the state – a situation that caused frustration for some people.

Making Sense: Distance, Numbers, and Men.

Given the desire of these policy makers to achieve change within the Bank, it is important to assess their own understandings of the institutional context within which they were working, to ascertain how they "made sense" of their own location and action. Importantly, although I never criticized the Bank in interviews, many gender staff sought to explain their engagement with the institution in ways that distanced themselves from its macro-economic lending, to which they were often personally opposed. For example, one gender policymaker described the hostility with which researchers on one of the SAPRI projects regarded the Bank, leading to a conversation about his/her own discomfort with the institution, and his/her own efforts to create change. S/he noted that many of the researchers were young people from the university and that they were conflicted "to be working with the World Bank as an institution. And to be honest with you I was not happy to work with the World Bank." When asked why, s/he replied that:

> "I accepted this work because in any respect I was going to be doing very similar work to what I had been doing for years in CONAMU and with possibilities of having an influence, and for me, I was in agreement with the objectives of **my** work. I don't want to say that I agreed with all the work of the Bank."

S/he went on to state that s/he had taken the job "because yes I believed in the work that I was doing, do you understand? Because I was not making the macroeconomic policies, no?" Laughing, s/he closed by stating "that is where I have differences."

As in this example, policymakers often made a distinction between themselves and "the economists" that was crucial to their vision of themselves as insider-outsiders, working on feminist projects rather than standard Bank projects, contributing to gender equality rather than the national debt. This distance from the Bank was expressed as part of a feminist common sense that I was assumed to automatically share. For example a Bank employee responded to a question regarding the lack of gender analysis in a prominent document by rolling her eyes, smiling, and saying "you now how the macroeconomists are." Another relayed a failed attempt to get gender into the 2003 Country Assistance Strategy[ix]:

> "well it appeared to us that the Bank and the governments were very veritcal, (and) it was necessary to incorporate gender in the Country Assistance Strategy. So we made an attempt but the people who formulate the Country Assisance Strategy, they are very hard economists. (It was) very difficult – the majority of them have a very neo-liberal vision – very strong." (World Bank 2003a).

Gender staff shared many such moments in interviews, based on an intimate insider knowledge that the Bank was like this, but also that feminists were not. It was expected that I would understand this because I knew the Bank and because I was a feminist. The persistent enactment of and appeal to this distance was a crucial part of feminist engagement with the institution.

That said, however, as much as they attempted to personally distance themselves and their work from "the economists" and the Bank's unpopular macroeconomic mandate, without exception all of these policy entrepreneurs claimed that their own work for the Bank was heavily influenced by the dominace of the neo-liberal paradigm. In this sense they were heavily conscious of and reflexive about the institutional constraints within which they were operating – as one employee put it, "its not that you can do everything, no? Because the Bank is very rigid, right?" Two constraints were identified by several interviewees as particularly prominent: the pressure for economistic, quantifiable results, and the pressure for male inclusion.

Firstly, the Bank wanted gender efforts expressed in convincing terms that made sense to its mainstream staff and projects. As one policymaker put it, "the World Bank has an absolutely technocratic vision of gender." Thus policy entrepreneurs were pressured to produce workable, practical, and above all rigorous gender materials that appealed to institutional interests in efficiency. The entire PROGENIAL initiative reflected a sense among gender policy entrepreneurs in the Bank's Quito office that gender remained largely at the discursive level, and that projects needed concrete results, tools for implementation, indicators and so on if they were to effectively integrate the theme into their day-to-day work. As summarized by one Bank employee:

> "PROGENIAL was an attempt to operationalize gender in a context in which is it very difficult to include gender. The people who work in the World Bank are in general economists, they are (in) teams that do not really value social themes or discrimination, although their discourses are very focused on combating poverty and all this. It has been a real struggle that they can accept technical themes, themes of sexual difference etc, and their form of working, mechanisms and proceedures are very focused on results that can be measured."

Given this context, the regional Gender Unit "made a very big, very important effort to try to convince people that gender can work, that it is not only a question of propaganda, that it is not only a banner, but that if inequities can be measured they can be accepted...As you see it is a quite positivistic field." Likewise Bank specialists felt pressured to hire consultants who would produce excellent gender research, by which they meant research that showed how gender inclusion could benefit the project in a value-added way, done by consultants who were experts in statistics. One interviewee claimed that gender had not been integrated into a prominent report because it was written by mainstream economsists, and there was a lack of data on gender, meaning that the issue would simply not be discussed – this, s/he reminded me, was what s/he was up against.

When summarizing her experiences with PROGENIAL another policymaker claimed that the Bank's demand for efficiency-based discourses caused serious problems within the project, pressuring staff to present results in certain ways, causing conflicts between national and D.C.-led priorities, and leading staff to feel ashamed of their accomplishments when they were reduced to terms the Bank considered legible. Consider the following comments:

> "look, I can tell you the following: for me it was a very big learning period that I value greatly. I learnt how the Bank functions from inside, to understand that inside such a large structure they can make these policies with good intentions like those of gender and so on, but if the policy in general and the system in general marches with another logic, with another sense, then what you can do in reality is crushed, and it is not crushed only from outside but it is crushed from our own gender unit, because (the head of the Gender Unit) put demands on us for achievements of a World Bank type. This produced a misunderstanding because you try to work with the logics of national actors, with the agendas that the national actors have developed for gender...This the Bank does not understand - it absolutely does not understand anything of it."

Specifically, she claimed that the Bank arrived with "its little drawer of obvious approaches," and it wanted everything to correspond to that drawer. This led to conflict "because what were achievements for us, for them were worthless." When asked to give specific examples, she mentioned a gender study undertaken in the Galápagos under

PROGENIAL auspices, one that was subsequently discounted by regional Gender Unit staff: "we made some recommendations and this was worthless (for the head of the Gender Unit). For them (the recommendations) had no value." Later staff tried to present their achievements at a workshop, and they saw their efforts converted into "a worthless formula...and it embarrassed us that our achievements were presented in this manner." Interestingly, s/he also felt that PROGENIAL staff had been pressured to "sell" their results to the Bank, given that regional staff were outside the country:

> "well in reality they (regional staff) read the national reality with an interloctor...so if the people in the project are very good at selling themselves, then they (regional staff) believe the film and they go and buy it and they find the project golden... They are always sellers who sell those products."

To sum up this issue s/he relayed a conversation with "a woman with good intentions" from the Washington team:

> "'you have good things,' she told us, 'yes, you have good things, but they are not well packaged, do you understand?' It was terrible...I didn't know how to do the packaging. It was horrible, horrible I swear to you - the biggest frustration."

This "biggest frustration" was later put on the agenda for one of the Bank's PROGENIAL missions. A discussion of the sustainability of gender in projects included a presentation "with a basis in social marketing, to explain how "to sell" the findings, with an aim to achieve sustainability and to make alliances." Another World Bank meeting for Women in Latin America and the Caribbean held in Quito included a session on: "Social marketing and the introduction of gender" asking:

> "What have been the limitations of previous strategies to promote equity and equality between genders? What concepts of social marketing can help us to have a greater impact when it comes time to obtain equity and equality between genders?"

Such pressure to sell results and package policies in institutionally-appropriate terms caused clear angst among staff.

Importantly, pressures for efficiency-based framings are confirmed in the Bank's Ecuador-related gender policy texts. In a discussion of "lessons learnt" from the attempt to integrate gender concerns into a rural development loan, the *Ecuador Gender Review* concluded:

> "According to project staff, the gender approach promoted by the project was perceived as a feminist orientation, which led to rejection and resistance. The approach to gender was also criticized for being too ideological - gender staff were unable to translate concepts into concrete actions. Experience from other projects demonstrates that a more convincing argument is to show how applying gender analysis contributes to project goals" (Correia 2000, 80).

The shift from a feminist, ideological orientation to a technocratic one grounded in efficiency was thus recommended as part of Bank best-practices. Indeed the Bank's praise for CONAMU was in part due to the enthusiasm with which the latter was seen to embrace efficiency rationales, particularly in terms of quantifiable results. The *Gender Review* remarked that:

> "Having made technical competence an explicit and priority objective, CONAMU clearly values technical excellence, in contrast to focusing on lobbying or implementing politically motivated token projects for women. A clear example of CONAMU's focus on technical competency is its SIMUJER gender disaggregated data base which compiles gender statistics from numerous sources in the area of demographics, health, education, violence, political representation, etc. The data base is the first of its kind in the Region" (Correia 2000, 8).

Indeed through the emphasis on technical rigor one can see that close involvement with the Bank has affected CONAMU itself. As Lind argues, "like other hegemonic state practics, CONAMU, as an interlocutor of gender and development policy, serves to normalize a certain set of ideas about women's roles in development, while rendering others invisible or less important" (2004, 66). Yet the ideas it normalizes are importantly influenced by its reliance on external money. Lind focuses on the pervasive emphasis on women's need for integration into free market activities as evidence of such constraints

(67), but Bank-CONAMU staff also highlighted pressures towards quantification of their work, and "technical" framings that would increase project efficiency and ensure results could be sold to the institution's mainstream staff.

Secondly, feminist policy entrepreneurs identified the pressure to include men, or to redefine gender in a complementary way, as a key institutional constraint on their work. According to one Bank gender specialist, gender was seen by some in the institution and in the projects with which PROGENIAL was trying to work as an external imposition, and as synonymous with feminist and/or "almost lesbian."[x] In part to counter such perceptions, several interviewees remarked that the Bank wanted men included in gender work. The official policy was that "we don't believe that there should be projects for women and projects for men, there should be projects with a focus on equity for men and women." Pressure was put on CONAMU to shift its approach in order to achieve this goal, causing conflict with CONAMU feminists who were less enthusiastic about a concentration on men and sharing partnerships. Consider this account from a Bank policymaker:

> "initially this project (PROGENIAL) was going to have strong involvement from CONAMU, but there was a misunderstanding between (the people involved). The misunderstandings have to do basically with conceptual thenes such as how to conceive gender...For CONAMU although they speak of gender, (they have) a strong focus on women, in contrast the World Bank, as you may have seen, makes an effort towards gender because gender takes into account the theme of men, perhaps not in the line of masculinities...but more in the more technical line that takes into account social inequalities that affect men. And CONAMU refused very firmly to work like this, that men would be beneficiaries of their activities, and their argument was this – "we women are those who suffer discrimination, so as a result it is absurd, unjustifiable to invest in men"... well they do not want to work towards (the benefit of) men, so this provoked a very strong disagareement...The relationship turned very very bad, very bad, and this affected personal relations of all types, but it was very ugly this polemic, very ugly."

The inclusion of men also caused serious conceptual problems within the Bank's gender efforts, confusing staff and the projects with which they worked. One Bank policymaker stated that PROGENIAL had been less than successful in part because it focused too much on theory and too little on concrete indicators, but in part because it was hard to maintain the position that gender refers to men and women when "I was always focusing more on women…Really, it was a little of a clash." Another gender consultant in a Bank funded loan stated that s/he had experienced problems in his/her work in part because "there was a little problem in the conception of what gender was, because it was thought that gender only took into account only women, and really there was the aspect of gender in generation, where we had to take into account all the generational differences of young people, children, the elderly, to see if they were really equal beneficiaries of the project." Here gender was being defined so expansively as to include participation in general, causing considerable confusion for staff.

The emphasis on including men was sometimes associated with the head of the Latin American and Caribbean Gender Unit, and his/her insistence that this vision of gender policy get adopted in national level work caused conflict with individual consultants and with CONAMU more generally. However this was not merely a personal conflict since his/her vision of gender reflected the Bank's - perhaps one reason why s/he was heading the region's gender unit in the first place. The institution's printed material also advocated this approach; although the head of the Gender Unit was involved in the production of these texts it is a vast over-simplification to argue that formally cleared publications reflected his/her personal views rather than the Bank's own position. For example, the *Ecuador Gender Review* criticized CONAMU for failing to include men in its gender work, and it recommended a complementary definition of gender as one of the "lessons learnt" from the rural development loan:

> "Limitations of a Women in Development Approach. Project experience demonstrates the importance of a true gender approach as opposed to one that treats women as a segregated group. For example, staff indicated that women's projects were often rejected because community members did not understand the rationale for organizing women on their own. Also, changes in women's roles imply that men's roles must change too, thus the need to work with men alongside women. For example, the involvement of men and other community members needs to be established at the outset of an intervention prior to forming women's groups" (Correia 2000, 80).

This focus on gender policy as needing to include men was also evident in Maria Correia's chapter on gender in the Bank's 2002 report on dollarization. This opened with the comment:

> "macroeconomic and financial crises of the type Ecuador has experienced can affect men and women in different ways, primarily as a result of their distinct biological and societal-based gender roles. The literature on this topic, however, is weak empirically. It also focuses almost solely on women to the exclusion of men" (2002, 178).

Thus "themes relevant to men in the projects" were on the agenda in a 2002 mission involving the Latin American and Caribbean Gender Unit organized by PROGENIAL, demonstrating the importance of this discourse to Bank gender efforts.

The policymakers interviewed for this research judged other feminists based on their perceived ability to negotiate these institutional constraints. Often this translated into a generosity of spirit towards others who were seen as struggling for space with good intentions. The head of the Latin American and Carribean Gender Unit was regarded as one such individual, repeated framed as personally committed to gender equality, and praised as an excellent institutional insider, able to get funds for PROGENIAL for example, and to support gender efforts using internal resources while remaining popular among feminists outside the Bank. Even if interviewees disliked another person they often tempered their criticisms with acknowledgement that this individual had faced serious hostility in their gender work. For example one Bank specialist who had strained working relations with a gender consultant remarked that the latter "had few friends" within the loan; notwithstanding her own irritation at this individual she was aware of how hard it was for her to operate within these constraints and she evaluated her work generously.

Simultaneoulsy, however, this context also led to anger and resentment at people who were understood to jeaporidize the tentative space that had been secured for feminist influence. Thus those who erred were the targets of considerable anger, because they were seen to endanger not simply their jobs, but the feminist project of opening the Bank more generally. In this sense feminist policy entrepreneurs imposed a "politics of respectability" on themselves,[xi] leading marginalized actors to harshly sanction members of their own perceived to jeapordize the delicate collective effort. In the Bank this played out in anger at those who were seen to produce poor quality work that could not be defended to the macroeconomists, or who were seen to lack the personal networking skills necessary to build alliances with mainstream Bank people. Consultants who were "very conflictive" were criticized, since they "created too many resistences", "generat(ing) many problems afterwards in the Bank." Not withstanding the shared "what are they like" mentality that drew feminists who knew the Bank and its mainstream economists together, staff understood that good working relations with other people in the resident mission were crucial, and individuals who damaged those relations were heavily criticized. One Bank specialist was highly critical of some of the work put out by gender consultants, since s/he claimed that low quality research made it very hard to justify Bank gender activites to the institution's mainstream staff. Thus s/he had to pressure gender consultants to produce quantified research that fit institutional definitions of rigor, and in some cases s/he had to personally train them how. S/he acknowledged that this made him/her unpopular with some individuals, since they felt s/he was interfering in their work, but s/he feared that if they produced poor work his/her own position and the broader national and regional gender efforts in the Bank would be damaged.

In short feminist policy entrepreneurs were in a complex and difficult institutional space, pressured to produce work that resonated with efficiency concerns and that included men while navigating counter-commitments to state level feminist agencies and progressive development concerns. These pressures significantly damaged personal relations between feminist colleagues. PROGENIAL consultants engaged in bitter personal fights which still resonated when I conducted interviews years later, such that one interviewee was close to tears when recounting certain interactions. This is not to argue that the Bank caused these fights, since many of the disagreements stemmed from CONAMU-era fights and personality clashes, but the pressure on marginalized staff to justify their efforts within the institution certainly made them more acute.

Prioritization of Paid Work

Due to these institutional pressures, getting women into paid employment is a clear priority for the Bank's gender policymakers in Ecuador as it is throughout Latin America.[xii] In this sense their vision of good gender policy importantly mirrored that put out in D.C.-based formally cleared documents. When asked about the Bank's goals in gender policy, several interviewees mentioned employment; one spoke of the need for investment to support women in creating their own companies, in areas such as tourism and artesanial production. Other consultants claimed that work was a right for women, and that it was a way for them to achieve other goals – for example getting into work reduced their vulnerability to domestic violence.

Work was again framed as a way to increase productivity, to achieve other development goals such as poverty reduction, and to empower women. For example the foreword to the summary of the *Confronting Crisis* reports (written by the Bank's Vice-President of Environmentally Sustainable Development) listed as the first "key finding" that labor is the poor's greatest asset, and that economic crisis leads poor households to mobilize the additional labor of women and children (Serageldin in Moser 1996, v). The last line of the foreword argued that "real progress lies in empowering the poor, the weak, and the vulnerable to become the producers of their own welfare rather the recipients of charity or the beneficiaries of aid" (vii). This notion of empowerment as self-reliance is exactly the argument used to explain the focus on women's work in formally cleared Bank texts.

Interestingly, Moser's own work on poverty and household vulnerability was more ambivalent about women's employment, framing it both as a source of empowerment and a desperate reaction to poverty. Moser found that women's labor force participation had increased significantly in Cisne Dos, from 32% to 46% between 1978 and 1992 (Moser 1997, 4), and that women's wages contributed crucially to household income (36). Indeed the Cisne Dos volume of the report listed increased labor market participation as the first individual coping strategy of the poor (94). To some extent this shift was regarded positively, since waged work was understood to reduce vulnerability and to thus empower the poor. Although noting that paid work could result in greater burdens on women, Moser still claimed that:

> "At the same time, there may be some advantages, however small, for women as a result of their increased responsibilities. For example, among those who are working, economic independence confers some increased control over their lives" (80).

That said, however, women's entry to the labor market was also framed as a desperate response to poverty. This was particularly true of women in informal sector employment (the majority), since "these women are forced by desperation to enter competitive, deadend occupations with low pay and long hours" (5). The assumption that working women function effectively as signifiers of poverty reduction was also questioned by the fact that "the poorer the household, the greater the number of women working and the more dependent it is on women's earnings" (6); such women are "forced by economic factors into paid employment" (10).

Importantly, however, while the prioritization of women's employment evident in Moser's study was replicated in later Bank texts on Ecuador, the recognition that women's entry into the paid labor force can reflect desperation rather than liberation was not. For example the 1996 *Ecuador Poverty Report* – which included Moser in the research team – argued that increasing women's labor force participation was key to increasing productivity and reducing poverty, and it thus urged the government to further deregulate the labor market (World Bank 1996a, x). Moser's report on Cisne Dos had been highly ambivalent about such deregulation, noting that the increase in short-term contracting led to a casualization of male employment which rendered households extremely vulnerable to poverty (Moser 1997, 38). No such concerns surfaced in the

Poverty Report, even in the chapter Moser contributed on gender. This focused on female employment as a poverty reduction strategy, to compensate for male absence due to migration (Moser in World Bank 1996a, 117) and for the decline in skilled labor opportunities for men (118).

The focus on women's employment was replicated in other gender-focused Bank reports on Ecuador, again in an unambiguous fashion. Between 1970 and 1990 the female proportion of the economically active population increased from 14 to 19 percent (Correia 2000, 29); the abstract of the *Ecuador Gender Review* used this evidence of women's growing labor force participation as proof that "Ecuador has made considerable strides in addressing gender issues" (v). Despite these trends towards increased female employment, however, work was still marked as a policy priority. The Bank listed several remaining problems in the arena, including relatively low levels of female labor force participation,[xiii] unequal wages,[xiv] unequal training opportunities (especially in potentially lucrative technical skills), higher female unemployment,[xv] occupational segregation, increasing male dominance in traditionally female fields such as food and textiles, gender discrimination in promotion, unequal benefits coverage, and the firing of pregnant women. Furthermore, policymakers asserted that women's lack of employment was an important issue even when data suggested otherwise. Although "available data indicate that the proportion of women with a secure job is greater than the proportion of men with a stable job" the *Gender Review* argued that "gender is a factor in household coping strategies and capacity to confront crisis" because "women may encounter greater difficulties in securing new income sources during economic downturns" (50). No evidence was presented to support this assertion. Work-related variables were also used to demonstrate the presence of a number of other, more general development problems in the country. The Bank listed seven bullet points to prove that "Ecuador's crisis has had a prolonged and massive human cost" – five concerned unemployment (4-5). Similarly rising unemployment was the first item in a list of the gender-differentiated impacts of Ecuador's economic crises (37), and the report included a seven and a half page discussion of labor, more than the space devoted to education or health (4).

The perception that work was a policy problem led to a persistent emphasis on work-related solutions to gender concerns. The report insisted that "any temporary work program being considered for Ecuador - including social infrastructure projects that generate employment – should include targeting mechanisms to reach women as well as men" (Correia 2000, xi). It also recommended services to support self-employed women and female entrepreneurs, such as "job matching" efforts in which NGOs "act as a clearinghouse for jobs as well as provide training on grooming and preparing oneself for a job" (58). Furthermore, the concrete policy advice provided in the report focused heavily on employment even when apparently dealing with other issues. In proving that rigid gender roles and socialization can negatively affect social and economic well-being, for example, the report concentrated on women and work:

> "In line with their maternal and caregiving roles... girls are expected to work in the home, where they are less likely to gain human capital and which, in turn, influences their labor market opportunities and earning potential later in life. The effects of gender roles extend into old age. Women's reproductive roles lead them to participate less in the labor market, to have more transient employment relationships, and to work in the informal sector in larger proportions than men. Hence, they are also less likely to receive social security or to have savings in their old age, and are more likely to be poor" (52).

Education was also framed as a mechanism through which to improve "human capital acquisition, ...earning potential in the labor market, and ultimately ...social well being" (xi). Explaining why, the report included a section devoted to the "impact of education on labor force participation" that claimed:

> "individuals enter the labor market if the marginal benefit exceeds the marginal cost. An educated woman has the ability to make high earnings in the labor market and hire domestic worker inexpensively, so her "cost" of working is low while the benefit is very high. An uneducated woman has low earnings ability but her economic need is so great (i.e.the "benefit" of earning income is very high) so even the benefits of earning a low income exceeds the value of her leisure and some homecare (cost)" (30).

This rationale for gender intervention revolves around employment, reinforcing the "keystone" strategy identified in chapter one and indicating the perceived centrality of work to policymakers.

Maria Correia's chapter on gender in the Bank's 2002 report on economic crisis provided further evidence of the prioritization of employment. Education was considered important in gender policy largely due to its perceived connections to labor force participation and pay, using a human capital argument that policymakers accept explains little of the wage gap in Ecuador.[xvi] For example Correia's section on human capital opened by arguing that:

> "education not only increases labor market returns, but it also allows individuals to adapt more efficiently and effectively to crisis and uncertainty...The better educated tend to use assets more efficiently; have greater capacity to obtain information, credit, and other productive resources; and are better able to exploit new income opportunities" (Correia 2002, 181).

As in the *Ecuador Gender Review,* women's lack of paid work was marked as a policy problem despite upward trends in female labor force participation, because unemployment and underemployment rates are still higher for women and because women are less likely to be in high productivity occupations (197). Moreover, getting women into work was seen as part of a broader empowerment initiative, with Correia concuding that "in terms of labor and vulnerability, women's labor force participation over the decades has increased dramatically, *thereby enhancing their economic independence and reducing their vulnerability*" (205 emphasis added). Increased employment was thus framed as part of an effort to "break the culture of dependency" (206) affecting poor communities, targeting women as potential employees in order to increase self-reliance and thereby achieve empowerment.

This framing of employment as the key strategy through which to achieve productivity benefits, poverty reduction, and women's empowerment was replicated in the Bank's more mainstream policy texts on Ecuador, in part because getting the poor into work was already central to the reform agenda. For example the 1996 *Poverty Report* argued that the labor market was the crucial link between economic policies and poverty (Rama in World Bank 1996a, 319), and it insisted that "the poor are hurt to the extent that regulations create barriers to entry to better-paying jobs" (World Bank 1996a, 11). In terms of gender, the document argued that "female labor participation is an important determinant of the ability of families to shed themselves from poverty" (Hrenstschel and Lanjouw in World Bank 1996a, 75). Thus the section on policy options opened by arguing that "helping today's poor women and tomorrow's mothers enter the workforce is key to enabling them to overcome poverty" (World Bank 1996a, 39).

Labor market reform was also central to the report entitled *Ecuador: An Economic and Social Agenda in the New Millennium*, and again gender was discussed primarily in relation to work. This report argued that sustainable and equitable social development required labor market reform, since "the accumulation of human capital should be complemented by eliminating rigidities in markets, particularly the labor market...by promoting an improvement in the income of the poor who have made efforts to improve their education and health" (Fretes-Cibils, Giugale, and López-Cálix 2003). Social assistance services should be targeted to protect marginalized individuals who can not benefit from accumulating human capital in this way – "those who face a prolonged impossibility of subsisting or generating an adequate income of their own" (Dulitsky 2003, 321). The *Agenda* report also defined household headship based on employment-related variables, claiming that "who is the main income earner of the household" (Parandekar, Vos, and Winkler 2003, 134). Thus if women earn more than men they are understood to "head" the family, in a very clear manifestation of the Bank's core assumption that income through employment leads to empowerment.

Similarly, work was prioritized within poverty policy for all Ecuadorians within the 2003 CAS, and in turn employment was privileged within gender efforts. Although the report opened by arguing that waged work will help un- and underemployed people escape poverty (World Bank 2003a, np), low labor productivity was also marked as a core problem facing the country – this enabled the Bank to explain why working people are still poor. In terms of labor policy, the CAS repeated the advice of the 2003 *Agenda*: that "the labor market is still insufficiently flexible;" that laws obliging profit sharing, wage increases, and severance entitements require reform; and that public sector wages and jobs need to be cut. Again employment was presented as a way to achieve empowerment through self-reliance. Among the "key findings" from civil society consultations was the fact that "employment and self-improvement are very important;

the poor want opportunities in the form of stable employment...rather than handouts" (np).

The CAS extended this focus on work to women specifically, arguing that women "are particularly vulnerable" to poverty because their lower educational completion rates and higher illiteracy rates translate into fewer employment opportunities and lower wages. Thus to overcome poverty the report recommended "faster, labor-intensive output growth" to "inclu(de) ...the poor (*especially women*) in the development process" (World Bank 2003a, np emphasis added). Work was mentioned first in the report's section on gender, before lack of prenatal care or the high maternal mortality rate. The CAS did note that when women join the labor force during economic downturns many "tak(e) on poorly paid and precarious work in the informal sector" (np), but this issue did not receive sustained attention. Rather employment was framed as generically empowering. Another "key finding" of the Bank's civil society consultations was that "gender roles have been transformed due to unemployment and migration of men, and due to women joining the labor force; women are more empowered while men's self-esteem has plummeted." Crudely put, this is the Bank's summary of the relationship between work and gender roles – it is the same one evident in formally cleared D.C. documents and varies little from recent gender policy texts put out by Ecuadorian feminists working for the Bank.[xvii] Work is recommended as a cure-all strategy for poverty alleviation generally, and for GAD policy problems specifically, with Moser's early ambivalence about its empowering potential replaced by unimpeded enthusiasm for a labor market solution.

Recognition of the Social Reproduction Problem.

> "Coping strategies that rely on women's income – particularly important in poor households – ...put pressure on women in their triple role of reproductive, productive and community managing work. Not only must they balance different tasks, but there are also severe constraints associated with the labor intensity of time use" (Moser in World Bank 1996a, 128).

The prioritization of employment notwithstanding, gender policymakers attempting to influence Bank initiatives in Ecuador are also fully aware of debates about the social reproduction dilemma.[xviii] This is most evident in Moser's *Confronting Crisis* study, which remains noteworthy within GAD circles for its recognition of the importance of caring labor, its operationalization of the triple role framework, and its concern that paid work responsibilities may overburden women. In summarizing Moser's key findings the Bank's Vice President of Environmentally Sustainable Development noted that "women, because of their multiple responsibilities, have frequently assumed a disproportionate share of the burden of adjusting to adverse economic circumstances, thus limiting their ability to respond to new opportunities" (Serageldin in Moser 1996, v). Serageldin also stated that the community support systems and voluntary work that sustain social capital such as trust – systems disproportionately reliant on women's labor - could not infinitely absorb the dislocations produced by adjustment, and should not be taken for granted (vi).

The body of the *Confronting Crisis* report confirmed this sense that the social reproduction dilemma was a serious problem for gender policymakers. Moser repeatedly recognized the blurred boundaries between productive and unproductive labor, and she urged the Bank to value women's reproductive and community managing roles as crucial to household and community survival. The first line to the section on "balancing productive work with domestic responsibilities" argued that "although labor is understood to be the poor's most valuable asset, the invisibility of domestic labor means that demands on women to perform unpaid domestic labor remain unrecognized" (Moser 1997, 68); later in this section Moser asserted that "unpaid labor in the home is also an asset, albeit unrecognized and increasingly depleted" (79). She also suggested a perceived equivalence between paid and unpaid labor when remarking that children contribute economically to the household in different – but equally important - ways: "boys are more likely to earn income directly, while girls tend to assist indirectly, taking on childcare responsibilites to release other household members – principally their mothers – to work" (4).

In a connected manner, Moser noted that social reproduction responsibilities have a direct impact on women's ability to participate in paid work. For example she claimed that although new white collar jobs have emerged for women as secretaries and clerks, these are only open to young, educated, unmarried women since "long working hours and commuting time mak(e) it difficult to combine these jobs with reproductive responsibilities" (39). She also quantified data to convince mainstream economists of the need for policy intervention. The summary to the report claimed that although women and men work similar numbers of productive hours (measured in terms of market *and* subsistence production, itself a broader notion of "work" than used in many Bank texts), women devote more time to reproductive and community management activities (Moser 1996, 13). The Cisne Dos volume also contained a text box explaining gender roles which laid out the triple role framework, and which reported gender differences in time allocation.

Finally, Moser explicitly criticized the "exhaustion solution" to the social reproduction dilemma, noting that women can not infinitely balance their multiple roles and continue taking on extra labor to pick up the slack of economic restructing. Citing Lourdes Beneria (a feminist political economist highly critical of structural adjustment for over-burdening women in Latin America), the summary to the *Confronting Crisis* study recognized that cutting social services could increase women's work burden and lead to unmet care needs, for both children and the sick. As Moser argued in a summary of the situation in Cisne Dos "women's multiple responsibilities have meant that during economic stress they frequently have assumed a disproportionate share of productive and reproductive labor, their burden undermining other coping strategies" (1996, 68). In particular, Moser noted that adult women pushed the burden of unpaid care onto their daughters when economic crisis forced them to work outside the home, and she expressed concern that this would undermine human capital development and perpetuate poverty. She also found that women's participation in community managing activities was negatively affected by the time constraints associated with their shift into paid work (Moser 1997, 12). Furthermore, women took on the burden of "expenditure-minimizing" strategies that increased their shopping and cooking times, and made them worry persistently about household survival (32). She framed this burden as one reason for the high levels of depression among women in the community, manifest in apathy, fatalism, excessive sleeping, exhaustion, and being "burnt-out." Moser also gave examples of younger people attempting to juggle multiple responsibilities in similar ways, with sisters who attended school in shifts, on a rotation system, and boys who worked in the day and were thus too tired to go to night school (Moser in World Bank 1996a, 129). These individualized attempts to balance multiple responsibilities were clearly framed as inadequate and exhausting.

The *Ecuador Gender Review* also demonstrated a clear awareness of the social reproduction dilemma. The overview contained a section on the "division of labor in the household and housework" (Correia 2000, 35-6), for example, and although recommending more research on "how households distribute work (paid and unpaid) to men and women during economic crises" (60), the report confidently made several factual claims about social reproduction. Women's household responsibilities restrict their labor force participation, for example, making them less mobile than male workers, more inclined to opt for low-paid self-employment (31) or transient, informal employment (xi), less likely to be covered by social security or formal pensions (xi), and less able to leave the home to look for jobs (xiv). These constraints are particularly important for single-headed households given that domestic responsibilities can not be shared with other adults (49). The report asserted unambiguously that "one of the reasons for women's lower earnings is that they tend to juggle domestic and work activities," and the section on "job advancement"claimed that women's opportunities are restricted because they "continue to bear the burden of care giving and domestic tasks" (35).

Moreover, again the review explicitly critiqued the exhaustion solution to the social reproduction problem, noting that increased female labor force participation caused by macro-economic crisis and adjustment policies can lead to "greater pressures on (women's) time given that adjustments in the division of household work have not taken place" (50). One of the "lessons learnt" from a recent loan attempt to integrate gender was “the need to address women's reproductive and domestic time constraints in conjunction with supporting their productive activities” (76), on the following basis:

> “As with so many other projects, women's productive activities often fail because of the time women must dedicate to reproductive and domestic roles. Thus to be effective, productive endeavors for women must be accompanied by measures to help them decrease their domestic workload” (80).

More recently, the Bank’s 2002 report on dollarization accepted that “gender biases…seem to make crises affect women more adversely” (Solimano 2002, 12). This sentence refers to the fact that women take on additional burdens to ensure household survival, given that Correia’s chapter on gender concentrated heavily on the social reproduction dilemma. Her opening literature review noted that much research focuses on the effects of crisis in intensifying household work, and she cited Moser, Beneria, and Elson in this respect.[xix] She also recognized that girls’ responsibility for domestic work can lead them to miss school; that women’s “home workload” makes them vulnerable to poverty (Correia 2002, 201); that “housework and childcare – which are the most part women’s responsibility in Ecuador – are key constraints to labor force participation and income generation” (199); and that female headed households may be more vulnerable to poverty because they are more likely to involve single-parenting, wherein “the double workload of productive and domestic responsibilities” can not be shared with other adults (187). More broadly, in the introductory paragraph to the discussion of labor Correia made it clear that the failure to recognize home production as of economic value harms those engaged in it (namely women):

> “in many countries in the world, families still maintain a traditional division of labor in which women specialize in home production and men specialize in market production. Given the unpaid nature of home-based work, women as a group are thus more vulnerable vis a vis employed men” (193).

Here the need to get women into work was severely complicated by a recognition that they already work, in tasks that are not recognized or paid but which constrain time use and should be accounted for in policy.

The awareness of the social reproduction dilemma so central to the Ecuador-focused gender policy texts put out by the Bank also made its way into more mainstream texts on the country. For example the 1996 *Poverty Report* contained several references to the issue, outside of Moser's chapter on gender which largely repeated the claims made above. The introduction noted that household and childcare duties "are the major reason why women do not participate in the workforce, and these are more pressing the poorer they are" (World Bank 1996a, 39), and the first working paper giving a poverty profile for the country found that 63% of women in the lowest expenditure quintile do not "work" due to household responsibilities (Hrenstschel and Lanjouw in World Bank 1996a, 75). This figure is lower (46%) for women in the highest quintile since they can pass on household and childcare responsibilities to domestic servants and childcare centers. The report also suggested a voucher scheme for students to compensate poor parents for lost opportunity costs incurred by their children's education (World Bank 1996a, 32; 76); as argued in chapter two this reflects a clear recognition of the importance of unpaid labor.

The 2003 *Agenda* report – which did not contain a separate chapter on gender – also included multiple references to social reproduction. These were particularly evident in Alexandra Ortiz's chapter on urban development, which cited Moser's Cisne Dos research. Summarizing the study's most important results, Ortiz wrote that 1. "mothers are forced to increase their participation in the working world and decrease the amount of time they spend taking care of their children;" 2. children work in family businesses or taking care of younger siblings; and 3. "family nuclei are diminishing and being replaced by extended families with "nests" of relatives who live on the same land and help to take care of the children, and help with cooking and other reciprocal chores" (Ortiz 2003, 259). The prioritization of these findings reflected an awareness that unpaid work is important, and that "trade offs" between market and non-market labor can cause problems.

Finally, and perhaps most surprisingly given its focus on macroeconomic issues and its general neglect of gender, the 2003 CAS also recognized the social reproduction problem, again in terms set by Bank feminist policy entrepreneurs. Its discussion of child labor noted that "children are withdrawn from schools during economic downturns both to contribute to family income and to avoid education-related expenses" (World Bank 2003a, np). That Ecuador has – at 58% - a far higher employment rate for 16 year olds than many neighboring countries was marked as a policy concern, linked to the need to help support dependents in the household. The recognition that dealing with human realities of dependence can render people vulnerable to poverty contains within it an acknowledgement that the social reproduction problem should not be resolved at a purely individual level, since this can lead to undesirable outcomes such as children leaving school. In short, then, the Bank recognizes that unpaid caring labor is important, and that it must be dealt with in policy if efforts to get women into work are to be successful – this is as true in Ecuador as it is in the institution's formally cleared D.C. documents.

Proposed Solution 1: Improved Infrastructure and Technology.

Once again, the Bank's gender policymakers propose concrete solutions to deal with the social reproduction problem in order to facilitate women's employment. Firstly, they advocate infrastructural provisions, both of economic infrastructure such as electricity and water, and social infrastructure such as health. This solution is prominent in both gender-focused and mainstream Bank texts on Ecuador. Serageldin's foreword to the *Confronting Crisis* summary recommended supporting the household as a safety net provider through basic infrastructure such as electricity and water services (Serageldin in Moser 1996, vi), on the grounds that this will increase productivity and save time. As the summary of the report argued, "when it takes women longer to carry out such tasks as fetching water, they have less time for income-generating activities" (7). The report also recognized that state cutbacks caused by crisis and adjustment have negatively affected the quality of services such as electricity, health, and water, leading poor people to rely on expensive and unreliable private vendors. *Confronting Crisis* thus recommended that the Bank prioritize longer term interventions "such as to restore eroding infrastructure" rather than short term compensatory measures in its efforts to reduce poverty (Moser 1996, 16). Hence its table on potential policy solutions included infrastructural services, to "provide time- and labor-saving technology" (18).

Moser's own volume on Cisne Dos also recommended infrastructural investment as a way to resolve the social reproduction dilemma. The first line to the chapter on "infrastructure as an asset" set out this policy justification very clearly: "the provision of infrastructure is critical for the economic productivity of the poor, increasing the efficiency and flexibility of their response to economic change" (Moser 1997, 45).

Specifically, social infrastructure enhances human capital, while economic infrastructure "allows for greater choice in operating income-earning enterprises, particularly home-based enterprises" (45). Thus better provsion of services such as water, electricity, transport, and health was one of the report's "priorities for action" (13). In all cases public investment in infrastructural provision was framed as a legitimate way to resolve the tension between paid and unpaid labor, in that it will permit time use to shift to productive activity, and reduce social reproduction burdens through increased efficiency.

The *Ecuador Gender Review* used a similar rationale for infrastructural investment – that it increases employment opportunities by opening up markets and resolves social reproduction tensions that otherwise restrict labor market participation. The summary of the report recommended developing infrastructure services in order to stimulate women's commercial activities, particularly in the Oriente where "transportation is a serious issue" but also in the Sierra and Costa in order to open up off-farm employment opportunities (Correia 2000, 60). As noted above, the appendix on lessons learned from the attempt to include gender in a rural development loan found that "...to be effective, productive endeavors for women must be accompanied by measures to help them decrease their domestic workload" (80) – the first suggested example was: "improved technologies to reduce time spent on fuelwood and water collection."

Importantly, the Bank's mainstream texts on Ecuador repeated this emphasis on infrastructure (both economic and social) as a way to boost employment and productivity. It was a priority in the 1996 poverty report, the 2002 dollarization report, the 2003 Agenda report, the 2003 CAS, and the 2004 poverty assessment. The priority was shared by the government in part because, as Jennifer Collins astutely points out, Ecuador's clientelistic political system rewards elected officials who can provide specific goods and services such as those associated with infrastuctural projects (2004e, 55). Infrastructural provision had thus already been marked as a key necessity in the neo-liberal reform effort, and feminist policy entrepreneurs could piggyback onto this existing emphasis to demand more services. As summarized in Moser's report on Cisne Dos, in the 1980s the Ecuadorian government undertook reforms involving "reorientation of (the) public investment program (to) emphasiz(e) the provision of infrastructure to support private sector activities" (1997, 22) – these reforms were supported (or led, depending on one's approach) by the Bank from the outset. Although a public health rationale was expressed here, more important was an emphasis on productivity and economic growth, and a claim that the poor would benefit because they would be able to increase their income.[xx] Consider for example the framing of infrastructural provision in the Bank's 2003 *Agenda* report on Ecuador. This contained chapters devoted to basic infrastructure (water sanitation, electricity, telecommunications and transport), and education, health, and social assistance (considered "social infrastructure"), and infrastructure was central to several of the other chapters on urban development, decentralization, petroleum, and rural development. The first sentence to the chapter on basic infrastructure argued that "the development of basic infrastructure is a fundamental challenge for Ecuador. An improvement in the quality of life for the population depends on it, as does economic growth" (Drees et al 2003, 196). This chapter highlighted problems of poor coverage, inefficiency, poor service, and low investment, and it recommended standard neo-liberal policy changes such as greater private competition, "rate adjustments" (price increases), decentralization, privatization, and community responsibility. Thus the Chilean telecommunications reform through which competition and private investment were increased was held up as a "success story" (221) for Ecuador to emulate, as was the Bolivian privatization of the telecommunications industry in 1996.

However the state and the Bank maintain a role within this apparently privatized system of infrastructural provision, since planning, subsidies for "start-up" investment, technical assistance, and "lifeline" protections for the very poor are still considered legitimate, if not essential. For example, in criticizing Ecuador's transport system the report stated that it was never coherently planned, and instead developed randomly according to the different needs of the people (Drees et al 2003, 225). This is a curious objection given the neo-liberal framing of the chapter, in which large-scale centralized planning *should* be replaced by organic development of services in response to local needs. It signals a continued desire to conserve space for development planners and technocratic experts in transport provision, space which the Bank agree should not be abanonded, planner-less, to "the market."[xxi] Likewise the chapter argued that:

> "Community-based service providers require long-term technical assistence and training in business management skills. The government must provide this technical assistence" (242).

The role for the state and development institutions is certainly limited here – to plan transport, to provide initial investment in order to overcome temporary market failures, and to assist communities in order that they can sustain their own services – but a role is nonetheless secured. It is a role defended in all other Bank texts on Ecuador, since notwithstanding the pro-market privatization agenda being advocated by the institution it is considered legitimate to intervene to fund infrastructure – both economic and social –

in order to secure development. This preexisting policy priority provided space within which gender policy entrepreneurs could argue for their own initiatives.

Policy Solution 2: Restructuring Heteronormativity To Get Loving Men Involved in Care

The second solution to the social reproduction dilemma proposed by Bank gender policymakers in Ecuador is to restructure intimate relations within the family, by getting women into work and ensuring men love better. This is framed as aiding both productivity and empowerment. Good gender planning is defined as including men, in order to encourage sharing, complementary partnerships between couples. Simultaneously, however, such changes in gender roles are understood as always-already market-driven, ensuring that the Bank's open promotion of them escapes critique. Likewise household restructuring is identified as a problem to which policymakers should devote attention, with gender consultants extremely concerned about poor men's absence from the family, their laziness, irresponsibility, drinking, and violence. They propose to resolve the social reproduction dilemma by including men in these limited terms, encouraging their complementary inclusion in gender lending to promote responsible fatherhood and loving attachment to restructured families in which their wives work.

Due to institutional pressures, the Bank's policymakers define good gender policy in a way that encourages male inclusion, and that focuses on changes to gender roles at the personal level. Attention to men and organizing in mixed groups are identified as key elements distinguishing an "ideological women in development approach over a true gender perspective" (Correia 2000, 76). Gender is also repeatedly defined as involving complementary attention to men and women. As the introduction to the *Ecuador Gender Review* defined it:

> "Gender in this report pertains to both men and women and refers to the different experiences, preferences, needs, opportunities and constraints men and women face because of their socially ascribed gender roles and expectations... The report discusses both male and female gender issues on the premise that both men and women are affected by socially dictated gender roles in negative ways" (1).

This definition was repeated in the executive summary (vii), and in a text box entitled "The Scope of Gender" which reinvoked the distinction between fixed biological sex and variable cultural gender also central to the Bank's D.C. documents. Once again, this conceptualization of gender drew attention to the inherent variability of roles:

> "While sex refers to the biological state of being male or female, gender refers to the socially defined aspects of being a man or a woman. Gender is a variable - like class, ethnicity, nationality, and religion - used to 'identify and measure differences in the roles of men and women, the activities they undertake, the responsibilities they have, the opportunities and constraints they face, and ultimately, their well-being. Gender is dynamic because men's and women's roles - as dictated by changing social and cultural norms and values - also vary over time' (Moser, Tornqvist, van Bronkhorst, 1998). Thus, gender in this report refers to aspects of social life and poverty which are experienced differently by men and women because they have different ascribed roles" (2).

In turn the focus on roles encouraged a privatized concern with the household, and with intimate adjustments to divisions of labor therein, leading to a definition of the social reproduction dilemma which privileged limited, privatizing solutions. As defined in the *Ecuador Gender Review*, for example,

> "The problem of the gender division of labor in the household is universal and is not limited to Latin America or to Ecuador. In the United States, which is considered to be a more gender egalitarian society, housework and childcare tend to be one of the most contentious issues of families today, according to Deutsch (1999). Her studies show interesting differences among socioeconomic classes, with working class families being more openly conservative but 'practicing more than they preach', and middle class families being more liberal but 'preaching more than they practice'. Her studies also show that men who are taking on new family roles face light chiding and teasing from other men because they consider housework and childcare to be a

> women's domain. While these findings were found in the United States, they would also be relevant in other countries such as Ecuador" (36).

Deutsch's work is based on a tremendously privatized conceptualization of social reproduction requirements; indeed her book epitomizes the restructuring heteronormativity solution to the tension between paid work and unpaid care. Arguing that "equality in parenting is achieved in the details of everyday life" (Deutsch 1999, 3), she asked who wipes noses, who fries bacon, and so on, seeking out "equal sharers…ordinary people simply inventing and reinventing solutions to the dilemmas of modern family life" (11) in a sample that was 96% white, and 100% English speaking. In half of her couples both husbands and wives had graduate degrees. In a frankly conservative approach to resolving domestic labor burdens she insisted that "it is simply easier for two devoted parents to meet children's needs than for one to do it" (228), and thus that "mothers and fathers buffer each other" (228). On the last page she raised the need for "generous family-friendly policies," "a childcare system in which every family had access to high quality daycare," equal pay, and so on (240), but overall the book is focused on privatized adjustments by loving couples – precisely the solution being advocated by the Bank itself.

The inherent dynamism of gender roles ensures that again Bank efforts to promote this solution remain unmarked as policy interventions, especially given that "the market" is understood to cause many of the shifts to which the texts draw attention (notably women's increasing labor force participation). For example Moser's *Confronting Crisis* study found that household restructuring was already taking place. The chapter on "household relations as an asset" noted trends towards female headship and household extension (Moser 1997, 61) as a result of economic crisis, with marriages breaking down due to economic stress and nuclear families expanding to incorporate vulnerable people such as older women and younger single mothers. Thus Moser's research conclusively proved that people restructure their intimate lives and loving attachments in part due to macroeconomic forces.

Importantly, however, she was ambivalent about the restructured gender roles and household relations observed in Cisne Dos. On one hand extended networks were understood to offer many benefits, primarily to adult children who move back in with their parents, but all gained "in the form of time efficiencies through sharing reproductive tasks such as childcare and cooking" (Moser 1997, 67). The arrangement also "allows sons and daughters to care for elderly parents while living independently" (67), and women in extended households spent less time on reproductive tasks than women in nuclear units (70). On the other hand, however, these adjusted household forms were also regarded with a certain unease. Moser fully recognized that breadwinner wages had disappeared, and she noted that households must now depend on multiple earners to escape poverty or even to survive (1996, 6). However she wished "families" to face such challenges in tact, unrestructured. She identified marital breakdown and the erosion of the household as a unified social unit as sign of vulnerability (3), and the growth in single parent households was considered alarming in several reports, evidence that changes in gender roles present "a new set of challenges" for the country (Correia 2000, v; see also Moser 1997).

This anxiety about the breakdown of the family was sometimes expressed in ways that focused on women's changing roles. For example Moser argued that migration weakened relationships, and she cited women in the Philippines who "voice growing concern about the erosion of family values, the long-term effects on children of being brought up without guidance from fathers, and the decline in reciprocity networks" (Moser 1997, 5). Household adjustment also worried women generally, since all "families have had to change long-held norms and patterns of parenting. Women in all communties worry about neglecting their children" (11). Other problems included family strife caused when elder daughters reject responsibilities put on them by their mothers: "resistence causes conflict… and can lead to irresponsibility, neglect of siblings, early promiscuity, and even prostitution" (76).

However, more commonly the Bank's concern about the breakdown of the family was a concern with men. Specifically, it was joined with a harsh criticism of poor men as at best absent, and at worst as lazy and unredeemably unreliable. The photograph on the front cover to the summary of Moser's *Confronting Crisis* study included no men, for example – it featured women and children only (image 20). To reiterate, this perceived male absence is framed extremely negatively in the Bank's gender work. Poor men's failure to take on social reproduction responsibilities as their wives move into paid work is repeatedly identified as a policy problem, and they are generally portrayed as lazy and unreliable. According to Moser, on a general level "marital conflict, the most important internal reason for restructuring, is closely associated with economic problems and men's failure to contribute sufficiently to the household" (1997, 66). Her gender chapter in the 1996 Poverty Report – based on her Cisne Dos research - contained a section on intra-household coping strategies which included several text boxes highlighting personal

Image 20: cover to Confronting Crisis

stories of community members. These portrayed poor men as absent, pathologically unfaithful, degenerate, or irresponsible, despite the recognition by the Bank's macroeconomists that poor men start work earlier than non-poor men (Hrenstschel Lanjouw in World Bank 1996a, 74); that poor boys drop out of school to work at faster rates than any other group (Correia 2000, 5); and that many regions of the country suffer from population imbalances caused by poor men's migration for work (11). Yet the Bank's gender texts persistently overlook this reality. For example one text box included in the Moser report on older women as heads of extended households featured Maria (who was abandoned by her husband until he later returned) and Consuela (whose husband died, forcing her to move in with her parents for childcare) (Moser 1996, 125). Another box on "avoiding poverty: young women as "hidden" female heads" featured Bella (whose finance moved in with her and her family until she threw him out for being "a lazy good–for-nothing" - she has no intention of looking for another male partner) and Maritza (who got pregnant by a man who deserted her for another woman one month after her baby was born) (126).[xxii] The text box on "balancing productive, reproductive work and spatial mobility: the story of two domestic servants" introduced Marta (whose husband was finacially unreliable, disappearing often, and who would not let her use birth control) and Josefina (whose husband deserted her after their sixth child) (127).[xxiii] Examples of responsible men were far less frequent. One text box on "Intergenerational Aspirations" focused on a man who had to abandon his dental studies due to cost and whose son may have to do the same, since their family remains below the poverty line despite the fact that both men have several jobs (Moser 1997, 44). However this is one of the only positive representations of poor men in the report.

Poor men are not only lazy and unreliable in the Bank's gendered imagination – they are also considered drunk. This issue was raised in several interviews, and one Bank gender specialist brought up the issue of alcoholism in rural areas and its impact on women when asked about future Bank activities in Ecuador. S/he understood that this problem affects the poorest of the poor, men who are in a cycle of depression, go into cities and drink their wages, hereby putting women at risk of violence. S/he wanted the Bank to be more active on this issue, and highlighted it as a key concern when describing the Bank's overall gender activities. *Confronting Crisis* also contained several references to poor men's alcoholism and substance abuse. This was understood to be a pathological problem reflecting male despondency due to wounded masculinity (see chapters one and three). The summary of the study claimed that "male alcohol consumption is frequently the biggest drain on household resources" (Moser 1996, 13), and Moser's report on Cisne Dos included a section devoted to "male drinking and drug use" in which she explored "the role of drinking as a form of male release from despondency associated with economic and job difficulties" (Moser 1997, 77). One of her text boxes, on "Casualization of a Construction Workers' Life," featured a skilled construction worker called Pancho who was forced to find day laboring work. He responded to this insecurity and poverty in the following way: "any spare cash is spent drinking, while his wife inadequately supports the family through laundry work" (38).

The concern with poor men's irresponsible drinking as a cause of Ecuador's gender problems is far more sustained in the *Ecuador Gender Review*. Although framed as "an important social problem facing Ecuador today" (Correia 2000, 17), alcoholism was considered a broader regional issue given that "Latin America has one of the highest incidences of alcohol consumption, with a rate three times greater than the rest of the world" (17). The abstract asserted that "alcoholism and substance abuse are a serious social concern" (iv) for men, and the issue took up half of a four page section on health, far more space than cancer, STDs, occupational health and hazardous work, or smoking. Alcohol was also mentioned in the summary and in the sectoral recommendations for health services reform (49; 55).[xxiv]

Correia's chapter on gender in the Bank's discussion of dollarization in Ecuador also foregrounded male alcohol abuse. Alcoholism took up three quarters of the space in a two page discussion of male health vulnerabilities. In particular, she argued that substance abuse and alcoholism predominantly affect poor men and men who are un/under unemployed, since they see alcohol consumption as a reaction to negative external factors such as job losses or hopelessness (Correia 2002, 185). Correia's concern with this issue is also demonstrated through the Bank discussion paper she co-authored on *Gender Dimensions of Alcohol Consumption and Alcohol Related Problems in Latin America and the Carribbean* (Pyne Claeson and Correia 2002). The report not only argued that alcohol consumption is a public health issue, linked to certain diseases and unsafe behaviors,[xxv] but also that it is a male problem since "men are more likely to drink heavily and excessively than are women" (v). Although this may change "as more women move into the workplace and gender roles change" the foreword, written by the chief economist of the Latin America and Caribbean region, stated that it was written in part "to create awareness of the importance that gender roles play *in the lives of men*" (vi, emphasis added). In particular, alcohol is considered part of machismo given that "drinking, most often execessive drinking, is one manifestation of the dominant (hegemonic) masculinity that is promoted in many societies in the region" (24). However poor men drink more (16). This is understood to be linked to "gender role stress;" in essence poor men drink because they can not live up to their gender identity (23).

These discussions are related to Karin Rosemblatt's research on the aggressive campaign of Chilean popular front organizations to eradicate immorderate drinking among working class men. In this context, alcoholism was linked to abuse, improper spending, bad work habits, men failing in their role to provide for their families (Rosemblatt 2000a, 273), and poor fatherhood, with invocation of a eugenicist attempt to better the Chilean "race" by regulating drinking (273). As seen in 1940s Chile, then, "overcoming an addiction to liquor was a sign of the self-discipline that marked true manhood and furthered national development" (272). These debates in Ecuador are also overlaid by a crucial racialized dimension, in which colonial stereotypes of irresponsible Indian alcoholics and drunken Negros endure. Although avoiding any argument that links drinking to race, Bank gender policymakers do appeal to stereotypical notions of the working class as intemperate, and male drinking becomes a policy problem that hurts families, lowers productivity, and overburdens women (Correia 2000, x; 51).

Crucially, the Bank's gender policymakers also argue that gender role stress leads poor men, and particularly unemployed men, to be more violent than their better-off brothers. Moser claimed that economic stress may lead to increased domestic violence (Moser 1997, 77), and she noted that women in Cisne Dos identify links between the bad economic situation and their sons' increased violence and public drinking (1996, 14). However the connection between class, masculinity, and abuse was far more central to subsequent work. For example increased male violence was proof of the gendered impact of restructuring for the *Ecuador Gender Review*:

> "Macro-economic crises have gendered impacts, with women tending to enter into the labor force during these periods. This implies greater pressures on their time given that adjustments in the division of household work have not taken place. For men, unemployment threatens their role of family provider and creates problems of self esteem and depression - which may have other possible negative effects such as violence."

Although violence is linked back to alcohol abuse, leading to suggestions that drunk men should be detained by the police as a violence prevention strategy, both violence and alcoholism are caused by wounded masculinity. Thus the report argued that:

> "Causes of male violence - including street violence and sexual and domestic aggression - have been linked to masculinity and gender roles. According to Barker (1998), to be a man in Latin America is equated with working hard, earning well, being responsible, and providing financially for the family. When these goals become difficult to achieve, men regularly assert their masculinity through violence (ibid.)."

Barker is cited frequently as an expert source in this respect; the section on gender roles and male health features his work thusly:

> "According to researchers, aggressive and risky behavior is linked to male gender roles and expectations. Studies have suggested that the inability of low income men to live up to societal and familial expectations of what 'real' men should do-particularly low income men-is associated with stress, substance abuse, risk-taking and violence (Barker, 1998). According to Barker's 1997 study conducted in the ghettos and favelas of Chicago and Rio de Janeiro, "low income young men, who may lack other, more mainstream ways of affirming their identity or of achieving manhood - in the workplace, or in school, for example - may use shows of force, fights and other forms of violence (including violence against women), experimentation with drugs, or acting recklessly to gain prestige within their peer group and to affirm a sense of self' (ibid.)" (Correia 2000, 16-17).

These references are to a conference paper. There were no references to far better known researchers on Latin American or Ecuadorian masculinity, many of whom question pathologizing portrayals of poor men as hyper-violent, addicted, or irresponsible in their formally published and peer reviewed work.[xxvi]

Moreover, other evidence cited by the Bank in the *Ecuador Gender Review* disputes the simplistic and offensive framing of poor male violence used elsewhere. For example:

> "The CEPLAES study in Ecuador found violence to be fairly evenly divided between those of rural and urban origin, those with primary and secondary schooling, male partners with different occupations, and families with different levels of income. Violence reduced somewhat (10 percent) for women with post secondary education. Women's independent source of income was found to be the only statistically significant factor influencing domestic violence. About 71 percent of women with their own income declared having been physically abused compared to 47 percent of women without their own source of income. A similar study in Lima Peru, however, produced mixed results. The study found that violence unleashed or magnified psychological and sexual violence but not physical violence and that employed men inflict more physical and psychological violence than unemployed men, most probably because men are more dependent on female earnings" (22).

Here working women were *more* likely to be victims of violence than non-working women, and unemployed men were *less* dangerous than employed men – both of these findings challenge the portrayal of pathologically violent poor men endemic to the Bank's writing on gender violence, yet neither receives elaboration.

Correia's chapter on gender in the dollarization report went further than the *Ecuador Gender Review* in its negative portrayal of poor masculinity, mentioning not only violence but also stunted emotional development and "destructive behaviour." She asserted that:

> "studies on disasters and coping have found that while both men and women feel the psychological effects of crisis, women display their stress more openly, whereas men's anxiety is exhibited more indirectly through destructive behaviour (for example, violence and alcoholism). This difference is probably the result of socialization processes, which inhibit men from expressing their feelings" (Correia 2002, 201).

Poor men are particularly stunted in this regard, since "aggression among men has been associated with male gender roles and expectations, and in particular the inability of men earning low incomes to live up to societal and familial expectations of being full income earners" (189). Unemployed men are thus again framed as a violent threat, while working women are considered less likely to be victimized:

> "more children means fewer opportunities (for women) to participate in economic activities and generate income, with corollary implications for their negotiating power in the household...For men – who, as in other countries, are considered the main breadwinners – more children means greater pressure to increase productivity and income, which, in turn, can have negative consequences if men are unable to fulfill this role (for example because of alcoholism, violence, delinquency, or depression)" (188).

Correia asserted (without evidence) that "dangerous behavior, violence, and substance abuse among men are likely to have increased during Ecuador's most recent crisis given the frustrations that unemployed and underemployed men face when unable to meet the societal expectations of being providers and protectors" (186), and she claimed (in contradiction to the evidence cited in the *Gender Review*) that increased violence correlates with low education, being unemployed/underemployed, and belonging to a low socioeconomic group. Again, notions of wounded masculinity are used to argue that poor men are more violent than rich men, and again unemployed men are framed as a particularly dangerous threat to women and children – even though the evidence supports neither conclusion.

The pressure to include men in policy – a key institutional constraint imposed by the Bank - occurs within the parameters set by this framing of the problem they cause for gender policymakers. Men should be included in ways that address the pathologies identified above. Thus research on alcoholism, violence, and delinquency should be conducted to correct "information deficiencies on men" (Correia 2000, vii). The preface to the *Ecuador Gender Review* argued that "men's issues in Ecuador...have yet to receive the attention they deserve given their important social consequences" (v) – these "issues" were alcohol abuse, irresponsible family behavior, and violence. Indeed the Bank's desire to include men in gender lending in Ecuador is a perfect example of Escobar's observation that the development gaze seeks to include new populations by targeting them as objects of interventions, as problems to be resolved "but according to interests defined by others" (190).[xxvii] Making groups legible requires turning those who do not fit the frame into pathologies or anomalies that need to be transformed (Bergeron 2004, 31). Thus poor men become targets for development intervention to correct their excessive drinking and violence, an agenda that hardly emerged from the articulated needs of the client group itself.

In relation to the social reproduction dilemma, however, the Bank not only targets poor men as violent, lazy, drunken problems – it also targets them as poor partners and fathers. Crucially the policy solutions that stem from the above sketches of poverty focus on keeping men around, and making them more reliable partners in the anti-poverty struggle. Rather than advocate strategies grounded in individual self-sufficiency designed to support women abandoned by irresponsible men, gender policymakers recommend concrete interventions to teach men differently. Specifically, the Bank's gender specialists seek to teach poor Ecuadorian men how to be responsible family members – how to love their families in a committed, sustained way in order that they can help pick up the slack of unmet care needs and hereby resolve the social reproduction dilemma. Thus getting women into work and getting men into parenting classes are considered complementary strategies, persistently framed as mutually supportive and equally necessary priorities, and as empowering to both parties. As the executive summary to the *Ecuador Gender Review* put it:

> "The report identifies six priority action areas. First, both female and male gender issues need to be considered when designing and implementing social safety nets and emergency assistance programs, so that, inter alia, programs strengthen the role of fathers and provide income generating opportunities for women" (Correia 2000, xii).

This "priority" to make women into workers and men into responsible loving family members was repeated word for word in the summary to the report (53).

Suggested interventions included "programs to promote men as fathers" which although "still very new in the Region and elsewhere... could be piloted in Ecuador" given models that exist elsewhere (xi). For example the *Gender Review* mentioned the need for reproductive health programs that include men not merely to ensure safe sex, but "to develop services for men in line with their needs, and to promote more active male participation in childcare and parenthood" (54). It also noted approvingly that "teenage pregnancy is no longer exclusively regarded as a female problem, and increasingly adolescent men are the targets of safe sex, family planning *and responsible parenthood programs*" (16, emphasis added). Later the report recommended teaching parenting skills to boys and girls as part of its health sector reform (57). Elsewhere, in a discussion of how to help female farmers overcome obstacles to participation in rural development, the report mentioned "working with male farmers so that they understand that supporting women's participation does not mean they are "mandarinas" (wimps/softies/unmanly) and training men to share domestic chores and childcare" (59). Likewise to help strengthen the family Maria Corriea's chapter on gender and economic crisis stated:

> "one possible model is that of Family Resource Centers that have been established in poor latino communities in the United States to target mothers, fathers, adolescent boys, and adolescent girls in dealing with issues such as responsible fathering, male

> alcoholism, women's economic opportunities and empowerment, pregnancy among teenage girls, and gang violence and drug abuse among male adolscents. *In particular, these centers have played an important role for men by broadening their roles as fathers*" (2002, 206 emphasis added).

This is a beautifully clear statement of the Bank's gender policy – women get empowered through work, poor men are irresponsible, and the Bank needs to teach them better fatherhood to (re)privatize caring responsibilities in order to resolve social reproduction tensions.

In some respects this redesign of the social safety net is understood to empower all people, since "broadening male gender roles could benefit men as well as women and their families, given that substance abuse, violence and depression among men have been linked to gender roles and the limited ways men have to affirm their identity" (Correia 2000, xi). That said, however, again the need to liberate men from restrictive masculinity does not apply equally. It is targeted to poor unemployed men in particular, explicitly intended to "promote men's roles as fathers and caregivers, particularly among unemployed men" (xi), because:

> "Men are often underemployed or off work during economic downturns and therefore could share the burden of household responsibilities. In contrast, women often enter the workforce to compensate for household income losses during periods of economic crisis and have less time to engage in domestic chores" (xiv).

Here the productivity rationale again mixed with the empowering one; poor men are not only hyper-oppressed by gender role stress but they are also sitting around with time on their hands, the perfect candidates for an easy resolution to tensions between unpaid care and renumerated labor. Indeed the Bank wants to know for sure how unemployed men are spending their time in order to know how to restructure it. A footnote to the discussion of strengthening social safety net programs by promoting unemployed men's roles as fathers and caregivers stated: "The World Bank is contemplating a study to determine how unemployed men spend their time, with a view to learning if men are taking on new tasks in the household, if they are engaging in non- productive activities such as drinking" (Correia 2000, 44). Engagement with social reproduction responsibilities thus becomes "productive" time use while consumption of alcohol (which does, actually, add to the GDP) is non-productive. This does not make sense in a neo-liberal economic model but resonates instead on the Bank's feminist register in which poor men are visable as drunks, targeted for gender policy in order to ensure they love responsibly when women move into work.

In summary, then, making women into workers and men into responsible loving family members is a complementary strategy for the Bank's gender specialists, and is presented as a key way to resolve the social reproduction problem. It is framed as both empowering (to men and women) and efficient; indeed it appears costless given the assumption that men are currently pathogically unproductive. To reiterate, the solution is problematic not because it seeks to include men in gender policy per se - men are made visable, but in extremely limited terms that pathologize working class masculinity, holding poor men responsible for a range of development outcomes best dealt with an an aggregate level, *and* that leave women utterly dependent on individuals who may, indeed, be lazy good for nothing drunkards. "Social safety nets" are in effect rendered non-existent, absurdly defined as individualized attempts to train men to be more loving family members, and those lacking access to normative partnership models are made vulnerable to poverty. That it is the Bank's preferred option, in this country case study as much as in formally cleared D.C. documents, is thus profoundly troubling.

Proposed Solution Three: Childcare

The Bank's gender policymakers repeatedly raise the issue of childcare provision in an attempt to resolve the social reproduction dilemma. Several interviewees mentioned the lack of nurseries as a key gender problem in the country, for example, and one consultant said this was a core demand of women with whom she worked in barrio projects. However this suggested solution does not get into mainstream Bank texts on the country, and it is not unambiguously endorsed by the resident mission as preferred policy. Again, then, childcare fails as a policy solution. In this section I attempt to explain why, arguing that (unlike the afore-mentioned policies) it raises serious cost-effectiveness problems, and appears to exclude men. Given that feminist policy entrepreneurs identify institutional pressures for quantified, efficiency-based policy framings and for gender initiatives that include men in a "balanced" way, they find it hard to advocate for childcare, and the solution ultimately fails to gain ground.

Caroline Moser's work on household coping strategies has always identified childcare provision as a necessity for women to enter the paid labor force without being overburdened. Her work made visible the informal networks on which many women rely to secure childcare (Moser in World Bank 1996a, 130), and her study was heavily critical of the government's 1993 decision to end – with one month notice – support for a network of childcare centers.[xxviii] In Cisne Dos this initiative provided three home-based daycare centers and two larger community daycare centers, giving jobs to 38 local women and also providing free food and primary health care programs. When Sixto Ballen's government withdrew support and the centers closed, ½ of mothers with children in the childcare centers lost their jobs (132). Moser was thus very clear that childcare provision should be a priority for gender policymakers. Her chapter on gender in the 1996 *Ecuador Poverty Report* included a table on obstacles to poverty reduction in Cisne Dos, and this mentioned "inadequate time for women to enagage in productive work resulting from balancing domestic and productive roles (*especially for those with unmet childcare needs*)" (134 emphasis added). One of the suggested solutions was, predictably, to "support local community-based and community-supported childcare" (134). Later, in her volume on the Cisne Dos research for the *Confronting Crisis* series Moser repeated the claim that better provision of childcare should be a "priorit(y) for action" to alleviate constraints on women's labor supply, and she again drew attention to the negative impact of the closure of the childcare centers (Moser 1997, 13; 86). This emphasis on the importance of childcare provision was repeated in broader summaries of the *Confronting Crisis* research. Serageldin's overview recommended that policymakers:

> "remove obstacles to women's participation in gainful employment or self-employment, to help them cope better with their multiple responsibilities. This means finding out their priorities for childcare and accessible water and health services and designing interventions accordingly" (in Moser 1996, vi).

This advice was repeated several times in the body of the report (16), and the table on potential solutions advised policymakers to "provide community-based, community-supported care for children and the elderly" (18) alongside investing in infrastructure, labor saving technology, and skills training.

Childcare was also regarded as a priority in the country's *Gender Review*, the most important gender policy text produced by the Bank on Ecuador. This provided an overview of Ecuador's childcare system, then covering around 120,000 children (Correia 2000, 38).[xxix] The *Review* praised the three programs involved since they all "have the advantage of facilitating female labor force participation" (24). However the report was critical of the low coverage rates, the poor coordination between programs, and the small scale of the initiatives. Thus the executive summary asserted that:

> "In terms of early education, coverage of early childhood care and development programs is limited and quality remains a concern. Because of gender roles, lack of childcare affects poor women in particular and their ability to enter into and advance in the labor market" (x).

This point was repeated, almost word for word, in the conclusion (49).

The report also contained a two page overview on early childhood development in a section on education which attempted to invoke an efficiency rationale for childcare provision. Citing Moser, the review argued that early childhood development interventions "are associated with positive outcomes such as improved school and labor market performance, lower crime rates, and more stable personal relationships as adults," and that they give employment opportunities for women. The discussion concluded that: "the positive externalities of ECD (early childhood development) programs justifies (sic) their relatively modest costs" (24). Indeed one of the "lessons learnt" from the attempt to integrate gender into a rural development loan was that:

> "to be effective, productive endeavors for women must be accompanied by measures to help them decrease their domestic workload, such as improved technologies to reduce time spent on fuelwood and water collection *and childcare. Early on, the project entered into an arrangement with the Ministry of Education and Culture to provide childcare services in rural communities*" (80 emphasis added).

Correia's chapter on gender in the Bank's report on dollarization in effect summarized the *Gender Review's* position on childcare, stating:

> "Childcare facilities and early childhood education allow mothers and daughters, who have traditionally been the primary care providers, the chance to participate in income-generating activities or go to school. Childcare facilities are especially important for single mothers who are poor. In a complementary way, the market for childcare provision creates additional employment opportunities, primarily for

> women. Childcare is particularly important during periods of crisis and uncertainty because of women's entry into the labor force as a household coping strategy...(T)he positive externalities of ECD programs justify their relatively modest cost" (Correia 2002, 199-200).

Thus in order to "addres(s) (the) labor market needs of household members," Correia specifically recommended that "for both men and women, but in particular women, improving the coverage and quality of childcare programs is a key priority" (206). There is thus no doubt that gender policymakers within the Bank consider childcare provision to be a key solution to the social reproduction dilemma, since they repeatedly advocate it in their policy advice.

However, this concern with childcare is not sustained in mainstream Bank texts on Ecuador, particularly not in recent documents. Interestingly the 1996 *Poverty Report* mentioned childcare relatively prominently, with the foreword noting that:

> "in urban areas, the participation of poor women is constrained by their household duties, especially childcare, and by limited mobility due to increasing violence. Restarting the daycare centers closed in 1993 could help many women to reenter the workforce" (World Bank 1996a, xii).

Later the report discussed a survey of 30 women who had sent their children to the centers showing that 15 had given up jobs. It thus recommended reopening childcare facilities in order to both keep girls in school and women in work (39). The chapter on social programs also criticized the poor funding of childhood services, pointing out that when the community childcare networks – with an average annual budget of $11 million - were eliminated in 1993, the program developed to replace them was never properly funded, and the special tax designed to finance it was scrapped (Godinez and Van Domelen in World Bank 1996a, 238).

However this unambiguous support for childcare provision wavered after the 1996 poverty report, until the issue eventually disappeared entirely from mainstream Bank texts on Ecuador. Although Correia focused on childcare in her chapter on gender, the 2002 report on dollarization did not mention the issue elsewhere. Daniel Dulitsky's chapter on social assistance in the 2003 *Agenda* report noted that funding levels for the four main childcare programs identified in the *Gender Review* are inadequate, and Carlos Rojas' chapter on education stated explicitly that " the supply of early childhood education is very limited," with little access and no coordinated national policy (Rojas 2003, 271). However the policies prioritized in this report did not include childcare and there was no attempt to defend early childhood services from the cutbacks proposed under the rubric of increased targeting and decentralization. Concern with the issue was not sustained, and it appeared no where in the 2003 CAS, indicating clearly that childcare is not a policy priority for the Bank. One is thus left with similar outcome to that which emerged in the formally cleared Bank texts on gender issued at the D.C. level: infrastructural provision and promoting loving masculinity within restructured partnerships succeed as solutions to the social reproduction problem, and providing childcare fails, even though it was repeatedly mentioned by gender policymakers.

This can be explained, in large part, by the institutional constraints which influence policy preferences within this organization. In particular, the Bank – especially since the 1980s - opts for solutions that increase productivity and efficiency, that can be justified on a cost-benefit basis, and that add to growth. In addition, the Bank privileges gender policies that include men, and that "empower" individuals through partnering them with the "opposite sex." Infrastructural provision is seen to fulfill the efficiency parameters. Getting men to love their families better in order that they pick up the slack of neo-liberal restructuring is itself largely a free policy option, especially given that unemployed men are not considered viable workers with serious chances of full time labor force participation. This option also includes men, and is framed as empowering to both sides of the heteronormative whole. Paid childcare provision, in contrast, causes multiple problems to a neo-liberal cost-benefit analysis. Currently unremunerated labor becomes visable, and hence costs are generated. Policymakers attempted to justify these costs on efficiency grounds, especially in the *Ecuador Gender Review*, by arguing that women will get into work, girls will stay in school, children will grow up more stable, more productive and so on – hence the "modest" costs are justified. However they are fully aware that other options exist – free ones. These will always win out in a contest given the institutional constraints within which policy preferences are currently forged. Moser, for example, criticized the fact that although women have taken on paid work in many households, men have not taken on more domestic responsbilies, and "neither has there been compensatory adjustment on the part of the government or the local community through the additional provision of childcare provision" (Moser 1997, 68-9). Faced with a choice between those two options, the Bank is institutionally inclined to opt for the first – getting men to take on responsibility within the privatized household - since this is free. The same choice of policy options was provided in the summary to the *Confronting Crisis* study (Moser 1996, 12) – the same institutional response is likely. Likewise, consider this list of policy options provided by the *Ecuador Gender Review*, in an attempt to support childcare provision:

> "DAY CARE/EARLY CHILDHOOD EDUCATION. Early childhood education programs are associated with improved school performance and hence should be a

> priority over the long term. A more immediate benefit is that child day care allows women or their daughters - who have traditionally been the primary care providers – the chance to participate in income-generating activities or stay in school. In a complementary way, the market for child care provision also creates additional employment opportunities, primarily for women... *To the extent possible, programs should also attempt to promote fathering*" (Correia 2000, 57).

The last sentence devastates the policy rationale for childcare provision, since if fathers can do it for free government services are simply inefficient.

Furthermore, childcare requirements are associated with excessive government regulation of the labor market, regulation which to the Bank is not only inefficient but damaging to women. Despite its persistent references to the importance of childcare, the *Ecuador Gender Review* is extremely uneasy about these associations. For example although it concedes that they are not enforced, it is concerned that labor laws requiring firms with over 25 employees to provide childcare "can also act as a double-edged sword, causing women's labor costs to rise and thus causing a disincentive for employers to hire women" (Correia 2000, 24-5). Later, when discussing labor legislation, it recommended that:

> "the Government should examine the impact of its labor legislation on employment patterns and opportunities by gender, as well as wage gaps, and identify what measures need to be taken to further promote gender equality in the labor force. Policy recommendations include: (a) systematically reviewing existing laws to ensure that they do not impose higher costs on employers for hiring women than for hiring men (which leads to disincentives to female employment."

Yet again, childcare is likely to lose here – policymakers fear that it will "impose higher costs on employers for hiring women than for hiring men," and thus it is a far less attractive option than the free one of (re)privatizing care burdens back into the restructured loving family.

Elsewhere, Bank staff express unease about childcare because – remarkably – it is framed as a conservative policy. Policymakers should be aiming to transform intimate relations in the household rather than facilitating men's neglect of social reproduction responsibilities. Public provision is thus not only potentially damaging to women because it maks them more expensive to employ, but it also lets their ever-lazy husbands off the social reproduction hook, not including them as is required of a good gender approach. Consider, for example, this discussion of domestic employees in the *Ecuador Gender Review*:

> "Domestic service remains a very important source of female employment, which is both good and bad. On the positive side, it enables poor women - and in particular young women with low educational levels and no previous work experience - to enter into the paid labor force and represents a stepping stone to finding other jobs. The availability of domestic service has also paved the way for middle and upper-class women to enter the paid labor force. *On the downside, it remains one of the lowest paid occupations and does little to encourage men to assume household responsibilities. In this sense, domestic service performed by women works to reinforce traditional gender roles.* A number of LAC countries, including Ecuador, have recently introduced labor legislation that gives special coverage and benefits to domestic workers. Argentina and Brazil are other examples. This is a positive step provided that the law is enforceable and does not raise the economic cost of domestic workers to the level where employers lay them off. There is insufficient information to comment on the particular situation of domestic employees in Ecuador in this regard" (Correia 2000, 33 emphasis added).

Although not dealing specifically with childcare, this discussion is more than relevant, since it demonstrates that the Bank prefers men to take over caring responsibilities in privatized arrangements rather than that they get provided for publically.

These concerns and moments of unease result in a situation whereby, by the end of the *Ecuador Gender Review*, a section headed "domestic work and childcare" could argue:

> "According to Deutsch's seminal research on how shared parenting works in the United States, three conditions need to be in place if gender equality in the household

> is to be achieved: (a) men need to learn new skills; (b)women need to give up the control they have had over the household; and (c) men and women need to have flexible work schedules. Short-term efforts in Ecuador should focus on the first two conditions, which can be promoted by civil society organizations working at the local level, for example, through youth programs, community water programs, adult education programs etc. The last condition - which involves the reorganization of work - would be a long-term objective given the pressing nature of unemployment in Ecuador today" (58/9).

There is no mention of childcare privision whatsoever in this section – the issue of "domestic work and childcare" is framed as one about shared parenting, changing gender roles, men learning caring skills, and women giving up caring monopolies. Even the issue of flexible work schedules – which is hardly expensive – is dismissed as too difficult. Thus the Bank's own gender policymakers end up endorsing a completely privatizing solution to the social reproduction dilemma, and erasing childcare provision entirely as a policy priority, because they are uneasy about its cost and its failure to "include" men by getting them to take on what are perceived as their responsibilities. Once again, it is helpful to compare this half-hearted, confused, jumbled response to the Bank's approach to infrastructural provision. The Bank's chapter on basic infrastructure in the 2003 *Agenda* report marks high cellular phone costs and low internet connectivity (Drees et al 2003, 224) as development problems that hamper productivity and efficiency, and although overall private provision of infrastructure is recommended a role for the state is nonetheless secured in such areas, regarded as essential for the smooth functioning of the market. However childcare services drop out of sight as solutions to the social reproduction dilemma because their costs are unjustified, given the fact that the services can be provided, free, by newly sacked fathers providing they have been appropriately trained to love.

Conclusion.

It is clear that the Bank's flagship publications on gender in Ecuador privilege employment as the cure-all solution to GAD concerns, because it will increase efficiency and empower women. However once more I argue that gender policymakers are concerned about the social reproduction problem and insist on the Bank's intervention to resolve it. This prioritization of work alongside recognition of the social reproduction dilemma also occurs in mainstream Bank texts published on Ecuador, and in advice on lending. Once again, however, I argue that the institutional location of Bank gender policy entrepreneurs in Ecuador shapes policy output in concrete, and damaging ways. Interviews with these policymakers revealed multiple senses of ambivalence, both about the Bank as an international financial institution, and about their own opportunities to secure change therein. The two types of institutional pressure they identified – to produce "rigorous" research that showed value-added benefits from incorporating gender and to include men in a "balanced" way – influence which solutions to the social reproduction dilemma get adopted and which get sidelined. The utilitization of institutionally-conditioned discourses of productivity and male inclusion encourages a focus on solutions involving technological/infrastructural improvement and the restructuring of private partnerships, particularly in relation to encouraging men to be more loving and caring. Meanwhile childcare services drop out of sight, since they trouble both productivity and empowerment-as-inclusion rationales. In this manner I trace how institutional context influences the Bank's country-specific gender policy advice in crucial, concrete ways, turning in following chapters to a grounded discussion of specific loans.

[i] Ecuador was the first Latin American country to grant women the right to vote, and the country's first female minister was appointed in 1979, predictably heading the Ministry of Social Welfare. Rosalía Arteaga was the first female Vice President, unfortunately elected on the platform of one of the most ridiculed Presidents in recent history. Bucaram was deposed in 1997 for alleged mental instability (his public displays of drunkenness, groping, and generally inappropriate behavior made him a national laughing stock, although his neo-liberal reform agenda was probably a more important factor in his overthrow. See de la Torrre2000), and Arteaga technically assumed the Presidency, although it was actually given to the head of Congress. The proportion of women in the legislature and judiciary has also been increasing in recent years, partly as a result of the adoption of a quota law requiring at least 25 percent of women on electoral lists (Correia 2000, 6-7). In other important legislative and judicial advances the state created a number of special Women's Police Stations in 1994, and a Law on Violence Against Women and the Family was passed shortly thereafter. A national Equal Opportunities Plan designed by the women's movement was approved in 1996, addressing a range of issues including citizenship, political representation, the feminization of poverty, the gendered division of labor, health, and education (Correia 2000, 9). A Free Maternity Law granting all pregnant women legal right to health care was passed in 1998. The new constitution – which involved the participation of many women's groups - guarantees equal rights to women and men in areas such as education, health, work, and political participation (6-7). Ecuador also has a vast range of women's groups spanning all ideological positions, from trade unionists to indigenous groups, from microcredit advocates to lesbian separatists; women therein produce academic texts on gender, and feminist graffiti on walls (Lind 2004). For more on Ecuador's feminist movement see Lind 2004; Herrera 2001).

[ii] In its latest policy paper on gender, the Bank recommended that all countries attach a gender component to their country assessment strategies (which are designed to give an overview of the development problems to which Bank lending should be directed) (World Bank 2001). This component can either be a section of the country strategy report itself, or a separate and more elaborate document. Few countries have to date met this goal.

[iii] The gender consultant for the indigenous and Afro-Ecuadorian development loan covered in chapters 7 and 8 was previously employed in the state's indigenous development agency, for example

[iv] See chapter 7 for more on PROGENIAL's activities in a specific loan

[v] All translations are mine.

[vi] Such strong connections to CONAMU were not maintained throughout the PROGENIAL collaboration, in part because CONAMU expected stronger support from their newly-placed allies insde the Bank and felt betrayed when they did not get it. Perceptions of a lack of loyalty on the part of PROGENIAL consultants led to a "rupture with CONMAU, a strong rutpture." Ironically however this led to more job opportunities in PROGENIAL for CONAMU staff – since the Bank could not rely on such close collaboration with the agency they had to hire more independent consultants, inevitably drawn from the CONAMU orbit.

[vii] On a lower level, an accountant involved in a women's microcredit initiative a Bank indigenous and Afro-Ecuadorian development loan (chapters 7 and 8) took that job after the bank she had worked in for several years was closed as part of the conditions of an IMF standby agreement.

[viii] See chapter 4 for an introduction to Bank restructuring in Ecuador

[ix] The CAS was forged by government staff in the economics ministry and Bank staff from outside the Ecuador mission, from D.C. – they were regarded as far more rigid in their neo-liberalism than the team in Quito.

[x] See Rosembloom 2000 for more on lesbian baiting as a way to counter women's international organzing.

[xi] As several authors interested in questions of race, imperialism, and sexuality have noted, marginalized actors often constrain their own behavior, self-monitor, and harshly penalize members of their own communiutiy for a perceived failure to self-monitor, in line with how these actions will be perceived by dominant groups. Whether understood as part of Fanon's sense that colonized subjects view themselves through a white gaze (1967), as part of E Frances White's analysis of a politics of respectability that persistently silences lesbianism within African American feminism (2001), or as part of Cathy Cohen's claim that Black anti-AIDS politics in the US has been heavily shaped by discomfort over discussingdrug users and sex workers for fear of reinforcing White racism (1997), these debates about the politics of

respectability all recognize that operating within constrained institutional contexts can lead marginalized actors to punish others for failing to abide by mainstream standards.
[xii] Like the rest of the Latin American and Carribbean region, Ecuador has experienced a "feminization of employment" (Bergeron 2004, 148); in Latin America the percentage of women as a percentage of the formal lab force grew from 20% in 1970 to roughly 28% now (149), an upward trend also evident in this country. Between 1970 and 1990 the female proportion of the economically active population increased from 14 to 19 percent (Correia 2000, 29).
[xiii] This rate is the second lowest rate in the region, after Guatemala (Correia 2000, 29).
[xiv] According to 1998 data, women's average salaries are about 68 percent of men's, 54 percent in rural areas. This is "a moderate salary gap" compared with other countries in the region (Correia 2000, 33).
[xv] "The rate of unemployment for women increased from 12 to 16 percent from 1993-98... For men, the increase was from six to eight percent over the same time period" (Correia 2000, 29).
[xvi] The 1996 poverty report noted that working women in Ecuador earn 30% less than men with the same education and experience (Hrenstschel and Lanjouw in World Bank 1996a, 77). More recent urban data from Quito, Guayaquil and Cuenca shows women's salaries are 16% lower than men's controlling for education, work experience, labor market insertion, and position in the household (Correia 2002, 198). Thus "in terms of the labor market, gender-based wage gaps persist even after taking into account as many variables related to education and skills as possible" (Correia 2000, v).
[xvii] I do not include the Bank's 2004 Poverty Report on Ecuador here because it contains virtually no discussion of gender - far less than the earlier poverty assessment, the Agenda report, or the CAS. However it does argue that employment generation is a crucial anti-poverty strategy, and that increased labor force participation, especially for women, was a coping strategy to reduce poverty in the 1997-99 crisis – it contains no references to desperation or force (World Bank 2004e, 62).
[xviii] Ecuadorian feminists have themselves devoted considerable attention to this issue, particularly in a structural adjustment context (see Herrera 2001 for an overview; also Leon Trujillo 2001; Ferraro 2000; Samaniego Brito and Fernández 1999; Cuvi Ortiz 1995).
[xix] That said, she subsequently avoided the core argument by noting that "for its part, the World Bank's 2000 World Development Report on poverty refers to the retrenchment of female public-sector workers and the increased incidence of domestic violence during economic downturns" (Correia 2002, 178) – a reference wich utterly misses the point raised by the above literature.
[xx] In fact counter-intuitively infrastructural investment does not always improve health given the poor quality of the services; one study of water and sewage connections found that on average 25% of children under 5 in Ecuador suffered from diarrhea in a given month – 23% of children without home connections, and 28% of children with, "which is not much of a difference" (Ortiz 2003, 258).
[xxi] See Pincus in Pincus and Winter (2002) and Scott (1998) for more on the need to plan the market.
[xxii] These examples were also used in Moser's 1997 report on Cisne Dos.
[xxiii] Other text boxes in other reports feature similar characters – Moser's 1997 report on Cisne Dos included one on "New Opportunities in the Agro-Export Shrimp Farms" in which Araceli – a mother of five teenagers – struggled to raise her sons alone when her husband got a job in the shrimp industry, until she "was mortified to discover that (he) had established a second household in the rural areas, further reducing the family finances and forcing the elder daughter to leave school and get a factory job" (Moser 1997, 39). Another text box featured Lucy, a washerwoman raising her children alone given that her husband has another family and has no financial responsibility for either, and Antonia, whose husband abandoned her for a younger woman (Moser 1997, 84).
[xxiv] The precise nature of the "problem" varies enormously – sometimes the Bank refers to statistics on alcoholism, sometimes to people who "stated that they had drank in excess the month prior to being surveyed" (Correia 2000, 17).
[xxv] Again the precise nature of the problem is unclear here - the study is curiously concerned to challenge studies showing alcohol could have beneficial health effects (Pyne Claeson and Correia 2002, 8), and it defines "excessive drinkers" exceptionally broadly, as including "those who drink habitually (more than 3 days a week)" or "who experience 12 or more episodes of drunkeness a year" (15).
[xxvi] Matthew Gutmann contests "racist sterotypes about Latino machismo" in his work on Mexican masculinity (Gutman 2003, 16); Carlos de la Torre highlights President Bucaram's decision to "presen(t) his own virility as a form of resistence to "effeminate" elites, affirming the masculinity of the poor" (2000, 109) in his research in Ecuadorian neo-populism; Michael Uzendoski demonstrates redefinitions of

masculinity among Napo Runa evanagelicals in the Ecuadorian Amazon (2003); and many researchers point to the existence of notions of "partible paternity" for men in some lowland South American commuities (Beckerman and Valentine 2002); none of these discussions are cited. See also Melhaus and Stolen 1996; Krohn-Hansen 1996; Ferrándiz 2003; Fuller 2003; Andrade 2003, and Olavarría 2003 for more on Latin American and Ecuadorian masculinities.

[xxvii] See also Mitchell's (2002) discussion of enframing and Scott's (1998) discussion of legibility.

[xxviii] These were established in 1978 through UNICEF and taken under government control, via a Ministry of Social Welfare program, in 1988.

[xxix] Services were split between three public programs: (a) the Child Development Program in poor urban neighborhoods, operated by the National Institute of the Child and the Family (INNFA); (b) the Child Rescue Program (ORI) (the largest program) run by the Ministry of Social Welfare; and (c) an Alternate Preschool Program (PRONEPE) run by the Ministry of Education, providing home-based and center-based care for urban poor children, and supporting a rural "community promoter" scheme which trained young people to care for local children. A new program funded by the Inter-American Development Bank, 'Nuestros Ninos' (our children) also aimed to increase the provision of childcare, in part through training (and paying) 8,000 mothers to care for children.

Chapter 6: Gender, Work, And Social Reproduction in Policy-Based Lending: Export-Promotion and the Flower Industry

Introduction

In the previous chapter I introduced the Bank's gender work in Ecuador through analysis of interviews with gender staff and relevant documents put out by the Latin American and Caribbean gender unit and the Bank's resident mission in Ecuador. I demonstrated a clear prioritization of women's employment as a development goal, a concern with the social reproduction dilemma, and an attempt to resolve it through increasing investment in infrastructure and restructuring loving relationships between men and women. These policy options succeed because they appeal to institutionally-conditioned discourses of productivity and empowerment as male inclusion; childcare fails because it does not.

In this chapter I explore these questions as they relate to a key component of the Bank's policy-based lending in Ecuador: export promotion. I explain export-promotion as a Bank priority in the country, having considered the interactions between the state, the Bank, and the private sector in the policy field. Indeed private companies involved in exports were purposefully integrated into the policy-making community by the Bank, deliberately nurtured as a counterweight to those resisting liberalization. I subsequently trace a connected concern to get women into work, arguing that gender policymakers within the institution endorse export promotion as a way to increase women's labor force participation. I hereby use export-promotion as a case study through which to analyze the Bank's gender efforts in Ecuador as they relate to macroeconomic policy-based lending.

I then shift attention to a specific sector within export promotion, floriculture, in order to explore the gendered nature of the Bank's policy-based loans in greater detail. The Bank understands floriculture as providing a model for other industries to follow with respect to women's employment, making debates about social reproduction within the sector of fundamental importance. I summarize the Bank's involvement in floriculture, before considering concerns with women's employment and the social reproduction dilemma therein. Employment in floriculture is presented as empowering to women, even when the Bank's own evidence disputes this claim. Once again policymakers are aware of social reproduction concerns, yet they argue that tensions between unpaid care and renumerated care have been successfully resolved in floriculture, given that the industry is understood to have promoted better male loving within the family such that couples have managed social reproduction problems privately. Infrastructural investment drops out of these discussions given the perceived success of the privatized solution, and once again childcare disappears as a policy option, even though it is frequently mentioned by women who work in flowers. The promotion of restructured heteronormativity is the only solution to social reproduction offered here, one that I again critique for its limitations.

Export-Promotion as Component of Policy-based Bank Lending in Ecuador.

Ecuador's economy is heavily reliant on exports, and has been for several centuries. As a colony it was a source of gold, textiles, and food for Spain, and since independence the country has experienced multiple export booms, in sectors such as bananas, shrimp, flowers, oil, textiles, minerals and so on. Exports have become increasingly important since the 1990-92 trade reforms undertaken by the country and the partial liberalization of the economy that resulted in the 1990s. These are often referred to as the "first generation" of reforms (World Bank 1998). They involved significant changes in the country's trade regime, through shifts in foreign investment regulations and taxation policy, privatization of key enterprises, modernization of government administration, elimination of export taxes, tariff reductions (from an average of 30% to 9%), and the lifting of import restrictions (World Bank 1997a, 2). For example, the March 1992 Export Facilitation and Cargo Reserve Law eliminated export licenses (2), while the 1994 customs law increased the role of the private sector and simplified customs procedures to help both exporters and importers. These trade reforms were given another boost in January 1996, when Ecuador joined the World Trade Organization (WTO); as a result it scheduled further reductions in import duties, reduced price regulation in agriculture, and eliminated the domestic content requirement in the auto industry (World Bank 1998). In 1997 Congress passed the Foreign Trade and Investment Law, which: 1.reorganized the Ministry of Trade, Industry and Fisheries (MICIP) in an attempt to "to streamline and consolidate trade policy formulation" (World Bank 1998); 2. created the Foreign Trade and Investment Council (COMEXI) to coordinate and assess trade policy decision-making and to ensure greater "independence" therein; and 3. set up the Export and Investment Promotion Corporation (CORPEI) to decentralize the provision of export development support services (World Bank 2003b). Both COMEXI and CORPEI had involvement from the export sector; indeed CORPEI was (and is) mostly funded by exporters. Another key piece of trade reform legislation was the March 2000 Economic Transformation Law; although primarily oriented to dollarization this also put in place measures for increased trade liberalization and tariff reduction, and it allows for greater private participation in the petroleum industry. Such pro-export trade reforms continue to the present, with further tariff adjustments and liberalization measures being taken in line with WTO commitments and other free trade agreements.

Currently the petroleum sector is Ecuador's most important source of exports, accounting for 15% of GDP, 1/3 state revenues, and 40% of total exports in 2003 (Fretes-Cibils and López-Cálix 2003, 115). However Ecuador is also the world's largest exporter of bananas, and the third largest exporter of flowers. Other important sources of export earnings include traditional industries such as wood, textiles, handicrafts, shrimp, cocoa, and coffee. Non–traditional exports have also increased their importance; in 1991 they accounted for 25% of total exports, a figure which rose to 30% by 2001 (165). The growth in non-traditional exports is particularly important given the poor performance of other key industries in recent years; after the 1999 economic crisis "Ecuador's three main exports declined as oil and banana prices collapsed and diseases raved shrimp production" (World Bank 2003b, np). Efforts are thus underway to promote exports in new sectors, with 14 products identified by the government as having great export potential. These range from mangoes to software, from medicinal herbs to "Panama" hats - which actually originated in Ecuador (Ministerio de Relaciones Exteriores del Ecuador/CORPEI 2004).

In this section I argue that the promotion of exports in Ecuador can - and should - be analyzed as a Bank policy, for several reasons. Firstly, the Bank identifies the weakness of exports as a core reason for Ecuador's development malaise, and the institution repeatedly emphasizes the need for export-promotion, particularly in non-traditional sectors. This definition of exports as a "policy problem" is central to the Bank's general descriptions of the country and its development needs. For example the Bank's web-based "Ecuador country brief" identifies as Ecuador's principal economic problem the fact that it has experienced several export booms, but has inadequate export diversification; thus the country is vulnerable to terms of trade shocks, and should boost export promotion[i] (Website). The 1996 *Poverty Report* noted that since 1990 non-traditional exports have grown by an average of 35% a year, and now make up roughly 20% of total export receipts – and it recommended that the country continue this trend (World Bank 1996a 47). Similarly the 2004 *Poverty Report* recommended export promotion on efficiency grounds, since "exporting firms and firms with access to foreign technology are 30% more productive than their counterparts" (World Bank 2004e, xxxvi).

Likewise the Bank's extensive diagnosis of Ecuador's development problems prepared for the new Gutierrez government, *Ecuador: An Economic and Social Agenda in the New Millennium* (2003), repeatedly emphasized the need for export promotion. The preface, written by the Bank's Vice President of Latin American and Caribbean affairs, identified a failure to follow through on necessary economic reform, including the "glaringly absent" failure to promote private investment in the oil industry (De Ferranti 2003, xl), the failure to diversify rural production to access new markets (lix), and the failure to implement trade reform. In an attempt to put in place a "competitiveness agenda" for the country, De Ferranti recommended commercial reform to promote non-traditional exports (xlix), and to overcome the strong anti-export bias stemming from misguided Import Substitution Policies. These led to high tariffs that are not only irrational, but that also violate free trade rules the country (as a WTO member and a signatory to the Free Trade Agreement of the Americas, Mercosur, and the Andean Economic Pact) is obliged to uphold (l). Thus "an increase in the productivity of the agricultural sector, especially the sector with export potential, should become a focus of permanent public effort, through technology development and transfer" (li); indeed this was identified as a key priority in the second stage of reforms to be implemented after immediate stabilization measures have dealt with the economic crisis (lxvii).

The emphasis on exports was equally central to many of the report's more specific chapters. The first, "Maintaining Stability with Fiscal Discipline and Competitiveness," noted that Ecuador has the third highest concentration of exports in a few traditional products in the region (López-Cálix 2003, 13), making it vulnerable to terms of trade shocks (22). To improve external competitiveness, the country must endorse a "pro-export" agenda (33), involving elimination of anti-export bias, promotion of diversification in non-traditional products, trade liberalization, and "flexibilization of labor markets" (34). The conclusion to this chapter stated that Ecuador needs: "a comprehensive reform of its trade policy to eliminate the anti-export bias and correct the many and chronic distortions that still "protect" its economy" (36). The second chapter, on tax policy, insisted that the country must further reduce tax exemptions used to protect domestic industry, and it warns against exemptions granted in "tax free zones." The Bank opposes these exemptions because they are granted "regardless of the final destination of their products," where as they should be employed to promote exports (49). Later the chapter asserted that "promoting business through tax or tariff exemptions requires the identification of those ventures whose promotion would be beneficial to the society as a whole and not only to the investors involved" (52); pro-export exemptions were clearly understood to meet this criteria. Similarly, the chapter on petroleum policy insisted on the need to increase exports (115), mainly through more private sector involvement in the industry.

The report also contained a chapter devoted to "Trade Policy and Competition"; this opened:

> "Ecuador's potential for future growth lies in its nontraditional exports as the country faces the prospect of exhausting its oil reserves in the 2020s. To boost nontraditional exports, the existing bias against exports must be significantly reduced" (Hachette 2003, 163).

Although the chapter acknowledged the partial liberalization of the economy in this direction in the 1990s, it asserted that Ecuador still scores low on the "Economic Freedom index" (172), in part because there remains "excessive" protection on domestic industry through tariffs and fixed prices (163/170). One of the proposed "Foundations of Ecuadorian Development" (168) was the need to better utilize resources for export, with agriculture identified as particularly important. Indeed the report differentiated between two types of agriculture (modern and traditional) largely based on export-orientation:

> "The former is forceful, dynamic, highly productive, and makes flexible use of new technologies available in the rest of the world, making it competitive and therefore export-driven and able to stand up to competition from similar foreign products. However, this subsector remains small. Traditional agriculture, meanwhile, has low productivity and little modern input, which makes it impossible to achieve low costs; be flexible, dynamic, prosperous; or an engine for growth. It is also strongly protected, which has been an obstacle rather than an incentive for rapid modernization" (177).

Export-orientation is thus considered a marker of modernity, efficiency, productivity, and growth, and it is a central component of the Bank's policy advice in the country.

In addition to the privileging of exports evident in the Bank's general descriptions of Ecuador's development problems, many loans have been given to promote exports – in this sense the Bank has matched its rhetoric with its money. Of the Bank's total portfolio of loans to Ecuador since 1954, several have been oriented to increasing exports, either by promoting specific products or changing the general policy environment to facilitate export-led growth (see table 6, appendix 3). Given that requirements of brevity prevent detailed analysis of these loans, I instead provide an overview of some key Bank interventions in supporting certain export sectors, before exploring one export-focused loan – the Ecuadorian Trade and Integration Project - in order to examine the complex relationships between the state, the private sector, and the Bank in this policy site in greater detail.

In terms of support for specific export-oriented industries, the Bank has repeatedly lent to help increase the export potential of the hydrocarbons sector. When the state-owned petroleum company was restructured into PetroEcuador in 1989, the Bank successfully pushed for increased collaborations with private investors such as Texaco (Mayorga 2003, 144), and throughout the 1990s it lent to facilitate increased privatization of the industry through various structural adjustment loans. In 1993 a new Law on Hydrocarbons was passed, in part due to Bank pressure, which allowed greater private participation in the sector (117), and in 2001 the government (again in part responding to Bank pressure) authorized the construction of a new privately funded pipeline from the Amazon to the coast (118). The Bank supported this project because it identified limited transportation capacity as a key problem blocking the export potential of the sector – the new pipeline was (and is) expected to alleviate that situation.[ii] The Bank has also lent to increase exports in mining, for example through the Ecuadorian Mining Development and Environmental Control Technical Assistance Project (PRODEMINCA). This was requested by the government in 1989 and approved in 1993. It involved a $14 million loan from the Bank and co-financing from British and Swedish development agencies to attract new mining investment, to increase mineral production for export, and to "arrest mining-related environmental degradation and mitigate the damage that result from the use of primitive and inadequate technology by informal miners" (World Bank Inspection Panel 2001).

There are several similar examples of Bank support to other export industries, particularly in primary products, which were 84% of all exports in 1997 (mostly bananas, shrimp, and petroleum). Although the Bank identifies the high concentration of exports in primary products and the decline in manufacturing exports as problems (World Bank 2003b, np), the exports it promotes are typically primary products. The institution has aided the flower industry, for example (see below), and a recent advertising supplement in the New York Times magazine intended to promote investment in the country mentioned the August 2002 opening of "Bananapuerto," Dole's new banana terminal in Guayaquil. This $30 million project - "an investment magnet" that "has been praised by experts as the world's most advanced fruit shipment terminal" - was "guaranteed by the World Bank-affiliate MIGA" (Summitt Communications 2004, 12).[iii] The CAS also highlighted IFC involvement in export-promotion activities, stating that the organization "continued to support its existing clients with good standing and export-orientation in agribusiness" (World Bank 2003a, np). In February 2003, the IFC made a $15 million investment in Favorita Fruit, one of the leading banana producers and exporters in Ecuador. As the text box explaining these activities explained:

> "The IFC has supported Favorita not only with critical long-term financing, but also with environmental and social sustainability and corporate social responsibility... On the financing front, the IFC has provided Favorita with total financing of US$45 million on three occasions since 1993... With these financings, the IFC helped Favorita expand to create a fully integrated production, packing, and transport system, including development of port facilities at Guayaquil, modernization and expansion of its cardboard box manufacturing plant, and acquisition and refurbishment of banana plantations" (World Bank 2003a, np)

It is thus clear that the institution has repeatedly given loans to aid specific export sectors in the country, reinforcing the validity of assessing export-promotion as, in part, a Bank policy.

In terms of broader policy change to facilitate export promotion, the Bank was a key player in the "first generation" of trade reforms, with structural adjustment loans throughout the 1990s including pro-export measures as conditions. More recently, the institution funded the SICA project through the Ministry of Agriculture with a loan of $20 million, approved in June 1998.[iv] This project was intended to create a new agricultural census, to increase access by producers to agricultural information (in part in order to aid export efforts), and to support agro-businesses (again, involving a strong export focus). In addition to aiding specific export sectors such as bananas, flowers, wood and so on, SICA also funded training for Ministry of Agriculture staff in order that Ecuador could participate more effectively in trade negotiations aimed at further liberalizing the economy. In another recent example of policy-related lending oriented to export-promotion, in May 2003 the Bank lent $50 million to the Ministry of Trade in a Fiscal Consolidation and Competitive Growth Adjustment loan oriented to trade reform, increasing labor flexibility, and "deepening competitiveness" through changes to pricing and regulatory policies (World Bank 2004d, np). Export promotion is key to the vision of "faster growth with competitiveness" promoted by this loan, as it was to the broader $151.5 million Structural Adjustment Loan approved in June 2000 (World Bank 2003c). Indeed as one Bank consultant argued in a paper on Ecuador: "agricultural industries and non-traditional products have grown in direct response to trade and macroeconomic reforms recommended by The World Bank and other institutions" (Newman 2001). In short the Bank is actively supporting changes in the broader policy environment geared to increasing exports; it is hard to ignore its role as a policy actor in this regard.

The Ecuador Trade and Integration Project (TIP)

I wish to close this discussion of Bank efforts to alter the broader policy environment to encourage exports by focusing in more detail on a specific loan, in order to explore more concretely the relations between the state, the Bank, and private industry in this policy field. One of the Bank's most important export-promotion efforts in recent years was the Ecuadorian International Trade and Integration Project (henceforth TIP). Originally called the Export Development Project, this was proposed in 1995 and involved efforts to accelerate investment in exports. The Project Information Document for this project,[v] produced in August 1995, claimed that "there is a profound concern in Ecuador that the development of the nation's export mentality and its export capacity are lagging, as measured against both its own expectations following its major trade reform of 1990-92 and performance elsewhere in the region" (World Bank 1997a, 1). Key problems were identified as an over-dependence on petroleum, stagnant export growth, limited export experience, weak overseas buyer connections, weak exporter links to domestic producers, and lack of knowledge of how to replicate the successful examples of export entrepreneurship in bananas, shrimp, and flowers. Moreover the project proposal noted that 70% of main primary exports were generated by small number of large firms, with less than 4% of Small and Medium Enterprises and microenterprises exporting their products.

The project was intended to help correct these shortcomings. It framed export promotion as a way to increase economic stability, via bolstering the economy's shock-absorbing capacity and improving balance of payments figures. Export promotion was also viewed as linked to broader structural adjustment efforts. According to a Bank study of export development in 35 trade adjustment loans "adjusting countries that have placed an equal emphasis on export as well as import policy changes have reduced adjustment costs associated with lost output and unemployment in inefficient industries through the early shift in resources to export industries" (8). From the start, then, the Export Development Project was framed as a way to mitigate the negative effects of restructuring on employment, by shifting newly unemployed people to more dynamic sectors of the economy and hereby realizing the promise of outward-oriented economic policies "which foster market linkages to best practice technology and skills, the allocation of resources to high productivity economic activities, and socio-economic benefits which spillover to the domestic economy" (1). At this early stage plans for the project were highly general. The Project Information Document mentioned proposals to modernize public sector trade, reform the customs duty exemption mechanism (a highly bureaucratic process which allowed exporters to claim back some taxes for imports subsequently used to manufacture exports), support product development oriented to export markets, increase quality awareness and quality control, and support the activities of pubic-private groups in giving export advice to producers and reorienting government policy towards export promotion.

By the time the Project Appraisal Document for this loan was put out in May 1998, it had been renamed the International Trade and Integration Project, and its overarching objective was "to promote increased socio-economic growth of the Ecuadorian economy using as an instrument international trade development and integration with the global economy" (World Bank 1998, 2). The project was approved in 1998, and it closed in June 2003.[vi] It involved a $21 million loan from the Bank, and $21.6 million co-financing from the Ecuadorian private sector, to be used over four years (1999-2002) to increase international competitiveness through export promotion and trade reform at the state level, and integration with export markets at the firm level. The performance indicators of interest to the Bank thus focused on WTO-consistent trade policies and new trade agreements, growth in exporters, and market diversification (World Bank 2003b). In addition, by 1998 the project had been linked to poverty reduction (a connection not made in the Project Information Document three years earlier). The Bank claimed that local integration with the global economy accelerates growth and reduces poverty (World Bank 1998, 3), and thus it connected the TIP to the Country Assistance Strategy, focused on poverty alleviation, and to the 1996 *Poverty Report*. Consequently the Project Appraisal Document also proposed to include employment and household income derived from outward-oriented growth as indicators of the project's success (2).

The TIP consisted of three components: (1) international trade management and market access, (2) entrepreneurial learning and innovation in smaller firms, and (3) product and process quality. The first "sought to help the Government to modernize the state's international trade management and increase market access" by "broadening participation" in Ecuador's trade policy-making (i.e. involving the private sector – see below), improving MICIP's trade policy formulation and management capacity, and "remov(ing) public sector impediments to firm-level international competitiveness" (2). It upgraded technology in MICIP, trained government staff in trade negotiation, produced diagnostic assessments to recommend export strategies in sectors such as textiles, clothing, non-traditional fruits and vegetables, chemicals, and electrical products (30), and aimed to secure reforms related to unfair trade practices.

The second component involved the Export Culture Program ($1.5 million), and a learning and innovation fund ($24.1 million, $17.1 million of which was from the private sector) to increase knowledge of export markets and support entrepreneurship and product innovation among smaller firms through public campaigns and training programs. This was intended to nurture Ecuador's export "culture," meaning the "understanding of the particular benefits of outward-oriented growth policies and the acquisition of export know-how and tools" (World Bank 2003b, np). These programs were organized through CORPEI (the Export and Investment Promotion Corporation), a public-private export initiative set up as part of the 1997 Foreign Trade and Investment Law. With funds from the loan, CORPEI offered co-financing for pro-export activities undertaken by small and medium size enterprises (for market research, export plans, product adaptation, quality certification etc), in order to help them overcome the high initial costs of entering the export market. This support for "demand-driven international competitiveness programs to generate new export market linkages" was framed as a temporary, one-time effort to overcome market failures, and the Bank's Project Appraisal Document argued that

> "First order exante estimates of the impact of this project component suggest that the net present value of incremental exports from the 3 year implementation period could well exceed $400 million, which would increase Ecuador's current non-traditional processed goods export levels by about 50%, and generate additional direct employment of some 15,000 jobs" (World Bank 1998, 21).

In short the government would not only recover its investment in this component through taxes on payrolls and corporate profits, but it should actually make money. The second component also involved a Grassroots Growth Fund, a pilot initiative supporting the provision by NGOs of technical extension services to small businesses "to carry out broad-based campaigns to inform and educate urban and rural low-income communities on the benefits and processes involved in outward-oriented growth" (35). This benefited almost 4000 microbusinesses, in 106 projects, mostly through workshops on productivity improvement, product promotion, market research, and product development. $3 million of the $6 million cost of this initiative was met by the Bank (11). Finally, the third component aimed to promote quality awareness and reform the accreditation and quality control system (World Bank 2003b). Specifically, the project intended to change the state's system of mandatory quality controls, many of which violated WTO rules, and to facilitate a shift to a largely voluntary system. The project was considered largely successful, with two components rated as satisfactory, and the third considered marginally so. The sustainability of the initiative was rated as likely, and its institutional development impact was considered modest (World Bank 2003b).

State, Bank, and Private Sector Relations in the Ecuador Trade and Integration Project.

In terms of state, Bank, and private sector relations, several themes emerge from close attention to the TIP as an example of export-promotion policy. At first glance, the government appeared to have the same agenda as the Bank in terms of export promotion. The Ministry of Trade (MICIP) had been an enthusiastic proponent of export-promotion initiatives, along with the Ministry of the Exterior and the Ministry of Agriculture, and the state produced a "national plan for the promotion of Ecuadorian Exports, 2001-10" on the need to diversify exports, leading CORPEI to focus on 14 new areas of product promotion. In relation to the TIP specifically, the state's audit of the project (included in the Bank's Implementation Completion Report, although translated badly) understood the overall aim of the initiative in the same way as the Bank:

> "to promote a greater social-economic growing of the Ecuadorian economy, using as an instrument the development of the foreign trade and integration within the global economy, which tends to accelerate growth and can render benefits to reduce poverty in the country to: (a) modernize, at a national and government level, the institutional frame of the State, regarding the administration of foreign trade and better access to the international trade markets; (b) at enterprise level, promote the management training and entrepreneurial innovation, especially between the medium and small enterprises, in order to establish links with the foreign trade; and (c) to support the improvement of the quality and productivity of the export sector" (World Bank 2003b, np).

The state's evaluation also came to similar conclusions about the project as the Bank's, assessing it as largely satisfactory, particularly in relation to the second component.

In turn the Bank framed relations between the implementing agencies as good. The TIP was considered well-prepared given the range of prior actions undertaken by the state in relation to trade reform, and the Project's technical support unit was in place when the initiative started, having already "gained appreciable experience in program management, procurement and financial management; including via a number of Bank-sponsored seminars in Ecuador on Bank norms and procedures for financial management, procurement and disbursements." The Bank felt that the project was a good example of collaboration, since "from the Project identification stage, work was based upon tripartite dialogue and consensus-building between MICIP, private sector domestic and export business associations, and the Bank" (ICR). Furthermore, MICIP's role as an implementing agency was rated as highly satisfactory, since:

> "Notwithstanding the high turnover at the ministerial and subsecretary levels, there was a constant renewal of commitment to Project objectives and implementation, both within MICIP and across government agencies and private sector associations. The technical support unit (within MICIP) countered the frequent changes in ministerial leadership with substantial staff constancy. The TSU (Technical Support Unit) staff maintained a strong focus on client needs and interests, and maintained sound links between the public and private sector Project stakeholders."

Similarly the Implementation Completion Report noted that "the Bank is now in dialogue with MICIP to define further policy adjustments, how to support capacity increases for international trade negotiations, and assistance to micro and small businesses to build competitiveness." In short at first glance it seems almost impossible to discern distinct policy actors in this arena – the state, Bank, and private sector seem to all support the initiative, and to be working harmoniously together, through dialogue, to ensure its success. This casts doubt on an account seeking to identify the Bank's specific role in the project, reinforcing the idea that the broader restructuring agenda of which this loan is a part is indeed one that enjoys consensual support.

Closer attention to this project reveals far more conflict, however, particularly between the state and the Bank. While I am not disputing the state's commitment to export-promotion, there were several important disagreements in the course of the TIP that complicate the notion of harmonious, consent-governed interactions presented above, and that support the need to analyze the policy as, in part, a Bank one. Firstly, the state had its own policy agenda, and disagreed with the Bank over certain key issues. The Bank conceded this in its own documents, although in a way that - as one observer noted - still "paint(ed) a rosy picture" of the project. For example the project was delayed at the start after CORPEI and the government amended legislation to change the reimbursement rate for firms participating in export-promotion activities from 30% to 50%. The Bank opposed this move because it feared it would slow implementation and reduce beneficiary commitment (World Bank 2003b, np). However the Bank lost – the union of private industry and the state was successful and the reimbursement rate was changed.

That said, however, in general the Bank's vision of export-promotion was the one that won out whenever there were conflicts with the state. For example, the state was criticized repeatedly by the Bank for delays and backsliding on key trade reforms and quality standards, and the Bank responded by withholding loan disbursements and putting in place new conditions for future lending that compelled state actors to change policy in line with Bank visions. The third component, quality standards, was rated as "marginally satisfactory" due to delays in implementation, and the state's failure to follow through on the original plan to privatize its commercial quality services and shift entirely to voluntary standards. The Implementation Completion Report noted that the introduction of the quality control system desired by the Bank was held up by congressional debate. Thus "facing continuing uncertainty, the Government decided with the Bank's support to launch the system by passage of a decree in May 2000" (World Bank 2003b, np). A new standardization system which complied with WTO requirements, "a condition of loan disbursement for the quality component," was therefore enacted. This provides further evidence to support the notion that a strong executive is often needed to push restructuring measures past objecting legislatives; it also suggests that the Bank and its system of attaching conditionalities to loans encourages such behavior. However despite these actions, a subsequent evaluation revealed that "some backsliding had occurred," with mandatory standards being maintained. In response, the Bank reallocated $1million of the loan. It also insisted in its Fiscal Consolidation and Competitiveness Adjustment Loan that the government agree to reduce mandatory standards further, and to eliminate those that were not compatible with WTO codes by 2004 (World Bank 2004d). Indeed the first "lesson learned" from the project was to closely tie adjustment efforts to such policy changes, to "ensure leveraging and mutual support" between loans designed to achieve trade openness (World Bank 2003b, np). In short the Bank's own loan texts – read closely – reveal important disagreements with the state and the sense that action has to coerced, complicating the notion of harmonious dialogue presented elsewhere.

Not surprisingly, however, there is far more evidence of such conflicts *outside* of Bank texts. Interviews with people connected to the TIP revealed that staff within ministries used the loan to advance their own interests in ways that caused serious problems in the project. This was particularly evident in relation to the third component of the loan, concerning quality standards and trade reform. While the Bank evaluated this as "marginally satisfactory," I was told that it was a "disaster" and a "failure." The team of "experts" appointed by MICIP knew nothing about trade standards, and got the jobs (which offered extremely good salaries when compared to most government positions) through corrupt hiring practices.[vii] The four core "experts" working in MICIP to implement this component of the loan were promptly sacked by the Bank in June 2001, after the resident mission in Quito discovered that a contract for an external consultant the Bank had signed with MICIP had been altered (a sheet was replaced increasing the consultant's salary by $6000). Thereafter the state's Institute for Standards (INEN) was asked to pick up the pieces of this component, but by this point there was no money left of the $2.1 million dispersed by the Bank – in fact previous staff had been writing checks on an account that was already empty, ensuring that by the time INEN took over the project was "bankrupt." Much of the money went to pay salaries for the "experts" hired corruptly. Funds also went to projects favoring certain ministerial interests – for example I was told that MICIP funded a system for certification for fishing boats in the Galapagos using money from this loan, because the then Minister of Tourism had investments in fishing boats in the Galapagos. $400,000 of the $2.1 million went straight to Microsoft, to pay for licenses on software used by MICIP – this had no relation to quality certification in line with WTO standards, and was simply an example of ministerial raiding of project funds. Although there are several important conclusions to be drawn from this information,[viii] on the most basic level it proves there were serious disagreements between the Bank and the government, and that on occasion the Bank took strong action to sanction state staff. This reinforces my point that the Bank needs to be analyzed as a key independent policy actor in this field, with leverage over the state.

The Bank also considered the government a weak political partner in many respects, and it was highly critical of instability within ministries. Indeed the Bank rated the government's performance in providing a supportive environment for project implementation as unsatisfactory, since "the dislocations in leadership and difficulties with Congress absorbed a substantial amount of effort on the part of MICIP and the technical support unit to maintain high-level focus and commitment on Project objectives and implementation" (World Bank 2003b, np). Given the euphemistic nature of Bank evaluations (recall that it rated a component wherein all the staff were sacked for rampant corruption as "marginally satisfactory"), the fact that a plain "unsatisfactory" rating was given here is a damning indictment. It is also further proof that the government was not regarded as a good ally. Specifically, according to the Bank:

> "The most significant factors influencing the project fundamentally within government control are associated with political structure. Ecuador has experienced substantial regional rivalry dating back to colonial times which has limited the effective power and management abilities of the central government. Congress has been characterized by an unusually large number of political parties, enhancing the challenge of effective governance... In terms of the Project, this conflictive situation made more difficult securing passage of the draft quality law, had a strong hand in the high turnover rate in MICIP ministers during the implementation period (8 ministers in four years), and most probably blunted the depth of institutional development of policy-making and coordinative bodies ...in the absence of more continuity of government leadership."

The Bank thus frames the state as weak, ineffective, fragmented, unable to secure the political or social consensus required for reform, and as harming effective project implementation.

In response the Bank nurtured the private business community as a counterweight to the state, aiming to circumvent weak political structures by increasing the role of the export sector in policy development and implementation. To clarify, I am not arguing that the Bank is responsible for the leverage that the Ecuadorian export industry has over the state - the political and economic power of the export and banking elites in Guayaquil is legendary and the Bank did not create this situation. However, attention to the TIP shows that the Bank has tried to alter the policy environment in the country so as to grant exporters greater political leverage over trade policy, in a way that does not require corruption. Indeed private sector participation was central to the TIP from the start. The project description promised that the Bank would learn from previous lessons in export promotion, including that public trade promotion organizations did not succeed in generating lasting reforms. As a result the Bank identified a need to develop better links to producers, and to nurture joint private-public activities, involving formal consultations to "better structure the public-private sector dialogue for the country working to increase outward-oriented growth" (World Bank 1998, 16). The Bank's Project Information Document also noted with approval that the private sector was co-financing some of the activities, and had presented to the government a "Law to Provide a Framework for the Promotion of External Trade"(World Bank 1997a, 3). Thus increasing the access of the private sector to trade policy formulation and implementation was a key part of the project's objectives.

These promises of private sector involvement were upheld. The Bank funded 67.5% of total project costs ($20.6 million), the private sector made contributions to the two learning and innovation programs that made up another 31.5% of costs ($9.6 million), and the government contributed 1% ($0.3 million). CORPEI, the public-private export promotion group, implemented the export learning component of the project, and took over responsibility for the accreditation activities towards the end (see below). CORPEI was also put in charge of the microenterprise Grassroots Growth Fund, and given the ability to decide which NGOs were qualified to "provid(e) acceptable outward-oriented growth programs" (World Bank 2003b, np). CORPEI's role was assessed very positively by the Bank, far more so than the state's. The Learning and Innovation Fund administered by CORPEI "attracted a very high level of demand and fully committed and disbursed" its funds, exceeding targets of firms assisted. A Bank evaluation found that 81% of participating firms felt better prepared to export and 83% believed that the Program had increased their export competitiveness. Sales grew, export market diversification expanded, and 3,293 new jobs were created in the 300 firms sampled (most were temporary day laborers). In general terms the project was considered successful, and sustainable, in large part because it involved the private sector so consistently:

> "While Ecuador's private sector certainly have their own stakeholder interests at heart, it is fair to say that the private producer and trade association constituency is also an important and consistent force to help sustain and drive further forward improvements in the business environment for export development. The Government and such groups also have a sound practice of working together on building international market access through new trade agreements which can be expected to continue. Given these factors, there is a high probability of sustaining the progress made under the Project"

In addition, the private sector benefited enormously from this project, particularly in certain sectors. For example, the Implementation Completion Report acknowledged that there was considerable "leakage" in the export promotion component at the start of the project, with benefits accruing to large firms with established records in exports. Although CORPEI and the Bank stepped in at the six month review stage to remedy this situation by imposing limits on sales, nonetheless there was clear evidence of funds being diverted to private companies in a less than open fashion. Similarly many large companies benefited from the reform of the customs duty buy back program, by which exporters could get reimbursed for taxes paid on imports subsequently used for exported products. The Bank conceded that generally only large export forms use this service since the process is so cumbersome, and that:

"… the procedural burden of the system actually increased with the imposition of verification procedures. This has unfortunately meant that access to drawback benefits continues to be limited to some 50-100 firms among Ecuador's more than 3,000 exporters" (World Bank 2003b, np)

To clarify I am not arguing that the policy objectives of the Bank and the private sector are always-already harmonious. CORPEI supported the state in increasing the reimbursements available to firms for export-promotion activities, against the Bank wishes. Once more, however, the Bank usually won in such clashes with the private sector, particularly when the latter lacked the backing of the state. For example the Bank stepped in to stop the "leakage" to large firms noted above, and the remainder of the project seemed heavily focused on small and medium enterprises as laid out in the project objectives. Moreover, interestingly CORPEI did not want to administer the grassroots fund oriented to microenterprises, since as one staff member explained it:

"Since CORPEI is more of a company or a trade promotion organization oriented towards companies, this is a bit of history, we had no experience dealing with microenterprises. At first, we said, before we signed the agreement we said look, we don't want this part, the World Bank said "no, either you do both or you do none." So we said "OK, everything is clear, now everything is clear, so we'll manage this," and we started this project."

Given the Bank's pressure in this area it is more than little ironic that its Implementation Completion Report subsequently criticized CORPEI for lack of supervision of the microenterprise initiative, a component the agency never wanted to administer in the first place.

That said, however, the staff I spoke to in CORPEI framed their relations with the Bank as more successful than their relations with the state, and the Bank was viewed as a more reliable partner than MICIP. Consider for example this extract from an interview transcript:

Kate: and how were the relations between CORPEI, the ministry of trade, and the Bank in the project?
x with us and the World Bank? Very good.
Kate why? What was so good about it?
x what was so good? I mean we had direct contact and communication with them, they asked for information, we provided, I mean we have a very open policy towards information, I mean, no secrets, nothing, and we are very transparent in what we did, so I think they liked that, and I mean, I wouldn't want to say it but I think we did a good job. With the ministry, I mean, as in every marriage I think there are ups and downs, there were sometimes... we had a few specific... we don't agree with this, it has to be this way, and we talked it over, and we came to agreement and so (...) I couldn't tell (you) really that we had a bad relation

Although diplomatically s/he concluded that "I think it was good working relationship with both institutions" and refused to be drawn on the specific conflicts with MICIP, it is clear from this segment that relations with the Bank were considered far more successful than those with government agents. CORPEI staff were also resentful that they were criticized by firms for the slow reimbursement of funds for export-promotion activities, a situation for which MICIP was considered responsible.

Finally, the Bank deliberately facilitated increased access by the private sector to trade policy formulation and implementation, and indeed this was framed as a key success of the project. In particular, responsibilities were transferred from MICIP to CORPEI, in part as a result of the Bank's sense that the state was weak and involved in tumultuous political conflict. Shifting resources to private sector implementing agencies was hereby considered a way to secure project efficiency, stability, and success. For example, when the MICIP team administering the funds for the quality standards component was fired, CORPEI was asked to take over the certification activities associated with the effort. CORPEI understood state agents as incompetent, lazy, and unable to execute the project effectively in this respect. As one CORPEI staff member explained it, the component of implementing quality certifications had been "thoroughly under-executed" by MICIP:

> Kate Why was that?
> x Maybe because people in public office are not as…I don't know… interested in… I mean, they were doing other things instead of executing these activities... but the thing is that since we were getting good marks here (in World Bank audits), they (the new administration team run by INEN staff) said look, they came up to us, they said look this component is totally under-executed, its to implement certification, there's a fund of $600,000, would you guys like to execute it. I said yeah... So we executed it.

Crucially, however, CORPEI specifically demanded Bank approval of the change, with one staff member remembering that:

> x: MICIP, the ministry of trade came to us. And we told them the conditions that we would execute it and it had to get approval of the World Bank, and we wanted especially the approval of the World Bank
> kate why?
> x because as you know sometimes ministers here change as often as, I don't know, you take a shower, so...and maybe the one coming tomorrow will say look, no I don't agree with this, and so the World Bank said if CORPEI is going to execute it, you've got our approval, so we got it.

To clarify precisely what is occurring here, the Bank is shifting responsibility for policy implementation to the private export sector in part because they believe the state is weak and corrupt, and in turn the private sector is demanding assurances from the Bank rather than its own government, again because the state is regarded as weak. Both the Bank and the private sector emerge stronger from this process, with more power over policy.

One core reason for this shift is that interactions with private sector implementing agencies are more predictable than those with ministries, given rapid turnover in staff and political instability. Every interview I had with government and CORPEI employees working on Bank loans mentioned this problem of high ministerial turnover and ministers changing "as often as you take a shower" and it is also a Bank concern raised in texts and in conversations with staff (see also chapter 5). For example the current CAS argued that earlier Bank reform efforts in Ecuador had failed "due to a slow start in implementing the reform program attributable to turnover among key Government officials, especially in the Ministry of Finance" (World Bank 2003a, np). The Bank also claims that it prepared important advisory reports for the government, "but high turnover rates in key government positions did not permit adequate follow-up in several cases."

Technical specialists and civil servants within the state can gain increased power over policy formulation and implementation as a result of this instability, since they are the core figures with institutional memory, experience and so on (Geddes 1994; Teichman 2004). Thus the Bank has long nurtured technocrats within the state civil service as allies, regarding them as far more stable partners than elected representatives. This reliance on technocrats has been criticized more broadly by many observers for insulating policy from democratic participation (Escobar 1995; Mitchell 2002). For example Judith Teichman's recent analysis of the Bank's involvement in policy reform in Mexico and Argentina found that "bank officials sought out and strengthened the hand of the radical free market reformers and contributed to the spread of market reform policy ideas in the...(state) bureaucracy" (Teichman 2004, 47). The Bank cultivated links with specific technocrats to strengthen decentralization efforts, to promote privatization, and so on, and policy networks were forged undemocratically in a way that excluded other political actors (55). However in the TIP the Bank also increased the role of private actors in policy implementation. For example, the Implementation Completion Report praised core staff in MICIP *and CORPEI* associated with the project, since they gave it stability:

> "in the face of high turnover in leadership and tumultuous economic conditions...They were extremely important in not only carrying out basic processes

> of procurement, finance and administration, but in renewing and integrating the Project with new ministerial and central government leadership changes" (World Bank 2003b, np)

Elsewhere the report claimed specifically that "very active involvement of private sector stakeholders in the design of regulatory reforms and new institutional arrangements is essential and can provide strong continuity to maintain Project objectives and implementation momentum in the midst of high turnover at government levels." In essence, then, the project attempted to circumvent weak state capacity stemming from political instability by drawing private business interests into governance; given that this instability is itself in part a *result* of the restructuring efforts being undertaken by the Bank it is impossible to ignore that the institution is a key policy actor in this site.

Notwithstanding the recognition that the private sector has its own "stakeholder interests" the Bank ultimately maintained that facilitating access to the policy planning and implementation process by exporters is a way to secure neutrality, state autonomy, and technically effective policy, hereby depoliticizing moves to grant businesspeople more power over government spending priorities. For example, the Bank's Project Information Document insisted that export promotion was necessarily linked to broader policy reform at the legislative level, since "it should be recognized that promotion efforts will not be effective on their own, but only when accompanied by a supportive neutral policy environment and other export support instruments" (World Bank 1997a, 9). To frame CORPEI's activities "to convey the needs and views of the export community in various public fora" as part of securing a "neutral policy environment" is to stretch the meaning of the term "neutrality" to extreme lengths – indeed elsewhere the Bank explicitly recognized that this process is better understood as one involving the deliberate nurturing of a new set of stakeholders in order to change the political environment to facilitate reform. As the Project Appraisal Document for this loan saw it, there existed "the need to provide policy and institutional infrastructural support to an incipient export drive so as to achieve a critical momentum that confers on interest groups sufficient political power to avoid strong advocacy of policies to reinstate protectionism" (World Bank 1998, 8). In short private companies involved in exports should be integrated into the policy-making community, deliberately nurtured as a counter-weight to those who oppose liberalization. While the pro-export community is an important policy actor, then, it is playing in a policy field structured by the Bank – it gets the influence in part because the Bank helps give it to them. It would thus be a serious error to analyze the policy effects of this loan as reflecting just state or private sector interests; rather this project is part of Bank policy. I am not simply arguing that it is legitimate and possible to analyze the TIP and the pro-export effects that it enacted as a Bank initiative here – I am insisting that it is *necessary* to do so.

Prioritization of Women's Employment within Export Promotion.

Having established the basis for analyzing export promotion activities in Ecuador as Bank policies, it remains to explain why this area of lending is relevant to a project focused on gender, employment, and social reproduction. The links are certainly not self-evident, and when I explained to interviewees involved in this chapter that my research was on gender they usually reacted with confusion. I was told that CORPEI had no gender activities, for example, that the TIP had no gender component, that women were not a target group, and that export policy was not part of the Bank's gender lending.

Moreover the Bank staff associated with gender, who were so helpful in my research for chapter seven and eight, generally knew little about these export-promotion loans, and did not consider them part of their own work.

This sense that gender is not relevant to export-promotion stems from the fact that the latter is an example of macro-economic policy based lending, a difficult site for gender policy entrepreneurship. Gender policy entrepreneurs within the Bank typically find it very hard to influence the mainstream macroeconomic discussions on structural adjustment, trade policy, fiscal adjustment, and so on on which policy-based lending is often focused. This has long been acknowledged at the D.C. level, with both Murphy and Moser noting that there is little discussion of gender within macroeconomic lending, and that gender policy makers increased their influence in the later 1990s as the Bank's emphasis shifted from macroeconomics to social development. However it is also a relevant concern at the country-level. For example, at the start of the PROGENIAL initiative focused on increasing attention to gender in Bank activities in Ecuador, staff held a meeting for all current projects to give them the opportunity to express interest in gender. One of PROGENIAL's consultants remembered that the social and environmental projects expressed such interest, and that PROGENIAL had success in areas such as violence prevention and education, but that it was far more difficult for advocates to influence macro-economic projects.

Notwithstanding the fact that lack of access by policy entrepreneurs should not sanction a lack of attention to the gendered effects of macroeconomic policy by researchers,[ix] the perception that export-promotion is gender blind in the first place is inaccurate, for several reasons. Firstly, the Bank in general understands export-promotion, particularly in non-traditional sectors, as an important source of women's employment.[x] For example, the 1996 poverty report recommended training for rural women to enter off-farm employment (World Bank 1996a, 39), given that rural poverty was linked to exclusion from vibrant off-farm markets (37). The *Ecuador Gender Review* also identified a link between export-orientation, particularly in rural areas, and women's employment given that "in Latin America, rural non-farm activities are particularly important for women" (Correia 2000, 32). In particular, "men have predominated in traditional industries, whereas women have concentrated in new sectors such as agriculture for exports" (37). The *Review* recommended expansion of such high productivity, export-oriented off-farm rural employment on this basis.

In addition, the Bank commissioned a study into the impact of women's employment in agricultural exports in Ecuador, focused on flowers. The study resulted in two publications: an English-language World Bank discussion paper written by Constance Newman, and a Spanish-language report written by Newman in collaboration with two CONAMU consultants.[xi] Newman's report asserted that agro-exports are of significant interest to gender policymakers within the Bank because they are associated with women's increased employment. As she put it: "economic reforms in Latin America have led to a boom in the growth of non-traditional agriculture exports, and along with it, a large increase in the demand for rural labor, especially female labor" (Newman 2001, np). Similarly the first line of the CONAMU/Bank report read: "employment opportunities for women in Latin America have increased dramatically in the last 20 years as a result of the growth of non-traditional agro-export industries" (Newman, Larreamendy and Maldonado 2001, 11). Export-promotion policies are thus, in part, about getting women into work.

The sense that export-focused industries are a crucial site for women's employment was reinforced by interviews with relevant staff. For example several CORPEI employees noted that there were high levels of female employment in many of the areas they promote, such as handicrafts, cocoa, broccoli, medicinal herbs, shell collection, and flower production. Bank staff also mentioned broccoli and flowers in this respect, arguing that these agro-export industries were a key source of employment for women in the Sierra who had been negatively affected by falling milk prices and whose reliance on small herds for income had thus become unsustainable.

The Bank has also introduced gender concerns into specific export-promotion loans, again in a way that privileges women's employment. For example, the Project Appraisal Document for the TIP contained an annex summarizing the project's design which linked the initiative to the Country Assistance Strategy on the grounds that it aims to "pursue a poverty alleviation strategy, in part by promoting sustained labor-intensive growth which generates strong and stable demand for labor, *and facilitates increased participation of women in the market labor force*" (World Bank 1998, 26 emphasis added). Hence the loan document recommended that the Bank should help the country boost exports to create jobs and diversify income, "particularly where off-farm employment and women's labor force participation are involved" (6). A concern with gender – specifically with getting women into work – was also evident in the grassroots growth fund subcomponent of the TIP, focused on microenterprises. The Project Appraisal Document marked women entrepreneurs as a key target of the microenterprise initiative, with NGOs advised to help support the project through knitting cooperatives, for example, or by giving women training in quality management and export. The privileging of women's employment is further illustrated in this description of the loan's "social" component:

> "the grassroots growth fund of CORPEI is expected to support some 3000 small low-income firms and their families through NGO-managed community programs to build international market linkages. This should provide the opportunities to diversify markets, create new urban and off-farm farm employment and, especially as some 50% of firms are operated by women, to generate additional income of direct benefit to family needs" (21).

To reiterate, this microenterprise initiative was foisted on CORPEI by the Bank. It is therefore not only legitimate to analyze export-promotion as a Bank policy; such promotion can also be assessed as part of Bank efforts to get women into work.

The Flower Industry.

> "the successful example of floriculture has served as a model for other attempts to develop non-traditional export products which the government of Ecuador is actively promoting" (Newman, Larreamendy and Maldonado 2001, 15).

In order to explore connections between the Bank's export-promotion policies, attempts to get women into work, and the social reproduction dilemma in greater depth I wish to focus on flower production as a specific export sector. Flowers have become such an important and established component of Ecuadorian exports in the last 20 years that they are now considered traditional exports in many reports. Ecuadorian flower production started in the mid 1980s as a result of Columbian producers shifting location due to internal disruption, although companies from several other countries, including Holland and the US, also operate plantations. This is overwhelmingly an export-focused industry; 99% of flowers produced in Ecuador are exported (Ministerio de Relaciones

Exteriores Del Ecuador/CORPEI 2004, 21). Plantations are concentrated in the Sierra, in mountainous areas north of Quito which have a climate conducive to floriculture (long hours of sun, temperate weather, and so on). Large landowners in this region originally sought out new agro-industrial investment opportunities in the milk industry, which drew several international producers such as Palmalat and Nestle to the area, but this suffered declining prices and profitability from the late 1980s. Landowners thus increasingly invested in flower production, and it is now the most important agro-industry in the region (Colloredo-Mansfeld 1999, 11).[xii] Between 1985 and 1997 the value of flower exports grew from $0.5 million to $120 million, and the number of people directly employed by the industry rose from 6,700 in 1993, to 26,000 in 1997, to 36,000 in 1998. By 1997 Ecuador had become the world's third largest flower exporter, specializing mostly in varieties of roses.

More recently the industry suffered considerable losses from the 1999 crisis, and many companies went bankrupt. Dollarization ensured that low wages no longer gave Ecuador a competitive edge over neighboring producers (wages in Colombian floriculture are lower, for example), and profitability fell. The new Russian export market also collapsed after the Russian economic crisis in 1998 (Beckerman 2002, 51). However the industry endured, and it now directly employs an estimated 37,000 people. 90% of adults working in the industry are under 35 (Newman, Larreamendy and Maldonado 2001); these workers are mostly mestiza and indigenous although an increasing number of Colombians and people from the Ecuadorian coast are moving to the area to work in the plantations. Compared to other agro-industries floriculture is relatively labor intensive, requiring on average 12 people per hectare, versus the 2 per hectare required for lacteal production. This makes it a key source of employment in the region; in addition to those directly employed in plantations flowers generate indirect employment through transport needs, infrastructural requirements, and so on. ExpoFlores, the industry's export association, claims that 500,000 workers are associated with the industry in these ways.

In general, floriculture is considered a success story, and an example of the broader reorientation of the Ecuadorian economy towards export orientation. For example both the Project Information and Project Appraisal Documents for the TIP consider flowers, along with shrimp and bananas, an "excellent exampl(e) in Ecuador of successful export entrepreneurship" (World Bank 1998, 7; World Bank 1997a, 3). CORPEI's 2004 "Ecuador Exports" catalogue claimed in a summary of the industry that:

> "Ecuadorian flowers are considered the best in the world for their matchless quality and beauty. The geographical situation of the country generates microclimates and a luminosity that lends unique characteristics to the flowers, including: long, thick, and perfectly vertical stems, large buds, and extremely bright colors" (Ministerio de Relaciones Exteriores del Ecuador/CORPEI 2004, 21).

Moreover the 1999 crisis is understood to have increased the competitiveness of the industry, with the strongest and most advanced companies surviving. Ecuador now trumpets its investment in technology as a key asset in the industry; a Bank staff person told me that flower producers in Ecuador (and Peru) have invested most in technology and Just-In-Time production, making them more advanced than Colombian firms who can not replicate the strategy due to internal insecurity. Ecuador remains the third largest flower exporter in the world, with production concentrated in roses, carnations and chrysanthemums. 70% of exports go to the US, 20% to Europe and Russia (mostly to Holland, which then sells flowers on to other countries), and 10% to other countries such as China, Argentina, Brazil, and Chile.[xiii]

Observers identify several important problems with the flower industry, including dumping of the plastic roofs used for greenhouses in certain seasons; unsafe use of chemicals and fertilizers leading to ill-effects on water quality, soil quality, and worker health; social changes resulting from the incorporation of workers into a consumer culture; growing alcoholism; increased street and familial violence; "the destruction of the family"; short-term contracts and job insecurity; lack of unionization; low wages (characterized as "terrible" by one NGO employee); long hours (especially during peak demand, and especially when workers are paid by quota rather than on fixed salaries); the firing of pregnant workers or their continued exposure to dangerous chemicals, depending on the plantation; an influx of migrants; a failure to provide adequate infrastructure for the growing population; use of child labor in plantations, and so on.[xiv] Not surprisingly the flower industry disputes these accounts; its representatives argue that wages in the industry are high; that regulations on the use of fertilizers and chemicals are strictly enforced to ensure workers and the environment are protected; that plantations provide excellent services to their employees; and that there is no evidence of child labor.[xv]

For their part Bank staff recognize the legitimacy of some criticisms of the industry. For example one employee remarked that some companies had turned communities into dumping grounds with their irresponsible disposal of plastic, and s/he acknowledged that some plantations were "a disaster," with no social or environmental responsibility and terrible wages, often paid to undocumented Colombians. Interestingly the *Ecuador Gender Review* also devoted attention to working conditions; its discussion of "occupational health and hazardous work" claimed bluntly that:

> "The Government has not been vigilant in monitoring occupational health hazards and illnesses, but several sources suggest that problems exist and that these are gender differentiated. For example, the flower industry, which employs about 60 percent women, requires intensive use of chemical substances" (Correia 2000, 19).

However, in general the institution is enthusiastic about the industry, and Bank-supported export promotion policies have greatly aided the sector. As the CONAMU/Bank study of gender in floriculture recognized, "the floriculture industry in Ecuador is an excellent case of a Latin American industry that has grown dramatically, *as a result of macroeconomic reforms*" (Newman, Larreamendy and Maldonado 2001, 15 emphasis added) – reforms in which the Bank was a key actor. For example as part of his Washington-Consensus style reforms Febres Cordero cut loans for peasants while increasing those for larger farmers producing new export crops, especially for new export crops such as strawberries, asparagus and flowers (Cockcroft 1996, 445).

More specifically, however, the Bank has taken concrete actions through loans to help the industry. Floricultural industries were listed as one of the main beneficiaries of the Learning and Innovation Funds given by the TIP to help promote quality certification (World bank 2003b, np), and CORPEI (which administered this section) gave *$2 million* to flower companies to promote their export activities as part of this loan. The industry remains a focal point for CORPEI, itself indebted (in several senses) to the Bank for its existence. CORPEI employs a floriculture specialist in the Quito office to help sector-specific export promotion activities, and it has extensive connections to ExpoFlores, such that a telephone call from the institution's flower specialist led to me being offered a same-day interview with the President of the exporting organization. The Bank has also aided floriculture through its $20 million SICA project. Although this initiative focuses mainly on the agricultural census, it also includes a component to promote agro-businesses. Flowers are a key sector here, and SICA's agro-business specialist works closely with industry representatives. SICA also supported, through the Ministry of Agriculture and with Bank money, advisory councils in industries giving producers, exporters, investors and so on a forum in which to discuss concerns and present recommendations - floriculture has its own advisory council under this program. In addition SICA funded a competitiveness study on several key agricultural sectors, including flowers; this was available on the SICA, CORPEI, and ExpoFlores website. The Bank's role in the sector is thus not hard to discern; the institution has consistently supported export reforms on which the industry relies for its success, and it has also aided specific companies through individual loans.

Women as Empowered Workers in The Flower Industry

> "The Ecuadorian cut flower industry is a classic example of a growing agricultural export industry in Latin America and one that has a large demand for female labor" (Newman 2001, np)

Floriculture is a relevant site for research into the Bank's social reproduction efforts because it is a key site for women's employment. In the late 1990s women accounted for 2/3 of employees in flowers (Newman, Larreamendy and Maldonado 2001), and although this proportion is now closer to 50% in some plantations women make up a far higher percentage of workers in this industry than in many others. For example, women are roughly 1/3 of employees in banana plantations, and only 20% in the furniture industry. The high level of female participation in this labor force is in part due to the regional location of the industry; in the 1990s the Cotoxpai/Cayambe region was characterized by high rates of male out-migration to surrounding cities and to

Europe, leaving women as managers of herds supplying the milk industry. When prices for milk fell and this subsistence strategy became unsustainable, women were thus positioned to enter the floriculture industry as workers. In addition, however, women were deliberately chosen above men as workers for some tasks, due to a "nimble fingers" discourse familiar to feminist scholars of export orientation (Ong 1997; Talcott 2003). They are seen as more apt than men for many types of work in floriculture, particularly the "delicate" production operations involved in planting, weeding, and packaging. For example CORPEI's banana expert in Guayaquil claimed that women worked in flowers because they were more delicate, while more men worked in bananas because the product was heavy. The next week, in an interview in Quito with CORPEI's floriculture expert, I was told that women predominated in the industry because they were more delicate and more-detail oriented, making them good workers for sorting, processing, and quality control. When asked why women were an estimated 60% of workers in this industry s/he replied:

> "because they are much more...in the area of looking, of cutting the stems, of packing, they are much more delicate and much more... in the area of quality, of differentiating a good rose, they are much more alert. Equally, this occurs in all industries – in the furniture industry for example all the construction work of the furniture is done by men, but the women are (working) in the details because they concentrate more."

In contrast men are over-represented in tasks considered dangerous and physically demanding, such as the construction of greenhouses and irrigation channels (CONAMU 16), and in fumigation; it is believed that they are better able to tolerate toxic chemicals than women (Newman, Larreamendy and Maldonado 2001, 28).

Given the characteristics of the floriculture workforce, it is perhaps to be expected that gender policy entrepreneurs within the Bank view the flower industry as an important source of women's employment. Indeed the industry is regarded as key site for gender intervention on this basis, and the high concentration of female workers in the industry is acknowledged throughout the Bank. One Bank staff member with an interest in gender joked that the Bank needed micro *and macro* enterprises to employ women; if there are any macro-enterprises in Ecuador of this nature they are in floriculture, making the industry a crucial site for research into attempts to get women into work. For example in a 2000 gender workshop organized as part of another Bank loan in Ecuador (see chapter 7), a Bank consultant explained the gender context in indigenous communities by asserting that "there are inequalities that affect men such as the lack of work compared to the better opportunities that women appear to have *especially in some new sectors such as floriculture*" (Velasquez 2000, np emphasis added). Women's high level of involvement in floriculture is also recognized in written reports associated with the Bank in Ecuador. The 2004 *Poverty Report* contained a text box entitled "women and the flower industry in Ecuador" taken from the Bank/CONAMU study; this reiterated that two thirds of jobs in flowers are held by women (World Bank 2004e, 87). The *Gender Review* also mentioned women's over-representation in the industry, arguing that debates about working conditions therein were gendered on this basis.

More specifically, the Bank also conducted extensive research into women in flowers as part of the discussion paper mentioned above. This involved a quasi-experimental study in two similar regions of Northern Ecuador, one with flower plantations and one without, to ascertain the effects of women's work in floriculture.[xvi] The discussion paper that resulted from this study summarized women's participation in the industry thusly:

> "As in more developed countries, married women's participation in paid labor has risen rapidly around the world, especially in export niches like that of Ecuadorian flowers. In Ecuador, the flower industry is only ten years old. Before it developed, women in these same rural areas had little if any paid employment.
> Employment in flowers has been one of the first types of paid off-farm employment offered to women and the only employment offered to women in such numbers. Firm managers and many others say that women work more efficiently in the detail-oriented, careful work required of the flower tasks. Others assert that women are hired because they are willing to work for lower pay than men" (Newman 2001, np).

Generally women's employment in this industry is framed positively, with the Bank's gender specialists regarding it as a source of empowerment and improved self-esteem. Although Newman's research found that men are paid more than women, the differences are less than in many other industries, and married women actually earn more than married men in floriculture. Newman also disputed the claim that women work longer hours in the flower industry as a result of the need to fulfill both household and paid labor responsibilities. As the conclusion put it:

> "...women are not working more time per day in the flower area, dispelling a frequent criticism of agricultural export development which maintains that women are unduly burdened by the work in the industry. Women work much more than men, but this is apparently a result of their culturally-assigned housework responsibilities and not a result of the availability of employment for women. There may be other reasons to criticize the flower industry (such as in its environmental impacts), *but the gender impacts are arguably positive on balance given that the employment for women itself leads to cultural change. By extension, the trade liberalization policies that led to the growth in this employment should be recognized as an important component in the expansion of opportunities for women. And finally, while it is well known that female employment is crucial to women's empowerment, this paper shows that those impacts can be rigorously measured through the use of specially designed survey data*" (Newman 2001, np emphasis added).

This section reiterated, and summarized, the argument made elsewhere in the Bank that getting women into work empowers them, functioning as an emblem of modernization and progress. It also confirmed that gender policy entrepreneurs within the institution support export-promotion policies on the basis of their perceived impact on employment, itself linked to emancipation very explicitly. Indeed the text box on women in the flower industry contained in the 2004 poverty report repeated this discussion of empowerment, arguing that the Bank's research found flowers boosted employment and earnings, especially for women, and that women gained power through this opportunity. Specifically "employment in the flower sector allowed women to view themselves, and their relationship with men, in a different light" (World Bank 2004e, 87).

Compared with the Bank's discussion paper, the CONAMU/Bank study devoted more attention to perceived problems in floriculture. These included health problems related to exposure to chemicals, long hours (especially during peak periods such as Christmas and Valentines, when employees can work 14 hour days), sexual harassment, and short-term contracts that enable companies to avoid giving the benefits to which full time employees are entitled (Newman, Larreamendy and Maldonado 2001, 28). Workers were asked to list the three most negative aspects of working in floriculture; the top complaints for both men and women were the work with dangerous chemicals (34), the uncomfortable and painful nature of the job, and the fact that it was bad for family life. Women put more emphasis on the long hours involved while men emphasized the low salaries (34), but both reported more illnesses and feared the impact of the work on their health (72-73). None of this information made it into the Bank's discussion paper.

That said, however, the CONAMU/Bank study argued that overall the floriculture industry has had positive effects, contributing to both economic growth and women's self-esteem. "In general, work in flower plantations is perceived as the only relatively stable local employment option for women" (29), and women see their jobs as giving them an opportunity to get money and to learn a new life outside of the domestic sphere.

Although again the study noted that men in general earn more than women, these differences are smaller than in other sectors, and women who work in flowers earn more than twice the average salary of women who do not. Moreover women in flowers were repeatedly framed as more liberated than other women. Women in non-flower regions were dependent on husbands to provide income; they participated in activities considered "compatible with home tasks and the care of children" (26); they accepted that their space was inside the home, that men bring in money, and that their movements should be approved by men; and "they could not imagine a life where they do not have total responsibility for their children" (61). In contrast women working in flowers often went into the industry against family wishes, since their labor breaks traditional norms regarding women's position in the home (32). One female greenhouse worker was quoted as saying: "he (her husband) told me no, but the decision was mine" (31). The experience of working in the industry was liberatory; women came to see themselves as having the same labor rights as men, and as being equal workers (40/41). The study also argued that women in the flower region are more organized, forming NGOs to demand equipment, better wages, uniforms etc.[xvii] It also claimed that women who work in flowers are more sophisticated in their understanding of machismo as connected to social roles. While women outside the region defined a *machista* as a man who maltreated women, usually with violence, for some in the flower area "the typification of "machista" behavior directly refers to the social norm that prescribes the responsibility of domestic tasks as exclusively that of women" (39). Similarly women in the flower region were more likely to demand "respect" from men, by which they meant the right to have sex when they wanted to rather than as an obligation (40), and to have more control over contraception and fertility (81). They were also more likely to confront traditionally sexist behavior, and to refuse to tolerate violence (83).

All of these effects were understood to stem from the link between "economic autonomy and changes in status" (40) – between earning money and increased self-esteem and power. For example the study claimed both that "income from floriculture has contributed to a strengthening of the status of women in a significant form" (75), and that "with a new economic power, they can chose their own destinies and in the process they feel themselves valued as people exercising their rights to equality of opportunities" (81). Indeed the first positive effect of floriculture mentioned in the conclusion was:

> "especially, women appreciate having their own money and the power to decide how to spend it. One could assert that women's economic autonomy has signified the fulfillment of equity in relation to their partners and families" (82).

Several quotations from workshop participants were included to reinforce this connection, such as: "a women who is already earning money can now impose her conditions, because she has become a little more independent" (41), and "Now I earn money, and I command, and I do what I want""(41).

Put bluntly the Bank does not have evidence for many of these claims. The framing of traditional gender roles as not involving women's work outside the home is inconsistent with the Bank's recognition that women in the region have long been involved in subsistence agriculture, the milk industry, handicrafts and so on. [xviii] Moreover the argument that women in the flower region assume more control over their contraception and fertility – repeated in the conclusion as a finding of the study (81) - was utterly speculatory, since the research did not measure control over fertility and it conceded that some women in the flower region lied to their male partners about their use of birth control because they were scared. Likewise the report stated merely that women in the flower regions are less likely to refuse to tolerate violence "at least in principle" (83), since they had absolutely no evidence linking lower abuse to wage earning. The CONAMU/Bank study also noted that on average, in *both* regions, women control the majority of family income (75), and that women outside the flower region are involved in subsistence agriculture, market-oriented home production of artesanial products, and so on. Although they earn less from these activities than women in flowers earn from plantation employment, and although women in the flower region control a higher proportion of family income, this is a matter of a degree that seriously complicates the Bank's dichotomous framing of empowered flower workers and traditional housewives who do not earn money or participate in market activities.

Moreover, the framing of women's employment in flowers as emancipatory persists despite evidence suggesting that is it not true. For example Newman's study measured household assets as a key variable, and it found that:

> "Women's shares (of housework) and participation (in paid labor) are not affected (by household assets), which is interesting in light of recent arguments in the intra-household bargaining literature positing assets as an important bargaining tool for women. This does not provide evidence one way or the other on that argument, however, given that the asset data is at the household level" (Newman 2001, np).

Certainly it would be better if the evidence was at the individual level, but typically the Bank is perfectly happy to accept household assets as proof of individual well-being, using these figures to count who (in an entire family) is in poverty and so on. Furthermore, while the result may not conclusively disprove the assumption that income empowers women, it certainly suggests more cause for doubt than the Bank admits here – in this sense the complete dismissal of the findings as irrelevant is misplaced. Similarly the CONAMU report noted that the women of Tabacundo – a flower region – argue that men do not treat them with respect even though they earn money; that work has not increased their prestige; and that there are cases where men have forced women to work in flowers (Newman, Larreamendy and Maldonado 2001, 42). *None* of these findings receives elaboration in the report.

When women report that they do not *want* to work outside the home, or in flowers specifically, the Bank's gender policy entrepreneurs tend not to believe them. For example the discussion paper found that many women in paid work did not want to be there. It responded in the following manner:

> "Somewhat surprisingly, women who think that they should dedicate themselves to taking care of the home are more likely to be working and to be working larger shares. One interpretation for this unexpected result is that the women who go to work feel some guilt for not fulfilling their caring role in the home. Obviously some percentage of women sincerely believe that women should stay in the home and only work because of economic need, but the strong positive association of this statement with working women may also show a reaction to the competing demands on their time" (Newman 2001, np).

While this is certainly "one interpretation" of the findings, it is not the most obvious; rather this result would seem to suggest that many women in paid work do not consider it empowering. Likewise, in a truly unethical treatment of evidence the CONAMU/Bank study actually framed disapproval of the flower industry as proof of lack of empowerment. When asked why they did not work in the industry, many women were highly critical of floriculture, arguing that it put people's health in risk and broke traditional forms of caring for children, and that "the plantations do not solve problems but rather they feed off them" (Newman, Larreamendy and Maldonado 2001, 30). The bad conditions in the industry were actually the second most common reason given (by 23% of respondents) for not working in it; the first was that women needed to fulfill social reproduction responsibilities (32; see below). In response, the CONAMU/Bank study claimed that women who do not work in the industry were victimized by traditional gender roles, and it dismissed their statements about bad conditions as unimportant in order to keep the narrative of employment as empowerment in tact. While conceding that the objection to bad conditions "merits a brief reflection" (33), it was rapidly dismissed as unimportant, with the report claiming that the response is not meaningful because there is no other source of work. Women are thus unable to compare the industry to others, given that no alternatives exist (33). Ultimately, then, the Bank's gender policymakers insist that employment in this industry equates with women's empowerment, and they do so even when the evidence is either non-existent or in opposition to this interpretation.

Recognition of the Social Reproduction Dilemma As a Legitimate Concern, But A Claim that It Has Been Resolved By Men

Once again, there is a persistent emphasis on the social reproduction dilemma within Bank discussions on gender and floriculture. Clear awareness of a concern with social reproduction as it is relates to women's employment in agro-export generally, and floriculture specifically, is evident in Newman's report. Entitled *Gender, Time Use, and Change* this looked at "the impacts of women's employment on household paid and unpaid labor allocation" (2001, np). It started from the premise that women's shift into paid work will impact social reproduction arrangements and "is likely to induce some changes in household time allocation." It thus measured time allocations to both renumerated and unremunerated work, using 24 time use studies and weekly reports. Similarly "domestic labor (was) defined as a necessary service that has to be done by someone," and so it was added to the model as a constraint just like family income. Although the research did not measure home production, since this would lead to "complications" regarding the focus on paid labor versus domestic labor supply decisions, Newman recognized that there are "pitfalls" with this approach – namely "that work in the home may be accidentally treated as leisure." In a clear awareness of feminist debates over the complex boundaries between work and non-work, she thus counted all hours of work – in the home or elsewhere – as either paid or domestic (unpaid) labor, using the time use data described above. Similarly, the CONAMU/Bank study framed its overarching objective as that: "we wanted to know precisely how the distribution of domestic work in homes has changed as a result of the new situation in which women leave to work outside their houses" (Newman, Larreamendy and Maldonado 2001, 51). It too focused on time use data and the distribution of unpaid and paid work responsibilities. Both studies are thus embedded in the recognition that social reproduction issues are legitimate concerns for economists interested in development; indeed this awareness structures Bank conversations about floriculture to a remarkable degree.

In a crucial difference from every other piece of Bank research included in this dissertation, however, here gender policy entrepreneurs argued that the social reproduction problem has been resolved. Data showed that although "women spend much less time in recreational activities than men do," in both flower and non-flower regions, women working in flower production do *not* work more hours in a combination of unpaid and paid activity. In fact, "women, especially married women, in the treatment group (the flower zone) do less housework than women do in the control group (the non-flower zone)" (Newman 2001, np); likewise married women in the flower region have more recreation time than married women in the non-flower region (Newman, Larreamendy and Maldonado 2001, 53). This disputes the claim that plantations lead to overburdening of women, and in fact suggests that employment in this industry increases women's leisure – a reversal of almost every prediction offered by feminist economists.

Flowers and the Successful Restructuring of Heteronormativity: Homely Men, Working Women, and In-Tact Partnerships

> "floriculture has stimulated radical changes in gender roles" (Newman, Larreamendy and Maldonado 2001, 12)

According to the Bank, the solution to the social reproduction dilemma enacted in the flower industry was the involvement of men in domestic labor. The most important finding of Newman's report, emphasized in the opening summary, the abstract, and the overview of the report provided by the Bank in publication materials was that "with the advent of market labor opportunities for women, women's total time in labor remains constant while men's time in unpaid labor increases" (Newman 2001, np). Men's greater involvement in housework in the flower region was *the* key finding of this research, emphasized repeatedly in both studies. It was the first finding mentioned in the conclusion to the discussion paper:

> "The most compelling evidence of the industry's impact is on married men's increased participation in housework. Married men in the treatment group spend double the time in housework, and this is clearly related to women's increased participation in the labor force"

Consider also these claims, all from the Bank's discussion paper:

> "In the control group (the non-flower region), men with working wives worked 32 minutes in housework, and in the treatment group, men with working wives worked

> 60 minutes. Both sets of married men do more housework when their wife works, but the magnitude of housework done by treatment men in both categories is significantly higher than that of the control men."
>
> "Married male household heads who work in flowers do more housework than married male household heads who work in other sectors, 69 compared to 47 minutes, and this difference grows even more when adding the factor of their wives' participation. Married and working male household heads do the most housework of any group of men when they work in flowers and their wives do too, 77 minutes. When men work in flowers and their wives work in another sector or not at all, their time in housework goes down to 36 minutes. When married male household heads work in another sector, but their wives work in flowers, their housework time is up to 69 minutes. *Overall, these data suggest that participation of either one or both of the spouses in flower employment increases men's time in housework significantly more so than work in other sectors of the economy"* (emphasis added)
>
> "Married men do almost two hours more of housework per week in the treatment group than married men do in the control group."
>
> "Within the treatment group, married men who work in flowers themselves or have a wife working in the industry spend more time in housework than those who do not work in flowers. Wives in the treatment group spend less time in housework, and even less if they work in flowers."

The CONAMU/Bank report included all of the above figures, again asserting that men in flower zones do more housework than men in non-flower zones; that men employed in flowers do more housework than men not in flowers, and that men who work in flowers and whose wives work in flowers do the most housework of all - 69 minutes a day. In essence then, the Bank asserts that the social reproduction problem has been resolved in relation to the flower industry, through men's greater commitment to domestic labor.

Crucially, the Bank understands this solution to have emerged automatically, as a result of market-driven changes. On a general level, for example, Newman's report argued "while it is true that roles in many developing societies are more narrowly defined for women, pressures from modernization are provoking swift changes" (Newman 2001, np). In particular, there is a trend towards women's increasing involvement in paid work, ensuring that the remaining gap between women's and men's labor force participation will narrow. Thus she responded to findings that women in the flower region still work less than men with the comment:

> "Given the relatively short history of women's participation in paid work, it is not surprising that women work less than men. Women in more developed countries have also been found to work less than men, though the gap is decreasing quickly over time."

The shift in gender roles is hereby framed as a result of modernization and the market, rather than as a concrete policy choice. Rich World countries are the model for the developing world to follow, and progress in achieving gender equality is measured in these terms.

This market-focused analysis is extended to explain men's greater participation in domestic labor. In good neo-classical fashion, shifting time use is "explained by the relatively higher wages for women in the flower industry." The fact that married women earn more than married men in floriculture encourages men to divert activities to domestic labor, since "as their wives' paid labor becomes more valuable, the men shift some of their own relatively less valuable time into housework." Thus the conclusion to Newman's discussion paper asserted that:

> "In the analysis of outcomes in the two sample areas, we saw that employment in the flower industry itself - rather than simply in the treatment area - was linked to even higher levels of men's time in housework. This seems to be related to lower relative wage differences between men and women in the flower industry, though this is not tested directly."

Here the Bank is arguing in effect that the social reproduction dilemma does not actually require concrete policy solutions, since once women's labor time is made more valuable other family members will automatically shift their own behavior. The market will ultimately resolve the problem, by encouraging men to pick up the slack resulting from women's move into paid work.

The Bank arrives at this conclusion regarding the social reproduction dilemma by employing many of analytical concepts identified in previous chapters. Firstly, again gender research is defined as focused on shifting roles within the family, with the household privileged as the key site for analysis. The second of two questions explored by the discussion paper, for example:

> "is whether there is some shifting of responsibility for the unpaid labor, traditionally done by women, to male members of the household. Such a change in participation in housework would imply a shift in gender roles."

The notion of gender analysis as focused on changing gender roles within the family was also evident in the CONAMU/Bank study, entitled *Women and Floriculture: Changes and Consequences in the Home*. This started from the hypothesis that "the presence of the plantations has initiated a process of change in the content of feminine and masculine roles" (Newman, Larreamendy and Maldonado 2001, 29). The use of comparative time use surveys was central to this focus, since ultimately the key claim of both reports - that "women who work in flowers do not work longer hours in a combination of paid and unpaid labor, but that women overall work around 3 hours a day longer than men" (Newman 2001, np) – rests on a notion of gender analysis as involving comparisons between individual men and women, and as aimed at encouraging more equal interactions. In essence then, the social reproduction dilemma is framed not as one involving the flower industry and its work practices, or macroeconomic policy and the pathologies of neo-liberalism, but as one centered on *men* and that 3 hours of work they fail to share with women. The key question is not "how does one reconcile neo-liberal export policies focused on work-promotion for all with the realities of human dependency" – a question firmly embedded in gender analysis - but "What is it about the flower sector that would induce these higher levels of unpaid work by men?" (Newman 2001, np) – a privatizing, family-focused question that concentrates attention on shifts in minutes of time use. For example the CONAMU/Bank study noted that women in flower zones work on average 324 minutes in domestic work a day, with men working 59 minutes (Newman, Larreamendy and Maldonado 2001, 53), while the figures for non-flower zones are 354 minutes and 52 minutes. Successful resolution of the social reproduction dilemma is thus defined as that 7 minute additional contribution from men in the household, in a highly limited notion of gender analysis that endorses (re)privatized care arrangements.

Similarly gender analysis is understood as focused on complementarity, and as including men. Shifts in time use showing men's greater involvement in domestic labor are heralded as "evidence of progress" (Newman 2001, np) wherein women "could work less time in the house and share tasks with other family members, in particular with the men" (Newman, Larreamendy and Maldonado 2001, 81). When discussing the methodological challenges that arise in research on this topic, for example, Newman noted that often male and female decisions are modeled as separate, with women's market participation treated as exogenous to men's decision to carry out housework. However this "non-cooperative model" "would negate the hypothesized interrelation of women's market work and male housework" (Newman 2001, np). Thus the discussion paper was understood to require "a model where time use decisions in all activities are simultaneous and inter-linked across household members." Consequently "household decisions are modeled as the optimization of the weighted sum of individual utilities."

Once again conflict is generally ignored in these discussions. For example, the Newman study found that *men's* beliefs about women's ideal roles in the home played a role in the determination of *their* time and *their* participation in housework, but "for women expressing the belief that their role is to stay home, there is no significant effect on participation or on shares of housework." This suggests either (or both) that women have no choice about their time use because economic need forces them to take jobs they do not want (an explanation which contradicts the Bank's insistence that employment is empowering), or (and) that men and women are not in equal power relationships wherein desires and beliefs are mutually respected, or can be mutually enforced. However the finding receives no explanation in the Newman report; instead the insistence that men will adapt with equanimity to women's increased empowerment through labor, and that loving partnership in the household will successfully resolve the social reproduction dilemma, endures.

The CONAMU/Bank study included more references to conflict than the Bank discussion paper, acknowledging for example that "the changes in roles involve 'negotiations' between men and women in the home, and in this way new conflicts emerge" (Newman, Larreamendy and Maldonado 2001, 11). The industry can also cause family strife through its long hours, since "the time of high demand in flowers (Saint Valentine's, Christmas) can last weeks, creating many problems in family life" (28). Similarly, in relation to marital relationships "there are reports that everything has worked together to improve relations between partners, but there are also reports in which there are more conflicts, precisely due to the rapid change of relative power in the house"(78). That said, however, the study ultimately asserted that these conflicts will diminish as women increase their income. For example, it argued that although most family members were opposed to women's work in the industry, "once they were working, the family discovered the importance of their economic contribution" (29) and became supportive – there is no notion of enduring conflict here. The family becomes accustomed to the change, and benefits from the increased resources, while women get more independence and strength (81); in essence everyone wins. The study also claimed that in Cayambe (a flower region) "it is common that (family planning) is a shared and consensual decision" (70), revisiting a tension between women's autonomy and the desire to get men involved in fertility that was raised in chapter three. Similarly, although the report acknowledged that women's entry into flower employment can cause conflicts within the family and can lead to recriminations against women, in the chapter devoted to the effects of wages on women's status and the family only one quote relates to these negative effects; eight were included for positive effects. The report also included specific quotations claiming that men help more in flower regions, to wash clothes, to care for children and so on; that young children in flower regions do not consider domestic labor women's work because they see their fathers helping in this manner (58); and that social norms defining men as the family provider have been changed by women's employment, leading women to question their home obligations and leading men to start to share, "little by little," in domestic work (82-3). At no point was sustained attention paid to conflict; rather the CONAMU/Bank study rested on a notion of negotiated bargaining within households that minimizes disagreement and privileges notions of harmonious complementarity.

Another manifestation of the Bank's support for complementary sharing partnerships is its concern over the impact of the flower industry on family relations. There is an interesting tension in the Bank's approach here. On one hand there is concern that floriculture is breaking down traditional family relations and introducing dangerous vices into communities, particularly among the young, leading to conservative assertions regarding the need to keep families in tact. As Newman's report summarized, "the expansion in off-farm employment has provided a badly needed income source for rural families, but it has also had a profound impact on the economic and social fabric of rural communities" (Newman 2001, np). The precise nature of these threats to the community fabric received elaboration in the CONAMU/Bank report, which acknowledged that the industry is seen to endanger indigenous identity through reducing commitment to community labor (Newman, Larreamendy and Maldonado 2001, 30), and that it is associated with a range of negative social consequences and family problems, including drugs, gangs, brothels, criminality, neglect of children, divorce, promiscuity, and separation. Women employed in flowers are viewed as sexually promiscuous given the mixed labor force in the plantations, leading to assertions that floriculture is no place for women "of good manners" (respectable women, in other words) (31). Likewise plantations are seen by many as a cause of divorce and separation, since they facilitate affairs which subsequently destroy marriages (43).[xix] Women are also often seen as overburdened with work such that their ability to care for their children is compromised, leading them to feel guilty. The CONAMU/Bank report suggested that these concerns over the abandonment of children are not entirely misplaced, since "currently, the women who work in flowers have little control over the activities of their adolescent and pre-adolescent children" (60). In some respects, then, gender policy entrepreneurs are concerned that the industry is causing a breakdown of the family, increasing support for policies that seem to keep it together.

Two points should be made regarding this concern about family disintegration, however. Firstly, it is not limited to the Bank – in fact I found it more prominent among *critics* of floriculture, who endorsed alarmingly conservative visions of imminent social collapse stemming from women's work. One critical observer told me that communities were being redefined through floriculture, and s/he gave me a long list of negative consequences of the industry. These included the fact that young people were no longer contributing to community labor projects, that discos and bars and drugs and violence had arisen in Cayambe, that youth were forgetting their culture and roots, and that individualism had increased. Other critics claimed that the industry was destroying the family, with women abandoning their children, having abortions, throwing their children in the rubbish, becoming prostitutes, and so on. Part of this concern with women working in flowers is traceable to general unease at women working, to a sense of employed women as a threat to the family, as signifying cultural crisis, as sexually uncontrollable, as liable to abandon their children, and as causing social disintegration. The Bank can actually be the voice of reason here - as the CONAMU/Bank report noted, for example, the belief that there is more infidelity in flower regions persists despite the fact that separation rates are actually the same for both areas (Newman, Larreamendy and Maldonado 2001, 44). In my experience, gender staff at the Bank are *less* likely to pathologize women working in this industry or to participate in exaggerated social panics regarding the imminent collapse of the normative familial order. I never heard from a Bank employee that employment in flowers caused abortions or prostitution, for example, and Bank staff never slipped into conservative, moralizing discourses about the need to "restore" mythical family values, even when criticizing working conditions in the industry.

Secondly, at the same time that the Bank is concerned with social dislocations focused on family breakdown, it also argues – far more strongly – that the flower industry keeps families together. This argument rests mostly on the claim that floriculture reduces male out-migration. There was a "migration boom" to Europe in the Sierra region in 1999 as a result of the economic crisis, leading to important "transformations in gender dynamics in the rural sector" according to the *Ecuador Gender Review* (Correia 2000, 42-7). High levels of male migration to other countries and to Ecuadorian cities, especially in the Sierra and Costa regions, led to an increasing 'feminization' of agricultural production and marketing. Indeed the *Review* recommended the promotion of export-oriented off-farm industries for this reason:

> "rural development policies should consider gender dynamics in migration. Evidence from the Sierra, for example, suggests that agricultural intensification and the improvement of off-farm employment would act to deter female migration, while improving access to land would keep more men from leaving... Non-farm employment and enterprises should be supported" (xiv).

However crucially there was less out-migration in flower regions. In contrast these areas were targets for in-migration, mostly from Colombia and the Ecuadorian coast. Specifically, Newman noted that the flower area had a higher proportion of in-migrants than the non-flower area, a fact "that (is) no doubt a result of the flower industry"

(Newman 2001, np). Similarly the CONAMU/Bank report claimed that "the work in flowers supplied an important alternative to migration outside the region" (Newman, Larreamendy and Maldonado 2001, 16), and that there is much in-migration to the flower region - only 59% of those interviewed were born there, for example. According to this study, "the principle reasons to migrate to Cayambe were: the work, the better income, *and the ability to bring the family*" (20 emphasis added). The flower industry is thus seen as helping keep families together, both by stopping Cayambe men from migrating, and by enabling poor people from other regions to move with their families in tact.[xx]

Finally, floriculture is understood to help families for the same reason that any industry employing women helps families – because women, always-already connected to those families, will act altruistically to maintain them now that they have access to wages. For example the CONAMU/Bank report noted that "the presence of fixed salaries and stable income has introduced various profound changes, for example in the self-esteem of women and in the spending habits of families" (77). These spending changes include the fact that food in households has improved since women started working in flowers, and that more resources are devoted to house repair, education of children, saving, and investing for the future (76). Women were once more framed as ultra-responsible and altruistic with the money they earn. Interestingly the report even argued that they become increasingly attractive to men through such mixing of family love and independent wage earning: it was claimed that young men in the flower region: "have higher esteem for women who work for money (and) contribute to the house", and that they like "the appeal of having a stronger and more independent woman" (79). Men are thus enthusiastic to "court" such female workers (79), reinforcing the sense that the autonomy on offer to women in this industry is one that relies on, and reproduces, their always-already commitment to male partners, and that will successfully shore up family relations.

Evidence refuting this framing is ignored. For example, marriage rates are lower in the flower region, in part due to the generally younger age of the population, but "marriage rates are even lower for women who work in flowers. In addition there are more single women in Cayambe, and more working in flowers" (19). Neither study asks why. Similarly the fact that more money is also spent on clothes and personal items that women desire in the flower region is underplayed. Once more, then, the approach to autonomy embedded within the Bank's vision of emancipation through employment is a profoundly confused one, resting neither on neo-classical notions of radical individuality and selfishness, nor on a genuine support for women's need to be economically independent and self-supporting. Rather working women are again framed as lynchpins of family stability and survival, and their altruistic love for dependents is required alongside their rational commitment to waged employment. In this way the Bank ultimately argues that the flower industry helps keep families together.

In addition, the Bank's claim that the social reproduction dilemma embedded in the flower industry can be resolved through a domestication of men once more rests on some profoundly troubling understandings of masculinity. Men are framed as irresponsible and lazy, and liable to shirk work associated with the household when possible. Newman, for example, insists that "the ratio of adult females to adult males is a household level structural variable that could have an impact on division of household by gender," since "the more females there are, the less likely men will do some part of these tasks" (Newman 2001, np). She does not explain *why* this is so; it is certainly not explained by the focus on wages as causing changes in time use through altering value that apparently accounts for changing gender roles. One is instead left with the impression that men will simply shirk work if women are there to do it – this is hardly rigorous neo-classical modeling.

Although the men and women who work in flowers are, as one Bank employee emphasized, hardly the poorest of the poor from the worst land in the Sierra, they are nonetheless considered to be affected by many of the pathologies affecting the working class. For men specifically these include alcoholism, domestic violence, irresponsibility, poor fathering practices, and infidelity. I was repeatedly told, for example, that flowers had a positive impact in the region by giving money to women, crucial because men drank their money rather than invest it lovingly in the family. When I asked CORPEI's floriculture specialist about labor conditions for workers in the industry, in part of his/her answer s/he stated:

> "and what is interesting is the subject of gender, is how when the woman receives the salary she shares it with the family, because another problem in the lower classes is that when the man receives it he simply wants to get himself drunk, drinking. In this case I believe that the salary is much better distributed"

Once again poor men, or men in poor countries, are framed as particularly sexist and particularly prone to acting out their wounded masculinity through violence, and it is claimed that they contribute less to domestic labor than men in richer nations. Replicating arguments made in D.C. documents that men in poorer countries are more oppressive, Newman asserted:

> "This imbalance (regarding domestic work) is a common finding in developing countries. Developed country totals for men's and women's work when including housework are much closer together...These differences suggest an important

> difference for how work is distributed by gender in a developed county context" (Newman 2001, np).

Similarly the CONAMU/Bank report agreed that "this difference is common in many developing countries and is less common in more developed countries" (Newman, Larreamendy and Maldonado 2001, 52), concurring that ultimately men in poor countries are the problem here. In line with these assumptions the CONAMU/Bank study expected to find increased violence against women in the flower industry, due to men feeling resentment at their replacement as family providers – this expectation of poor men's violence persisted despite the fact that consistent application of neo-classical economics predicts men will be less likely to abuse women who earn money (45; see chapter 3). As usual, the assumed relation did not hold either way – there was slightly less violence in the flower region but the difference was not sufficient to support causal assertions regarding the impact of wages on abuse.

Similarly, given these claims about poor men's increased sexism it is beautifully ironic that the Bank's research on flowers proved exactly the opposite – that men in richer families did *less* housework, which is precisely what a consistent neo-liberal model will predict. The study included household assets as a key variable:

> "under the assumption that wealthier families would be less pressured by economic circumstances to have men take on housework responsibilities, and this is shown by the results. Men's shares of housework and their likelihood of participating in housework are negatively and significantly affected by higher levels of household assets" (Newman 2001, np)

Similarly although Newman claimed that higher education for men "could imply a greater openness on the part of men to share work in the home," men's education was insignificant in the study. She suggested that this is due to counter-veiling pressures stemming from the fact that men with higher education have "a higher opportunity cost in terms of expected wage outside the home." However given the neo-classical approach used in this study, one would not expect a stalemate between these opposing factors (increased attitudinal openness and economic pressures from good labor market prospects). Any consistent application of principles of utility maximization will suggest that better educated men will work less in the home, given the high costs of their time. This was precisely the relationship between time and value used to explain men's greater domestication – there was no perceived need to bring in attitudes there. Applied consistently, the model suggests that poorly educated men, with few good labor market prospects, will be *more* likely to engage in domestic labor than highly formally educated men with good jobs. The expected relationship between class and sexism here should be precisely the reverse of what the Bank predict – yet poor men were *yet again* represented as more backward, traditional, and oppressive that their richer brothers who are doing less domestic work.

The notion that men's involvement in domestic labor reflects a bundle of positive, inherently classed qualities is reinforced by several other expected relationships in the discussion paper. For example Newman predicted that religious men would be less likely to participate in housework, since they would be more "traditional" in their views of women's role in the family, hereby positioning men's involvement in domestic labor as a marker of secular, progressive modernity. Yet the report found that "instead of having a "traditional attitude" effect, being religious (for men) translates into being more willing to contribute to the household." The inconsistency was never explained. Similarly, it was assumed that men living in urban areas would participate more in housework, since:

> "the urban areas are more modern and presumably more subject to men sharing this work. Strangely, however, the results...are negative and significant, the opposite of

> what was expected and not readily explainable....These weak results could indicate that the underlying expectations for urban areas are already captured by the other explanatory variables (such as age, the treatment area, education, etc.)."

The possibility that the core assumption involved here – that modern, better off, urban, sophisticated men participate in more housework than their more sexist, traditional, backward, rural poor brothers - could be wrong is clearly not an option, even when that explanation seems the most compelling in the light of the Bank's own evidence. In fact *again* consistent application of neo-classical principles should have led Newman to predict a *negative* relationship between urbanization and men's participation in housework, since their time is of higher value given its far greater likelihood of being linked to formal paid work. The fact that the relationship was insignificant thus not only challenges the Bank's frequently pathological framing of poor rural men as lazy and sexist, but it also calls into question the neo-classical argument that time use is determined primarily by wage opportunities – an argument used throughout the Bank's work on floriculture to support the claim that the industry empowers women.

In summary, then, the research on women's employment in floriculture carried out by the Bank's gender staff is firmly located in a feminist context that recognizes the importance of unpaid work and the dangers of overburdening women through the "exhaustion solution" to social reproduction. However crucially the institution's staff argue that social reproduction tensions have been successfully resolved in floriculture, since men have taken on extra domestic labor, in essence picking up the slack of caring as women move into paid work. The industry thus becomes the shining example of women's empowerment, and of the successful implementation of the Bank's preferred policy solution to the social reproduction problem: getting men to love better, and to turn that love into extra unpaid work in the family. Although this shift in time use is primarily explained through economic factors, the Bank also argues that men's greater involvement in domestic work reflects the progressive effects of secularism, urbanization, and better education, linking the emergence of better loving couples to a bundle of classed concepts connected to modernization narratives that again end up pathologizing poor, rural men as violent, drunk, irresponsible, unloving, and lazy. This framing persists despite the lack of evidence to support it.

Policy Option 3: Childcare.

To close this discussion of the Bank's approach to the social reproduction tensions involved in floriculture, I wish to briefly consider the institution's comments on childcare, the ever-unsuccessful policy option. The Bank devoted sporadic attention to children and childcare provision in its two studies on women's employment in flowers. For example, a key finding of Newman's report was that the presence of children in the household significantly, and positively, influences the time men spent on domestic labor. As she explained:

> "The number of children was included, despite its correlation with the household size variable, because child-care is considered to be more labor intensive, and perhaps even more important to determining women's participation in work outside the home... The results show that the number of children has an important, positive impact on men's time in the home and it does for women's as well. The strength of this effect is notable given the multicollinearity introduced with household size, yet they have strongly significant opposite effects on time and participation in housework" (Newman 2001, np).

This finding again challenges the notion that men are lazy work-avoiders who pass labor off onto women whenever possible; in fact like other Bank evidence on the correlation between children and men's labor force participation (chapter 3) it strongly suggests that poor fathers are working primarily to fulfill perceived family responsibilities. Moreover, in the justification for including the variable Newman acknowledged that childcare is a key factor influencing women's labor force participation – perhaps the most important one of all. Indeed Talcott's study of workers in the Colombian flower industry argued that women's labor was linked to that of "community mothers" who provide informal childcare in homes – the same group discussed by the Bank in some gender texts (see chapter 3). This form of "outsourcing" social reproduction needs is supported by Colombian flower producers, who help fund the community mothers – usually older women who can not work in the plantations. Thus "embedded in the value of an export-quality flower lives the labor of community mothers" (Talcott 2003, 479), since "if the flower industry is a "globalization success story" for the agents of technomuscular capitalism, then the madres comunitarias are surely its intimate others" (2003, 485). I cite this research to demonstrate that connections between women's employment in flowers, and debates about childcare, are made in several countries, and hence one would expect the issue to be addressed in the Bank's Ecuador research.

It is thus simply inexplicable that this study did not collect data on childcare provision in plantations. The omission is yet more glaring given the fact that there is, in fact, a relatively high provision of such services in floriculture, and indeed the existence of nurseries is frequently cited as proof of the industry's benevolent effects and social responsibility. It was mentioned in *every single interview* I had regarding flowers, without exception – by Bank staff, CORPEI staff, ExpoFlores staff, NGOs critical of the industry, and staff in government ministries involved in promoting floriculture as part of agro-business development. CORPEI's flower specialist claimed that, although not all plantations have childcare facilities,

> "I believe that, yes, many benefits are given to the children of workers. Generally we have health centers, the plantations include lunch, and in many of them there are childcare centers"

Childcare services are also part of the industry's promotional materials. A leaflet in English and Spanish designed to promote "The Farms of Tabacundo" (a key flower region north of Quito) includes a photograph of a smiling child lying in the grass above the caption "Child of the Nursery "Florecitas" (image 21). The text next to the photograph reads: "The farms sponsor social programs such as the Nursery "Florecitas", in which the young children of the flower workers and of the community receive education, nutritious food, and care" (nd, np). The industry and all those involved in promoting and criticizing it thus recognize the provision of childcare services by plantation owners to be an important issue related to women's labor force participation – yet the Bank's study did not include it as a variable. There is therefore no way to know whether women reporting more satisfaction with their employment were in plantations with good services; whether the industry's claims that its services are crucial to its employees well-being are true; whether *this* factor helps explain the reduced hours of women in floriculture in domestic work. The "knowledge bank" – the world's most prestigious and respected development research institution – did not include the variable.

Read closely, however, there is some evidence in the Bank's reports that the issue of childcare provision is far more important than policymakers acknowledge. This is particularly true in the CONAMU/Bank study, which included more of the qualitative



Image 21: Flowers and Childcare

data than Newman's discussion paper. Arguably the interviews and workshops allowed more opportunity for research subjects to raise their own concerns – this is more difficult in a badly deigned survey that does not ask the right questions or collect quantifiable information on the relevant variables.[xxi] For example, information from the focus group interviews revealed that "one of the important changes as a result of the presence of the plantations is that gradually the search for strategies to substitute for the mother in the care of children has been accepted" (Newman, Larreamendy and Maldonado 2001, 59). Specifically, "we discovered that the women who work in flowers, because they can not do all their household tasks, have found various forms of reorganizing and distributing domestic work, including childcare" (57). Elsewhere the report found that:

> "one source of family conflicts is the inability to delegate childcare, or the inability to pay for this service. This problem is one of the most important that women confront to be able to work in flowers" (47).

Yet the remainder of this section focused on *alcohol* and its connections to conflict and violence, in a simply stunning example of silencing the concerns of research subjects.

Moreover, women themselves identified the lack of nurseries as a problem, and as a key reason why they delegate childcare to older children or other female relatives, sometimes for money but sometimes for free (59). As the report acknowledged, "according to the greater part of the interviews," women claim that "although there are childcare facilities, given that these do not offer 8 hours of service, it is a better option to leave their children in the house, paying for their care" (60). The CONAMU/Bank study subsequently – and with arguably insufficient evidence – argued that women prefer to pay relatives as way to redistribute wages within the family, and to ensure that children will be raised by people who guard family customs. However its data seems to clearly suggest that this system predominates because childcare services offered by plantations are inadequate.

While one can not prove any conclusive results regarding childcare from the Bank's data, then, one can certainly recognize that it merited far more attention than it received in the study, and that the research design was fundamentally flawed in ignoring this variable. Indeed I would argue that the Bank's work on flowers is arguably the best – or most egregious – example of the truly damaging effects that certain definitions of gender analysis can have on policy entrepreneurship within this institution. The Bank focuses on intra-family variables, gender roles, tiny shifts in minutes of time use and so on, ignoring supra-household factors related to collective provision for social reproduction, and policymakers hereby miss an apparently perfect opportunity to push for increased childcare services in an industry that is already open to the idea, that already accepts its legitimacy as part of corporate responsibility, and in which women are demanding better services. Rather than leaving women with the impression that they need to move to the flower region, so their men will work an extra 28 minutes a day in the home, or best yet get themselves and their husbands jobs in flowers so their husbands will work seven minutes more than men in other employment, this study might have suggested childcare centers stay open eight hours a day, as women want, or that flower companies stop forcing people to work long hours during peak demand in order that they are not forced to rely on informal arrangements with relatives. Good policy advice could have stemmed from this study, and it might actually have been followed – the flower industry is very concerned about its international reputation, and there are some decent childcare services being provided by companies as a result. Yet policymakers failed to seize the space they were given to promote change in this respect. In the context of this broader project, I argue that this failure is not an isolated example of bad research, but is embedded in the Bank's current approach to gender analysis – one that encourages privatization, that reinforces necessary connections to the family, and that persistently fails to recommend the public policy solutions that make most sense to the social reproduction dilemma. Getting men to share housework becomes more important than getting employers to provide childcare, in a limited and profoundly inadequate solution to the tension between paid work and unpaid labors of care.

Conclusion

In this chapter I have traced the Bank's concerns with women's employment and the social reproduction dilemma through export promotion efforts. I assert that although the state and private companies involved in exports are important actors in this policy field, the Bank has a key role in shaping the loan priorities and structuring interactions between other participants, rendering it legitimate – and I argue necessary – to analyze these actions as in part Bank policies. Indeed these loans intentionally restructure forms of access to political influence in Ecuador, reducing the role of the state and increasing the influence of the Bank and the private sector in an attempt to secure a "neutral" policy environment. Although these loans seem to be gender neutral, and are usually analyzed as such, I demonstrate a clear awareness within the Bank that export-promotion is connected to gender concerns, primarily through its impact on increasing female labor force participation. Gender policy entrepreneurs within the institution thus support export promotion as a result of their own aim to get women into work. I consider this interaction between export promotion and gender concerns in greater detail through a focus on floriculture, an industry with a significant proportion of female employees and on which gender staff in Ecuador have conducted research. This research is firmly located in a feminist context that recognizes the importance of unpaid work and the dangers of overburdening women through the "exhaustion solution" to social reproduction. However crucially the Bank's gender staff argue that social reproduction tensions have been successfully resolved in floriculture, since men have taken on extra domestic labor. Women are empowered, men are domesticated, and once more the Bank ignores the most obvious policy solution, the one that the floriculture industry itself says is important, and the inadequacies of which women highlight as a problem. This stems from the Bank's employment of a profoundly privatizing, heteronormative definition of gender analysis as focused on sharing partnerships and family roles, a definition which concentrates attention on shifts in minutes of time use within the home and yet which fails to collect data on which workers have access to childcare facilities, hereby leading to a wasted opportunity to demand more concrete policy reform. The social reproduction dilemma is resolved here because it is reprivatized, onto the backs of men and women who are framed as hereby liberated, leaving the pathologies of neo-liberal macroeconomic policy untouched.

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[i] See World Bank's comments on Ecuador at http://web.worldbank.org/WBSITE/EXTERNAL/COUNTRIES/LACEXT/ECUADOREXTN/0,,menuPK:325122~pagePK:141159~piPK:141110~theSitePK:325116,00.html. Cite accessed oct 18 2002/may 24 2004].

[ii] The Bank hopes that the pipeline will double oil exports by 2003 (Beckerman and Cortes Douglas 2002, 118). Its construction prompted protests by environmental groups and local communities – it is currently polluting parts of the northern Oriente and the Esmereldan coast.

[iii] See introduction for a brief explanation of MIGA – it basically guarantees projects for private investors in developing countries. Part of the Bank group it is not usually considered part of "the Bank" – that term is typically reserved for the development arms of the institution (the IDA and the IBRD), but it is obviously relevant in macro-economic and pro-export discussions.

[iv] A supplement of $4.8 million was approved for this project in April 2002, to cover extra costs stemming from the economic crisis.

[v] Bank loans go through several stages between proposal and Board approval, and they require certain key documents as part of the preparation, proposal, approval, review, and final evaluation process. Project Information Documents involve descriptions of proposed projects; Project Appraisal Documents are latter-stage evaluations of further advanced but still unapproved projects, and Implementation Completion Reports are end-stage evaluations of closing projects.

[vi] Closing was extended to allow project completion. This is not unusual; see chapter 7.

[vii] I was told that MICIP ran the advertisement for 2 of the jobs on the 31 December 1999 in the first edition of a newspaper that issued two editions for the last day of the year – most people bought the second. This job advertisement required applications to be submitted to MICIP by the 2nd of January 2000, suggesting that "certain people had already been favored for the positions."

[viii] A key question here is the extent to which the Bank is itself in part culpable for this misuse of funds. See Winters (2002) for a discussion of the bank's role in corruption in Indonesia. In this case, certainly the Bank stepped in and took prompt action to stop mismanagement of resources – staff were sacked, loan reimbursements were delayed, and new provisions were written into loans currently under negotiation. This suggests that the institution's goals are in conflict with those of the state in some key ways. I am inclined to support this explanation given the excellent salaries of Bank staff (making them unlikely to engage in corruption), and the strong institutional focus on clear audits and transparent accounting – everyone I spoke to who had connections with Bank projects was exhausted by the endless missions and audits, expressing a sense of being "evaluated to death" (Young 2002,176) also identified by other Bank scholars. That said, however, on the other hand one observer claimed that the Bank was far too lax in its system of control, in an attempt to be diplomatic and gentle with borrowing governments, and this had increased opportunities for corruption. To clarify, I asked whether s/he felt there had been a lack of supervision of this particular project on the part of the Bank – s/he smiled and said no, it was not a lack of supervision, but a lack of interest – the Bank did not CARE about the corruption and thus ended up being part of it. This suggests that Bank staff involved in macroeconomic projects – mostly out of the country, with few day to day contacts with the loan disbursements – are not sufficiently invested in the loan to act to stop the misuse of funds; money thus flows to state agents who misuse it with implicit sanctioning by the institution. It is unclear whether this sanctioning was evident in this project, but the issue was raised by some people connected with the loan. However it must be emphasized that this was NOT the case in relation to the other Bank activities in Ecuador researched as part of this project (the indigenous development loan PRODEPINE covered in the next chapter and the broader activities of the Bank's gender consultants in chapter 4). I got the information on the corruption involved in the TIP in 2 weeks, in interviews with about 5 people in Quito and Guayaquil. I spent 4 months researching PROPEPINE, over 2 years, interviewing far more people, in offices all over the country, and I also participated in the day-to-day activities of this project. I never heard or saw anything suggesting that funds were being misused by the office itself. Similarly I interviewed almost every gender consultant associated with the PROGENIAL funds – again, noone mentioned the misuse of funds or corrupt hiring practices, even in interviews with people who disliked each other and who told me other personally damaging information. The gender and social development activities seemed to me to be run transparently and cleanly. This can not be said of the

macroeconomic loan. I suspect that this is explained by the fact that the gender activities and the social development loans are run out of the Quito office, by staff who have strong day to day contact with the initiatives, and who were heavily involved in the minutia of project activity. The TIP was run out of D.C.; the Bank staff person who knew most about it and to whom I was always directed when I asked who to talk to in the Bank was hardly ever in the country, and by June 2004 (less than a year after the project closed) there was 1 person left in the Quito office who know anything about it – the head of the Bank's resident mission. However his role was minimal, and he directed me to his D.C. counterpart. This was a project prepared, implemented, and evaluated, by D.C. staff, which is true of most of the Bank's macroeconomic loans in the country. In any respect, though, the fact that the corruption is in the macroeconomic loans and not the social development ones is a beautiful irony given the insistence by the Bank's hardcore macroeconomic staff that *they* are the objective technocrats preserving the Bank's core mission of neutral development aid against threats of special interests (Fisher).

[ix] Several researchers have argued that the lack of attention devoted by GAD scholars to these questions of restructuring is a serious problem, and that scholarship which did not take into account macroeconomic issues, or which did not attempt to influence debates therein, was fundamentally flawed; see Sen and Grown 1987; Baaker 1994/2003, Folbre 1994, Elson 1993 and so on.

[x] Feminist scholars also highlight the gendered nature of many export industries; see Ong (1997) for example.

[xi] A methodological note is in order regarding the legitimacy of using these texts as evidence of "Bank policy". The discussion paper was funded by the Bank's Gender and Development Thematic Group, the Gender and Poverty Thematic Group, and the World Bank Research Committee. It was intended to influence the forthcoming policy-paper on gender, *Engendering Development* (see chapters 1-3). The objective of these background papers was to initiate discussion on important findings, and thus the Bank issued them quickly, "even if the presentation is less than fully polished." The description of the background research papers states: "The papers are preliminary and carry the names of authors and should be cited accordingly". Thus Newman's paper can not be read as a formally cleared Bank text reflecting official policy endorsed by regional or D.C.-based managers, as the Ecuador Gender Review can. However, the Newman discussion paper IS a site from which to analyze gender policy entrepreneurship within the institution, and it is included on this basis. The CONAMU/Bank text can be read in the way. Although not strictly a Bank text, this was a report on Bank research written by a Bank consultant and a person who would, as a result of this study, be hired as a Bank employee in the Quito office.

[xii] The head of ExpoFlores, the association of flower exporters, insisted that it was the ONLY export industry in the region, but producers of textiles, handicrafts, music, and so on may disagree (see Meisch 2002).

[xiii] This breakdown of the export market is identified by several observers as a key cause of the poor social and environmental record of the industry, with US consumers notoriously uninterested in the ethical dimension of their purchases. In contrast Germany is pressuring the industry to implement a Flower Label Program, a stamp of approval enforced by external observers including NGOs to certify that plantations operate in a socially and environmentally responsible manner. CORPEI, NGOs, and the industry itself all acknowledge that these pressures are European derived, and are not particularly relevant to the US market – the same is true of the recent scandal over child labor in banana plantations, which led to a sharp drop in sales to Europe but was irrelevant to American consumers.

[xiv] Molly Talcott raises similar concerns in her 2003 article on women workers in the Colombian flower industry, and she also argues that working conditions have worsened in that country due to labor reforms undertaken in the 1990s in line with IFI advice.

[xv] I did not conduct in depth research into labor conditions in the industry and this chapter is not focused on that issue. I was, however, shown photographs by an NGO as part of a project in which workers in plantations were given cameras and asked to document their jobs. One showed a person spraying chemicals onto plants inside a greenhouse, wearing head-to-toe protective equipment. 10 feet from him was a woman cutting flowers, wearing no protective equipment at all. Another photograph showed a young female child, certainly under 10, tending plants in a greenhouse. Similar scenes are documented in a video on floriculture put out in the Ecuadorian NGO IEDECA. There are several excellent critical studies on floriculture in Ecuador – these include Norma Mena's (1999) report on the consequences of the industry in Cayambe, and Jaime Breihl's work on the health effects of flower factories (2003).

[xvi] Research involved a survey of 562 households, 37 interviews with individuals, nine focus groups, seven participatory workshops, and four life histories.

[xvii] There is no mention of unions here, perhaps not surprisingly given that the industry is mostly non-unionized.
[xviii] PRODEPINE made the same claim about "traditional gender roles" involving home-bound women in communities where women define themselves as workers – see chapter 7.
[xix] This is a fascinating producer-focused discourse of prostitution and promiscuity given the connections between flowers and romance, love, and heteronormativity at the consumer end of the industry
[xx] This is not necessary an entirely positive development – while the flower industry does indeed keep families in tact by enabling them to work together, all the members are only working together in the plantation in the first place because wages are insufficient to support dependents. Furthermore the fact that many plantations employ members of the same family is one of the reasons for continued child labor in this industry - this is also true in banana plantations.
[xxi] The preference for surveys and easily quantifiable data is itself a function of institutional constraints regarding what evidence is considered compelling in discussion papers – see intro and chapter 1 re: discussion of pressures regarding quantification. See also Jennifer Terry's (1999) brilliant reading of sexologist research for the way marginalized people talk back in interviews.

Chapter 7: Gender, Work, and Social Reproduction in Project-Based Lending: PRODEPINE.

Introduction

In the last chapter, focused on policy based lending, I explored the connections between export-promotion, employment, and gender policy in Ecuador through an analysis of the flower industry. In this chapter I shift attention to a final dimension of the Bank's gender lending in the country, involving project-based work. I explore one of the most prominent project-based loans in the Bank's contemporary Ecuadorian portfolio, PRODEPINE, focused on rural development among indigenous and Afro-Ecuadorian communities. Having demonstrated first that the Bank is a key policy actor in this site, through interviews, project visits, and document analysis I examine the gender activities carried out by Bank staff in conjunction with the loan, focusing particularly on the attempts made to get women into productive employment. I argue that work emerges as central to the Bank's gender activities because it is linked to productivity and empowerment, and because in this case it is understood to stem from community demand – an understanding I complicate in this chapter. Once more I argue that the Bank's gender policymakers are aware of the social reproduction tension that emerges as a result of their prioritization of women's work, providing the necessary basis for the concrete policy solutions analyzed in chapter 8.

Afro-Ecuadorian and Indigenous Development.

As noted in the introduction, Ecuador's ethnic diversity is difficult to analyze given the complexities surrounding group affiliation.[i] Indigenous people are anywhere from 10 to 40% of the population, depending on the study cited (Collins 2004, 39). The 2001 census claimed that 7% of people were indigenous and 5% were Afro-Ecuadorian, but indigenous organizations claim that they represent a third or more of the population (World Bank 2004e). Such categorizations, of course, have very grounded effects. While 46% of Ecuadorians are poor according to recent national poverty measures, indigenous poverty rates are around 86% (World Bank 2003e, np), and "indigenous and afro-Ecuadorian people have the worst living conditions, the lowest schooling levels with inappropriate educational systems, serious unemployment levels, minimal access to health services, and (face) severe social and economic discrimination" (government implementation completion report in World Bank 2003e, np). Indigenous and Afro-Ecuadorian rural people also experience persistent racism, evident in the most casual of social interactions – bus journeys where mestizo drivers will not stop for indigenous people, or where they are not given seats, and so on.

However these categorizations are yet more complex given the fact that they shift depending on context. As Marisol de la Cadena points out categories of Indian and mestizo are relational, and people label themselves and others in their community as mestizo if they have contact with urban sectors, if they work in urban jobs and so on (1995, 330). Men are more likely to identify as mestizo and women are more often relegated to rural Indianess. Categories of ethnic affiliation are thus open to political contestation, and have become far more important in recent years as people have moved from "campesino" discourses of mobilization which suppressed ethnic identity to "indigenous" discourses (Pallares 2002).

Indeed the mobilizing of indigenous groups is one of the most important recent developments in Ecuadorian politics. Like many other Latin American states, Ecuador's nation-building project was a whitening one, based on discourses of civilizing Indians and constructing a path of national progress that either excluded indigenous peoples, or that incorporated them based on their coerced acculturation. The state policy of *mestizaje* (often translated as "blending" but involving a coerced whitening process) framed white culture as superior, and understood assimilation as part of an anti-poverty strategy (Meisch 2002, 201; Radcliffe 1999; Whitten 2003). As Janet Hendricks argues in an essay on the Shuar (an indigenous group in the Amazon), the mestizaje ideology promoted in development programs rests on the notion that all Ecuadorians have an Indian heritage; this eliminates, by default, the "Indian problem" (1991, 56). Accordingly, "as Ecuador extends its cultural hegemony into the Shuar territory through missionaries, schools, colonization, and development projects, it also spreads an ideology of Ecuadorian nationalism and a policy promoting ethnic assimilation that equates progress with Whiteness and Christianity as well as economic development" (1991, 55). The idea of state development thus hinged on curing indigenous people of their perceived dirtiness, subsistence agriculture, and so on: "the state would no longer shoot at a pregnant woman but rather find new purpose in "developing" her: help her feed, educate, and nurture her child into a healthy citizen who is integrated into the nation" (Colloredo-Mansfeld 1999, 70; Larson 1995, 36).

Ideologies of contamination and hygienic racism thus merged with those of development in ways which continue to resonate with the development community. In one fascinating recent example, Archietti charted a national state project of changing "traditional" guinea pig production and consumption practice as part of developmentalist ideology "which has achieved an almost 'religious' status in Latin America" (Archietti 1997). This effort, oriented to indigenous women, aimed to remove guinea pigs from people's houses, put them in hutches, control breeding scientifically, commercialize production and so on (119). Indeed Olivia Harris claims that the very definition of Indianness in the Andes is identified with limited market participation, poverty, and backwardness (Harris 1995b, 349); thus, as de la Cadena argues, the process of mestizaje still involves ideas of "learning to work" (1995, 340). These state development strategies were inherently aimed at the erasure of indigenous existence, and the denial of the possibility of blackness. As Jean Muteba Rahier argues in an essay on Afro-Ecuadoran female sexuality, there is absolutely no place for Afro-Ecuadorians in the mestizaje framework – they are "the ultimate Other, some sort of historical accident, a noise in the ideological system of nationality, a pollution in the Ecuadorian genetic pool" (2003, 300).

Importantly, however, mestizaje has been challenged by recent assertions of indigenous identity, and seems to be being replaced by an emphasis on multinationality (Whitten 2003, 16). Such assertions are in part motivated by anger at neo-liberal reform measures such as cuts in subsidies and price deregulation, and also at state and IFI-backed activities in the Amazon (Treakle 1998). As Albo argued in a recent overview of Ecuadorian indigenous political mobilization, "the changes wrought by neoliberalism have often been catastrophic for indigenous peoples, particularly in the opening up of land markets and the new activities of international corporations in indigenous areas" (2004, 31; see also Sawyer 2004). Such measures were one cause of the 1990 national indigenous uprising, involving a national strike, road blocks, and land seizures (Black 1999). Likewise indigenous people protested at the 1994 land reform which privatized common land, and eventually the supreme court changed it, removing private control of water and recognizing collective land claims (Treakle 1998). These uprisings strengthened Pachacutik, an indigenous-based social movement party that has won important gains in recent elections and which runs on anti-neoliberal platforms. Indigenous groups successfully pushed for important changes in the 1998 constitution, which celebrates the pluricultural and multiethnic character of Ecuador, and which recognizes collective rights of indigenous people who define themselves as a nation (Albo 2004, 26). Moreover, indigenous organizations responded to the 1999/2000 economic crisis with a massive march to Quito and a blockade of the country's roads, demanding Mahuad's resignation and supporting the coup attempt (which involved the president of the country's most important national indigenous organization) (Collins 2004, 38). This mobilization of indigenous groups against neo-liberal reforms is a crucial part of the background against which Bank efforts should be analyzed in this policy site.

PRODEPINE: An Overview.

PRODEPINE is the Indigenous and Afro-Ecuadorian People's Development Project. It was a joint project between the Government of Ecuador and the Bank (which loaned $25 million of the $50m project costs), although it also involved smaller financing from multi-lateral development organizations such as the Inter-American Development

Bank. The loan was proposed to the Bank in 1996, appraised in 1997 and approved in January 1998. The projects it funded ran until June 2004, when a follow up loan, PRODEPINE 2, was put in place. According to the borrower's implementation completion report (prepared by and reflecting the official position of the government), the goals of PRODEPINE were to build managerial capacities among indigenous and Afro Ecuadorian organizations, "to integrate indigenous and Afro Ecuadorian peoples into democracy, incorporating their own view of development," to reduce poverty by diversifying income and employment, and "to develop the ability of State institutions to implement a decentralized participatory planning system that responds to the demands of indigenous and afro-Ecuadorian communities" (in World Bank 2003e, np). The loan had four original components reflecting these aims:

a) Institutional strengthening of local indigenous and Afro-Ecuadorian membership organizations and communities, particularly in 7 indigenous communities identified as "at risk," in order to develop capacity in local development planning, financial management, "cultural patrimony", and human resources development (World Bank 2003e, np).

b) Regularization of land and water rights, including government purchase of land and support (such as legal reform) for titling[ii]

c) Rural investments. This was the largest component of the project, taking up US$26.7 million (53%) of project costs at appraisal. It financed "demand-driven, small-scale investments and subprojects" (World Bank 2003e, np), including those for natural resources management, community-based economic and social infrastructure, training, technical assistance, and micro-enterprises. These investments required matching contributions from municipalities and communities, in the latter case usually through work projects known as *mingas*.

d) Institutional strengthening of the implementing agencies.[iii] These state organizations were to be strengthened through training in finance and administration, in order that national policies for indigenous and Afro-Ecuadorian development could be better designed and implemented.[iv]

PRODEPINE 1 was run out of a national office in Quito, and seven regional offices; I focused research on the Northern Sierra (Sierra Norte) and the Northern Coast (Costa Norte). PRODEPINE employed 70 staff, 15 of which were in Quito. The loan was administered by professionals drawn from CODENPE (the state's indigenous development council), the education sector, and NGOs, including some with decades of experience in indigenous development. They were a mix of mestiza, indigenous, and Afro-Ecuadorian people. Staff understood PRODEPINE's aims in much the same way as highlighted above – to raise the quality of life of people in rural areas, to increase wages, income, and productivity, and to improve access to public services such as health, education, and infrastructure.

The Bank, the government, and the staff employed by the loan considered PRODEPINE to be a success; one employee claimed that it "rates 'double A.'" According to the Bank's Implementation Completion Report the loan rated satisfactory in all respects, and the evaluation team decided not to provide a Highly Satisfactory rating only due "to a shortfall in the provision of counterpart funding from GOE (government of Ecuador)" (World Bank 2003e, np). Likewise the final report submitted by the Sierra Norte office claimed that the core goals and objectives of the loan had been met (PS report June 2004). Specifically, the Bank pointed to successes in "improv(ing) the quality of life of many poor rural indigenous and Afro-Ecuadorian communities," in "diminish(ing) the negative impact of the economic crisis" on those groups, in promoting participatory planning, in increasing the capacity, confidence, and public visibility of indigenous and Afro-Ecuadorian organizations, in "encourag(ing) the democratic inclusion of Afro-Ecuadorian and indigenous peoples in the state," and in delivering social services cheaply and efficiently to remote areas. Support was given to scholarships, books giving "cultural profiles" on certain groups, music, videos, cultural events, community training, and rural investment subprojects involving everything from greenhouses to potable water projects. As the Bank summarized it, then, "in general the Project has produced a qualitative change in many of the Afro-Ecuadorian and indigenous communities, which have increasing confidence in their abilities to improve their future, and the participatory approach used, has proven to be an important vehicle for decentralization and social empowerment for their communities" (World Bank 2003e, np).

Following this perceived success, the government requested a follow up even before the loan closed, and PRODEPINE 2 was approved by the Bank in June 2004. The Project Information Document for this loan, written in April 2004, describes it as seeking "to promote the empowerment, and improved access to natural and financial resources for indigenous and Afro-Ecuadorian communities within the framework of their own development and interculturalism" (World Bank 2004f, np) The Bank will fund $34 million of $45 million project costs; the government pledged $6 million and the Bank anticipates matching funds from beneficiaries to the value of $5 million. PRODEPINE 2 involves few substantive changes from the first phase, and it is likely to be implemented in much the same way.

The Role of the State and the Bank.

The Ecuadorian government supported the project for several reasons. The Implementation Completion Report from the government highlighted the roots of PRODEPINE in awareness of the disproportionate poverty, poor education, illiteracy, unemployment, and lack of access to basic services suffered by rural indigenous and Afro-Ecuadorian communities (World Bank 2003e, np). The government traced this exclusion back to conquest, although it also noted that it is "being aggravated by the effects of macroeconomic models and their respective development policies" (government implementation completion report in World Bank 2003e, np). In addition, the government understood that indigenous and Afro-Ecuadorian communities offered the potential for a new approach to development, grounded in solidarity networks and cultural traditions that could be used as a resource for rural improvement. This characterized the "ethnodevelopment" approach that made the project so innovative. As described in the government's report:

> "Despite their diverse economic practices, communities conserve their social cohesion when facing conflicts, promoting their demands and participating in festivities, cultural events and ritual acts. Thus, material poverty among indigenous and afro-Ecuadorian communities has its counterpart in customs and practices that are different from other social groups, with solidarity networks based on family and community ties, which reproduce social unity through labor sharing and deeply-rooted forms of reciprocity that maintain family relations as a means of economic and social survival, as well as ancestral knowledge, lore and practices that reflect priceless traditions and cultural wealth. Besides their language and sense of ethnic identity, the distinctive features of indigenous and Afro Ecuadorian communities include attachment to their ancestral land and a rich cultural heritage" (government implementation completion report in World Bank 2003e, np).

In addition to this interest in using the cultural resources of indigenous and Afro-Ecuadorian communities as a component in rural development, and in strengthening "the family" as a basis for income growth, PRODEPINE was also popular with the state in part because of the important political role of indigenous communities in the 1998 constitution recognizing Ecuador as a multi-ethnic and multi-cultural country. The Bank describes this constitution as "one of the most advanced of Latin America" (World Bank 1997c, np) in terms of its recognition of collective rights, and mobilizations associated with it pushed the government to endorse concrete actions to alleviate indigenous and Afro-Ecuadorian poverty. As the implementation completion report put it, "the struggle of the Indian and black nationalities and peoples of recent years has generated conditions that have motivated the national government and international organizations to design support programs to benefit the said populations" (World Bank 2003e, np). The success of the coup in January 2001 in ousting Mahuad further strengthened the political hand of indigenous groups, and the reliance of the new Gutierrez government on support from this sector reinforced commitment to PRODEPINE, as the Bank's ICR recognizes: "these circumstances (of the attempted coup) might have indirectly benefited the Project, by raising governmental commitment to the indigenous sector." (World Bank 2003e, np)

That said, however, concrete government support for the project faltered after the economic crisis, and by the end the counter-part funds provided by the state amounted to just 18% of those promised at appraisal (World Bank 2003e, np). [v] Indeed one Bank employee associated with the loan claimed that the Gutierrez government had reneged on its commitments to the indigenous communities who brought it to power, and was concerned at strengthening them further for fear of another uprising – s/he considered this a manifestation of state racism. PRODEPINE staff were negatively affected by this lack of state support. When I visited in 2004 as phase 1 was closing the accountant in the Sierra Norte was having to draft legal letters to get long past-due money sent by the state so that s/he could pay the electricity and water bill, and the office could not afford to buy disks so that material on microcredit initiatives could be backed up. More seriously, none of the project staff in this office – recognized as one of the most successful in the country – were retained in phase 2, in what everyone I spoke to took as a reflection of government nepotism.

Given the waning support expressed by the Gutierrez administration the Bank took an increasingly important role in PRODEPINE, and yet again Ecuadorians with connections to the project claimed that the Bank provided the most consistently supportive role:

> Kate: How was the role of the World Bank in the project?
> X: Excellent… look, for me the World Bank was excellent, from which point of view? From the fact that the World Bank is an organization of its word, no? If you have an agreement, it fulfills it. It doesn't come tomorrow and tell you we are changing it. And secondly because the World Bank sends its missions opportunely to resolve problems opportunely, right?

In this respect the Bank was compared favorably to domestic organizations who could not be trusted to keep their word, or who lacked the resources or motivation to follow through on problems once they were identified.

The Bank supported the loan largely due to its "non-conventional" (World Bank 2004f, 2) nature in its concern with poverty reduction, "ethnodevelopment" and decentralization. It aimed to channel assets and services directly to poor indigenous and Afro-Ecuadorian rural communities, and thus "it went largely outside the broken centralized government system, using ethnic affinity groups to transform dependent communities into proactive groups empowered to address their development problems directly" (World Bank 2004f, np). For the Bank, this approach reflected a "general recognition" that proper decentralization was the key answer to the problem of rural development, and that the state should support community investment rather than attempt to provide services itself. In addition, as the Implementation Completion Report saw it:

> "The identifying vision of "ethno-development" challenged the conventional approach to the misconceived regional "indian problem." It was a ground-breaking attempt to use indigenous culture's positive qualities to promote local employment and growth. The willingness of the GOE (Government of Ecuador) and Ecuadorian society to follow this vision was properly recognized by the identification team as a unique opportunity to address local development issues in a completely new context" (World Bank 2003e, np).

The Bank's role in project identification was rated as "highly satisfactory" on this basis.

In addition, as noted by both critics and advocates, PRODEPINE also drew indigenous and Afro-Ecuadorian organizations closer to the state, bureaucratizing them to some extent and inculcating standardized forms of political behavior. For example, although the seven "at risk" groups were no better protected at a direct result of the project (according to the Bank because they refused to participate due to legacies of distrust and suspicion), with PRODEPINE support other groups contacted them and "were able to publish dictionaries and alphabetization charts of their native language and to prepare and implement local development plans" (World Bank 2003e, np). On a more general level, as the Bank put it in a discussion of the project's "Institutional development impact,"

> "Perhaps most importantly the Project was able to convert a general protest mentality within the target groups to genuine concern for development. It created linkages to local governments and introduced many people to these political processes. The Project provided GOE (the Government of Ecuador) with a timely response to public protests and unrest, while developing or reinforcing a culture of administration of

> resources with accountability, controls, and deliverables. In short, the Project helped separate political discussions from technical ones" (World Bank 2003e, np).

Similarly the PRODEPINE 2 Project Information Document reiterated the concern that indigenous poverty, illiteracy, unemployment and so on, "restrains investment opportunities and creates conditions for social unrest" (World Bank 2004f, np), and it linked the initiative to broader economic reform efforts on this basis, since it would help ensure macro-economic reforms were socially sustainable. Hence:

> "its strategic value lies in tackling the lack of social inclusion which constitutes one of the key obstacles to poverty reduction in Ecuador. To reduce poverty, sustained economic growth needs to be complemented with reforms that address inequality and increase the access of the poor to basic services. The project will contribute to this objective by increasing the capacities and assets of the target groups, by decentralizing decision-making to the level of the communities themselves and by helping the Government raise the profile of indigenous issues in selected sector ministries" (World Bank 2004f, np).

In this way the project will help the government respond to a "restive indigenous movement" opposed to its longer-term reform measures.[vi]

The Bank is very proud of its role in PRODEPINE. The institution self-identified as:

> "one of the few lenders/donors directly involved in helping the Ecuadorian government efforts to reduce indigenous and Afro-Ecuadorian poverty…The Bank has played a key role engaging in the development dialogue with indigenous and Afro-Ecuadorian organizations as well as with government institutions created to serve their needs" (World Bank 2004f, np).

It was the Bank's first foray into ethno-development, and it was publicized considerably within the institution as a pioneering "best practices" example. The Bank regards the model of local participatory development pioneered in PRODEPINE as having proved *so* successful that it is being replicated with PROLOCAL, a $25 million loan focused on rural poverty alleviation and development for groups not covered by PRODEPINE.[vii] The project is mentioned in the most recent Country Assistance Strategy as evidence that the Bank is responding to civil society recommendations, that it takes social development concerns seriously, and that it realizes how "ethnic, spatial, and gender considerations need to be built into policy and project designs in a consistent way to ensure access for the poorest…in the particular case of indigenous populations, it is essential to take into account cultural values tied to ancestral traditions that may differ from those of the majority population" (World Bank 2003a, np). Staff involved in the project also used it as evidence that "now the Bank has opened the door a lot to work with the indigenous." Several PRODEPINE staff have also been invited to Bank events at the Latin American and Caribbean level and in Washington D.C. itself to give information on the project, and PRODEPINE is mentioned in a recent Bank-wide publication entitled *Faces of Inclusion*, as evidence of the Bank's commitment to participatory social development (World Bank nd, np).

The Bank had direct influence over the project from the start, assigning a staff person in Ecuador to work with it on a day–to-day basis (a social anthropologist). Several other Ecuador-based Bank employees also had considerable involvement in PRODEPINE, as did the "task manager" for the loan who was located outside the country. As the Implementation Completion Report put it, "Bank management recognized the unconventional aspects of the project concept and assigned the region's most qualified staff and consultants, with an emphasis on social and anthropology skills" (World Bank 2003e, np) – these were not standard economists by any means. My observations confirmed this impression of staff who "provided a strong skill set and the highest regard for development impact." Unlike staff in the national and regional offices, the Bank's own PRODEPINE team is remaining in place between phase 1 and 2, leaving them with the key institutional memory. The Bank supervised the project very closely, and, given its high level of financial commitment and the stalled contributions of the government, it watched the budget carefully. Project files are full of memos, FAXes and e-mails of "no objection" from the Bank's task manager for specific proposals for intercultural fairs, CDs, videos, microcredit evaluations and so on, showing the high level of involvement the Bank had in everyday project decisions. In addition, the core Bank staff member assigned to the project was treated as a highly respected insider in PRODEPINE's national office in Quito; s/he showed up unannounced and had access to all offices, computers, and staff, and her word was a guarantee that employees would talk to me. The Bank also regularly solicited – and got – the involvement of many PRODEPINE staff in Bank activities. In one case in 2002 frantic FAXes were sent to the Nicaraguan ambassador to expedite a visa request in order that a PRODEPINE staff member could attend a Bank event at the last minute. The FAXes (including one from the Minister of Social Welfare) all cited the Bank's invitation as a key justification for the request, suggesting that if the intervention of the Government Of Ecuador was not sufficient, the Bank's support might be (indeed it was).

When the Bank and the national level implementing agencies disagreed over the budget, the Bank won. For example in January 2002 the Bank staff person responsible for PRODEPINE at the regional level sent an e-mail to the project regarding the proposed budget, asking why new activities had been added without approval. S/he was particularly concerned about an added component for the institutional strengthening of CODENPE and CODAE which increased the budget from $375, 000 to $512,000, and s/he insisted that this be scaled back to "reasonable levels." Similarly, in late January 2001, in the midst of national protests against the government that would eventually lead to the overthrow of Mahuad and the election of Gutierrez, the head of the Bank's resident mission sent a jumbled memo to the executive director of PRODEPINE postponing an intercultural fair funded through the project due to the possibility that the event "could, although unintentionally, be a motive that is taken advantage of in order create (a situation) in which unrest could arise."[viii] There was no suggestion that this cancellation was open to negotiation.

Similarly when the government and the Bank went head to head, the Bank won. This is not necessarily to criticize the Bank; indeed the Bank's objection to the afore-mentioned attempt by CODENPE and CODAE staff to secure their own institutional survival by diverting resources to their own "strengthening" is ultimately one grounded in the Bank's interest in transparent accounting. Likewise, the Bank probably had a democratizing role by winning a key fight over the term "nationalities and peoples" within the project, a legal assignation that was used by state agencies:

> "as a tool to try to exclude from the Project groups not strictly organized by ethnic "nationality", such as indigenous people organized by religious affiliation or by economic or social class like Campesinos. This approach was opposed by the Bank, as it ran counter to the inclusive and participatory principles on which the Project was designed" (World Bank 2003e, np).

By pointing out the Bank's veto role over the state in these areas, I am not arguing that it is necessarily normatively wrong – here the Bank's decisions seem to have sometimes improved the project's democratic, participatory nature, and sometimes (particularly in the cancellation of the fair) limited it. On a basic level, however, these observations again confirm the importance of analyzing the Bank as an independent policy actor in the loan.

PRODEPINE, Gender, and the World Bank.

The original PRODEPINE proposal did not include attention to gender. A gender component was added in the middle of the project, due to Bank intervention. One Bank employee claimed that when s/he was hired, after the start of the project, s/he recognized that it was "very gender biased", and thus s/he insisted on increased attention to gender in the mid term review. S/he was supported in this by the Latin American and Caribbean Gender Unit, which had already secured space for gender entrepreneurship within Bank projects through the PROGENIAL initiative (see chapter 5). A collaboration between PROGENIAL and PRODEPINE was thus proposed by the head of the Gender Unit, and in September 2000 the head of PROGENIAL and the head of PRODEPINE signed a two year agreement of cooperation to this effect. It promised to provide sensitization and capacity-building training for PRODEPINE staff and leaders in community organizations, to collect gender disaggregated data, to do consultations on how to improve the treatment of gender in PRODEPINE, and to provide information on gender, including a specialized bibliography (World Bank 2000f).

PROGENIAL applied for and received a technical assistance grant from the Japanese government to fund these activities. The Project Information Document for this grant promised that the PROGENIAL/PRODEPINE collaboration would: 1. review and collate information by gender from 120 local indigenous development plans produced as part of PRODEPINE; 2. adapt project methods and establish gender disaggregated development indicators; 3. develop annual operational plans with a gender perspective and build staff capacity on gender issues; and 4. prepare and deliver capacity –building activities for indigenous leaders on pertinent gender issues (World Bank 2000f, 2). As PROGENIAL's proposal to work with PRODEPINE summarized it:

> "This loan is supporting (the provision of) technical assistance in gender in government agencies responsible for the implementation of programs of social and economic development, with views to strengthening public policies, programs and services in order to provide a better response to the different needs of women and men, and in order to increase gender equity and equity in general. This loan is seen as a model for the construction of capacity-building in gender in the Bank" (6).

$232,1000 was received to assist PRODEPINE in taking gender differences into account in this way, funding activities including workshops, case studies of gender roles in pueblos and nacionalidades[ix], and a study of the impact of a microlending initiative directed at women.[x] A "consultant on cultural heritage and gender" was appointed in Quito; later the project also hired a consultant on Afro-Ecuadorian gender issues on a short-term contract using the grant money.

The incorporation of a gender component into PRODEPINE was, of course, not without its difficulties – some national staff were skeptical, and regional offices varied in their support for the workshops and capacity-building events. Gender was seen by some as an external imposition, and as breaking principles of reciprocity by encouraging a focus on individual women. There were clashes between the Bank and PRODEPINE gender staff, and the latter in turn clashed with each other over the prioritization of indigenous versus Afro-Ecuadorian needs. Gender staff also faced difficulties within PRODEPINE; one observer claimed that the organization's gender consultant had few friends inside PRODEPINE, that s/he faced internal discrimination and resistance, and that gender was not taken seriously, with many male staff making sexist jokes. Likewise in monthly memos to the national gender consultant the Afro-Ecuadorian gender specialist reported excellent support from the Sierra Norte office but hostility from her bosses in the Costa Norte, who were refusing to answer her requests for information or implement the gender matrixes she designed.

That said, however, the overall impression I received from Bank, PROGENIAL and PRODEPINE staff and other development specialists who knew about the gender initiative was that the collaboration had been a success. The efforts were mentioned in the recent Country Assistance Strategy as proof that "the Bank has built greater gender consciousness into its portfolio of investment projects," and the *Ecuadorian Gender Review* stated:

> "indigenous people's initiatives should be strengthened so that they address gender differences and disparities. Measures being taken by the World Bank financed PRODEPINE Project to review country- wide participatory assessments from a gender perspective are an example of what can be done" (Correia 2000, xii).

One Bank employee felt that PROGENIAL had helped the project "do gender in a way that was value added for them," by developing concrete instruments for integrating a gender focus. Gender was incorporated into discussions on inclusion and equity, and the panic caused by the collaboration (mocked by one employee as a concern about "what will we do, women will take over, they will stop wearing skirts") receded. The gender consultants hired for PRODEPINE were also respected more broadly, and their work was held up by CONAMU consultants as a good practices example. In terms of concrete activities, in 2001 in the Sierra Norte region the project funded a diagnosis on gender and culture, eight workshops on gender sensibilization, and one capacity-building event for PRODEPINE staff. PRODEPINE also produced a VHS video on experiences of development with identity involving a focus on the equity of men and women, and a large amount of written work on gender; nine case studies, reports on workshops and capacity-building events, evaluations of microcredit initiatives and local development plans with respect to gender, guides for gender indicators, and so on. Indeed the Project Information Document for PRODEPINE 2 cited 22 studies and evaluations from PRODEPINE 1 in its bibliography; 10 are to do with gender (World Bank 2004f, np).

Gender was also included in many of the broader evaluations done for PRODEPINE, suggesting that the profile of the issue had risen. For example the "Heifer" study on organizational capacity-building and institutional strengthening – the most extensive evaluation done of the project – included data on gender representation in the leadership of organizations with which PRODEPINE worked, on the numbers of women and men who received training (Larrea et al 2002, 8), and on the participation of men and women in the participatory local development plans used to identify community needs (36). The Sierra Norte evaluation of PRODEPINE, written in June 2004, actually put this gender focus into the original project objectives, claiming that "one of the important characteristics of this project is to strengthen development of those sectors marginalized from state action, attempting to secure respect for cultural identity, natural resources, *and motivating the participation of women inside those processes*" (PS report 2004, 1 emphasis added). Similarly the Bank's evaluation of phase 1 stated that failing to include gender from the start was a mistake, and it cited the mid-term intervention of PROGENIAL to finance gender studies and train "gender promoters" to correct his oversight (World Bank 2003e, np). Ultimately the Bank concluded that "in order to have a more comprehensive approach to inclusion, attention should be given to gender differential issues during appraisal" (World Bank 2003e, np), and thus gender has been integrated from the start into phase 2.[xi] In short the gender activities carried out in this loan – itself a best practices example for project lending – were understood to be successful, and thus assessing them critically is of crucial importance given that they are likely to be replicated in other Bank interventions.

This is all the more pertinent given that the Bank was the crucial actor in PRODEPINE's gender efforts. I was told by PRODEPINE staff that the Bank asked for focus on gender and therefore it was incorporated into the project. The Bank had an important role as a producer of knowledge about gender in Ecuador, and Bank reports were cited in many written documents put out as part of the PRODEPINE-PROGENIAL collaboration. For example the PROGENIAL proposal to work with PRODEPINE stated as part of the relevant background information that:

> "over the last couple of years, the GOE (government of Ecuador) has sought guidance from the World Bank on gender concerns. As a result of the dialogue, the Bank has financed studies...and is seeking to enhance the implementation of the Indigenous People's and Agro-Ecuadorian Development Project by strengthening its gender focus" (World Bank 2000f, 3-4)

The Bank's *Ecuador Gender Review* (see chapter 5) was also cited as an authoritative source on gender in several documents, including the case studies on gender and ethnicity produced by PRODEPINE.[xii] Moreover, PRODEPINE staff frequently cited Bank gender material to garner support for their own gender work – Bank support for gender was invoked by staff trying to get a gender specialist in the Costa Norte office, for example. One proposal for gender indicators put out by PROGENIAL for PRODEPINE tried to legitimize gender analysis by noting both that the Ecuadorian government have changed the constitution to take it into account, and that "for its part the World Bank established a focus on gender as a policy in September of this year, which signifies that projects...must lay down clear objectives and concrete strategies regarding this subject" (PRODEPINE 2002, 17).

However the Bank's role in PRODEPINE's gender work went far beyond one of knowledge production and provision of convenient citations. The institution was active in this work on a day-to-day level and shaped it in important ways. For example a September 2000 workshop on gender equity involved PRODEPINE's national gender consultant (funded by the Bank), two PROGENIAL consultants (working out of, and paid by, the Bank), and the Bank's social development specialist, who was in charge of PRODEPINE at the country level – s/he explained empowerment. PROGENIAL also asked for and received the support of the Bank's indigenous development specialist for the technical assistance activities undertaken for PRODEPINE.[xiii] These interactions between PROGENIAL and PRODEPINE to secure attention to gender also involved Bank staff from the Latin American and Caribbean gender unit, and the Bank's task manager for PRODEPINE; s/he sent several "no objection" e-mails for gender activities, including for the appointment of an Afro-Ecuadorian gender specialist.

Furthermore, the Bank reached out to PRODEPINE gender staff on several occasions. The head of the Bank's resident mission in Ecuador invited PRODEPINE's gender consultant to a Latin American seminar on gender in Quito in 2000; the next year s/he was invited to a Bank-organized event to celebrate women's day. When PROGENIAL was evaluated by Bank missions in 2001 and 2002, D.C.-based staff from the Latin American and Caribbean gender unit met with PRODEPINE staff, and the director of PROGENIAL asked PRODEPINE's gender consultant to set up meetings with indigenous and Afro-Ecuadorian female leaders for the mission. Indeed in May 2002, in advance of a June evaluation of PROGENIAL, the Bank's Latin American and Caribbean gender unit contacted PRODEPINE's gender consultant directly asking for information on the project; when s/he did not answer they contacted the head of PROGENIAL and the Bank's core PRODEPINE staff member in Ecuador asking that they get the necessary information from the consultant (they did). PRODEPINE was central to this visit; mission staff spent longer with the project than with any of the others in which PROGENIAL was involved (a day and a half in a five day trip), and visits were made both to the PRODEPINE national office and to the countryside to see the benefits of microenterprise initiatives and scholarships. Latin American and Caribbean gender unit staff also reached out to PRODEPINE after the missions, paying for the project's gender consultant to go to Nicaragua in November 2002 to participate in a PROGENIAL workshop and present on the loan after PRODEPINE's director turned down the original invitation due to lack of funds.

This high level of Bank engagement could result in outright cancellation of events or ending of discussions. For example the memo of a June 2001 meeting between Bank, PROGENIAL and PRODEPINE staff to coordinate pending activities raised the possibility of "affirmative action" in PRODEPINE to get more women into higher-level jobs. The Bank employee in charge of PRODEPINE at the national level remarked that this "is not a policy of the World Bank and already has generated certain resistances in other projects;" the discussion ended at this point. Similarly a memo sent to the national office from the Afro-Ecuadorian gender specialist in June 2002 mentioned that two workshops on gender "were suspended by a decision of the World Bank."

More frequently, however, Bank staff guided gender activities, and did not have to exercise vetoes over PRODEPINE action. Bank staff corrected requests written by PRODEPINE gender staff for the documentary video on ethnodevelopment and gender and the three case studies on gender and ethnicity, and in one case they urged more concrete activities in order that the Bank would approve the proposal. Bank staff also sent "no objection" e-mails to PRODEPINE's director on shortlists drawn up for the gender consultants appointed as part of the PROGENIAL grant. One key Bank employee acknowledged his/her high level of involvement in the project's activities by stating that s/he had worked very closely with PRODEPINE's gender consultant because the latter lacked experience with gender, and thus needed support to ensure s/he could produce results that would convince Bank and PRODEPINE staff of the importance of the theme. The Bank's employee said this in part to correct a misunderstanding that had apparently arisen during stage 1, in which the national gender consultant felt that the Bank employee was interfering in his/her work and trying to take too much control. The dispute is further evidence that the gender activities undertaken under by PRODEPINE were *Bank* activities, making it more than legitimate to analyze this project level output as *part of the Bank's gender own policy.*

Prioritization of The Need to Get Women into Work.

Getting women into productive work was a core objective of the Bank's gender activities in PRODEPINE. Interviews with Bank and PRODEPINE staff all revealed a sense that women's lack of access to productive employment was a development problem, and all prioritized interventions designed to correct it. For example the Bank's indigenous development specialist (who worked closely with the PRODEPINE project and who presented workshops for it on gender and ethnicity) emphasized that indigenous women have few employment opportunities, and are often relegated to sectors of the labor market with low pay and poor conditions, such as domestic work. This led to migration, both to cities within Ecuador and abroad. In response, s/he argued that communities needed investment to support women in creating their own businesses and commercializing their subsistence production. Although s/he stressed that all rural people needed access to such activities, PRODEPINE also needed specific women-only projects designed to increase productivity, a point reiterated by a specialist in the Costa Norte office. S/he claimed that women had been excluded from productive activities, and were rarely given opportunities to participate in work; rather they were relegated to the home and given domestic tasks. PRODEPINE should organize women to overcome this, to make the most of their capacity to participate in productive activities. Likewise PRODEPINE's gender consultant saw a need to improve access to productive activities in order to increase income for women, s/he specifically stressed the need to get ensure women had skills to access better paying positions in the community employment projects generated by the loan.

Written documents associated with PRODEPINE's gender activities also emphasized women's employment, and the original PROGENIAL proposal to work with the project was heavily focused on women's employment. In arguing that much progress had been made to reduce gender disparities in the country, it gave as its first example: "women's labor force participation has steadily increased over the last 2 decades, whereas the proportion of men in the workforce has declined" (World Bank 2000f, 4). Progress in education was mentioned after these comments on labor force participation; fertility rates were mentioned thirdly. However the report quickly went back to employment, arguing that women's labor force participation remained a development problem during economic crisis even though "the proportion of women with a secure job is greater than that of male workers," because "it may be difficult for women to secure new income sources during economic downturns" (4).[xiv]

Women's lack of productive work was also marked as a development problem in several other PRODEPINE gender activities. In a 2002 PROGENIAL proposal on gender indicators staff emphasized the importance of measuring who got access to employment through PRODEPINE, the chosen careers of those students given scholarships through the program, and the insertion of women into non-traditional work.[xv] When the Latin American and Caribbean gender unit visited the project in 2002, themes of interest included PRODEPINE's attempts to "improv(e) access and control over opportunities, resources, and investments for indigenous and Afro-Ecuadorian women," and conversely when these attempts were absent, the project was criticized. For example a case study of participatory local development planning faulted organizations for failing to develop plans to enhance women's productive activity (Aulestia 2002, 21), and it insisted that "commercialization (of products) is a problem for women" (24), requiring development intervention. PRODEPINE's national gender consultant sent $5000 to the Costa Norte office to finance the commercialization of artesanial products by one group of indigenous women, for example. Staff were also concerned at women's lack of access to jobs within PRODEPINE itself. This issue was raised by the Bank's indigenous development specialist at a workshop on gender equity in September 2000, and again by the head of PROGENIAL, who noted that women were predominantly employed in low-paid administrative positions.

In addition, the projects privileged by PRODEPINE's gender staff were those associated with getting women into work and/or developing their productive capacity. This is particularly evident in relation to the microcredit Caja Solidarias program. The Caja Solidaria initiative emerged in 1999 as an emergency safety net program funded by the International Fund for Agricultural Development (FIDA, in Spanish), to provide flexible credit to vulnerable people at risk due to the economic crisis. Seed capital was given to small associations (with a minimum of 15 members) of rural indigenous and Afro-Ecuadorian women to stimulate rural savings and investment in productive activities. From the start of 1999 to the time the project was evaluated at the end of 2001, 525 Caja Solidarias had been founded with 12,220 members, 98% of who were women. Interest rates varied; in the Sierra Norte they were between 4-5% monthly (Guamán 2003, 17) and in the Amazon they reached over 30% a month in some cases. These high interest rates led one PRODEPINE staff member to refer to the project as one involving loan sharks, a term s/he also used for the Bank itself.

Although most of the money for this initiative came from FIDA and the Bank's relatively tiny PROGENIAL grant, it was prominent in all of the conversations I had with Bank and PRODEPINE staff, and by 2003 it had become the emblematic "women's project" to which I was always directed when I told people I was researching gender in the loan. As one PRODEPINE staff person put it, "when people in the project think about gender they always think of the Cajas Solidarias." Similarly when staff from the Latin American and Caribbean Gender Unit's evaluation mission for PROGENIAL visited in 2002, the first theme of interest listed for them was the Caja Solidaria program and the $14,027 given in credit thus far to indigenous and Afro-Ecuadorian women. The mission subsequently met with some groups during their visit. The Afro-Ecuadorian gender specialist (funded by PROGENIAL) devoted much of his/her short time with PRODEPINE to working with Caja Solidaria groups, and both the Costa Norte and Sierra Norte offices hired full-time staff to coordinate Caja Solidaria activities.[xvi]

Staff working with the Caja Solidarias understood them as providing credit to generate productive activities. Thus the Sierra Norte Caja Solidaria coordinator emphasized to communities that proposed projects needed to be for productive activities, not consumption or health. Appropriate projects included commercial activities, artesanial production, restaurants, and microenterprises. Staff in the Costa Norte office mentioned that Cajas Solidarias were funding artesanial projects with a hope to access export markets. Similarly the Afro-Ecuadorian gender specialist suggested that the Caja Solidaria initiative include "capacity-building in productive micro-businesses" in order that the project could improve the quality of life for the rural poor,[xvii] and in the Costa Norte Caja Solidaria groups focused on projects to raise chickens, start shops, and commercialize the collection of shells. A Sierra Centro evaluation of the Caja Solidarias insisted that each be seen as "a financial enterprise" (Guamán 2003, 25), and it recommended more credit to stimulate investment in productive activity that generates profit, and more capacity-building training for small businesses (26). Moreover, the May 2002 national evaluation of the Cajas Solidarias produced for PRODEPINE assessed groups based on their success in developing and strengthening productive activities, and on their degree of commercialization and organized business activity (Camacho 2002, 5). The study also mentioned how many Cajas Solidarias from the Sierra Norte region participated in an Intercultural Fair in Lima to sell artesanias produced using

PRODEPINE money (44). This credit program was thus essentially a work initiative for the Bank, designed to increase women's involvement in productive activities in order that they generate income. The centrality of the Caja Solidaria program to PRODEPINE's gender activities thus provides further evidence of the broader centrality of efforts to get women into work in the Bank's project-based lending.

Why the Employment Priority Emerged

a. It fits with PRODEPINE's existing emphasis on rural productivity and efficiency

In part the focus on getting women into productive employment emerged due to the overall focus of the PRODEPINE loan on increasing productivity and employment as a core component of rural development. The Bank cited the government's commitment to increase competitiveness and "promote a more flexible and dynamic labor market" (World Bank 1997c, np) in the Project Information Document, and the rural investment component – the largest in terms of budgetary commitments - was described as aiming "to diversify and/or intensify rural production" (World Bank 2003e, np). The government wrote in their own evaluation that "Indigenous and afro-Ecuadorian communities...have little or no means of production, are illiterate or scarcely schooled, have limited production know-how, few work skills, and lack access to social and productive services and infrastructure" (government implementation completion report in World Bank 2003e, np). These factors "limit stable access to an already weak labor market in Ecuador," and lead to Afro-Ecuadorian and indigenous people being concentrated in poorly paid jobs.

Furthermore the Bank understood the promotion of community participatory work as one of the most important successes of the PRODEPINE loan, emphasizing how projects:

> "mobilized significant labor time by all beneficiary communities which was provided under reciprocity mechanisms, thus reinforcing social capital and providing for its application to the delivery of goods and services. Subproject implementation was generally accompanied with a great sense of pride and ownership, which bades (sic) well for the future sustainability of the investments" (World Bank 2003e, np)

This sense that work commitments signify community ownership of the project and increase sustainability was reiterated in the second phase, which raised requirements for local counterpart investment in microenterprise subprojects (usually provided through community *mingas*) from 30% to 40% (World Bank 2004f, np). Other "lessons learnt" from the first stage of the project included that "in order to be sustainable natural resource management practices…must be linked to income generation" (World Bank 2004f, np), and that "any successful model of "development with identity" must overcome a traditional basic-needs approach and must facilitate opportunities to generate wealth through productive initiatives based on the culture" (World Bank 2003e, np).[xviii]

Non-gender PRODEPINE staff also repeatedly emphasized the problem of low productivity and unemployment. The head of the Costa Norte office highlighted PRODEPINE's role in supporting small community-based industries such as bakeries, rice processing plants, confectionary initiatives, chicken farms, wood processing plants, bars, and shops. He stressed that employment was generated by all of the 74 PRODEPINE projects in the Costa Norte, since they all required architects, technical specialists, engineers, and community labor for construction, for example. Likewise a specialist in the Sierra Norte office framed the core development problem to which

PRODEPINE was directed as lack of investment for productivity in two interviews, a year part. As s/he understood it, small companies could not compete due to low productivity and lack of access to credit; this put a brake on national development. Thus all of his/her suggestions were directed to this problem – ensuring universities produced more technicians and engineers; getting private companies involved in financing studies to improve profitability and productivity; improving technology in classrooms; and increasing access to irrigation in order to raise crop yields.

This framing of development as focused on the generation of productive activity was reiterated in a written evaluation produced for PRODEPINE's Sierra Norte office in June 2004. This defined projects as sustainable or successful in part depending on whether they had generated income (Silva Delgado 2004, 2). On this basis 52% of Sierra Norte subprojects were successful, 16% were averagely successfully (generating productive activities that were only enough to minimally maintain the project rather than produce a significant profit), and 31% failed, stimulating no productive activity (2). Most of PRODEPINE's activities in this region were directed to either productive infrastructure such as greenhouses, the raising of small animals, and the commercialization of artesanias (41% of subprojects), or social infrastructure such as potable water provision and school construction (44% of subprojects). Like the Bank, the Sierra Norte office considered the aim "to rescue the *minga* as an ancestral form of organization and work, in order to satisfy (the community's) basic needs" (6) as one of the loan's most important achievements; another was the heightened awareness by community members of "new productive alternatives, beyond the traditional ones, that offer the possibility to improve their income, using criteria such as: novelty of the product, market demands, requirements of new markets" (11). It too identified low productivity, bad quality control, and lack of new technology to improve production as key "brakes" on development (11-12). Having criticized the financing of subprojects in which "the communities do not have production experience or, even worse, when those goods or services produced have an uncertain market" (5), this report recommended "strengthen(ing) processes of technical assistance and capacity-building in the communities, in a continuous and systematic manner, to improve processes and productive outputs, given that this is one of the most serious problems that confronts the country's agricultural sector" (5-6).

PRODEPINE's gender activities were importantly shaped by this preexisting emphasis on rural productivity and employment generation. The sense of "fit" between loan priorities and the activities of gender staff to increase women's access to productive work is nicely illustrated in the report on the collaboration between PRODEPINE and PROGENIAL prepared by the head of the latter in March 2002. This noted that "although (PRODEPINE) did not work with a focus on gender," the project did help to "strengthen (women's) productive contributions through the micro-credit program for women known as "cajas Solidarias"" (1).[xix] Indeed one Bank employee stressed that PRODEPINE projects were not just for women in this respect – they aimed to generate productive activities for the community, since the imperative to invest in local entrepreneurship and agricultural production was perceived as a broader rural development strategy oriented towards poverty alleviation. Another PRODEPINE employee argued that the project's gender activities were directed to the same overarching objective with which

PRODEPINE itself was concerned – "to help people of limited resources and to improve the quality of life of our rural people with productive projects."

The "fit" between PRODEPINE and a focus on women's employment was reinforced by two specific factors: an emphasis on the need to show project results using efficiency discourses, and the sense that women's increased labor force participation was a market-driven inevitability to which PRODEPINE was merely responding. PROGENIAL staff directed attention to how "the incorporation of gender has contributed to efficiency and effectiveness in project services," asking staff to describe such benefits "in precise form" in a 2002 questionnaire. As argued in chapter 1, employment-focused projects are perfect fits for this emphasis on efficiency and productivity. However at the project level, given that roles, rationales, and organizations are so intertwined, it is often unclear whether these pressures for efficiency-related discourses are actually external to gender staff at all. In the case of PRODEPINE, staff ended up using these efficiency rationales in order to justify their own projects to themselves, all the while arguing that they had to show results in this form to help convince others of the need to invest in gender. For example, one Bank gender policymaker claimed that s/he was pressured by macroeconomists within the institution to produce rigorous research on gender that had practical import (see chapter 5), yet s/he also said that the PRODEPINE team itself was only interested in numbers – on how much land had been transferred, on which water resources had been secured and so on. They thus did not support the efforts of the national gender consultant, since the focus on gender complicated these already difficult technical questions still further. The Bank employee responded in part by demanding a high level of technical rigor in the gender studies undertaken for PRODEPINE, since s/he felt the need to justify gender research in technocratic terms to the project. Yet this pressure was interpreted by PRODEPINE's gender staff as stemming from the Bank itself. In short the Bank's gender policymakers were trying to convince PRODEPINE (a project they funded) of the need to include gender (an initiative they proposed and again funded), by urging an emphasis on efficiency-related benefits as if it were an external constraint to which staff need to respond in order to get support for their projects. Meanwhile PRODEPINE staff felt pressured by the Bank to produce quantifiable results on the efficiency of their subprojects, and anything that generated employment or that raised involvement in productive activities was seized upon by a myriad of actors to prove the legitimacy of their efforts, often to themselves. This ended up strengthening the focus on women's work, even as all agencies pointed to others as the causal agent driving the concentration on efficiency in the first place.

In addition to framing a focus on women's employment as a way to prove the benefits of PRODEPINE's gender activities to each other, gender staff also claimed that the focus was inevitable, and reflected market-driven factors rather than policy choice. Much of this discussion concentrates on male migration, represented as a market-driven process to which the project should respond. For example one PRODEPINE gender consultant informed me that by default the project's employment generation activities had become a female-focused effort, since ultimately they were the source of recovery given male absence due to migration. In this sense women's shift into productive activities is understood as caused by broader market forces, rather than by project activities. The same point was made by one of PRODEPINE's Caja Solidaria coordinators, who advised me to walk around a nearby town to see the paucity of men and the importance of women working. This notion of male migration as an inevitable market development leading to women's greater labor force development reiterated the argument of the Bank's *Ecuador Gender Review* that male migration to urban labor markets and the subsequent feminization of production and agriculture in the 1990s had transformed gender dynamics in the rural sector. This report, and the associated notion of men's migration and women's increased labor force participation as an inexorable market-led development to which the Bank is responding rather than helping to cause, was used in PRODEPINE's case study on the Kichwa of Toacazo (Vallejo Real 2002b, 21). This study stated that "the general tendency, as much at the urban level as the rural, is the growing incorporation of women into the work force," caused by male migration which leads "women to demand credit for expenses or productive undertakings" (28). Getting women into productive work is thus a popular initiative for PRODEPINE staff in part because it does not look like an initiative – it has been caused by market forces, and projects are simply responding to needs stemming from external sources.

b. Employment Empowers Women

Several Bank and PRODEPINE staff claimed that giving women access to income through engaging them in productive activity empowered them. In this sense the justification for getting women into work mirrored that evident in formally-cleared policy texts. For example the 2001 description of planned activities for the cultural programming component of the loan sent to the Bank by PRODEPINE's gender consultant aimed "to strengthen and develop innovative activities that permit the development of artesanial production activities carried out by organized (groups of) women,"[xx] as part of the broader effort to promote women's capacity-building and increase their self-esteem. Similarly several case studies argued that getting women into work will ensure they are inserted into decision-making regarding land use, technology and so on (Vallejo Real 2002b, 22), with one evaluation of local participatory development planning claiming "where there are greater levels of access and control of resources and benefits is in women's productive projects, where they are the managers and beneficiaries of their own work" (Aulestia 2002, 11).

The emphasis on employment as empowerment was particularly important in relation to the Caja Solidaria initiative. The Terms of Reference for the study into the impact of the program highlighted the need to look at whether women have changed their position within families, and at relationships between "credits and women's economic autonomy" at the family, organizational, and community level. Indeed the "very positive impact" associated by staff with this program was in part due to the sense that it was changing gender roles by getting women into productive activities. For example one Caja Solidaria coordinator told me that the results for the program had been "incredible", registering profits of $5000 and $6000 from investments of $600, and that it was "super-interesting" how women had been empowered as a result. Another stated:

> "I am very satisfied because I have seen that people's self-esteem has been greatly elevated, of the women especially, of the directors, not only because they have a responsibility to look after and take care of the money, but also because the Project has built their capacity, if you understand me. There were many people who before barely knew how to read and write and who now know how to add and subtract and multiply and divide and make a percentage and calculate, they know how to do bookkeeping, so they say "good, I have not wasted time" because this serves them, to help them afterwards with their children's homework... So I believe that we have covered much in this...Not only to teach people how to do bookkeeping but also to make them understand that this person is worth a lot, you understand? Not only because the money is in her hands but because she has to distribute and administer this money well – its a very big responsibility"

Staff in the Costa Norte also claimed that women had started to be in charge of families because they had money as a result of the microcredit program, while those in the Sierra Norte office understood the Caja Solidaria program to be very successful since it met women's needs for money, thereby raising empowerment and self-esteem. One employee in the Esmereldas office stated that s/he had researched:

> "really how much the quality of life in these homes had improved, the quality of life of the women, if really the self-esteem of the women compañeras had been elevated...since they started to have renumerated work, productive work, since previously although they did social labor it was not renumerated. So (the Project) started to change the panorama of the compañeras of Esmeraldas a little"

Empowerment was understood firmly as self-reliance and self-help within these conversations. Consider this summary of the project's success from one regional staff member:

> "our cajas solidarias became conscious that they did not have to wait all the time with their hand extended, waiting for the World Bank or FIDA or whatever organism to come and give them money. No. What we did in the capacity-building workshops was make sure that they realized that if they wanted something they have to make an effort themselves and make sacrifices themselves. You have to beable to be animated and make an effort and not just be like this "I am a poor little woman, I need" and only with complaints – no. These women here need solutions."

They were empowered because they designed and implemented the solutions themselves – they were liberated because they were self-reliant. Similarly PROGENIAL staff saw the Cajas as helping "strengthen women's autonomy," since the provision of credit reduced economic dependence on family members.[xxi] The 2002 evaluation for this project stated that "credit has permitted (women) to raise their self-esteem because they are also supporting family income" (Camacho 2002, 4). This was in part connected to women assuming new roles outside the domestic sphere due to family survival needs (5), although credit was also associated with changes in women's position in the family and community (5), and with increased economic autonomy (50). Specifically, credit to stimulate productive activity "has permitted them to strengthen their traditional productive activities and move into other areas that before were not accessible to indigenous and Afro-Ecuadorian women" (40). This is an extension of an argument regarding the emancipatory effects of employment that I have traced since chapter 1 of this dissertation, and it is not surprising that it is prominent in the loan.

c. The Community Demanded These Projects

The final key reason why the attempt to get women into productive employment succeeded as a policy priority in this loan is that staff insisted that the communities with which they work demanded it. This insistence is central to the notion that PRODEPINE responds to the development needs of the rural population rather than imposing its own vision of improvement – it is one of the core features differentiating participatory "ethnodevelopment" from old-style modernization approaches. Specifically, communities wanted infrastructure, credit, capacity-building activities, and microbusinesses to generate employment. Policies to get women into work were also framed as stemming from community demand, and therefore the evaluation of the Caja Solidaria program insisted that at no point did PRODEPINE specialists suggest market activities to the groups – "there was no technical intervention that helped the producers to promote their initiatives" (Camacho 2002, 44). Thus the fact that "one of their principle lines of action is credit to initiate or extend productive activities" is because "that is most solicited by the needy groups" (23) – not because it was an outside intervention. Similarly I was told by one PRODEPINE employee that:

> "the women became very enthusiastic on the issue of developing and commercializing artesanias. They wanted loans to improve artesanial microenterprises...they were very motivated to work."

Evaluating the validity of these assertions is complex. Some of the productive employment projects certainly seemed to be welcomed by the communities involved, and this should be factored in to any analysis of the loan that seeks both fairness and effective critique. Many of the written reports produced by PRODEPINE in which the communities have a voice seem to confirm the notion that productive employment is demanded by "the people." For example in a group exercise on problems faced by the community at a 2001 PRODEPINE workshop, participants listed "lack of entrepreneurial culture, low productivity, (and) lack of sources of financing."[xxii] Likewise when asked to give proposals for the future at a 2002 gender workshop, community members suggested investment in productive activities, especially for women, securing access to international markets for artesanias, getting space at the train station to sell handicrafts to tourists, and so on (Muňoz Consejal 2002). Demands for productive activities were also made by people interviewed as part of the 2002 case study on gender and ethnicity in Cotopaxi; specific suggestions here included "a loan to raise chickens, guineas pigs, and sheep" (Vallejo Real 2002b, 64), capacity-building in weaving and embroidery, "improvement of seeds and production" (64), "credit and capacity-building in the management of small plots", microenterprises, and processing of lacto-products (63-66). Similar suggestions were made by women involved in the case study in San Lorenzo (Vallejo-real 2002a, 78-80; 82-3). When people here were asked their needs, they responded with a focus on employment: “at the economic level the central problem that they mention is the lack of sources of work” (78).

The voices of community members evident in PRODEPINE’s evaluation of participatory local development planning also seem to confirm that productive employment projects are a response to community demand. Men in one community organization stated that “they require better sources of employment to improve the economic situation of their families and to counteract migration,” while women also mentioned the need “to generate sources of employment” (Aulestia 2002, 40). People in other organizations studied for this evaluation mentioned “low productivity in agriculture and livestock breeding, the need to generate projects that raise the productivity of the land and of farming” (40), and the need “to generate sources of employment beyond agriculture, to encourage productive programs in agricultural work”, “to do capacity-building with groups of women in microenterprises.”

This emphasis on employment and productivity was also evident outside of written texts. I went to a meeting with a Caja Solidaria in the Sierra Norte region in June 2003 in which PRODEPINE staff were thanked extensively for their support in the provision of microcredit and the grant of money for furniture and office equipment with which to administer the Caja. I went back to this Caja Solidaria alone the next year and spoke with the President and her father – both pressured me to lobby PRODEPINE staff to continue funding their microcredit initiative, and he told me enthusiastically about his desire to develop productive activities in the neighborhood. PRODEPINE’s loans were received with similar enthusiasm in another Caja Solidaria project in a neighboring community, which had funded a small shop (images 22, 23, and 24).

Image 22: PRODEPINE meeting for Caja Solidaria, Sierra

Image 23: PRODEPINE-funded microenterprise

Image 24: PRODEPINE-funded microenterprise

I also visited a greenhouse project in the Sierra Norte in 2003, alone – it was advertised by a broken sign containing the PRODEPINE logo (image 25). The greenhouse had half a plastic roof - the other half was strewn around the surrounding mountain, leaving the crops inside open to the elements (image 26). The woman working inside said that the plastic broke often; it had been constructed by outside contractors from Cayambe, but the land was prepared by a *minga* in the community. The project was not profitable, since prices for the tomatoes being grown were very low. Behind the greenhouse was another PRODEPINE project, involving brick troughs for compost (image 27). The husband of the woman in the greenhouse said that although initially the project did well, with the help of PRODEPINE engineers who trained him in how to process rubbish, it was no longer profitable – the price for compost fell, the project had disagreed with the local municipality over collecting market rubbish, and the motor provided to help process the compost was stolen. Most of the troughs were empty. However he enthusiastically told me that now the community has proposed a new project for a pig farm; one can make a lot of money raising and selling pigs, he said, and he motioned to half way up his thigh and noted that the black ones can get that big… I raise this example not only because it shows the persistent attraction of development initiatives as the next "get rich quick scheme," but also because it confirms that PRODEPINE staff are sometimes right – some people *do* demand projects to increase involvement in productive activity as part of their vision of rural development, and the loan *can* legitimately be framed, at least on occasion, as responding to these articulated needs.

Image 25: PRODEPINE sign, Sierra

Image 26: PRODEPINE project, Sierra

Image 27: PRODEPINE project, Sierra

That said, however, on other levels this claim is relatively easy to refute. Firstly, assertions regarding the need to get women into employment persisted despite the claim by women in many of these communities that they already worked. For example when asked to define masculine and feminine characteristics in a gender workshop in the Sierra, women identified themselves as defined by the term "trabajadoras" (workers) (Muñoz Consejal 2002, 5). Similarly when asked to identify what defined them as Afro-Ecuadorian women, women in a PRODEPINE case study mentioned repeatedly that they were workers, with one stating:

> "I identity myself to be a struggling woman, a worker. I say I am a black woman because I struggle, because I know how to work" (Vallejo Real 2002a, 70).

These were the same women that the Costa Norte office felt needed integration into productive activity.

Moreover, the notion that PRODEPINE staff had no role in promoting the productive activities funded by the loan is simply not true. One PRODEPINE staff member described his/her role thusly:

> "the role that I carried out was to strengthen capacity-building processes...to design them in many cases because we also designed projects, we didn't only evaluate them – we also designed projects."

Examples included mills and irrigation projects. Moreover in several meetings with women frustrated by the Caja Solidaria program due to the inability of members to re-pay loans, one PRODEPINE staff member understood her/his role to be to help women develop successful microenterprises by suggesting ideas to them; these activities did not seem in the least part community driven. For example in one failing Caja s/he suggested first baking and selling bread. When the women pointed out that none of them knew how to do that s/he shifted to selling fish to places where prices were higher, selling juice, and selling ice-cream. S/he finally mentioned a cooperative in a nearby town to which PRODEPINE sent a facilitator to teach women how to make clothes – this cooperative eventually gained a contract to make uniforms for local colleges. This staff person also pushed the idea of the sewing cooperative to another failing Caja, in which most of the money was being loaned to provide for family welfare when people got sick. Elsewhere, the PRODEPINE staff member tried to get a Caja's President to join him/her in a scheme to buy cheap sheets and towels from Quito to sell back in the community; s/he knew a factory that produced the sheets, and s/he offered the Caja use of the car that look her/his sick mother to the capital twice a month to facilitate the business.

After being asked three times who suggested the productive projects carried out by the Cajas Solidarias, another coordinator of the microcredit initiative, in a different region, finally replied with a smile that most of the time s/he did – among the activities s/he suggested and that were subsequently carried out by these groups were bingo, food and drink provision at football matches, the purchase of hats in Ambato and their re-sale at higher prices locally, organizing local dances and charging an entrance fee, running betting services for volleyball, and setting up community shops. My observations of PRODEPINE thus categorically refute the notion that "there was no technical intervention that helped the producers to promote their initiatives" (Camacho 2002, 44) (images 28 and 29).

Further evidence that these productive activities were not necessarily as community-based as PRODEPINE and Bank staff suggest comes from the projects themselves. I visited several such initiatives, based out of three regions, sometimes with

Image 28: PRODEPINE Caja Solidaria Workshop

Image 29" PRODEPINE Caja Solidaria Workshop

PRODEPINE staff but sometimes without. The projects I was taken to see were overwhelmingly productive activities. Often these were deserted or not functioning. For example, I went with Sierra Norte staff to an artesania workshop in which hats, textiles, carpentry, and metal work were supposed to be being produced. No one was working in it. The computers intended to teach employment-related skills to adults in the community were still wrapped in plastic – no one was available to teach the course (images 30 and 31). In the Costa Norte I was taken to a factory intended for the commercialization of coconuts – this factory had brand new machinery intended to help the community produce various coconut-derived products (images 32-34). The factory was deserted, and it took several hours for PRODEPINE staff to gather the workers for a meeting. Later that day I was told by despondent PRODEPINE staff that the factory had been put there due to the pressure of an important politician in the region, and lacked community ownership; project staff were thus themselves aware that many of these productive projects lacked wider support, and were being approved for less than demand-driven reasons. Interestingly, though, the next year PRODEPINE staff in the coast told me that although the project's leader did indeed lack community support, *he* did not originally ask for a factory to industrialize coconut production; he asked for small-scale equipment to facilitate traditional processing. The factory was PRODEPINE's idea.[xxiii]

I also visited a greenhouse in the Sierra Norte; this was completely destroyed, with the plastic torn and on the ground (images 35 and 36). The men working in the area told me that people in the community were indebted to PRODEPINE because they had taken out a loan for the greenhouse which they could not pay. The project was a failure, and PRODEPINE now wanted them to take out another loan to repair it – they said they

Image 30: Virtual Classroom, PRODEPINE



Image 31: Unused Computers, PRODEPINE



Image 32: PRODEPINE-funded coconut processing factory



Image 33: PRODEPINE-funded coconut processing factory



Image 34: PRODEPINE-funded coconut processing factory

Image 35: PRODEPINE-funded greenhouses

Image 36: plastic from PRODEPINE-funded greenhouses

would not, because they would go further into debt. The people I spoke to here saw PRODEPINE more as a loan shark who imposed "productive projects" than a facilitator of community-driven development. Indeed the evaluation report prepared by the Sierra Norte noted than many of the greenhouse projects associated with the loan were complete failures, being built in totally inappropriate locations with no chance of success, and that they were approved for political reasons rather than out of community demand (Silva Delgado 2004). At this juncture PRODEPINE staff usually argued that the organizations with which they worked had erred – they were undemocratic, corrupt, had approved activities for unprofessional, non-technical reasons, and had illegitimately diverted funds to support projects that were not community-driven. While this may certainly be the case in some examples, it ignores the evidence presented above that PRODEPINE staff are themselves key agents pressuring communities to undertake certain productive activities, activities which are then said to stem from local demand rather than donor imposition. In short, although there are certainly examples of communities requesting work-related projects, much of the time PRODEPINE staff are wrong that their attempts to generate productive activity are demand-driven.

The Bank's Recognition of the Social Reproduction Dilemma.

Having once again charted the prioritization of women's employment in the Bank's gender efforts, it is unsurprising to note that this occurred alongside recognition of the social reproduction dilemma. This is evident in discussions concerning reproductive labor, women's triple role, time burdens, and male migration. Loan staff frequently expressed concern about women being overburdened through projects that failed to take into account their multiple responsibilities, and many questioned the standard definition of productive activity. One PRODEPINE staff member told me that, in the communities in which she worked, there was no clear division between work in the private or public sphere, given that most people were engaged in home-based production of artesanias for sale in the weekly market. Similarly although I was told by the head of the Costa Norte office that that 80% of people in the region were un or under-employed, s/he quickly added that many of these people were not strictly unemployed since they were engaged in productive activities, on a subsistence basis rather than to earn wages. When discussing the Cajas Solidarias, another employee stated: "well, the most serious problem that the women confront is hard work – this is why it is important to define the gender work that (staff in the Project) propose in their programs" S/he noted that although "women in urban areas have mechanisms to liberate themselves from home activities" when they participate in "productive work" these were not available to rural women. Such mechanisms included technology such as microwaves, fast food, washing machines and so on. Thus s/he cautioned that PRODEPINE should not overburden rural women or make their situation worse.

Recognition of the importance of social reproduction was also evident in the gender material put out as part of the PROGENIAL-PRODEPINE collaboration. The original PROGENIAL proposal to work with PRODEPINE noted that "it may be more difficult for women to secure new income sources during economic downturns" (World Bank 2000f, 4), in part because women have less mobility due to domestic responsibilities. When teaching staff and organizations how to "do" gender, attention was repeatedly devoted to the triple role framework and the economic importance of non-market activities. For example, in a 2000 workshop on gender analysis provided for PRODEPINE's technical team, a PROGENIAL consultant explained that it involved attention to productive and reproductive roles. The next year the same consultant sent a proposal on gender indicators to PRODEPINE and PROGENIAL staff – the first line of this read: "the sexual division of labor, the needs of women and men, the daily workload and the use of time are permanently ignored factors in development interventions" (PRODEPINE 2001b, np). Similarly the August 2001 "Basic Document and Guide to the Theme of Gender" put out by PROGENIAL to help PRODEPINE staff integrate gender concerns cited Moser's triple role framework, and emphasized the need "to change the paradigm of work that associates reproduction with economically unproductivity, and to encourage masculine co-responsibility" (PRODEPINE 2001a, np).

A report on a gender workshop in the Amazon a month later also identified the triple role as one of the basic categories of gender analysis, using the following definition:

> "Gender roles: productive. Describes the tasks that generate income or goods that have relation to the market. They are paid and socially valued. It is associated with the masculine gender. Male provider. To be someone in life is to have an occupation or profession. Carried out by men. Reproductive: describes tasks carried out for the care of children and maintenance of the home. It is associated with the feminine gender. It is not articulated in the market, it is not renumerated or socially valued. Inactive population. Community: defines the tasks and actions carried out in benefit of human collectivities: neighborhoods, communities" (Aulestia and Quintero-Andrade 2001, np).

This report also identified "the tasks that mothers and fathers must fulfill to achieve family well-being" as the main limitation on participation in PRODEPINE projects. The workshop included an exercise requiring participants to chart daily time use by gender, on the basis that projects should be aware of different types of labor in order that they did not overburden people. Importantly, as discussed below, this workshop was a disaster, and in response one of the coordinators designed his/her own methodological packet to take into account "Amazon reality". It too used the triple role framework and time use studies. This suggests that awareness of the need to contest standard notions of productive work is now so central to the Bank's gender activities that it will almost always be present in workshops, even when they are radically redesigned.

The emphasis on triple roles, time use, and the economic importance of unpaid labor continued into 2002. *The Proposal for Indicators to Track and Evaluate Topics of Equity between Men and Women in the PRODEPINE project* put out by PROGENIAL in January emphasized women's invisible role in ensuring family and community survival in rural areas (1), and it urged the project "to establish mechanisms to quantify and value the economic contribution of women's unrenumerated work" (32). The categories used to formulate relevant indicators included different gender roles in productive, reproductive, and community processes, and participatory local development plans were criticized for ignoring such roles (8). For example staff were warned to plan infrastructural investments with the triple role framework in mind, in order to avoid problems "such as: an overload in female work (and) infant abandonment due to the absence of fathers and mothers involved in the project" (31), particularly given that women were understood to sacrifice reproductive labor for community labor in a trade off between roles. A March 2002 gender workshop taught participants that women work more than men but are recognized less and have a key but under-valued role in agriculture (Muñoz Consejal 2002, 9), and one of its objectives was "to make visible and revalue the work that women do" (20).

Likewise Matilde Camacho's 2002 evaluation of the Caja Solidaria program contained an insightful discussion of female labor force participation rates in Ecuador, which again reveals awareness of the social reproduction dilemma. She noted that rural women's labor force participation grew from 12% in 1982, to 19% in 1990, to 57% in 1995 when measured as a percentage of the economically active population over 10 years old (11). However she recognized that the large jump in 1995 was due to changes in how "work" was defined, changes which challenged the "invisibilization" of women's activity (11). She also stated that the majority of women's work is unremunerated (11), and that skewed visions of productivity lead women to underestimate their own contribution to production (14).

The emphasis on unpaid labor and social reproduction is also evident in the case studies put out by the loan. One of the most prominent was a study of local participatory development plans undertaken by PRODEPINE done by Ana Aulestia in 2002. Work was defined even more broadly here, since the report used a four-role framework involving productive, reproductive, organizational/political/community, and cultural labor (37). The latter includes work to transmit values, beliefs, skills, and practices to others to generate social capital and maintain community solidarity and identity. Once more, it was argued that women engage in these activities more than men (see also Vallejo Real 2002a, 10). The time use data collected in this study showed also that women worked more hours than men (Aulestia 2002, 7). One community study concluded:

> "in the interviews it is seen that women have such a heavy workload of domestic work and subsistence labor in service of the family that they can not obtain time to invest in themselves. Participatory local development plans must consider this aspect of the formulation of projects" (10).

The report later stated as a fact that "there exists a devaluing of domestic work" (16) and "the domestic space is not valued" (26), and it recommended efforts "to incorporate the valuing of domestic work in PRODEPINE's policies" (16). Women who were interviewed themselves "demand(ed) that their participation in the maintenance of the home be seen as more valuable" (40), and they responded to men's request that they participate more with the comment ""sometimes it is impossible to participate. We have a lot to do." Finally the checklist of effects to which staff were directed to pay attention in participatory project evaluations asked "has women's work time been reduced?... Have the responsibilities of women with respect to domestic work changed?" (75-6), demonstrating recognition of unpaid labor and a concern with its impact on the project.

These concerns with social reproduction were reiterated in the case studies on gender and ethnicity in various communities involved in the project. Originally three such studies were proposed, of the Shuar in the Amazon, a Quichua-speaking indigenous community in the Sierra, and the Afro-Ecuadorian population in San Lorenzo (in the north on the border with Colombia). The terms of reference for these case studies proposed "to understand how gender relations are constructed, their manifestations, roles, representations, and the effects that these have in all spheres of life" (1). Subsequently six more case studies were approved. These followed a similar format, setting out the need for more information on gender and ethnicity, the social and economic context in the community at issue, and assessing gender roles and levels of participation. They also repeatedly emphasized the social reproduction dilemma, drawing attention to time use surveys and trying to measure reproductive, productive and community work in a concrete application of the triple role framework. For example the case study on the Chachi population (an indigenous group in Esmereldas) included discussion of productive and reproductive tasks carried out by men and women (Eguiguren, Maldonado and Marchán 2002, 2), defining the latter as:

> "domestic tasks and responsibilities assumed in the raising of children, necessary to guarantee the maintenance and reproduction of human life. These roles cover activities such as the preparation of food, the collection of water and fuel wood, the maintenance of the home and the care of family health. They also involve the care and maintenance of the adult labor force, and of children, and in this way of the future labor force" (21).

The report also noted that many development programs focused on women as producers forgot their reproductive role, and thus "they lengthened women's work days even more, reinforcing existing inequalities between men and women" (2002, 11). Similarly the case study on the Kichwa of Toacazo included time use surveys for the different communities involved (Vallejo Real 2002b, 34-41), as did the case study of Afro-Ecuadorian gender relations in San Lorenzo.

A concern with the social reproduction problem also surfaced in PRODEPINE through discussions of male emigration. Several interviewees raised this issue, particularly evident in the Sierra given that male emigration is particularly prevalent there. Male absence was understood to lead to women being overburdened with multiple responsibilities, such that interventions were necessary to help them cope. For example one Bank employee informed me that male emigration left women virtually abandoned in the communities to care for families alone, and hence they needed investment to create businesses. Another Bank staff person brought up male emigration twice in his/her list of problems faced by women in rural areas, and one of PRODEPINE's Caja Solidaria coordinators claimed that it left women having to fulfill double roles as business administrators and mothers.

The concern with male migration as a factor that aggravates the social reproduction dilemma was also evident in written material associated with PRODEPINE. The San Lorenzo case study of Afro-Ecuadorian gender roles argued that indigenous women had greater flexibility in gender in part as a result of male emigration (Vallejo Real 2002a), and the 2002 evaluation of the Caja Solidaria program noted that women were assuming new roles outside the domestic sphere due to family survival needs (5), a discussion linked to high rates of male migration (Camacho 2002, 13). Similarly the case study of participatory local development planning noted that

> "women have new roles that do not correspond to the representations or imaginations of the leaders (of the organizations crafting the plans). These new roles are caused above all by the migration of families" (Aulestia 2002, 26).

These discussions of migration are strongly linked to social reproduction concerns.

Conclusion.

In this chapter I have attempted to trace the Bank's gender lending all the way down to the project level, considering a social development loan with very grounded, tangible effects. I again argue that the Bank is a key actor in this loan, particularly given the weakness of the state – a situation that the Bank is actively reinforcing through its decentralization agenda. I thus consider the gender activities enacted by PRODEPINE to be primarily Bank activities. Once more, these activities are focused on getting women into work, a policy priority that emerges in part because it is linked to market-driven concerns with productivity and efficiency, in part because it is understood to empower women, and in part because staff claim it reflects community demand. I found mixed evidence regarding community demand for projects to increase productivity, although it was abundantly clear that PRODEPINE staff had a far more active role in promoting these initiatives than was recognized (or admitted) in written reports. Again, however, the prioritization of women's employment occurred alongside recognition of the social reproduction dilemma - this should now be expected in analysis of the Bank gender's efforts. Indeed awareness of the social reproduction dilemma was integral to the gender activities undertaken by the PRODEPINE loan – it was a part of the project's common sense, and was accepted as a basic principle of gender analysis. In the closing chapter it remains to analyze the concrete solutions to this problem enacted by the project.

[i] For more on the complexities of categorization see Fernandes (1997).
[ii] This issue is complex. It requires legal changes to allow private land ownership in supposedly protected areas – the idea is that by regularizing titles through the government land will be protected from logging companies etc – but critics argue that the introduction of private land markets will make things worse. See Sawyer (2004) for a discussion of this in relation to Amazonian groups and oil companies.
[iii] Originally the National Council of Indigenous and Afro-Ecuadorian Development, CONPLADEIN, replaced in 1998 by the Development Council for Ecuadorian Nationalities and Pueblos, CODENPE, and the Afroecuadorian Development Corporation, CODAE.
[iv] See Pincus (2002) for an Indonesian-focused example of Bank policy involving a similar clash between strengthening state organizations and local participatory groups.
[v] Ironically, though, PRODEPINE may have "restored some of the credibility lost by government" in the economic crisis, even though by that point the latter's contribution to the project had virtually stopped. One is thus faced with another irony in Bank-state relations – when the social development projects work the state often takes credit for them, even when they failed to actually deliver their own share of the funds. Thus governments which are highly critical of the Bank, which misuse its macroeconomic funds, or which withdraw support from projects can end up strengthened by its activities.
[vi] Interestingly the fiercest opponent of PRODEPINE I met in Ecuador – a member of a left-wing NGO with 30 years of experience defending the rights of indigenous groups in the Sierra and Amazon - said exactly the same about the project: that it diverted protest into bureaucracy and led to groups being co-opted by the state through a technocratic vision of development as service provision. See chapter 4 for more on this.
[vii] Some of the phase 1 PRODEPINE staff left unemployed by the government decision to hire an entirely new team for phase 2 are involved with the plans and consultations for PROLOCAL, and there is considerable cross-over in the projects. I did some research on PROLOCAL in 2003 and could have used it as a case study, but PRODEPINE was better because it was further along and could thus be assessed more comprehensively in terms of implementation – PROLOCAL is still in its early stages.
[viii] memo 31st January 2001, in PRODEPINE archive
[ix] the difference between a pueblo and a nacionalidad is a legal distinction reflecting different forms of government recognition – most Quichwa- speaking groups are considered pueblos within a broader nacionalidad; most Amazonian groups are considered nacionalidades. Language is important here, but other factors matter too – the distinction is far beyond the focus of this chapter. See Lucero 2003.
[x] PRDEPINE archive, 9 May 2001: "Informe de Asistencia Tecnica de genero al proyecto PRODEPINE" may 2000-feb 2002: 3-4).
[xi] The Project Information Document for PRODEPINE 2 includes targets for women's groups involved in subprojects as one of its "key performance indicators" (World Bank 2004f, 2), and it promises that "intercultural relations, gender and other equity issues will be incorporated systematically in all these programs."
[xii] Vallejo Real 2002b, 21-22.
[xiii] PRODEPINE archive, 7 march 2002: PROGENIAL, World Bank "Informe de Asistencia Tecnica de genero al proyecto PRODEPINE" may 2000-feb 2002, 5).
[xiv] This was the same reasoning used in the Gender Review; see chapter 5.
[xv] PRODEPINE archive (Jan 2002 (PROGENIAL) "Propuesta de Indicadores para seguimiento y evaluacion de asuntos de equidad entres hombres y mujeres en el proyecto PRODEPINE).
[xvi] As of writing the program was not being funded under PRODEPINE 2. The failure to fund the Caja Solidarias in the second loan was a cause of much dispute in 2004 when I visited; the national PRODEPINE office blamed the Bank for not supporting the program, the Bank blamed the government for not wanting to carry it on because it lacked feasibility studies, and the people getting the money blamed their regional PRODEPINE office. However the future of the initiative is uncertain – money could well be found from somewhere to sustain it, and Bank staff all wished this to occur.
[xvii] PRODEPINE archive, Informe de Actividades, May 2002.
[xviii] This quotation is included almost word for word in the Project Information Document for the stage 2 loan. Indeed Phase 2 intensifies attempts to raise agricultural productivity through extension projects, soil

fertility management, livestock improvement, irrigation systems, infrastructure development, and "industries such as agro-processing", and once more the bulk of the Bank's loan will fund rural investments which include demand-driven small-scale "community productive investments", "community microenterprises", and "technical assistance for production and marketing" (World Bank 2004f, np). PRODEPINE 2 expands eligible activities to include handicrafts, tourism, and ethnobiological products and their marketing, even when "cultural producers" reside in urban areas; this suggests the likely strengthening of the focus on microenterprises and the generation of productive work

[xix] PRODEPINE archive (7 march 2002: PROGENIAL, World Bank "Informe de Asistencia Tecnica de genero al proyecto PRODEPINE" may 2000-feb 2002.)

[xx] PRODEPINE archive: (World Bank file 2001: programación del programa patrimonio cultural,

[xxi] PRODEPINE archive (30 Jan 2002: PROGENIAL "Propuesta de Indicadores para seguimiento y evaluacion de asuntos de equidad entres hombres y overseen el projector PRODEPINE').

[xxii] Velasquez 2000, np

[xxiii] it was a profoundly poor idea, whose ever it was. The project aimed to industrialize the production of coconuts using steam, but the water to which the community had access was of insufficient quality to run the machines – thus another project was necessary to clean the water before it entered the machine. The next year, I mentioned this project and said that when I had visited it was not working. The former PRODEPINE staff member with whom I was talking rolled his/her eyes, interrupted, and said "And it never worked". This prompted the group of employees with whom I was talking - after they had finished working for stage 1 and by which time it was clear that a new team would be hired for stage 2 – to give me a list of failed projects, each laughing harder as the examples got more and more absurd – projects to produce panela in regions where people only ate sugar, or (even better), where there was no sugar cane, projects to process rice in areas where there is no rice, and so on. This sketch of communities littered with failed development projects that they did not demand and experienced as external impositions is one with which all critical development scholars are familiar – it was the same portrait painted of Lesotho by James Ferguson (1994) and of several essays in the recent Pincus and Winters anthology (2002).

Chapter 8: Solutions to the Social Reproduction Dilemma Enacted by PRODEPINE.

Introduction.

Having argued in the previous chapter that the gender activities undertaken in the Bank's PRODEPINE loan involve a prioritization of women's work and a parallel recognition of the importance of social reproduction, it remains to assess the concrete solutions proposed to resolve the tension between paid labor and unremunerated care. Two solutions are proposed and enacted by the institution in this respect: infrastructural improvement to ensure better time management, and, most prominently, restructuring partnerships between couples to ensure that men love better and women act with (limited) rationality in the marketplace. These solutions succeed within the institution because they are framed as beneficial to productivity, as market-driven, and as empowering. Again, childcare fails to be adopted as a policy solution, even when suggested by the communities targeted in this apparently demand-driven project, because it troubles Bank discourses of efficiency and empowerment. These solutions mirror those proposed in the formally cleared gender policy texts analyzed in chapter three, although at the project level staff make far more explicit interventions to teach the supposedly natural market mentalities required for their productive interventions to work as cure-alls for development ills. In this loan attention was also devoted to the perceived interaction between sexuality, gender, and ethnicity as it relates to social reproduction debates, with staff intervening to shore up certain normative models of partnership marked as culturally authentic while stereotyping communities with alternative arrangements of sexuality as hyper-oppressive to women.

Solution 1: Better Time Management, Primarily Through Infrastructural Improvement

PRODEPINE staff frequently mentioned that they needed to change meeting times in order that women could participate in activities, hereby suggesting that schedule adjustment was a way to resolve competing demands stemming from the triple (or quadruple) role. However, once again attempted solutions to the social reproduction dilemma went beyond a simple attempt to adjust schedules in order that multiple tasks could be carried out more efficiently. Specifically, the project framed infrastructural investments as a way to enable women to get involved in remunerated, market-oriented labor while dealing with their existing responsibility for caring work. Importantly, infrastructure was defined as a priority for PRODEPINE from the start, and investments therein took up most of the money directed to the project. The Bank's evaluation of the first loan noted:

> "Of the subprojects financed, 50.4% were for social infrastructure; 40.4% for community productive infrastructure and 8.1% for environment and sustainable management of natural resources. Social infrastructure investment was primarily for classrooms, shelters, dining areas, and drinking water systems. Main activities financed under community productive subprojects, were irrigation systems, agro-industry, stone paved roads and greenhouses" (World Bank 2003e, np)

Costa Norte staff also cited a heavy demand from communities for infrastructure, particularly roads to transport products to cities, and they claimed that the electrification projects funded by the loan helped increase productivity. This point was also made in relation to irrigation systems in the Sierra. Importantly, the Bank's final evaluation of the project attempted to defend the need for state involvement in infrastructural provision and maintenance even within a loan intended to increase community management thereof; one of the highlighted lessons learned was:

> "An integrated participatory approach, applied at grassroots level, can create in beneficiaries a sense of ownership and responsibility for self development; *yet the sustainability of public infrastructure will ultimately depend on the availability of public budget resources to maintain it"* (World Bank 2003e, np emphasis added)

The state provision and maintenance of infrastructure was thus asserted as a development good, a legitimate intervention in the market, within a project framed elsewhere as exemplifying the Bank's turn to decentralized, community-driven development.

Given the high prioritization of infrastructural development, it is perhaps not surprising that gender initiatives were connected to this theme. Several interviewees claimed that improving infrastructure was a gendered intervention because it reduced the time women spent on domestic labor. In addition to emphasizing the health and productivity benefits of infrastructural improvement, one PRODEPINE staff member mentioned that the provision of potable water made women in particular very happy, because previously fetching water took up many hours of their time. Similarly, several of the case studies on gender relations in indigenous and Afro-Ecuadorian communities mentioned infrastructural investments as a way to help save time. For example, the San Lorenzo study of gender relations claimed that electrification had benefited both men and women, and it criticized the municipality's failure to enact its plan to provide basic services such as sewage and paved roads (Vallejo Real 2002a, 77). This failure to develop infrastructural services was considered a theme of obvious relevance to gender analysis. Although a relatively minor concern compared to the attention given to restructuring loving partnerships, then, infrastructural investments were regarded as gendered interventions in some cases, endorsed due to their perceived efficiency benefits.

Solution 2: Restructuring Heteronormativity.

The second, far more prominent, attempted solution to the social reproduction problem proposed and enacted as part of the PRODEPINE project was the restructuring of heteronormativity. Specifically, the loan attempted to inculcate 1. (limited) rationality in women such that they operated as better workers, while retaining altruistic attachments to children and male partners, and 2. better loving in men, such that they could pick up the slack of caring labor when their (partially) rational wives moved into productive work.

Once again this approach stemmed primarily from a definition of good gender analysis as encouraging empowering complementarity, itself resting on a prior legitimation of the inclusion of men in WID/GAD efforts. Indeed the approach to gender analysis taken by PRODEPINE very closely matched that evident in formally cleared Bank texts on gender, and it encouraged similarly privatized solutions to the social reproduction dilemma. Firstly, gender relations were framed as flexible, and always-already changing, ensuring that PRODEPINE's attempts to change them in specific directions were not marked as political interventions. Biological sex, conversely, was presented as static and natural, ensuring that a dualistic, binarized, but complementary vision of gender was prominent in the project's gender efforts. The August 2001 *Basic Document and Guide to the Theme of Gender* prepared for PRODEPINE opened by citing a formally cleared Bank text defining sex as biological and gender as social, changing over time (PRODEPINE 2001a, np). The failed gender workshop in the Amazon tried to explain gender in the same way, tracing the term to the work of John Money in 1955, through Robert Stollers' (1968) "clarification" of the difference between sex and gender - in essence that sex relates to biology and reproductive organs, and is "a natural condition, immutable in time and space," while gender is about education, socialization, and culture: "gender is not natural but is a social construction that changes with time and space" (Aulestia and Quintero-Andrade 2001, 7). This definition of sex as natural, immutable, and biological, and of gender as social, learned, and characterized by change was repeated in many other PRODEPINE gender documents, from the analysis of participatory local development planning (Aulestia 2002, 1) to workshops showing that "the distribution of roles and jobs changes" (Muñoz Consejal 2002, 21; see also 8). It was also used in the case studies on gender and ethnicity (Eguiguren, Maldonado and Marchán 2002, 7).

Secondly, GAD itself was defined as including men, and aiming at complementary balance between partners. For example, noting the resistance of many communities to gender, one Bank employee with connections to PRODEPINE stated that the concept was often misunderstood as a focus on women, rather than being seen as something that includes both men and women. A PRODEPINE gender consultant also emphasized the importance of men and women sharing roles, and of girls and boys being taught to undertake activities previously reserved for the other. For example s/he pointed to changing gender roles in artesanial production among indigenous groups as evidence of success, claiming that men, women, and children now all work together in the family. Another, involved in the microcredit program, stated:

> "I understand for myself that gender is not only to speak of women but to speak of the family, right? So I tell you that the majority of our clients now in the cajas solidarias are men and women. It is a mix now in this region – its not only women, its also men"

The August 2001 basic guide to gender provided by PROGENIAL for PRODEPINE argued that for GAD "the problem is in the whole of inequitable relations between men and women that devalue the social roles of women, obstruct their access to resources and benefits of development, and exclude men from reproductive responsibilities" (PRODEPINE 2001a, 2). Training activities also defined gender in this way; in one of the first workshops organized by PRODEPINE in 2000 the national gender consultant explained the gender context in indigenous communities by asserting that "gender does not make reference only to the situation of women but also to that of men" (Velasquez 2000, np). Next the head of PROGENIAL stated that while men and women had different roles, each was of equal value and complimented the other. Similarly, an NGO capacity-building workshop held by PRODEPINE set out as its vision of the future that men and women would be recognized as different but not inferior or superior, and that they would share tasks and responsibilities (Aulestia 2002). The (failed) gender workshop in the Amazon also asserted that "men and women must share the same ideals, in order to progress with the project" (Aulestia and Quintero-Andrade 2001,7). It framed gender roles as impeding both men and women from expressing liberty as human beings: "from men (they) tak(e) the right to cry, and from women the right to participate in public life." "Understanding of the unity of the genders" was needed to overcome such limitations.

Written material prepared by PRODEPINE also defined gender analysis as including men, as being focused on intimate interactions in the household, and as aiming at complementary relations between loving couples. The August 2001 document prepared to give PRODEPINE staff an overview of gender claimed in its regional history of gender analysis that:

> "decades of work have shown that the work for and by women does not solve problems of inequity that affect men as much as women. The focus on gender tries to avoid unilateral development interventions, to consider men as well as women as actors and beneficiaries of projects" (PRODEPINE 2001a, 2).

Again GAD was defined through the inclusive focus on men, differentiated from WID on this basis (2). A 2001 description of gender programming in PRODEPINE sent to the Bank from a gender consultant in the loan claimed that PRODEPINE takes into account "the participation, the joint decision-making of men and women, that is to say of indigenous and afro-Ecuadorian families, as transversal axes of development." Similarly the proposal for gender indicators put forward by PROGENIAL identified as a remaining problem for PRODEPINE a "lack of clarity between the focus on women and the focus on gender, especially at the level of the executive executing agencies, which confuse the theme of gender with topics related exclusively to women".[i] Thus the questionnaire sent out by PROGENIAL to PRODEPINE (and other projects) in June 2002 focused on how the incorporation of gender affected the participation of both men and women, and on whether it had positive effects for both genders. Similarly a 2002 report on five case studies into the impact of participatory gender planning in relation to PRODEPINE insisted that "men and women must participate equally" (Aulestia 2002, 40), and it aimed "to educate men and women in order that roles are more flexible" (27) in order to achieve better equity "and in this way promote changes in the relations of men and women in the community" (10). The report also criticized development plans that included "gender" but which ignored men (14), and it recommended training to reduce "the prejudice of considering gender as a problem of women" (14).

This approach to gender analysis as involving men and as focused on loving, sharing partnerships was also central to a fascinating booklet on adolescent sexuality for indigenous adolescents produced by PRODEPINE for the Imbabura school system. The booklet took a highly biologist approach to sexuality as a public health issue: it is full of advice on familiarizing oneself with one's genitals, daily bathing, exercise, and adequate rest, and it contains numerous tables on symptoms of diseases and functions of various organs. It also taught a biological two sex model, as demonstrated by the cover photograph showing a diagram of male and female bodies (image 37). Within this approach, however, a complimentary model of gender relations was endorsed, in which romantic love and the inclusion of men was particularly important. For example adolescence was described as a time when "adolescent boys and girls look for their identity as men and women to feel more secure in themselves" (Conejo 2002-3, 15), as:

> "the stage of attraction for the other sex, (in which there) exists an intimate desire to be liked, to call attention to oneself by changing one's way of dressing, hairstyle, way of walking etc. To this is added sexual fantasies, which have an erotic and romantic character. They have curiosity to learn about their sex, the changes in their body, masturbation, erotic feelings, physical sexual attraction that is`initiated with various manifestations of sexuality such as falling in love, where they start to interact with people of the other sex, whose initial meetings are of short duration and are limited to kisses and caresses"

In a beautifully incoherent attempt to legitimize policy intervention to shore up what is apparently a biological impulse, puberty was framed as a hormonal change leading to sexual impulses and feelings, but as a result adolescents need sexuality education in order to reduce fear and shame, "in order to help them live this stage with naturalness, happiness and satisfaction" (17). Similarly, walking a difficult line between representing (hetero)sexuality as biological destiny and attempting to stop young people with apparently "ready" bodies having intercourse, the booklet also advised adolescents that biological readiness does not equate with psychological or social readiness, and that teenagers should complete their studies "and obtain a job that assures them stability

Image 37: Speaking of Sexuality with Indigenous Adolescents



before having children" (31). Heterosexual romantic love, expressed through monogamy, was central to the representation of healthy sexuality. Each chapter opened with a quote from the Lacanian psychoanalytic theorist Francoise Dolto, and many of these waxed lyrical about love. For example, the module on sexually transmitted diseases opened with the quote: "what happens in a relationship of authentic love is mysterious and incommunicable" (37); the module on family planning began:

> "true love is one of the most powerful forces that exists, stronger than time, death, or law. It is found identically in all places and all times" (46).

This love was understood to unite men and women. Indeed, the booklet advised, the continuation of the human species depends on this unity; consequently adolescents must take care of their bodies to prevent sterility, with boys protecting their testicles when they play sorts for example (29). There was one mention of homosexuality, in relation to how to catch AIDS (image 38); the extra male floating dangerously about the text box and disrupting the complementary wholeness emphasized throughout the booklet makes it clear that this condition is not understood to apply to women.

The emphasis on loving heteronormative partnership and male inclusion within this loan led again to a completely contradictory treatment of the household, and a failure to recognize the inevitability of clashing preferences therein. Once more, PRODEPINE argued that all would benefit from changing gender roles, and that men would adapt with equanimity. Both men and women were seen to be harmed through gender roles, for example, with one report arguing:

> "the rigid assignation of roles and the asymmetrical appreciation of the feminine and masculine affects relations, impedes the search for new forms of distribution of responsibilities and more democratic practices inside the family, the community and the society. In this way the construction of a satisfactory environment for the lives of women and men is limited" (Aulestia 2002, 11).

S I D A

(Síndrome de Inmuno Deficiencia Adquirida)

Contagio del SIDA



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Image 38: HIV/AIDS prevention

The PROGENIAL proposal to work with PRODEPINE listed as part of its evidence on the need for gender intervention that: "experiences demonstrate that reproductive health programs that target women only may be ineffective and unsustainable because they fail to consider men's important roles in family planning" (World Bank 2000f, 9). This implies that men's and women's needs and interests in reproductive health care can simply be added together to produce harmonious, non-conflictual results. Similarly the August 2001 basic guide to gender insisted that men and women should be included equitably in all projects. Specifically, along with projects to further women's rights over their physical autonomy, body, and sexuality, there was a parallel need to promote "masculine co-responsibility in sexuality and reproduction" (PRODEPINE 2001a, np). There was no sense that this may conflict with women's right to sexual autonomy. Elsewhere a (male) staff member involved in the Caja Solidaria initiative explained to me that if men alone controlled money, they would rule the household, where as if men *and* women both had it, they both would. Clearly he expected that they would rule together amicably, and that the apparent coup enacted by PRODEPINE's intervention would cause no problems.

My observations of PRODEPINE suggest that this expectation is unwarranted. In particular, a key tension existed in the Caja Solidaria program between the emphasis on gender balance and male inclusion, and the orientation of the micro-credit program towards supporting women. This tension was resolved in ways that appeared to augment male authority and circumscribe space for women. Caja Solidaria staff repeatedly emphasized that men could take part in the microcredit activities, for example, and that the money would benefit the whole family. Although men were only 2.1% of the members in Cajas Solidarias, they were a far larger percentage of loan beneficiaries – the coordinator of the program in the Sierra Norte read me out a list of names of loan beneficiaries from one Caja Solidaria that included over ½ men, for example. This tension ridden framing of the project as one aimed at women, at men, at families, and at communities was also evident in the meeting I attended to thank Sierra Norte PRODEPINE staff for their support for a Caja Solidaria. At this meeting one of PRODEPINE's (male) tecnico's told the group that he wanted the unified participation and integration of men in the initiative, so that men and women would make decisions with consensus, and loans would benefit everyone. Again he assumed that balanced inclusion of men and women would benefit the project, rather than cause tensions. However it was clear that men dominated this project; men did most of the speaking at this meeting, and outnumbered women in the room. The Caja Solidaria president was the daughter of the barrio's president; her father was a key political actor in the community, and he considered PRODEPINE, the Caja Solidaria, the World Bank, and my research to be a potential site for funds for development projects in the neighborhood.

I also visited a Caja Solidaria project in which the leaders were all men and the female "president" told me she has been appointed because they needed a woman for the forms. This project was one connected to a local political organization in which the male treasurer and male accountant were both active; they set up the Caja Solidaria, and got funds for a local shop which was run by their female relatives (none of whom would talk to me about the project – they all directed me to their husbands). Most of the loans went to men. The President said that many of the women in the group were unhappy at the treasurer's influence, and wanted to split from the Caja Solidaria to set up their own initiative, although she felt that the problems currently plaguing the project (namely lack of repayment) would occur again. This project seemed characterized by leadership infighting, mutual suspicion, and the incorporation of women to serve existing political agendas. These effects did not prompt a response from the Sierra Norte office, in part because they considered the balanced inclusion of men to be *goal* of the Caja Solidaria initiative, refusing to consider power dynamics and conflict in the process. As I have argued throughout this dissertation, this failure to conceive of conflict stems both from the heteronormative definition of gender analysis as having to include men to be balanced, and from the Bank's inconsistent application of neo-classical economics. On one hand it views the household as a cite for negotiated change such that work will empower women by giving them resources which alter power relations in the family, but on the other it retains a vision of the family as ultimately harmonious and unified, such that everyone will be happy with reformed gender roles. This results in a persistent refusal to deal with conflict between men and women, even when, as in this example, it clearly effected project performance.

The Attempt to Inculcate Limited Rationality in Women

PRODEPINE's attempt to inculcate loving partnerships between men and women as a solution to the social reproduction dilemma once again involved an explicit effort to increase women's rationality as workers, although in limited ways. Women were still understood to be necessarily, and altruistically, linked to the people they love in this model of changed gender relations. The proposal for PROGENIAL's collaboration with PRODEPINE, for example, stated that: "experiences in Ecuador show that (putting) economic resources in the hands of women leads to greater investments in family well-being and children's welfare" (World Bank 2000f, np). Likewise a key aim of the Caja Solidaria program was to improve family well-being based on the assumption that women would share the benefits they gained through productive activity with those they love. One evaluation stated that the program aimed "to promote family and communal integration, strengthening solidarity and self-help" (Guáman, 2003, 5); there is no sense that self-help and family integration may clash. The claim that men and families would benefit from women's work was also crucial to gender workshops. A group workshop on the Caja Solidaria program provided the following comment:

> "the Caja Solidaria is an aid for poor families.... It is good that it helps our husbands with the household economy. Before we only waited for our husbands, for what he earned, now the couple helps each other and we consider ourselves better off" (Camacho 2002, 43).

In the event that a man would not let his wife participate in project events, one workshop advised other men in the community to explain to him that he need have no fear – all would be better off if women participated, because children would advance if women had better education (Muñoz Consejal 2002, 8). Once more the vision of "autonomy" on offer here was a highly circumscribed one – women were rational enough to work but their labor was understood to occur within their continued altruistic commitments to those they love.

Crucially, PRODEPINE recognized a need to teach this limited rationality to women, and in this way the Bank acknowledged the need to cultivate market mentalities, even as it asserted their universal naturalness. Specifically, women were understood to need socializing into a culture of savings in order that their incorporation into productive activity succeeds as an empowerment strategy, and PRODEPINE intervened persistently to ensure this socialization. In particular, Caja Solidaria staff believed that PRODEPINE's effort to get women into productive activity required that they be trained in market behavior. One Caja Solidaria coordinator told me that many women were confused over the meaning of "credit," not understanding that they were expected to pay the money back. Thus s/he needed to help socialize people as part of her work, forcing them to save as part of the Caja Solidaria effort in order that they understood market principles. Indeed several staff members were involved in teaching women how to save and manage money, through providing free accounting support, running workshops on basic bookkeeping, and requiring members to save a minimal sum every month. Written evaluations of the Caja Solidaria program reiterated this emphasis on the need to teach women to behave as rational workers and businesspeople. The Sierra Centro report on the microcredit program insisted that PRODEPINE must help communities promote a culture of savings (Guáman 2003, 5) "understanding that saving is one of the fundamental pillars for the development of families, companies, and nations" (25). The more extensive 2002 evaluation noted that the Caja Solidarias had achieved particularly poor results in the Amazon where growth rates were either low or negative, due again to a perceived lack of savings culture (Camacho 2002, 34). The consultant thus underlined the importance of *requiring* savings as part of the Caja Solidaria project, arguing that although it would take time this rule would eventually help women learn to save (38).

My project visits to Caja Solidaria programs confirmed that PRODEPINE staff were heavily involved in day-to-day efforts to inculcate the supposedly always-already existing skills required for productive policies to empower women and families. These efforts went beyond the provision of basic accounting and bookkeeping skills. For example, I visited one Caja Solidaria initiative near the Columbian border with a PRODEPINE staff person, wherein seven cooking stoves had been given to women to start productive activities. The meeting turned into a general fight over who had received money, who had attended meetings, who had defaulted on loans and so on. Some women refused to pay in any more until they received benefits, and the President threatened to turn over the list of defaulters to the police (they laughed at this threat). In response, the Caja Solidaria coordinator told them they need to save small amounts to get accustomed to the practice, and s/he urged them not to get depressed – rather they needed to get organized and reunite to ensure the project's success. S/he made them promise to meet every week, and she gave the defaulters one month to pay before PRODEPINE would take their stove back and throw them out of group.

Similar problems surfaced in a nearby meeting of another Caja Solidaria: people had not paid, the group was not meeting, and women seemed singularly unimpressed with the initiative. Again, the PRODEPINE staff person tried to both rally and threaten them, insisting that they *could* pay, albeit little by little, and reminding them that the money had been given by PRODEPINE for work and productive activity, "not a community *fiesta.*" S/he also threatened to report defaulters, and ensure that they did not get other credit. A third Caja Solidaria in a neighboring community was also experiencing problems, with one woman who had not paid her debt and another who stole Caja money after she was sent to the highlands to buy goods to bring back and sell at a profit (itself an idea of PRODEPINE staff). The coordinator spent several hours with the president of this Caja explaining basic bookkeeping to her on forms s/he designed, covering how to record debts, charge interest and so on. Finally, at a workshop for a Caja

Solidaria that was understood to be very successful by PRODEPINE, the staff member had to deal with several questions regarding what to do about people who could not pay, and women lacking the time and money to invest in productive activities. In addition to drawing tables and flow charts on interest rates to explain the basic principles of banking, s/he also promised that the office would send an official letter to threaten defaulters.

Aside from provoking some much need skepticism over assumptions that these types of credit programs are trouble free given women's inherent honesty, responsibility, and altruism, this evidence also confirms David Williams' recent (1999) analysis of Bank attempts to actively (re)produce market behavior, attempts that coexist with neo-classical assumptions that this behavior is always-already present. At the project level, no one believes that getting women into productive activity will achieve all it is supposed to unless development agencies intervene first, to promote a savings culture, a mentality of work, and the ability to force debtors to pay up. These efforts were *not* so prominent in formally-cleared Bank documents – there it was more often assumed that the limited rationality women need as workers will automatically appear with their integration into the market. However at the project level this assumption disappears, and active measures are designed to produce the rationality required. On occasion these efforts can seem almost ridiculous. Microcredit programs have been in operation in the Sierra, from which many of the above examples were taken, for decades and the region has been tied to the market for centuries[ii]; it seems absurd to claim that people are not integrated into the modern economy and need help understanding capitalism. They did not seem confused about the wonders of compound interest to me; they either could not pay, or had stolen the money. However the Bank saw this behavior – itself arguably an inevitable *result* of capitalist market relations rather than evidence of their lack - as a cultural issue, and understood themselves as having to teach the market to women marked by their poverty, rural location, and ethnicity as particularly backward. In turn this troubles the Bank's broader insistence that the market is natural, inevitable, and likely to emerge without development intervention. Rather PRODEPINE staff are acting as the handmaidens of a gendered version of neo-liberalism aiming to empower women as semi-rational workers, and they are very much aware of it.

The Attempt to Inculcate Love (and Sometimes Work) in Men

Finally, I wish to consider the way in which men are framed within this over-arching attempt to change loving relations within couples, since once again the notion that men are the problem to which gender efforts are directed within PRODEPINE is very prominent. In a 2004 interview the (then ex) gender consultant for PRODEPINE stated this directly, claiming that gender activities needed to be directed at men because:

> "We are not working with women, here, no? We are working more with men, because the problem is the men (laughing), the problem isn't the women, the problem is the men. You have to be working with them"

Men were, however, a multifaceted problem, requiring several sorts of intervention. Importantly, like women, men sometimes had to be taught to be good rational workers, and thus they were also targets for efforts to inculcate a market mentality. These efforts to (re)produce work skills in men were not nearly as prominent as those directed to women, and they did not surface in the Sierra, but they were evident on the Coast and thus merit mention here. As the head of one regional office explained to me, "not everyone in the world is a businessman." Specifically, s/he claimed that male workers in nearby palma plantations were not a genuine proletariat; they lacked factory discipline and went to the plantations when they wanted to, leading the companies to contract workers from places where a daily worker culture exists. Indeed when this staff person visited the (failed) coconut refining factory mentioned above s/he spent several hours advising the male workers on such behavior, telling them to establish management teams, specialize in certain tasks, make lists of who was working when, plan how much was to be produced, and so on. Later that day, this staff person conceded that many of PRODEPINE's subprojects failed to generate employment, but due to lack of organization rather than lack of money. The "campesinos" involved did not have "the logic of profitability" required to run a factory; they were producers not businessmen, and thus starting microbusinesses was very hard in this region. As I knew, s/he went on, campesinos are conservative people who want security and are adverse to risk and fast changes, making them poor entrepreneurs. Furthermore, afro-Ecuadorians more generally lacked a clearly established community sentiment, since "clan" ties prevailed that were focused on inter-familiar relations. Thus men needed to be taught not only to work, but also to work in a community-oriented fashion. This is more than a little ironic given PRODEPINE's claim that it was building on pre-existing community sentiment and work habits through ethnodevelopment.[iii]

More commonly, though, men were a problem for PRODEPINE because they were not sufficiently integrated into the domestic sphere. In particular, they did not do enough housework, and did not show enough love to their families. The workshop on gender in the Amazon cited as one negative consequence of existing gender roles that men are outside of reproductive responsibilities, and it suggested men's cultivation of "family love" in response. A 2002 report on participatory gender planning stated that PRODEPINE should try to "to incorporate men into domestic work" (Aulestia 2002, 45) and ensure they offer more support to women in their daily tasks (28). In a group interview with several PRODEPINE staff members in the Costa Norte office, a (male) staff member raised the possibility that rural women could be overburdened by productive activity given that there was no reduction in their household labor, and that they lacked access to labor saving technology available to urban women:

> KB: Are there solutions to this?
> X: yes of course
> Y: capacity building in equality of conditions, but you have to start building capacity with men
> X: this is the solution that the man understands
> Y: because before when capacity-building in gender was given it was only focused on women and this isn't the point – the point is to give capacity-building to men and to women inclusively, in more family-oriented terms…
> X: clearly, then, to see the solution that we proposed you have to increase capacity-building in the sense of the whole group, so that the family has to function as a participatory group in development, right? So there is no work specifically for women nor for men, but that the man has to participate in everything.

One of the key successes of the Caja Solidaria program was that it was perceived to have integrated men into the home in this way. A Bank staff person told me that the microcredit initiative had encouraged husbands to take care of children and to share domestic tasks in a more complimentary fashion, while a PRODEPINE staff person joked with me that "men are cooking in the houses of Caja Solidaria projects." On this basis several policymakers affirmed that the Cajas have had a very positive gender impact.

The definition of men's lack of support for social reproductive labor as the core "gender problem" at issue in this project was also evident in the case studies on gender and ethnicity put out by PRODEPINE. Despite their frequent references to broader social and economic contexts, these case studies ultimately became descriptions of gender roles, descriptions which focused on the need to make men work more in the house. For example, Vallejo's study of a Kichwa community in Cotopaxi noted that problems faced by the community included fluctuations in prices; migrations; declining markets for potatoes; deforestation caused by lacto-industries; and the decline of systems of reciprocal community work given the growth of paid day labor (Vallejo Real 2002b, 17; 20). However the focus of the gender analysis remained the household, and most attention was given to charting the disadvantages of the "traditional sex-gender model" wherein men are considered household heads with little involvement in domestic work (41). Similarly the case study on the Chachi identified several important challenges faced by the community in the second chapter on relevant social and economic context: clashes with Afro-Ecuadorians over land and natural resources, deforestation caused by logging companies, environmental destruction caused by mining companies, poor health, high malnutrition, lack of access to clean water, high illiteracy, male migration to look for work, and so on (Eguiguren Maldonado and Marchán 2002, 16-18). However it focused on who did what within the household, and on the fact that "men…must assume reproductive tasks that permit them to fulfill new roles within the home" (36). Thus when PRODEPINE's gender consultant was invited to Nicaragua in 2002 to participate in a PROGENIAL workshop, the Bank's Latin American and Caribbean staff person asked him/her to come "above all to present a summary of the studies on the roles of men and women in different ethnic communities in Ecuador" that stemmed from this research – there was no mention of mining, logging, or low wages.

Men were also often viewed as irresponsible, violent, and drunken, and PRODEPINE staff understood that they had a role in correcting this behavior. In a discussion of gendered spaces in an Afro-Ecuadorian community in San Lorenzo, PRODEPINE staff identified women's spaces as shop fronts, porches, places in the river where women do washing, and mangroves where women go to collect shells (Vallejo Real 2002a, 20). Men's spaces, in contrast, were bars and porches where they play cards (20). The case study made it clear that men mainly work in male-only spaces – in oil companies and in wood extraction, for example, although day labor for palmaculture factories is also male dominated. However these working spaces were not identified as male spaces – one is instead left with a sketch of men who are drunkenly gambling while women orient their activity to productive work.

Elsewhere unemployed men were seen as particularly prone to violent, drunken irresponsibility, given the loss of status associated with their inability to provide for their families. For example the original PROGENIAL proposal to work with PRODEPINE stated:

> "macroeconomic crises have gendered impacts, with women tending to enter into the labor force during these periods. This implies greater pressures on their time given that adjustments in the division of household work have not taken place. For men, unemployment threatens their role of family provider and creates problems of self-esteem and depression – which may have other possible negative effects such as violence" (World Bank 2000f, 4).

This reinvokes a discourse evident in all contemporary Bank gender policy, wherein unemployed men are framed as particularly violent and drunken, their wounded masculinity causing a pathological mistreatment of women to which their wealthier brothers are apparently immune.

Importantly, however, PRODEPINE was involved in attempts to reform the behavior of such men. During a period of widespread festivals throughout the area a (male, mestizo) PRODEPINE staff member told a group of indigenous men gathered at a meeting to celebrate the community's Caja Solidaria program that they should give love to their children, that they should not come home and fight with their wives, and that they should not drink too much during the fiesta period. He insisted that drinking was not part of indigenous culture; rather it was part of colonization and slavery. At this point the men politely nodded and offered him more food, inviting him to their community's fiesta that weekend (he declined). Given that these discussions of alcohol are embedded in a broader cultural and historical context in which indigenous men have been pathologized for centuries as "drunken Indians," the comments were at best heavy-handed and misdirected, but the sense that they were considered relevant to PRODEPINE activity reveals much about the perceived need to teach such men temperate loving responsibility.[iv]

Aside from their laziness, drunkenness, violence, and irresponsibility, men were also a problem for PRODEPINE because they migrated. Some Highland indigenous and coastal Afro-Ecuadorian communities have experienced particularly migration rates since the 1999 economic crisis, and men have been more likely to leave than women.[v] Migration was frequently framed as disrupting the sharing, complimentary family, and as the cause of host of social dislocations and cultural crises. When introducing Otavalo the booklet on adolescent sexuality put out by PRODEPINE for the Imbabura school system mentioned migration early and prominently:

> "in the last 15 years...many indigenous families (husband and wife) have migrated outside leaving their children (including newborns) in the care of grandparents, uncles, older siblings or other family members. This has provoked drastic changes inside some families, which becomes evident in situations of family disintegration, alcoholism, use of other drugs, acculturation and alienation, leaving school and repeating grades, all which we can not quantify, unwanted pregnancies, STDs etc" (Conejo 2002-3, 1-2).

Typically men were held primarily responsible for these ills. Male migration was considered abandonment, and absent men were understood to be irresponsible with the money they make. The case study on the Kichwa of Toacazo noted that women have been left to run credit services since men have migrated to find work, and it suggested that this can cause problems when men return and drink the money intended for community saving and investment (Vallejo Real 2002b). Male migration was also held responsible for a perceived loss of culture and traditions, particularly in Quichwa speaking Andean communities in the Sierra. In one of PRODEPINE's first workshops on gender, the head of PROGENIAL identified relevant problems as including men's lack of cultural identity, stemming in part from migration (Velasquez 2000). As PRODEPINE's case study on participatory local development planning showed, this concern over the "loss" of culture and migration is primarily a concern over *men*. People in this study repeatedly associated negative cultural changes with men who had migrated and who come back with new ideas, or who left women to face lives as single mothers (Aulestia 2002, 39), and participants mentioned the need "to strengthen identity in order that the migrants do not destroy the culture and their homes" (46).

Once more, then, the Bank's approach to gender analysis appears to be based on profoundly misdirected priorities, making poor men culpable for a broad range of development evils that they do not cause. Male migrants are not responsible for the disintegration of the family in the Sierra, and they are not to blame for "deculturation" or the loss of roots. This entire discussion is based on a notion of culture and family as static and unchanging, on a wistful longing for an imagined past that ends up blaming victims of broader economic, social, and political shifts for causing social dislocation. Indeed the Bank's macroeconomists recognize that migrants' remittances have kept Ecuador, and their families, solvent in the worst economic crisis to hit the country in a century. In 2002 migrants sent $1.4 billion in remittances, 5.4% of GDP (Frtees Cibils and López-Cálix 2003, 17) – the highest per capita rate of remittances in Latin America after El Salvador and the Dominican Republic (World Bank 2003a, np) (this does not count the money sent back home from migrants inside Ecuador). As men recognize in the workshops on gender, "they migrate to bring money" (Muñoz Consejal 2002, 6), out of a sense of family responsibility – yet this decision is persistently framed as signifying precisely the opposite.

In addition, there is a massive disconnect involved in these discussions of male irresponsibility, given the fact that men in the communities targeted by PRODEPINE overwhelmingly define themselves as workers, and emphasize that their masculinity rests on their ability to care and provide for their families. When asked to identify the reasons why they identified with their ethnic group, men in a gender workshop in Guamote said: "because I am a working man." Part of their responsibility was "to be responsible in my home and with my children" (Muñoz Consejal 2002, 74). Chachi men also "consider the obligation to provide for the house and to feed the children as a role and a basis of masculine identity" (Eguiguren Maldonado and Marchán 2002, 35); indeed here men are supposed to show public love and affection to their wives and children, and they are supposed to worry about providing food (35). Likewise Afro-Ecuadorian men listed as their responsibilities to provide food, to get wood and water, to teach their children how to work, to worry over their children's health, to educate and discipline their children, to work, to maintain their family, to not mistreat women, and "to be responsible in all that relates to the home" (Vallejo Real 2002a, 22). Poor Afro-Ecuadorian boys are particularly likely to leave school in order to fulfill these family obligations, entering the labor force early to supplement family income. Without meaning to romanticize anyone's masculinity, these realities are simply inconsistent with a portrait of poor rural Afro-Ecuadorian and indigenous men as lazy, irresponsible, drunken, unable to love, avoiding family obligation, and needing to work harder. However these inconsistencies do not register with the loan's staff; gender activities continue to define men as the core problem, and to focus excessively on their drinking, violence, and lack of housework, even when more positive representations of poor masculinity are far more visible, and have unanimous support.

Racialized Heteronormativity: Sex, love, gender, and culture.

Given that PRODEPINE focused on rural development in indigenous and Agro-Ecuadorian communities, debates about the need to forge loving, sharing partnerships in order to resolve tensions between unpaid work and paid labor imbricate discourses of race, ethnicity, and culture. On one hand, gender relations in communities were assessed based on their approximation to a Western idealized norm of loving partnership. Specifically, non-monogamy was understood as a marker of ethnic identity, and it was the main yardstick by which a culture's gender relations were measured – more equal communities, wherein women were more empowered, were ones in which men were monogamous. Thus there was a clear conceptual hierarchy operating within the project's gender efforts, with polygamous Amazonian men and serially unfaithful Afro-Ecuadorian men framed as particularly oppressive. On the other hand, however, PRODEPINE's gender efforts also invoked a notion of some indigenous cultures as based on models of harmonious complimentary gender relations, hereby making the project's specific attempts to (re)forge heteronormativity appear culturally authentic and in-keeping with principles of ethnodevelopment. I wish to close this discussion of heteronormativity within PRODEPINE by exploring the complexities of this interaction between sexuality, ethnicity, culture and gender policy in greater depth.

As Jean Muteba Rahier points out, the Ecuadorian "common sense" about sexuality is heavily racialized. She focuses on stereotypical representations of Black women as hypersexualized (2003, 297), implicitly contrasted with notions of indigenous women as nonsexual, or as needing to be conquered by White men as part of the colonial project. Less attention has been devoted to representations of non-White male sexuality in this respect. However men's non-monogamy was repeatedly presented a problem in PRODEPINE's gender efforts. This was understood to inherently oppress women, and it was the yardstick by which gender relations in all communities were judged. Specifically, I was repeatedly told in interviews – both with Bank and PRODEPINE staff - that gender relations in the Amazon were particularly oppressive, and this always hinged on the fact that men there were polygamous.

The notion of Amazonion groups being more traditional and backward than highland groups, who are seen as better able to integrate themselves into national ideologies of mestizaje, has a long history; indeed the distinction between "model Indians" who worked hard and were neat and sober, and "savage" Amazonian groups has been central to Ecuadorian discussions of indigenous people for centuries (Meisch 2002, 29). As David Kyle (2000) notes, Otavalan highland communities (exploited as weavers under the Spanish) were chosen by Ecuadorian elites to represent noble, progressive Indians; they were seen as taller, more hard working, and more sober than other groups, and they were consciously used by "nationalist image makers" to represent the new nation (see also Colloredo-Mansfeld 1999). Similarly Mary Crain (1996) notes that some Andean indigenous women have been incorporated into tourist markets in Quito as residual icons of Indianness, as folkloric relics (Crain 1996, 144) who demarcate their community's "difference" from dominant national society, representing an "authentic" indigenous identity uncontaminated by colonization, hybridization, and displacement (136). However not all indigenous people are given space within such "official views of appropriate Indianness" (136). The quest for authenticity – itself part of an imperialist nostalgia (Meisch 2002, 87, borrowing from Renato Rosaldo 1989) - is evident alongside a white mestizo stereotype of other indigenous groups as dirty, lazy, irrational, and backward.[vi]

The distinction was nicely illustrated in the comment of one PRODEPINE staff member when speaking of PRODEPINE's gender work among indigenous groups in the Amazon: "their culture is more, er… (pause)... *cultural.*" Specifically polygamy was the core reason that Bank staff saw gender relations in the Amazon as particularly "complex" or "complicated", by which they meant particularly oppressive, sexist, and hard to change. Although PRODEPINE did not overtly criticize polygamy in its gender workshops, Amazonian's men's non-monogamy was identified as the core "gender problem" in the region in several conversations I had with staff. One stated that gender work was hard in the Amazion because:

> X: ...of the socio-cultural, geographical, and educational situation basically, because they are if you like a little isolated geographically, the populations, and there is no permanent social contact...And above all it is a machista society, well machismo is very complicated in the Amazon...For example in the Shuar and Achuar nationalities in the South of the Amazon there they have polygamy. You know what polygamy is, yes?
> KB: Yes
> X: A man with lots of women. Well in this sense to develop the theme of gender is very complicated.

The point was also made by Bank staff and staff in the Sierra Norte office - ultimately, as one interviewee put it, the biggest problem in the Amazon was that men have two or three wives.[vii]

In other conversations, men's "serial polygamy" was repeatedly framed as a problem in discussions of Afro-Ecuadorian gender relations, and I was told by Bank and PRODEPINE staff that Afro-Ecuadorian men were tremendously unfaithful and promiscuous, frequently having relations with two or three women. Unlike with Amazonian communities, these discussions were relatively open, and were not only conducted in the absence of men from the marked ethnicity. While discussing gender relations with me on a coffee break during a meeting in Quito for regional staff, a PRODEPINE consultant (a Quichwa speaking person from the Sierra) explained that Afro-Ecuadorian women were prominent in leadership positions in the coast, and had far more freedom than women in the Amazon. S/he then turned to two Afro-Ecuadorian men sitting at the same table, laughing, and told me that the *companeros* just needed to keep to one wife.

Moreover, concerns over Afro-Ecuadorian men's non-monogamy made it into printed texts. The *Ecuador Gender Review* described the gender division of labor in the coast (a regional foil for discussing race) thusly: "due in part to a stronger 'domestic ideology' that confines women to home-based activities, the gender division of labor in agriculture is significantly more pronounced than in the Sierra." (Correia 2000, 41). In addition, in a tremendously loaded and racialized framing of non-normative sexuality, the report stated:

> "in terms of household composition, it is relatively common for rural men in the Costa to simultaneously maintain more than one common law union (compromiso). So-called "visiting unions", in which the male partner resides only temporarily with one or several women-who may themselves live permanently with extended natal family members-are a frequent residential pattern in this region. The implications of these types of unstable and multiple unions for economic activity patterns and income distribution are not well understood" (41).

This theme was also prominent in the case studies put out by PRODEPINE. The case study on Afro-Ecuadorian gender relations in San Lorenzo focused heavily on the fact that most couples do not formally marry, that "both men and women engage in various conjugal relationships throughout their lives" (Vallejo Real 2002a, 84), that people are in "free unions", and that women have numerous "compromisos," in between which they head families alone (18).[viii] The study relied on Norman's Whitten account of Afro-Ecuadorian society as characterized by matricentral families involving a dyad of mothers and children who are supported by the recruitment of fathers. When adult men are present they head the family, but women resume this role when these men leave, which they inevitably do. Men thus engage in "serial polygamy," having two or three women sometimes in the same pueblo, "in the same neighborhood or even in the same house" (18). Women are understood to tolerate this outrageous behavior "not only for love, but to get a roof, food, and protection for children" (34). However the system is understood to lead to negative consequences for children, since:

> "in a structure of female family headship, the mother assumes a strong character (she) takes the place of ...a masculine figure of authority for her children. It is she who punishes and imposes corrections. In these cases it is considered that the woman fulfills the function of father and mother, covering domestic and economic-productive roles at the same time" (26).

This diagnosis of the policy problem appears not merely mistaken, but profoundly dangerous and pathologizing in its (re)production of racist discourses of Black men's irresponsibility, sexual voracity, and failure to properly love their families. Absent is the critique of the wood and oil industry to which many men migrate to find work; absent is the critique of the palmaculture industry to which many people have sold land and for which many men (and some women) work as day laborers for wages insufficient to provide for human dependencies; absent is the critique of the shrimp industry for destroying the ecosystem on which the region depends for food subsistence; absent is any caution about defining sexual morality solely in terms of heterosexual married monogamy. Although the section on social and economic context in this case study mentioned such issues in passing, ultimately the core gender problem here was Afro-Ecuadorian men's inability to be faithful, to love properly and responsibly.

That said, however, simultaneously PRODEPINE's gender policymakers argued that some Andean indigenous cultures were based on models of harmonious complimentary gender relations. Thus the discourses of sharing and male inclusion so central to their efforts to restructure intimate relations were framed as culturally authentic. As Gioconnda Herrera notes in her overview of gender research in Ecuador, some academics argue that gender relations in Andean communities are characterized by a harmony and equity not found in mestiza communities (Herrera 2001). Sarah Hamilton's book *The Two Headed Household* epitomizes this approach. Hamilton's research on an Andean community found an "extraordinary degree of economic, social, and political gender-egalitarianism" (1998, 8). Women and men shared decisions about crops, household spending, children, animals and so on; the community was characterized by a fluid gender division of labor, and husbands and wives "learned (or are learning) to capitalize on one another's strengths and to compensate for one another's weaknesses in matters of economic survival" (Hamilton 1998, 76). Thus she concluded that "gender equality is a central feature of social organization" (63). Likewise Lynn Meisch, an anthropologist specializing in Otavalan highland Indian communities, claims that gender complementarity is central to Andean culture, in which harmony, balance, and reciprocity are vital (2002, 9). A similar argument is found in Frederique Appfel-Marglin and Loyda Sanchez's critique of Bolivian state gender policy for presuming that existing gender relations are detrimental to women, and for imposing binary gender categories on Andean communities in which notions of duality in the body and person are readily accepted (Appfel-Marglin and Sanchez 2002, 28). Reference to this discourse is a frequent response by male leaders in indigenous communities to gender discussions. For example a representative from a key Ecuadorian indigenous political organization who spoke at the opening panel in the Social Forum on the Americas on gender and diversity also claimed that indigenous communities (he was speaking of Quichwa-speaking groups) aimed at reciprocal, harmonious, complimentary gender relations.

However as Herrera points out, not all academics (or feminist activists) share this perspective, and some insist gender inequalities *do* exist within these communities.

Arguing that "the emphasis on cultural difference tends to overshadow an analysis of relations of power between the genders" (Herrera 2001, 41), she argues that dichotomous positions which posit inequality as absent or which ignore variation in gender roles are largely unhelpful, and that more nuanced approaches would seem merited. Likewise in a piece focused on the Andes more generally Marisol de la Cadena challenges recent ethnographic work claiming relations of complimentarity between Andean men and women (1995, 329) – she asserts that women are seen as inferior in the family, that they often suffer abuse and discrimination, and that women's work is undervalued. In short these discourses are sites for struggle, and they certainly do not represent fixed authentic "truths" about ethnic groups. In a beautiful demonstration of this fact, a prominent Ecuadorian feminist presented alongside the indigenous leader in the panel on gender and diversity mentioned above, wearing a rainbow flag bandana tied around her neck – a symbol of multinationality and ethnic diversity, and of sexual diversity as well. The panel was held in a building where another rainbow flag hung from the roof, announcing the presence of the gay and lesbian caucus of the social forum. Other panelists at this forum also drew attention to the dangers of complementary discourses for rendering many expressions of intimacy unspeakable.

What interests me is the importance of this discussion for PRODEPINE, since claims that some indigenous communities have complementary, harmonious gender relations surfaced repeatedly in the loan. Indeed this sharing was the basis upon which Andean groups out-ranked other groups in the hierarchy of good gender relations. Maria Correia's discussion of gender in economic crisis claimed that Sierran households are more egalitarian with respect to domestic work (Correia 2002), for example, and the

Ecuador Gender Review stated bluntly: "Most evidence suggests that the gender division of labor is significantly more restrictive among mestizo as compared to indigenous rural households" (Correia 2000, 40). It divided the section on gender roles in agriculture up regionally, and the discussion of the Sierra cited Hamilton's claim that women participate equally in all phases of production, that they are equal decision-makers, and that "the gender division of labor in this region-both in agriculture as well as in domestic tasks such as cooking, cleaning and childcare-is characterized by mutual substitution and joint or alternate task performance (40).

Similarly a Bank specialist mentioned this issue when describing gender relations in Andean communities, as did a PRODEPINE employee in the Sierra Norte office. Another staff person replied to a question about PRODEPINE's gender activities by stating:

> "well, the first priority of PRODEPINE isn't necessarily the focus on gender, because in the indigenous world there is not this discrimination against women like you see in the mestizo sector. So here rather the nuclear family is very united"

S/he reiterated this framing of indigenous gender relations later in the interview, and criticized the gender workshops carried out by the project when asked about the Bank's role in PRODEPINE's gender activities. S/he stated that workshop coordinators had certain 'tendencies" to push for women's independence, causing fights and resentment, rather than focusing on a construction of gender from a base in the indigenous world view, one involving mutual respect, family circularity, sharing, unity and so on.

The gender material put out by PRODEPINE also frequently referred to Andean communities as offering a model for complementary, harmonious gender relations from which new loving partnerships between men and women could be built. For example the basic guide to gender put out by PROGENIAL for PRODEPINE in 2001 stated that:

> "from a Western view it is assumed that productive work is carried out in general in the public sphere by men, while the reproductive role is carried out by women in the private sphere (house). The experience of work with a gender focus in countries with mestiza and indigenous traditions has shown that the separation does not always exist and therefore it is important to see the synergy between these distinct roles" (PRODEPINE 2001a, np).

In evaluating workshops designed for PRODEPINE's technical staff PROGENIAL suggested that PRODEPINE not use the category of gender or the language of "gender-focus" because it generated resistance. Specifically, it was understood by some groups as referring just to women, and "in its place (the groups) propose reference to a focus on equity between men and women that is oriented to recuperate principles of solidarity, complementarity, equality between us" and in which "men and women work united with respect, tolerance, equality of opportunities."[ix] Later PROGENIAL staff wrote that one of the aims of PRODEPINE's gender workshops was "to recuperate the principles of "equality" "duality"(and) "harmony" of Andean culture and to enact development with identity," in a clear demonstration that 'ethnodevelopment' was understood to involve the promotion of apparently 'authentic' traditions of sharing partnership.[x]

In part this emphasis on authentic complementarity was popular in the Bank because it helped staff walk a difficult line between respecting the "culture" of ethnic communities and ensuring that gender workshops aiming at empowerment and changed roles were carried out. As one Bank policymaker put it:

> "well its not a question of saying in a community, to go with a discourse and to say "here the men are this and the women are this other thing, now the men have to cook and the women have to go with the machete in the Amazon or in the coast. They would lynch us."

For this reason, s/he described the experience of the project as '"very complicated and hard," one made easier by arguing in workshops that the loan aimed at harmony and restoration of ethnic values. Indeed these negotiations interestingly complicate standard post-colonial critiques of development. As feminist scholars have long noted, women from the South are framed as passive victims in need of liberation from their cultures in GAD work. Such representations portray Poor World communities and nations as being without history, as having fixed, "backward" cultures, and "as dominated by the grip of 'traditional practices'" (Narayan 1997, 49). "Third World Culture" is thus understood to be frozen, unitary, and ahistorical, and Third World Women are framed as passive victims, in effect outside of culture or at least unilaterally oppressed by it. They are "helplessly entangled in the tentacles of regressive Third World patriarchy" (Parpart 1995, 254). However in PRODEPINE apparently "progressive" elements of indigenous "culture" are being used instrumentally by gender staff to promote the privatization of social reproduction responsibilities – a finding that suggests the need for more research into issues of sex, gender, culture, and development policy.

Several of PRODEPINE's case studies on gender and ethnicity also drew on this complex cultural discourse. The research aimed to help overcome the perceived cultural resistance of indigenous and Afro-Ecuadorian groups to the notion of gender, by showing "the social, cultural and economic dynamics that push for changes in the traditional gender roles of the peoples and nationalities" (2)[xi], but often these "traditional gender roles" were framed as equitable. For example the case study on the Kichwa community in Cotopaxi identified complementarity, reciprocity, interchange, and internal cohesion as key characteristics of the Andean social structure (Vallejo Real 2002b, 19). However the emphasis on complementarity as a cultural phenomenon was nowhere better illustrated than in the letter sent by the head of PROGENIAL to PRODEPINE's gender consultant in January 2002, as PROGENIAL was closing; this ended by stating "we hope that the process in PRODEPINE advances. In all we are sure that the focus on gender will contribute to the restoration of the identity of the peoples and nationalities, with the rescue of knowledges, practices and spheres of men and women, without which it is not possible to achieve the strengthening of bonds of duality and complementarity."[xii]

Interestingly, although usually associated with Andean Kichwa communities, the notion of authentic gender relations involving sharing reciprocity was also raised in relation to indigenous groups in the Amazon. In a report on what appears to have been a disastrous gender workshop with Shuar, Achuar, Quichwa and mestiza people (Aulestia and Quintero-Andrade 2001), participants refused to accept figures provided by the facilitators on gender differences in Ecuador in relation to wages, literacy rates, years of schooling and so on, arguing that they reflected an urban, mestiza, feminist bias, and did not take into account Amazon reality. This reality was characterized as based on complementary relations between men and women, meaning "'that the display of charts of men and women paves the way to the division of families and does not respect cultures'" (Aulestia and Quintero-Andrade 2001, 2). The first suggestion given for how to improve the workshop was thus "to start the analysis (of gender) from the principles of Amazonian philosophy – complementarity, reciprocity and binarity" (7). The facilitators subsequently criticized the Western vision of gender as based in binary categories and exclusive worlds, since "interrelations, complementarity, and reciprocity are not envisioned." In contrast they argued that men and women share roles in the Amazon, and that:

> "gender relations, especially between the Shuar and Achuar peoples, are complementary, therefore they are neither inequitable nor discriminatory. To build capacity and discuss subjects of equity between men and women is not useful for these nationalities."

In short, then, the gender material put out PRODEPINE was focused on the inclusion of men, locating the "gender problem" at issue in the private sphere of intimate interactions in the household, and aiming at the (re)production of restructured heteronormativity in which both partners love better. It defined this emphasis on complementarity and reciprocity as central to its model of ethno-development, a model which can not recognize power inequalities and which assumes the household will ultimately be restored as a site for harmonious loving relations. I have argued that this failure to recognize power inequalities within the household and the tendency to define men's inclusion as definitive of good gender policy is profoundly problematic, and has damaged some of the projects funded by PRODEPINE. Moreover, the discussion of balanced heteronormativity as a marker of indigenous gender relations, and as the end point of gender policy, rests on a profoundly inaccurate sketch of "Western" gender relations, which are binarized but also interlinked. Wholeness is to be achieved through gender partnerships, spheres are to be linked, parts of the self are to be made complete, and anatomies are framed as fitting together naturally in a biologistic notion of complementarity.[xiii] To argue that "indigenous" gender relations are different from Western ones on the basis that the former promote complementarity is thus profoundly wrong-headed.

In addition, the notion that gender analysis is not necessary in communities where men and women share roles left PRODEPINE staff – and GAD policy makers more generally – in a difficult position. By defining policy success as balanced inclusion of men and women, shared roles, and complementary partnerships, PRODEPINE staff found themselves confronted by a number of communities who argued that complementarity was an always-already defining feature of their national identity. One could, of course, argue that they were wrong. The report on the Amazon workshop hinted at this possibility when noting that although the Shuar and Achuar say a gender focus is not necessary because roles are complementary, three women in the workshop said that inequalities *did* exist regarding political participation and decision-making in PRODEPINE, a statement they retracted when it was repeated by the facilitators. In another case study gender consultants repeated community assertions that marriages are sacred, families are stable, and divorces do not exist, only to concede that there are some cases of separated couples (Chachi 2002, 39). However this is a perilous approach, appearing to silence community self-definition and impose external "expert" diagnoses on indigenous problems in ways that run counter to principles of ethnodevelopment.

Rather the core problem here stems, again, from the fact that gender equity is defined as complementary partnerships in the first place. This allows no space for discussion of inequality *within* shared partnerships, and reference to complimentarity becomes by default a racialized trump card that demonstrates the uselessness of gender analysis, one vied for by leaders in many communities, including those considered by PRODEPINE staff to be on the outside of sharing models. Thus women in one case study for PRODEPINE had to negotiate the apparent contradiction of inequality and partnership by asserting: "women maintain that there exists complementarity in the home, but they still they mention that an over-load of work exists" (Aulestia 2002, 40), while another gender consultant noted "relations of opposition and complementarity exist between genders within the Afro culture" (SL 2002, 20). The case study of another indigenous community asserted: "within the culture and as a positively-valued behavioral trait is the fact that women work together with their husbands, which is a marital obligation" (Chachi 2002, 34), again demonstrating perfectly the tension between complementarity and autonomy, between requirements of sharing and desires for self-governance. Harmonious work in production is presented positively here, even though it may be coerced – the fact that it is apparently shared becomes by default evidence of emancipation. This is profoundly dangerous for gender analysis; not only are investigations privatized and focused on household roles to the neglect of broader social, economic and political issues, but evidence of "sharing" within those roles is automatically seized upon as proof of success, in a way that reinforces compulsory types of partnering and runs counter to feminist interests in self-determination, sexual autonomy, and the need to secure space for people to live respected, dignified lives free from coerced intimacies.[xiv]

Childcare.

Given that the social reproduction dilemma at the heart of the Bank's attempts to get women into work is resolved through infrastructure and better loving couples, once more it becomes necessary to explain why the third solution – childcare – failed, this time at the project level. References to childcare facilities were sparse in PRODEPINE, and the issue rarely surfaced in written material or in interviews conducted with staff. When it did, it was not defined as a priority for the project itself. For example, the original PROGENIAL proposal to work with PRODEPINE cited childcare as one of the problems restricting women's ability to work (6), but it did not subsequently recommend childcare provision as a policy priority – rather, concrete steps to resolve the social reproduction dilemma focused on infrastructure and better loving men. Similarly submerged – but still visible – demands for childcare were present in the case study on Afro-Ecuadorian gender relations, which noted that women in one community tried to set up a nursery that failed due to local disagreements (Vallejo Real 2002a, 55). It was not considered part of PRODEPINE's responsibility to rescue this initiative (compare this (non)response to that evident in the Caja Solidaria program, wherein staff made desperate efforts to keep malfunctioning groups going). This case study also referred to complaints in other communities over:

> "the lack of sources of work for women. Childcare facilities are a necessary (service) so that women can have more time to work" (81).

Again, however, no recommendations were offered to meet this perceived need; the report was far more interested in stopping men's serial polygamy (which was never defined as a problem by women in the report itself) than in demanding daycare. Similarly the case study on the Chachi concluded that "projects that involve both sexes, such as for example the construction of childcare centers, sports grounds and school classrooms, are successful because they facilitate the tasks of women and signify work opportunities for men" (Eguiguren Maldonado and Marchán 2002, 53). However the concrete policy measures recommended in this report focused on getting men to share housework, not on constructing nurseries.

Elsewhere, when childcare was mentioned it was often identified as the responsibility of another agency, as outside the purview of PRODEPINE. In an important exception, staff in the Costa Norte told me that their office built two childcare centers, and that these were working very well – however these were run by the Ministry of Social Welfare as part of the "Operation Child Rescue" program, and PRODEPINE's involvement had been limited to construction. It had no role in the proposal for the project, and despite that fact that this initiative worked when so many others in that region failed, there was no sense that it should be replicated or that it was a "women's project" in the way that the Cajas Solidarias, in all their unprofitable and defaulting glory, were considered to be.

When I asked staff directly about childcare provision[xv] many lamented that services were inadequate, it was a serious problem, people were very concerned, and so on, but there was no consensus that services should be provided. One PRODEPINE employee commented: "truly at the regional level it is a very serious worry, very serious I say," but s/he then stated:

> "personally I see that having nurseries isn't sufficient....I see that it is necessary to carry on generating more projects of this type (the cajas solidarias), because the women stay in the house. Because no one is going to care (for the children) better than their mother or their father."

Even when staff agreed that service provision was a priority, usually PRODEPINE itself had done nothing, and other agencies were considered responsible for service provision. One policymaker, when asked about childcare services, replied:

> "that's the ideal, right? The idea would be this – that while the parents are busy the children are developing their skills etc, in an educational center – the ideal – but in practice it isn't like this. The children are on the mother's back, or the back of their older siblings in some cases"

I was often referred to other, barely-functioning government childcare programs in these conversations, but the services were understood to be outside of the loan, part of the general community background context rather than something PRODEPINE itself could actively change. For example the evaluation of the Caja Solidaria program noted that Swiss Aid credit initiatives in Cotopaxi funded childcare centers so that women could work, but the report never suggested that such actions be part of the Caja Solidaria mandate. Interestingly the terms of reference for this study aimed to look at "the growth or reduction in domestic workload, the degree of demand for services such as childcare centers, medical services, among others," but again the generation of nurseries was framed as a possible *consequence* of the Caja Solidaria initiative, rather than being viewed as a necessary part of the program from the start. Similarly the case study on the Chachi community noted with interest that girls of 14 or 15 were being employed by mothers to help with domestic tasks (Eguiguren Maldonado and Marchán 2002, 35), but there was no sense that PRODEPINE had any role here other than to observe the emergence (or otherwise) of a private market to provide for social reproduction requirements.

It is hard to imagine PRODEPINE making a similarly reversed argument about infrastructure – to study whether the provision of piped water increased in Caja Solidaria communities as women shifted to productive activities. The absurdity of this framing would be immediately be evident, since PRODEPINE staff understand that they have a responsibility to provide infrastructure in order to get people into productive work. I did not see this understanding extended to childcare, despite the fact that reproductive work was defined in several instances as including *both* water collection and childcare

(Amazon workshop). While PRODEPINE supported collective public provision for the former as a legitimate solution to the social reproduction dilemma, the latter was supposed to be provided by the private couple. This stems in part from the fact that infrastructure was a broader concern of the loan, having been long identified as a priority in rural development discussions, and that the Bank paid for community mingas in infrastucture – there were no efforts to pay people for childcare. Childcare thus again generates no good costs, and was not part of existing discussions of efficiency and increased productivity.

However the failure of childcare to garner wider support with PRODEPINE also stems from the fact that it was not seen as empowering to indigenous and Afro-Ecuadorian people. Forging sharing gender relations, in contrast, was understood to emancipate. Aside from the general fact that anything which did not include men in balanced way was regarded as bad gender analysis, several interviewees claimed that indigenous people in particular wanted their children cared for in the home, by relatives, in order that family traditions and cultural inheritances were properly transmitted. Good ethnodevelopment thus (re)inforced privatized childcare arrangements, since to change them would be disempowering, while getting men and women to share domestic tasks was culturally authentic. Thus ultimately childcare provision failed, yet again, to emerge as a successful solution to the social reproduction dilemma at the heart of this project-level intervention to improve gender relations. It was not a priority of the broader loan; it was not defined as central in the original proposal; it was not understood to be within PRODEPINE's sphere of activity; it was not linked to existing conversations about productivity and efficiency; and it was not seen as empowering or culturally authentic.

Hence even when it worked it was ignored; even when it was brought up by communities themselves it was not provided; and even when there was a consensus that it was important, PRODEPINE did nothing.

Conclusion.

In this chapter I identified two solutions to the social reproduction dilemma enacted by PRODEPINE: better time management through infrastructural provision, and restructuring partnerships between couples to ensure that men love better and women act with (limited) rationality in the marketplace. The latter is a particular priority for this loan given its focus on backward women who do not understand the culture of the market, and drunken, sexually irresponsible, lazy, absent, and polygamous men from ethnic minorities. These solutions mirror those proposed in the formally cleared gender policy texts analyzed in chapter three, although at the project level staff make far more explicit interventions to teach the supposedly natural market mentalities required for their productive interventions to work as cure-alls for development ills. The options succeed in the institution because they deliver perceived efficiency benefits, and because are understood to empower couples and communities. Again, childcare drops out of consideration because it lacks these qualities, and it is erased as a policy priority, even when raised by the communities at issue.

The efforts to restructure partnerships evident in this loan are particularly troublesome. PRODEPINE's gender efforts were repeatedly complicated by the insistence of the indigenous communities with which the project works that gender relations are *already* characterized by complimentarity and balance, rendering intervention pointless. Generally PRODEPINE staff responded by agreeing, or by arguing that the project should aim at the regeneration of lost values of reciprocity and sharing partnership. This is a profoundly conservative effort, based on a false dichotomy between Western and non-Western gender models which ignores the complementarity embedded in the former, and which makes it extremely difficult to speak of inequality *within* apparently sharing partnerships. Rather the appropriate response would seem to be to dismantle the notion of complementarity as reflective of gender equality – or at least not to strengthen that notion by making it a defining feature of gender analysis. At the project level as much as in the Bank's formally cleared D.C. documents, then, the ubiquitous attempt to resolve social reproduction tensions by forging better sharing partnerships is a troubling development, and the fact that it succeeds in PRODEPINE is cause for considerable concern.

To reiterate, these troublesome solutions to the social reproduction dilemma did not emerge because the loan was a disaster, because staff were incompetent or mean-spirited, or because the Bank failed to listen to its gender specialists – I have argued precisely the opposite. The pathologies embedded in PRODEPINE are pathologies of the Bank's approach to gender analysis, and they can not be dismissed as caused by context-specific factors. In contrast, PRODEPINE was run by good people with excellent skills, it is considered highly successful, it is held up as a good practices example of ethnodevelopment and gender mainstreaming within Ecuador and the region more generally, and it is precisely the sort of project liable to be cited by the Bank when it is criticized for the negative social consequences of macro-economic lending. PRODEPINE did not fail; it succeeded, and the Bank will try to ensure its success is repeated elsewhere. This makes it perhaps the most important research site to which I have devoted attention in this project, and the one that reveals most about the Bank's vision of good gender policy. The ways that the social reproduction dilemma are resolved here are the ways the Bank will try to resolve them everywhere its gender entrepreneurs can secure institutional space – and frankly that is alarming.

[i] Jan 2002 (PROGENIAL). "Propuesta de Indicadores para seguimiento y evaluacion de asuntos de equidad entres hombres y ujeresen el proyecto PRODEPINE' (39), in PRODEPINE archive.
[ii] See chapter 5 and chapter 6 on agro-industry in the area
[iii] Moreover there is a crucial tension here between the effort to inculcate rationality in the workplace, and the concern that men are losing traditional commitments to community labor – commitments that rest fundamentally on altruistic connections to others, non-individualistic approaches to utility, and non-remunerated, non-marketized visions of work. The Bank is worried that community labor is being undermined, and they blame men for losing their culture, yet the practice is undermined primarily through the marketized day labor practices the Bank is pushing.
[iv] These efforts were often contradictory – to keep the same Caja Solidaria going another PRODEPINE staff person encouraged members to sell alcohol at sporting events and to sponsor community dances where alcohol was being served. In this sense my analysis confirms Rosemblatt's findings (2000a; 2000b) that efforts to instill temperance in Chilean working class men were never fully successful – she notes that men routinely went drinking after Popular Front meetings in which alcohol had been criticized.
[v] For more on migration and ethnicity in Ecuador see Kyle, Meisch 2002.
[vi] This can lead to a preoccupation with hygiene, disease, and the body (Colloredo-Mansfeld 1999, 59). During a 1991 cholera epidemic in the Otavalo area, for example, the state erected boundaries between clean and infected populations by asserting, in effect, that all indigenous people were suspect. Peasant communities are often seen as dirty in this way (75) – young white men claim indigenous money is "dirty" money, for example (81).
[vii] This focus on men interestingly complicates discussions that point to women as signifiers of indigenous identity – as "more Indian" than men given their reduced access to urban markers of mestizo identity (de la Cadena 1995, 329).
[viii] A compromiso is somewhere between a date and a person you are engaged to, depending on the context. It is implied here that women may not REALLY be engaged to such men, since they come and go so often, although women are faithful to them until the men leave and women find another one.
[ix] PRODEPINE file 2002, memo. on evaluating workshops designed for PRODEPINE's technical staff, 2
[x] PRODEPINE archive (Talleres de validacion de la incorporacion de los elementos de genero en el manual de diagnostico comunitario e identification participativa de proyectos con enfoque de equidad entre hombres y mujeres" Kattya Hernandez Basante, PROGENIAL, 2).
[xi] PRODEPINE archive: 7 march 2002: PROGENIAL, World Bank "Informe de Asistencia Tecnica de género al proyecto PRODEPINE" may 2000-feb 2002.
[xii] PRODEPINE archive 2002, from World Bank 9 Jan 2002.
[xiii] See introduction.
[xiv] These include single people, divorced people, separated people, people partnered in other ways etc. This is where the narrow focus of some transnational GLBTQ authors on seeing themselves everywhere is troublesome – scholars may seek out tiny populations of transsexual prostitutes in Mexico City rather than considering sexual identities and possibilities in a broader way that does not require explicit marking as "gay", "lesbian" and so on. Thus as Puri (1999) points out in her discussion of gender and sexuality in India, greater tolerance for single people –particularly single women - is (or should be) part of sexual rights activism – a move that in turn requires dismantling notions that complimentary gender roles are required to make people whole.
[xv] and I usually had to since they never mentioned it otherwise – this was never true of the Caja Solidaria program, for example, and was the complete reverse of my experience with the flower industry, wherein childcare facilities were always brought up by interviewees.

Conclusion: Broader Implications and Policy Suggestions.

> "The welfare impacts of a development policy are likely to be multidimensional. So, measures that pertain only to selected aspects give us only a partial picture- and it can be easy to draw misleading conclusions. Consider two studies on Ecuador that arrive at opposite conclusions about the overall impact of structural adjustment. One study, of a low-income neighborhood in urban Guayaquil, Ecuador, concludes that cuts in government expenditures on public services forced mothers to increase their time on household and community care activities at the expense of leisure (Moser 1989). Daughters were similarly compelled to reallocate time, taking away from their schooling. The conclusion is that adjustment harmed women and girls. The second study, of the cut-flower industry in rural Ecuador, credits an adjustment-induced boom with expanding the demand for female labor, raising women's incomes relative to men's, and increasing women's leisure time (Newman 2000). Men in cut-flower producing areas increased their time in home maintenance and care activities compared with men in other areas. The study concludes that adjustment has benefited women" (World Bank 2001, 206 from a text box on measuring the policy impact of structural adjustment).

From the *Engendering Development* policy paper to Moser's research on Cisne Dos, from interviews with Ecuadorian flower farmers to visits to defunct coconut processing plants, this dissertation has found the World Bank endorsing the same solution to the social reproduction dilemma as that highlighted in the above quotation – domesticating men. At the start of this project, I wanted to know if the world's largest development institution had addressed the social reproduction problem, if it had generated answers, why it had generated those answers, and whether those answers were the right ones. In the most basic terms, the findings presented in the previous 8 chapters answer those questions. The Bank's gender policy makers have addressed the problem, and they have generated two recurring policy solutions: investment in technology and infrastructure to save time, and, most prominently, restructuring loving partnerships between men and women. Those solutions succeed in the Bank because they are seen as efficient and empowering, meeting the needs of mainstream technocrats and progressive new recruits interested in social development. Those solutions are not the right ones, and I argue that the promotion of restructured heternormativity in particular is a profoundly dangerous response to the tension between paid labor and unpaid care that warrants serious feminist contestation, and not only because it is being used as proof that structural adjustment is a pro-feminist endeavor.

In these specific terms, then, the findings are of interest because they shed light on a previously unexplored dimension of Bank gender policy, concerning one of the most pressing puzzles in contemporary development literature. The project hereby generated results that relate to debates in feminist political economy, the scholarly arena to which it is ultimately most indebted. Simply put, I show that the Bank has answers to the social reproduction problem – this has not been acknowledged in feminist political economy and is thus of interest to scholars who expect, based on existing literature, an exhaustion solution to be the default policy option. More substantively, however, I argue that the broader feminist failure to acknowledge the crucial reframing of the Bank's approach to social reproduction leaves us unable to critique and resist the concrete policy solutions that emerge from it – solutions that threaten to become hegemonic in international development policy, and which have profoundly dangerous implications. This project was not intended to simply chart, explain, or predict policy solutions, although it managed to do so relatively well – it was intended to critically analyze them, to ask if the answers that worked for the Bank were the right ones for feminists. I insist that they are not, although I am far more troubled by the Bank's preference for promoting adjusted partnerships than I am by investments in infrastructure given the predominance of the heteronormative option in current policy. It appears urgent to contest this, since it is likely to proliferate in the new Bank with heightened interests in empowerment and gender.

However the contestation of this reprivatizing solution is currently lacking, for two reasons. Firstly, there appears to be a reluctance, in scholarship and practice, to critically assess the troubling ways in which poor men have been framed in GAD policy, and thus the Bank's targeting of poor men as violent, lazy, drunken problems, suffering from wounded masculinity given their inability to live up to elite standards of manliness is allowed to pass without comment far too often. This is not the typical critique of gender policy for including men – I am not arguing that men are necessarily diverting project benefits (although this did occur in PRODEPINE in a few of the caja solidarias), or that a focus on male gender problems leads to a neglect of more serious women's issues. Rather I am claiming that poor men are being included in frankly pathologizing ways aimed at their coerced domestication, ways which lay the blame for the failures of neo-liberal development at their feet in a completely misdirected diagnosis of the policy problem. The Bank's gender specialists are trying to teach poor men how to be responsible family members – how to love their families in a committed, sustained way in order that they can help pick up the slack of unmet care needs - and this is simply unfair. Poor men are not responsible for the inability of neo-liberal development projects to provide for inevitable human dependencies, and the few minutes of extra domestic labor time that women employed in flowers can secure by marrying them is not an adequate solution to social reproduction needs. It leaves women dependent on men who may, indeed, be lazy good for nothing drunkards (to paraphrase a woman in the

Cisne Dos study), and it coerces men and women into attachments that should be more freely chosen.

That feminist policymakers appear to be endorsing these solutions, or at least failing to loudly critique them, is thus troubling, and it perhaps reflects a deeper failure to explore their own flawed class assumptions. Certainly, contesting the Bank's framing would require increased attention to the colonial logics involved in many GAD discussions of "brown men" as inherently lazy, drunken, and abusive, but it would also require critical interrogation of how feminist policymakers see poor men generally. Perhaps the ease with which pathologizing portrayals of working and underclass men are accepted speaks to a broader failure on the part of feminist bureaucrats – and even academics - to interrogate their own investments in class hierarchies. At any rate it is still far too easy to blithely claim that poor men are more violent because their masculinity is wounded, and it is still far too rare that feminists who make that claim are held to account for it. For the Bank's solutions to the social reproduction dilemma to be contested, then, feminist policymakers need to interrogate class and masculinity with more care, in order that they recognize the danger of attempts to (re)privatize care by coercing poor men into loving better.

Secondly, the Bank's attempt to (re)privatize caring responsibilities by adjusting loving partnerships between men and women is overlooked by feminists because policies that rearrange heterosexuality are not marked as "policies" due to the persistent refusal in development studies and feminist international political economy to denaturalize heterosexuality. My project reveals the limitations of this refusal to apply the insights of sexuality studies to critical development studies, and it demonstrates the necessity of taking sexuality seriously as a category of analysis in international development research. As Foucault noted: "sexuality is not the most intractable element in power relations, but rather one of those endowed with the greatest instrumentality, useful for the greatest number of maneuvers and capable of serving as a point of support, as a linchpin, for the most varied strategies" (1978, 103). Adjusted heterosexuality is indeed a linchpin of the Bank's current attempts to secure the continued provision of caring labor in a neo-liberal context, but this policy preference is often invisible, because of a general failure to accept that initiatives playing with normative family formation are sexualized interventions which produce real world effects. As sexuality scholars have long noted these policies are not marked as controversial or about sexuality because they deal with heteronormative expressions thereof; this is a key reason why the Bank's current interventions generate so little comment. Indeed it is worth recalling the definition of successful mainstreaming as invisibility highlighted in chapter one in this respect. As Bank gender policymakers understood it:

> "Something is said to be mainstreamed when it is so routine that it provokes neither conflict nor comment. Computerization of office work, the numbering of streets, and sending six-year-olds to school are all illustrative of the concept of mainstreaming" (World Bank 2000d, 2).

Hence "success often renders the issues less visible" (2). In this sense the promotion of adjusted partnerships in which women work more and men love better has become a piece of GAD common sense, like the work policy itself – it has been mainstreamed into invisibility as a policy intervention, such that it is ignored by the institutions critics. This is a cause for great concern, because it suggests that feminists will fail to contest what is clearly a poor policy. Consider again Molyneux's question - "will states" or, in this case, international development institutions, "in an excess of bureaucratized zeal, continue their intervention into the most intimate realms of human relations, and will they do so with or without the blessing of feminism?" (Molyneaux 2000, 71). Until feminist political economists start taking sexuality seriously as a category of analysis, the answer to that question appears to be "yes they will, and feminists will give their blessings" – that was certainly the answer I found in the Bank's gender policy texts, in its Ecuador documents, in its export promotion loans, and in its PRODEPINE activities. My project thus confirms Jacqui Alexander's claim that "the urgency of a research and political agenda that continues to make the processes of heterosexualization transparent, tying them to both *national and international* social interests cannot . . . be overstated" (Alexander 1994, 19 emphasis added) – without this the Bank's solutions to the social reproduction dilemma can not be successfully contested.

Aside from contributing to debates in feminist political economy, however, this dissertation also raises a number of other, broader issues of relevance to a range of political science conversations, and I wish to address some of these in closing. Specifically I draw attention to the implications of the findings for analysis of the Bank itself, for institutionalist discussions about policy development, and for debates about the role of the state and international financial institutions in contemporary restructuring efforts. Primarily, of course, my argument is one about the Bank itself, as the world's largest development institution. In many senses helping to generate a better understanding of that institution is sufficient contribution for a project of this limited scope. My research demonstrates the need to take the Bank seriously as a multifaceted, complex institution undergoing a profound shift in identity as it reorients itself from the

Washington Consensus of the 1980s to take social development concerns more seriously. I suggest that the intersection between empowerment and efficiency will become increasingly important as a site for new policy solutions in the institution, given this shift. Consequently, I have researched the new Bank, James Wolfensohn's Bank, not a caricatured metaphor for the evil empire that sometimes appears in critical anti-development literature. I sense this approach generates more effective critique. As easy as it is to focus on egregious examples of rampant corruption and strong-armed Bank tactics in macro-economic policy, good, effective critique of the Bank has to be able to respond to the "hard" cases as well – to the social development loans that give people water, to fact that it employs Caroline Moser – because those hard cases are an exceptionally effective trump card used by the institution to dismiss criticism. *Starting* from here, from a recognition that this institution is fluid, that it employs good people, that its funds massive structural adjustment loans and little social projects – is a far more secure place from which to launch a useful and trenchant policy critique. For example, taking the Bank's commitments to "participation" seriously, I draw attention to the way in which it attempts to draw civil society actors into a neo-liberal development agenda as service providers; this dimension of Bank activity is occluded if one is unwilling to accept the changing nature of the institution since 1995. The Bank is more, not less, dangerous in this context, and outdated analyses of its 1980s persona are simply not helpful.

My research also contributes to long-standing debates among Bank scholars, particularly feminists, regarding the role of efficiency discourses in the institution. The findings suggest that feminist critics of the institution's neo-classical approach to policy justification surrender far too much ground by agreeing that the Bank's point is proved in its own terms and then saying its terms are wrong. In many cases, the Bank's point is not "proved" with the neo-classical analysis that is employed. The Bank's own data disrupts its claims that human capital differences explain wage gaps, that income correlates with rights, that work empowers, that unemployed men are more violent than working men and so on. Pointing this out is important if the Bank's research role is to be properly understood and critiqued, and if assumptions about the coherence and all-powerful nature of neo-liberal economics and the reasoning on which it rests are to be successfully disrupted. To argue otherwise when writing of efficiency discourses is to ironically strengthen their status as the ultimate prover of truth. Accepting apriori that efficiency discourses give Bank policymakers the proof they want misses a crucial opportunity to contest the way in which "evidence" about economics works in the first place. This suggests an urgent need for feminist political economists to cast a critical eye on the Bank's neo-classical knowledge claims, since I suspect the paucity of data supporting the policy priorities on which I focused is evident in other spheres of the Bank's work. Acts of making research fit institutional agendas by taking out negative cases, defining variables endogenously, claiming that research proves one thing in the text and conceding in footnotes that evidence is conflicted and so on may be endemic to a feminist efficiency strategy, a fact that is elided in policy analyses that present efficiency discourses as easy to use. Improving critique in this respect is a pressing matter, part of a vital effort to dethrone the Bank's as the "pace-setter" (Hancock 1989, 57) of development policy, with its staff regarded as the ultimate development experts and its data considered all-powerful. As critical development scholar Arturo Escobar puts it, the prevailing wisdom in the policy field is that "if 'the Bank' does not have clear answers, nobody else does"

(Escobar 1995, 160) – if those answers are to be effectively contested the research on which they rest has to be critically assessed.

Secondly, and departing from the Bank itself, my findings relate to debates within political science regarding the influence that institutional context has on policy framings, and the ways in which policy entrepreneurs attempt to negotiate complex insider-outsider spaces to secure support for their initiatives. The choices made by these policy actors are explained by institutional factors, and the solutions to the social reproduction dilemma that "succeed" in the Bank do so because they meet institutionally-conditioned, and institutionally-defined, requirements of efficiency and empowerment. The model that explains why the Bank endorsed employment priorities within GAD policy also explained why it endorsed technology, infrastructure and restructured heteronormativity, and why it did not endorse childcare. It would be interesting to ascertain whether the same institutional factors were able to explain, or predict, policy outcomes in other sites.

Moreover, through my interviews with marginalized policymakers I was able to explore, in a limited sense, the way in which they make sense of their own location and in this regard the project generated some interesting findings of relevance to debates about institutional ethnography. These policymakers tried to distance themselves from hegemonic institutional actors ("the economists"), but they were also fully aware that the policies they forged were constrained by these actors, in specific, easily delineated ways. By focusing on the complexities of such locations, I suggest that institutional sensitivity and radical critique need not necessary exist in separation – in contrast, based on this research, I sense that they may dialectically push each other forward. Staying attentive to the reasons why policymakers act in the way they do directs critique to the right place – in this case, to the underlying model of economics being promoted, to the limited visions of empowerment as requiring normative attachments, to the pathological approaches to the poor.

Thirdly, my findings relate to broader debates within international political economy concerning the role of IFIs and states in restructuring. Chapters 4-8 demonstrate clearly that it is crucial to include governments as actors in Bank policies, actors whose personnel can be corrupt, whose processes can be undemocratic, who can mismanage money intended for other purposes, who can have far from benevolent interests in their own population, and who often try to blame "the-international-monetarists-of-the-IMF-and-World-Bank" for their own mistakes. Moreover I show that domestic political and economic elites support key elements of the restructuring agenda, and have done for several decades. Yet the findings also illustrate that the Bank is a crucial policy actor in neo-liberal reform efforts in Ecuador. These efforts do not reflect social consensus, despite the Bank's claims to the contrary. Closer interrogation of the institution's activities in the country reveals a far more conflicted approach to reform, one which recognizes the distinct lack of support for restructuring, and which praises administrations for overriding opposition. The Bank is sufficiently concerned about this lack of consensus that they propose a dual reeducation-coercion strategy to resolve it. Civil society is to drawn into "partnership" such that the Bank can educate NGOs about the pro-poor benefits of restructuring and reorient their activities from protest to service provision, and Bank lending is to be tied increasingly closely to changes in macroeconomic policy, giving the government far less ability to renege on reform commitments. On the most basic level, this proves that the Bank is an important policy actor in the country, with its own priorities and means of securing them.

Moreover, the Bank is restructuring the political environment to further undermine an already weak state and party system, and to grant unrepresentative elites greater power over state policy. The Bank not only acts a policy actor in this country; it acts to undermine democracy in order to secure the passage of neo-liberal reform, suggesting the need to fundamentally recast conversations that frame restructuring as a normatively neutral or positive endeavor. Its attempts to push reform through by executive order, to bypass legislative bodies, to transfer development activities from state actors to export companies, and to bring private industry into policy formulation and implementation undermine democratic space. Of course, I do not argue that these findings provide a model for all Bank-state interactions. Neo-liberal reform efforts have generated particularly vehement protest in Latin America, and thus the resistance to restructuring present in Ecuador may not be evident in other regions. Moreover some states are far stronger and have far better linkages between political actors and social movements such that it is harder for elites to seize control of national policy. However perhaps Ecuador's experience is not unrepresentative of countries wherein the state is weak, government officials are corrupt, and the party system is fragmented. In this case, the Bank made that situation worse, and its damaging impact on the democratization process speaks directly to the on-going political science debate about the relationship between restructuring and democracy. The claim that reform is normatively beneficial and linked to democracy, and that opponents of it are "special interests" thwarting silent majority demands for neo-liberalism is not shared by all political scientists, but it stands uncontested in our journals far more frequently than it does in other social science fields with interests in development, such as geography, or anthropology. This research categorically refutes that claim, and I hope that findings such as these will contribute to a much-needed shift in internationally oriented political science research, towards greater openness to work that is critical of restructuring.

To close I wish to briefly consider, in a more practical sense, what can be done in the above context – to ponder how best to respond to the Bank's current policy agenda given the explanations I have proposed for its existence. Although the offering of solutions is often rejected in critical development studies as reenacting of expertise, undemocratic and so on, I take seriously the anger this provokes in more practically minded development practitioners, who regard it (perhaps rightly) as a refusal to take responsibility, a denial of the need to engage, an attempt to retain a purist outsider stance that ironically reenacts the very modernist dichotomies many authors try to disrupt. There is no absolute outside to retreat to, no pristine world of anti-development uncontaminated by the errors of the modernist project to rely on, and no moral high ground to be claimed by refusing to act to make the situation better when the institution charged with ensuring global development is systematically wasting money and making things worse through wrongheaded policies.

As Naila Kabeer notes, though, "planning for transformation entails strategic thinking and a grounded sense of what is possible" (Kabeer 2000, 45). Institutionally-sensitive analyses are well-placed to provide such strategic thinking and knowledge of what is possible, because they draw attention to the constraints within which policymakers already act. At the same time, however, as Sanford Schram puts it, "interrogating discourse provides a way to challenge structures of power that constrain what is politically possible" (Schram 1995, xxiv) – after one highlights the discursive structures that make it possible for things to happen the way they do, one needs a second step of helping to generate resistance (xxix). One is thus caught between imperatives – to be grounded and strategic, and to challenge the ground on which existing options are strategized. With regard to the latter, it is easy to concur that the Bank and its model of development must be either ended entirely, or so radically reformed that the institution appears nothing like its current self. I thus concur with critical development scholars such as Escobar, and those who want to see the Bank "broken" not fixed, as the signs in the 2000 protests put it. Indeed I have repeatedly argued that restructuring should be contested; that the Bank's status as development expert should be challenged; that social policy should be forged through democratic negotiation not elite imposition or crony self-interest. It does not appear necessary to re-state that efforts to achieve such changes merit support. Instead, I propose the following in an attempt to enact the balancing act required by taking Kabeer's demand for grounded strategy seriously – to ponder the possibilities for action within the institution itself.

Most obviously, of course, policy entrepreneurs within the Bank should actively mobilize to promote childcare as the core solution to the social reproduction dilemma. They can attempt to do so using neo-classical arguments more consciously than they have done thus far, claiming that childcare is necessary infrastructure to ensure productivity, that childcare will increase human capital, that the market will not provide it and thus the

Bank have a legitimate compensatory role, and so on. I am not suggesting that this will work in a simple way to change policy; I have argued repeatedly that childcare inevitably causes productivity problems for neo-liberal economists because it generates illegitimate costs and can not compete with "free" solutions provided by privatized couples. However a concerted effort to reframe childcare, particularly one that invokes arguments more commonly used about infrastructure, may create space within which to expand the range of policy possibilities entertained by the Bank. For as long as neo-classical cost-benefit approaches dominate this institution, the Bank is unlikely to fund childcare workers or services, but feminists maybe able to convince it to build childcare centers, to supply them with electricity and running water, and so on. The Bank's major donors make money off such initiatives and they have already been accepted as appropriate interventions designed to compensate for market failures and speed up modernization.

Space within which to demand childcare may also increase if feminists actively contest the Bank's current framing of communal provision as in decline. This makes it extremely hard to argue for intervention, since it appears to go against market trends. Thus it may be helpful to insist that the marketization of childcare needs is a consequence of development. In this sense feminists would be well advised to stop using US-focused analyses and replace them with more strategically chosen examples from West European welfare states which put in place decent services, and which have maintained them through the 1990s unlike transition countries. Glowing citations of Francine Deutsch's appeal to privatized provision in the U.S. are not helpful and there is no need to include them in policy texts; if space exists it may be wise to opt instead for more savvy references to countries in which recognition of communal responsibility for social reproduction needs has been accepted as a consequence of capitalism.

Likewise an increased emphasis on the disjuncture between the Bank's own internal activities and its policy advice to borrowers may be helpful. The Bank provides childcare for employees; it also provides paid maternity and paternity leave, and flexible hours. Feminist staff have mobilized for such changes inside the institution, and it may be wise to seize any opportunity to praise the Bank for their adoption, facilitating pointed interrogation of why it has failed to promote the policies externally.

More controversially, for different, better solutions to the social reproduction dilemma to be enacted by this institution, gender analysis in the Bank – and outside - has to move away from binarized approaches to gender involving complementary bodies and sharing partnerships that make people whole. There is simply no way that non-heteronormative policies can be promoted within the Bank using the current "complementary" definition of gender. If nothing else, the graphics of whole people requiring male-female faces and the constant appeals to unity through coerced attachment to others have to be scaled back, to the minimum necessary to get policies enacted. Currently these discourses are actively embraced by feminists, and considered a good idea: changing this approach is urgently required. Note that efficiency discourses are not regarded in this benign way – they are sometimes resented and the constraints they impose on the politically possible are often acknowledged by policymakers, and by outside observers. However the emphasis on complementarity is not being criticized within the Bank by feminists, or by outsiders trying to hold staff accountable for the effects of their policies. It is therefore important to change the way in which complementarity discourses are regarded in this institution, in order that they be seen as a constraint with negative effects on policy. Although they may be necessary strategically, they also need to be resisted whenever possible.

In addition, the justification for gender policy must shift from the current notion of empowerment as encouraging necessary attachment for both men and women in order that they can be liberated within a monogamous sharing couple. This is not to naively argue that individual rights to determine intimacy should be advocated. These discourses are themselves embedded in specific approaches to sexuality that generate resistance, and I am not blithely suggesting a libertarian celebration of the individual right to arrange intimate life. However I am suggesting that the Bank's current definitions of empowerment are utterly conservative and dangerous to feminists – and that they have to be reframed if more space is to be secured for non-normative arrangements of intimacy. This entails walking a difficult line between celebrations of individual rights – ones that have been soundly criticized for their (re)production of gendered, racialized, and transnational binaries embedded in liberalism – and recognition that no feminist should be perpetuating the notion of empowerment as involving coercing people into normative attachments. Navigating those tensions is beyond the scope of this project, but I do suggest that the line needs to be walked. The balancing act needs to be practiced and perfected, because until attempts to do that are enacted Bank policymakers are forging damaging policy.

As a final step, in addition to scaling back the enthusiastic embrace of complementarity to a more self-reflexive, critical level, an avidly pluralistic approach to gender relations, kinship, and family formation should be promoted, with emphasis on the vast number of ways in which happy, functional human beings arrange their intimate lives. It is unclear how much space exists for this reconfiguration in the Bank because gender analysis there has always been grounded in naturalized, biologized approaches to sex that make heteronormative sharing appear to be a functional imperative. It may thus appear naïve to suggest it. However I do so out of a sense that development practitioners may potentially be more open to the insights of sexuality studies than they realize, and that they may be allies for feminists seeking to contest heternormative gender policies. Many internationally savvy, cosmopolitan development "experts" accept as part of their common sense that human beings arrange their intimate lives in hugely diverse ways – this may not be as true of the economists of the Fund but it is arguably more apparent among the sort of grounded practitioners being hired by the new Bank. At any rate it is unclear how much gender analysis in the Bank "needs" binary sex and how much it can invoke extended families, single parents, divorced people, and other assorted non-normative souls in its policy appeals without them failing to generate support. It may be interesting to find out.

Appendix 1: Text Selection and Coding Strategy

Given that the Bank produces so many reports it is necessary to provide explicit criteria for document selection in order to ensure that broadly representative and relevant texts are included. To analyze the Bank's official, D.C position on women's employment, I focused on high-level, official gender and development policy documents produced by the institution between 1979 and 2001. In a recent co-authored analysis of Bank gender policy Caroline Moser refers to these as "formally-cleared" documents, and she too considers them good resources for policy analysis (see also Murphy 1995, 87). In addition, I reviewed speeches, presentations, and websites through which the Bank present a public, official stance on gender; these include Wolfensohn's address to the Beijing conference, official materials produced to accompany the launch of the 2001 policy paper, and Bank-posted web material associated with their gender site. Excluded from consideration are discussion papers written on gender, reports by external consultants on specific issues, research published by Bank economists in academic journals, and so on. Although far from irrelevant, these more marginal documents are of limited utility when trying to ascertain policy priorities at the official level; they are far less likely to be read than the documents listed above, and they lack the institutional stamp of authorization given to documents that are prefaced by the President, that are publicly showcased at international conferences, and so on.

Two points need to be made about this sample selection decision. Firstly, the choice to exclude these documents should not be taken as a dismissal of the Bank's research role. As Gilbert and Vines (2000) point out in an insider-oriented overview of the Bank's future, research activities and advice on best practices within development are a crucial part of Bank work, and are a central reason why Bank staff are regarded as the ultimate experts in their field. The Bank is re-positioning itself as a "knowledge Bank", and is extremely self-conscious of its role as the leading distributor of ideas about development. Indeed it is precisely *because* I recognize the crucial role of the Bank as a distributor of ideas about development that I consider its documents relevant in the first place. In this sense, as Escobar so importantly points out, any attempt to separate the money from the ideas, or the materiality from the discourse, is missing the point. My argument is that the most successful examples of Bank research – those places where the Bank's role as researcher and educator is most relevant and important – will make their way into flagship publications, and hence can be accessed without straying from formally cleared work.

Secondly, and on a related note, feminists familiar with the Bank will quickly note that a narrow focus on formally cleared work will automatically exclude much feminist policy entrepreneurship from consideration, since much of it takes place in discussion papers written by external consultants, and in projects funded by non-Bank money. I concede that some policy entrepreneurship will be missed this way. However, again evidence suggests that the successful efforts will get into the formally cleared publications. Lori Heise's pioneering discussion paper on gender violence as a development issue (1994) got into the Bank's official documents immediately, for example, and feminist seizure of space is clearly visible in this policy arena. Where there is no carry-over of such ideas into formally cleared work, however, one can not with any rigor claim that they are a current part of "Bank policy." Consider, for example, the

Bank's marginalization of "a path-breaking technical note" (O'Brien, Goetz, Scholte and Williams 2000, 56) produced by the Africa regional gender team on gender and structural adjustment (Blackden and Morris-Hughes 1993). This was welcomed by Bank outsiders for taking feminist concerns over macroeconomic restructuring seriously. The Bank's 1994 policy paper on gender did not cite this study, and the Bank economist who reported it at a 1994 meeting undermined its credibility completely, using the term "anecdotal" five times to describe the evidence employed, and repeatedly referring to its findings as "controversial" (O'Brien, Goetz, Scholte and Williams 2000, 56). The Bank has not been open to feminist critique of its macroeconomic agenda – the erasures and absences in formally cleared texts demonstrate this very clearly.

The Texts.

Recognizing the Invisible Woman in Development: The World Bank's Experience (World Bank 1979a).

This was the Bank's first booklet assessing the impact its projects have on women. It aimed to illustrate "some of the approaches the Bank has adopted to improve opportunities for women to participate in development" (McNamara in World Bank 1979, iii).

Progress Report on Women in Development (World Bank 1990).

In April 1990, concerned that Bank projects submitted for approval frequently ignored WID issues, the Bank's board requested a progress report on the WID initiative (Murphy 1995, 45). The 1990 Progress Report on WID was based on country studies in Kenya, Pakistan, Bangladesh, India and Nigeria, on an Operations Evaluation Department review of 442 operations approved in FY 1988-1989 for their treatment of women's issues, and on 254 internal reports written on economic and sectoral work written in FY 1988-89. Murphy claims that "peer reviews of the 1990 report found it 'too optimistic or 'self-congratulatory' in tone" (Murphy 1995, 46).

Enhancing Women's Participation in Economic Development (World Bank 1994). This was the Bank's first official policy paper on gender, and marks the shift from a "reactive" to a "proactive" stance on GAD according to Murphy's chronology (Murphy 1997, 45). Policy papers are crucial achievements for internal policy advocates, since "this kind of review is intended to be a state-of-the-art assessment of the subject areas as well as a Bank position statement" (O'Brien, Goetz, Scholte and Williams 2000, 46). Policy papers indicate that a topic "is a legitimate Bank concern, integral to good development planning," and they require a "stock-taking" of available evidence on the issue which in turn requires external consultation and raises the profile of the topic in Bank work (Murphy 1995, 55). As Murphy frames it, the roles of a policy paper are to "develop consensus, legitimize, and guide action" (Murphy 1995, ix), and they "set forth clear objectives for Bank staff" (Murphy 1995, 21). The policy paper "thus provided the legitimacy and official support that had been lacking" (Murphy 1997, 13). Indeed Murphy's 1995 OED study implied that, with the publication of the policy text, policy debate had virtually ceased:

"The policy documents provide a solid basis for discussion of gender issues with borrowers, and they give staff clear objectives. The focus is now on implementation." (Murphy 1995, 21).

Gender Issues in Bank lending: An Overview (Murphy 1995).

In 1994, an Operations Evaluation Department (OED) conducted a study on "how the concept of women in development, and later the broader concept of gender, came to be reflected in Bank policies and lending" (Murphy 1997, 1); this was later published as *Gender Issues*. As summarized in the foreword, this report "looks at the Bank's record of incorporating gender issues in the operations it supports. It finds that after extended debate and experimentation, many of the prerequisites for a full integration of gender issues in Bank lending are now in place" (Robert Picciotto, foreword, in Murphy 1995, xi). Rather than trying to "measure the impact of Bank lending on women", the 1995 OED study:

"reconstructs the evolution of Bank thought and actions in some depth through archives, published documents, and interviews. It describes the characteristics of 615 projects with some gender-related action, discusses the implementation experience through detailed file reviews for 60 of these projects, and assesses the outcomes for those projects already completed" (executive summary Murphy 1995, 1).

It also compiled a list of projects with gender-related action approved from FY67 to FY93. Management summarized the 1995 report as "a valuable history of how the Bank has responded to the introduction of a new dimension in the development process" (Murphy 1995, 129).

Wolfensohn's speech to the Beijing Conference (Wolfensohn 1995)

This was the first time a Bank president had led a delegation to a UN conference on women, and his speech there represented a turning point in the Bank's treatment of gender policy, raising its profile considerably.

Promoting Gender Equality Among the Bank's Shareholders (World Bank 1995b)

This was a report on a discussion on gender in the Bank in the context of the Beijing conference.

Towards Gender Equality (World Bank 1995c), Advancing Gender Equality (World Bank 1995a)

These two reports were issued for the Beijing conference. *Towards Gender Equality* "pulled together the evidence and made a case for government action to improve the economic status of women. The report highlights innovative and unexpected strategies that have proved successful and that may stimulate further ideas for creative solutions" (World Bank 1995c, 2). It thus "presents the broad conceptual framework for analyzing the implications of persistent gender inequality" (Choksi, foreword in World Bank 1995c, v). Conversely: "th(e) companion booklet, *Advancing Gender Equality: From Concept to Action*, shows how the Bank is transforming that analysis into action" (Choksi, foreword in World Bank 1995c, v). *Advancing Gender Equality* is a distinctive World Bank document – it follows a non-standard structure, including two parts. The first summarizes *Towards Gender Equality*, and the second gives 13 case study "examples of Bank assistance: from analysis to implementation" drawn from all over the world.

Implementation Reports on the Bank's Gender Policies (World Bank 1996b and 1997b).
In 1996 the Bank published its first post-Beijing progress report on implementing its gender policies. This "reviews the evolution and current status of World Bank operations (both lending and non-lending activities) with respect to gender and looks at the initiatives that have been undertaken to support the Beijing Platform for Action" (Husain foreword in World Bank 1996b, np). It also directly responds to the petition submitted to Wolfensohn from feminists critical of the Bank's policies. In 1997 the Bank published a similar update.

Mainstreaming Gender in World Bank Lending (Murphy 1997).
In 1997 the Bank published an updated OED evaluation of gender, again written by Josette Murphy. It was based on interviews, focus group discussions with staff, analysis of policy texts, and a review of projects, sector work, and investment lending, and evidence from over 800 projects with gender-related actions between FY67-96, giving particular attention to the 58 projects with gender-related action approved in FY87 or later and completed by December 1995, since the last review. It aimed "to confirm or revise-based on a larger body of evidence-the 1994 study's preliminary findings, and to review progress in implementing Bank policy and OED recommendations in recent lending and non-lending work" (foreword Robert Piciotto xi). It includes discussion and recommendations to assess the place of gender "in a changing Bank", and it advises managers on how to move "Beyond Beijing" in mainstreaming gender (43).

Mainstreaming Gender and Development in the World Bank: Progress and Recommendations (Moser, Tornqvist and von Bronkhorst 1999)

This report was written by Caroline Moser in collaboration with consultants Annika Tornqvist and Bernice van Bronkhorst, for the Social Development Family of the Environmentally and Socially Sustainable Development Network of the Bank. It involved a "stocktaking" review of the Bank's approach to mainstreaming gender, based on consultations inside and outside the Bank, review of gender documents put out by outside agencies, and "extensive" review of what Moser terms "formally cleared World Bank documents with a gender focus" (Moser Tornqvist and van Bronkhorst 1999, 2) - policy papers; OED documents, country strategies; and regional-level social, participation, and gender action plans. "The primary objectives of the review are to: (a) identify the current rationale, language, and underlying policy approach to Gender and Development (GAD) adopted by the World Bank; (b) evaluate the extent to which these are shared across the institution; and (c) make recommendations concerning future steps toward mainstreaming gender in the World Bank" (1).

External Gender Consultative Group report (1998).

The EGCG was set up by the Bank after Beijing to give a forum for the women's movement to get involved in Bank gender policies (see intro.). This text reported on the meetings held since Beijing and the Bank's progress in meeting its goals.

Précis Gender Edition (World Bank 2000d)

In 2000 the Bank devoted an edition of *Précis*, an OED publication, to the discussions of gender policy that took place during a workshop and roundtable, in which "senior policymakers and specialists in gender and evaluation from around the world discussed issues relevant to the proposed evaluation of the gender dimensions of Bank assistance" (World Bank 2000d, 2).

Advancing Gender Equality (World Bank 2000a)

In 2000 the Bank put out another document entitled *Advancing Gender Equality*, covering action on gender since Beijing. "This report, which was written as the World Bank's contribution to the five-year follow-up to the Beijing Conference, outlines the most important steps the Bank has taken to make the commitment to reduce gender inequality a reality in our day-to-day work." (Wolfensohn foreword in World Bank 2000a, iv).

Engendering Development Through Gender Equality in Rights, Resources, and Voice (World Bank 2001)

This was the Bank's second policy paper on gender, a massive 364 page report that represented a key seizure of space for policy entrepreneurs and the culmination of years of research. *Advancing Gender Equality* talked it up as: "the largest Bank effort to date in the area of research on links between gender and development" (World Bank 2000d, 27).

ATLAS Software and Coding

The afore-mentioned texts were loaded into the textual analysis software package ATLAS-ti. Two methods of coding were used to facilitate data analysis. ATLAS has a powerful word search tool able to sift through massive amounts of texts and tally counts for individual words (and for misspellings of those words – a crucial tool given that firstly many of the Bank's texts are badly scanned, and secondly that the earlier version of ATLAS with which I was working required that texts be converted into simple text formats from PDFs in a process that generated numerous spelling errors). Comparisons can be made across different texts, to see if certain terms occur more or less frequently for example. Crude counts can be supplemented by statistics on the percentage of text devoted to sentences containing that word – this is a more useful statistic in many cases given that texts vary enormously in length. That said, however, crude counts are also helpful, particularly for words used less frequently – the fact that "feminist" appears six times in *Engendering Development* is arguably evidence of a shift to a more "activist-friendly" Bank even though these sentences take up virtually no text space, generating a % figure of close to 0. I also searched for specific words such as "violence" "fertility" "childcare" "empowerment" "men" and so on, to see if the use of these terms had changed over time – these results are reported in relevant sections of the dissertation.

I also used generated two "clusters" composed of terms associated with the two key concepts in this dissertation: work and social reproduction. Words related to the employment focus included work, labor, wages, entrepreneurship, breadwinner, employment, earnings, occupation, vocation and so on (see table 1 appendix 2 for a complete list). Counts were generated for all texts, and used as the basis for the discussion of work in chapter 1. In addition I generated percentage figures for a sub set of terms (employment, jobs, labor, wages, work, workers) across all documents, again included in chapter 1 (see table 2 appendix 2). Likewise a cluster of terms associated with social reproduction was also generated for use in chapter 2 – this included terms such as childcare, domestic, care, housework, unpaid (see table 3 for a complete list). Percentage figures were generated for a subset of these terms across all documents.

Although useful in providing broad sketches of word use patterns, the data generated by this type of coding process has to be interpreted with care. The process picks up many false positives (with "work" having a variety of context-specific meanings, for example); it treats words in footnotes as having the same import as those in executive summaries; and it diverts attention from close reading to broad-brush comparisons across texts based on a few common keywords. It is hard to measure the importance of employment using keyword strategies, especially given the Bank's own confusion about what counts. For example, gender projects used to be assessed by sectoral distribution, with sectors including education and training, agriculture and rural development, urban development, employment and income generating activities, and PHN (Murphy 1995, 43). However as Murphy notes in her 1995 OED study, this sectoral designation is methodologically dubious, since many activities overlap; in the projects listed in the 1979 pamphlet for example "increasing future employment opportunities" was a frequent objective for education projects and for two population projects (vocational training in Bangladesh, and training of nurses and mid-wives in Thailand) (Murphy 1995, 41). Agricultural projects often rest on employment rationales, and can be coded as "employment initiatives" depending on the researcher, and credit initiatives are always linked to employment, with the Bank trying to generate entrepreneurship and productive activity through credit programs. I try to account for this by including "credit" in the cluster of terms associated with work above, but the broader problem – that keyword coding based on scanning text and generating tables of hits misses a lot of conversations about employment – remains. In short it is a basic step in a far more complex textual analysis process, and the tallies it generates, although helpful, can not alone be the basis for any rigorous interrogation of the data.

Therefore, I also manually coded all of the documents, using codes such as "work", "empowerment", "social reproduction problem", "technology", "gender analysis" and so on. In total 60 codes were generated in this way. For example, I searched for the preferred solutions to the development problem to which Bank GAD efforts were directed, for the highlighted examples of successful or failed policy, and suggestions for the future. In this sense quotations coded under the category "failure" were highly instructive. These included sections of text in which the Bank itself was criticized, usually very gently, and an alternative policy was recommended. The demand for increased emphasis on employment is central here. This type of close reading paid appropriate attention to quotation location, an essential element in a rigorous textual analysis of Bank documents given that many staff only read executive summaries and overviews of reports. I pay closer attention to quotations in forewords, executive summaries, overviews, or conclusions, as should be clear from the discussions in chapter 1-3.

Once coded, the concepts and categories identified as important (work, social reproduction, infrastructure, gender analysis, men, etc) could be considered alongside each other. Queries were constructed to identify, for example, how work initiatives were framed in relation to other policy priorities (such as population control or education), how work featured in highlighted examples of successful or failed policy, how social reproduction problems were framed and resolved, how definitions of gender analysis related to discussions of empowerment, which in turn related to discussions of work, and so on. Indeed ATLAS is at its most powerful in the query mode (if the coding has been done rigorously) – the patterns identified in chapters 1-3 are all based on output generated using this feature.

Ecuador Texts.

I also used a variety of Bank texts when assessing the Ecuador-specific policies of the institutions in chapters 4-8. In terms of gender, I devoted particular attention to the *Ecuador Gender Review* (Correia 2000). In its latest (2001) policy paper on gender, the Bank recommended that all countries attach a gender component to their country assessment strategies (which are designed to give an overview of the development problems to which Bank lending should be directed). This component can either be a section of the country strategy report itself, or a separate and more elaborate document. Few countries have to date met this goal. Ecuador did, with its gender review. The report was based on a desk review of published and unpublished materials; official statistical information; interviews with governmental officials, academics, representatives of non-governmental organizations and women's organizations, in-country counterparts of World Bank projects and World Bank staff; a review of the World Bank's portfolio for Ecuador; and field visits to sites of various World Bank-financed projects in Ecuador (Correia 2000, viii). Written by Bank staff employed in the Latin American and Caribbean Gender

Unit, it aimed "to identify gender issues across sectors with a view to reducing gender inequities and inequalities - and as a corollary enhancing well-being - and improving the effectiveness of Ecuador's social and economic development programs" (1). According to the preface:

> "This report aims to bring to light the most salient gender issues affecting Ecuador's social and economic development today...It is important to note that the report represents a rapid review of issues across key sectors and is in no way comprehensive nor does it attempt to capture the richness of all the gender work carried out in Ecuador over the years by capable practitioners and researchers. It does, however, provide a picture of gender issues of the day, as a basis for discussion, debate and action. It can also serve as a tool for strengthening current development interventions and or designing future policies, programs and services with a gender focus" (v).

It is thus provides a useful opportunistic moment to research a site in which policymakers can be interviewed for their insights regarding gender policy as it relates to a specific country.

In addition to gender texts, I also assessed mainstream reports put out by the Bank on Ecuador, such as diagnoses of the country's development problems, poverty assessments, advice to the government, Bank research on certain sectors and so on. Particularly important here was the most recent Country Assistance Strategy, or CAS (World Bank 2000e). This document is in effect the "masterplan" for the Bank's activities in Ecuador until 2007. In preparation for the CAS the Bank consulted with the government, the Bank's own operation evaluation department, and with "strategic partners" such as the IMF, the Andean Development Corporation, the UN system, and bilateral donors (Board of Directors summary in World Bank 2003e, 2). The Bank also prepared policy notes as part of the CAS negotiations, on the macroeconomy and competitiveness, tax reform, trade reform, labor markets, and the civil service, decentralization, governance and anticorruption, judicial reform, hydrocarbons, financial sector development, urban development, rural development, environmental protection, basic infrastructure (energy, telecommunications, transport, and water), education, health, social security, and social protection. These were given to the government and subsequent published in *Ecuador: An Economic and Social Agenda in the New Millennium*, prepared for the new Gutierrez government (Fretes-Cibils and López-Cálix 2003).

In addition to these mainstream reports I assessed relevant loan documents, available publicly from the Bank. Bank loans go through several stages between proposal and Board approval, and they require certain key documents as part of the preparation, proposal, approval, review, and final evaluation process. Project Information Documents involve descriptions of proposed projects; Project Appraisal Documents are latter-stage evaluations of further advanced but still unapproved projects, and Implementation Completion Reports are end-stage evaluations of closing projects. All were assessed for the Trade and Integration Project and PRODEPINE. I was also given access to some archival material on PRODEPINE and the Bank's gender efforts therein.

Appendix 2: Table 1: Work Hits By Document

words	1979 Recognizing The Invisable Women	1990 WID Progress Report	Enhancing Women's Participation 1994	Murphy 1995	Wolfensohn Beijing speech 1995	Promoting Gender Equality	Towards Gender Equality 1995	Advancing Gender Equality 1995	Implementing 1996
BREADWINNER	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
BREADWINNERS	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
CREDIF	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	0
CREDIT	13	49	23	16	2	1	36	20	14
CREDITIS	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
CREDITS	1	0	0	11	0	0	2	0	1
CREDITSLOANS	0	0	0	1	0	0	0	0	0
CREDITWORTHINESS	0	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	0
CREDITWORTHY	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
EAININGS	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	0	0
EARIIINGS	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	0
EARINGS	0	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	0
EARINIGS	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	0
EARLNING	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	0	0
EARN	3	7	2	0	1	0	6	2	0
EARN-INGS	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
EARNED	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	1	0
EARNER	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
EARNERS	0	0	1	1	0	0	0	0	0
EARNIIGS	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	0	0
EARNIIIGS	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	0	0
EARNINAS	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	0	0
EARNING	1	6	1	1	0	0	1	0	0
EARNINGS	4	3	16	2	0	0	11	7	0
EARNINIGS	0	0	0	0	0	0	2	1	0
EARNINIS	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	0	0
EARNINLGS	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	0	0
EARNS	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	0

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EIIPLOYNIENT	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	0
EMILPLOYMENT	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	0
EMNPLOTYLMNENT	0	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	0
EMNPLOYINENT	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	0	0
EMNPLOYMNCTL	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	0
EMPLOES	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
EMPLOIYIENT	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	0
EMPLOVERS	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	0	0
EMPLOVMENNIT	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	0	0
EMPLOVMENT	0	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	0
EMPLOVNIELT	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	0
EMPLOY	0	1	1	1	0	0	0	0	0
EMPLOY-EES	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
EMPLOY-MENT	2	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
EMPLOYED	5	3	1	1	0	0	8	0	0
EMPLOYEES	1	0	0	1	0	0	0	0	0
EMPLOYER	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	0	0
EMPLOYERS	0	1	0	0	0	0	6	0	0
EMPLOYERS-SPECIAL	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
EMPLOYIENT	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	0	0
EMPLOYIIENIT	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	0	0
EMPLOYING	1	1	0	0	0	0	1	1	0
EMPLOYMENIT	0	0	0	0	0	0	6	1	0
EMPLOYMENL	0	0	2	0	0	0	0	0	0
EMPLOYMENLT	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	0	0
EMPLOYMENT	19	30	19	27	0	0	34	16	8
EMPLOYMENT-CONSTRAIN	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
EMPLOYMIENIT	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	0	0

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EMPLOYMIIENT	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	0	0
EMPLOYMILENIT	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	1	0
EMPLOYMLIELIT	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	0	0
EMPLOYMLIENIT	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	0	0
EMPLOYMLIENLT	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	0	0
EMPLOYMNENT	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	0	0
EMPLOYNIENT	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	1	0
EMPLOYNMENT	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	0	0
EMPLOYS	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	0	0
EMPLOYVNEIT	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	0
ENIPLOYMERIT	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	0
ENIPLOYRLIERLT	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	0	0
ENTREPENEURS	0	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	0
ENTREPRE-NEURS	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
ENTREPRENEURIAL	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
ENTREPRENEURLS	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	0	0
ENTREPRENEURS	3	6	5	5	1	0	3	2	2
ENTREPRENEURSHIP	0	3	3	1	0	0	0	1	1
ENTREPRENEURSLHIP	0	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	0
ENTREPRENLEURS	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	0	0
ENTREPRISES	5	0	0	1	0	0	0	0	0
ERIIPLOYERS	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	0	0
ERNPLOYLLENT	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	0	0
JOB	1	0	7	2	2	3	4	4	0
JOBLESS	1	0	0	0	0	0	1	0	0
JOBS	10	1	7	2	1	2	16	8	0
LABOL	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	0	0
LABOR	17	15	48	31	0	0	95	49	4

Appendix 2: Table 1: Work Hits By Document

words	1979 Recognizing The Invisable Women	1990 WID Progress Report	Enhancing Women's Participation 1994	Murphy 1995	Wolfensohn Beijing speech 1995	Promoting Gender Equality	Towards Gender Equality 1995	Advancing Gender Equality 1995	Implementing 1996
LABOR-SAVING	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
LABORCAUSES	0	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	0
LABORERS	0	1	1	1	0	0	5	1	0
LABORFORCE	0	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	0
LABORMARKETDISCRIMINATION	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
LABORR	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
LABORREGULATIONS	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
LABORRESOURCES	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
LABOUR	0	0	0	1	0	0	3	0	0
LABOURMAR-KET	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
MICROCREDIT	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1
MICROEN-TERPRISES	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
MICROENTEIRPIRISES	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	0	0
MICROENTERPRIS-ES	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
MICROENTERPRISE	0	1	2	0	0	0	0	2	4
MICROENTERPRISES	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	3	2
MICROENTREPRENEURS	0	0	0	1	0	0	0	0	0
MICROFINANCE	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	3
MICROFINANCING	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
MICROFINANEE	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
MICROFIRNS	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	0	0
OC-CUPATIONAL	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
OCCU-PATIONS	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
OCCUPA-TIONAL	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
OCCUPA-TIONALLY	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
OCCUPATION	2	2	0	0	0	0	0	2	0
OCCUPATIONAL	2	0	4	0	0	0	2	2	0
OCCUPATIONIS	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	0

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OCCUPATIONS	1	4	1	0	0	0	6	1	0
OCCUPIED	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
OCCUPY	0	0	1	0	0	0	1	0	0
PAY	2	2	6	4	0	2	8	5	0
PAY-ING	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
PAYCHECK	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
PAYING	2	1	1	2	0	0	0	0	1
PAYMENT	0	0	1	1	0	0	0	0	0
PAYMENTS	0	0	1	1	0	1	1	0	0
PAYS	0	3	0	24	0	0	1	0	0
PROFESIONAL	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
PROFESSION	1	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	0
PROFESSIONAL	0	0	0	3	1	0	4	2	0
PROFESSIONALS	0	0	0	3	0	1	2	0	0
PROFESSIONS	0	0	1	0	0	0	0	1	0
RETRAINED	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
RETRAINING	0	0	0	2	0	0	0	0	0
RETRAININGX	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
TRABAJADO	0	0	0	1	0	0	0	0	0
TRABAJAR	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
TRABAJO	0	0	0	4	0	0	0	0	0
TRADERS	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	1	0
UNEMPLOYMENT	0	2	0	2	0	0	1	3	2
UNEMPLOYNMENT	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	0
UNEMPLUSWENT	0	0	0	1	0	0	0	0	0
UNION	3	0	7	2	0	1	3	0	0
UNIONIZED	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
UNIONS	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	0	0

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UNSKILLED	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
URNEMPLOYRIIERIT	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	0
VOCATIONAL	8	4	0	2	0	0	2	5	0
VOCATIONIAL	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	0
VORKERS	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	0
VORKLOADS	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	0
VVORKIN	0	0	0	1	0	0	0	0	0
WAGE	2	1	12	3	1	0	23	5	0
WAGES	3	2	3	0	0	0	18	7	0
WIORKING	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
WORK	22	37	45	91	3	25	65	44	17
WORK-AND	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
WORK-ERS	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
WORK-ING	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
WORK-RELATED	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
WORKED	0	1	3	5	0	3	2	0	1
WORKELS	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	0	0
WORKER	1	0	0	0	0	0	3	0	0
WORKERS	12	9	6	1	0	0	30	9	1
WORKFARE	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
WORKFOR	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
WORKFORCE	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
WORKI	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
WORKING	6	8	17	70	2	6	14	40	7
WORKINIG	0	0	0	0	0	0	2	0	0
WORKINLG	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	0
WORKL	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
WORKLOAD	0	0	1	1	0	0	0	2	0

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WORKLOADS	0	0	1	0	1	0	0	1	0
WORKPLACE	0	0	0	0	0	1	2	0	0
WORKPLACES	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	0
WORKPROGRAM	0	0	0	1	0	0	0	0	0
WORKS	1	0	7	0	1	4	2	7	0
WORKSITES	0	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	0
WORLK	0	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	0
WORLKED	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	0	0
WVAGES	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	0
	156	208	255	328	13	45	448	266	69

Appendix 2: Table 1: Work Hits By Document

words	Implementing 1997	Mainstreaming Murphy 1997	EGCG 1998	Moser 1998	Precis 2000	Advancing Gender Equality 2000	Engendering Development	Totals
BREADWINNER	0	0	0	0	0	0	2	2
BREADWINNERS	0	0	0	0	0	0	4	4
CREDIF	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1
CREDIT	9	4	6	10	2	15	59	279
CREDITIS	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1
CREDITS	0	0	0	0	0	0	2	17
CREDITSLOANS	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1
CREDITWORTHINESS	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1
CREDITWORTHY	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1
EAININGS	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1
EARIIINGS	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1
EARINGS	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1
EARINIGS	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1
EARLNING	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1
EARN	0	0	0	1	0	0	27	49
EARN-INGS	0	0	0	0	0	0	10	10
EARNED	0	0	0	1	0	0	2	5
EARNER	0	0	0	0	0	0	2	2
EARNERS	0	0	0	0	0	0	3	5
EARNIIGS	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1
EARNIIIGS	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1
EARNINAS	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1
EARNING	0	0	0	0	0	1	4	15
EARNINGS	2	0	0	1	0	0	107	153
EARNINIGS	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	3
EARNINIS	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1
EARNINLGS	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1
EARNS	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1

Appendix 2: Table 1: Work Hits By Document

words	Implementing 1997	Mainstreaming Murphy 1997	EGCG 1998	Moser 1998	Precis 2000	Advancing Gender Equality 2000	Engendering Development	Totals
EIIPLOYNIENT	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1
EMILPLOYMENT	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1
EMNPLOTYLMNENT	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1
EMNPLOYINENT	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1
EMNPLOYMNCTL	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1
EMPLOES	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	1
EMPLOIYIENT	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1
EMPLOVERS	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1
EMPLOVMENNIT	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1
EMPLOVMENT	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1
EMPLOVNIELT	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1
EMPLOY	0	0	0	0	0	1	0	4
EMPLOY-EES	0	0	0	0	0	0	2	2
EMPLOY-MENT	0	0	0	2	0	0	12	16
EMPLOYED	0	0	1	0	0	1	11	31
EMPLOYEES	0	0	0	0	0	1	13	16
EMPLOYER	0	0	0	0	0	0	2	3
EMPLOYERS	0	0	0	0	0	0	27	34
EMPLOYERS-SPECIAL	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	1
EMPLOYIENT	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1
EMPLOYIIENIT	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1
EMPLOYING	0	0	0	0	0	0	2	6
EMPLOYMENIT	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	7
EMPLOYMENL	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	2
EMPLOYMENLT	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1
EMPLOYMENT	4	2	5	6	0	3	158	331
EMPLOYMENT-CONSTRAIN	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	1
EMPLOYMIENIT	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1

Appendix 2: Table 1: Work Hits By Document

words	Implementing 1997	Mainstreaming Murphy 1997	EGCG 1998	Moser 1998	Precis 2000	Advancing Gender Equality 2000	Engendering Development	Totals
EMPLOYMIIENT	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1
EMPLOYMILENIT	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	2
EMPLOYMLIELIT	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1
EMPLOYMLIENIT	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1
EMPLOYMLIENLT	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1
EMPLOYMNENT	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1
EMPLOYNIENT	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	2
EMPLOYNMENT	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1
EMPLOYS	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	2
EMPLOYVNEIT	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1
ENIPLOYMERIT	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1
ENIPLOYRLIERLT	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1
ENTREPENEURS	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1
ENTREPRE-NEURS	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	1
ENTREPRENEURIAL	0	0	1	0	0	1	0	3
ENTREPRENEURLS	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1
ENTREPRENEURS	0	0	0	0	0	3	9	39
ENTREPRENEURSHIP	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	9
ENTREPRENEURSLHIP	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1
ENTREPRENLEURS	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1
ENTREPRISES	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	6
ERIIPLOYERS	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1
ERNPLOYLLENT	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1
JOB	2	0	3	0	1	2	36	67
JOBLESS	0	0	1	0	0	0	0	3
JOBS	0	0	0	0	0	1	63	111
LABOL	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1
LABOR	8	20	10	25	0	6	417	745

Appendix 2: Table 1: Work Hits By Document

words	Implementing 1997	Mainstreaming Murphy 1997	EGCG 1998	Moser 1998	Precis 2000	Advancing Gender Equality 2000	Engendering Development	Totals
LABOR-SAVING	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	1
LABORCAUSES	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1
LABORERS	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	10
LABORFORCE	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1
LABORMARKETDISCRIMINATION	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	1
LABORR	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	1
LABORREGULATIONS	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	1
LABORRESOURCES	0	0	0	3	0	0	0	3
LABOUR	0	0	0	3	0	0	23	30
LABOURMAR-KET	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	1
MICROCREDIT	0	0	0	0	2	2	3	8
MICROEN-TERPRISES	0	0	0	0	0	1	0	1
MICROENTEIRPIRISES	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1
MICROENTERPRIS-ES	0	0	0	0	0	1	0	1
MICROENTERPRISE	0	1	0	0	0	2	2	14
MICROENTERPRISES	1	0	0	0	2	1	3	13
MICROENTREPRENEURS	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1
MICROFINANCE	10	0	0	0	0	12	36	61
MICROFINANCING	0	0	0	0	0	1	0	1
MICROFINANEE	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	1
MICROFIRNS	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1
OC-CUPATIONAL	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	1
OCCU-PATIONS	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	1
OCCUPA-TIONAL	0	0	0	0	0	0	2	2
OCCUPA-TIONALLY	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	1
OCCUPATION	0	0	0	1	0	0	6	13
OCCUPATIONAL	0	0	0	0	0	1	26	37
OCCUPATIONIS	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1

Appendix 2: Table 1: Work Hits By Document

words	Implementing 1997	Mainstreaming Murphy 1997	EGCG 1998	Moser 1998	Precis 2000	Advancing Gender Equality 2000	Engendering Development	Totals
OCCUPATIONS	0	0	0	0	0	0	11	24
OCCUPIED	0	0	0	0	0	0	3	3
OCCUPY	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	3
PAY	2	0	0	1	1	3	81	117
PAY-ING	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	1
PAYCHECK	0	0	0	0	0	0	2	2
PAYING	0	0	0	0	0	0	2	9
PAYMENT	0	0	0	0	0	0	5	7
PAYMENTS	0	0	0	0	0	0	7	11
PAYS	0	2	0	0	1	0	3	34
PROFESIONAL	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	1
PROFESSION	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	2
PROFESSIONAL	6	0	2	1	0	4	6	29
PROFESSIONALS	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	6
PROFESSIONS	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	2
RETRAINED	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1
RETRAINING	0	0	2	0	0	0	3	7
RETRAININGX	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	1
TRABAJADO	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1
TRABAJAR	0	0	0	0	0	0	2	2
TRABAJO	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	4
TRADERS	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	2
UNEMPLOYMENT	0	0	4	0	0	1	12	27
UNEMPLOYNMENT	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1
UNEMPLUSWENT	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1
UNION	1	0	12	0	0	1	29	59
UNIONIZED	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1
UNIONS	0	0	1	0	0	1	2	5

Appendix 2: Table 1: Work Hits By Document

words	Implementing 1997	Mainstreaming Murphy 1997	EGCG 1998	Moser 1998	Precis 2000	Advancing Gender Equality 2000	Engendering Development	Totals
UNSKILLED	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	1
URNEMPLOYRIIERIT	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1
VOCATIONAL	1	1	0	0	0	0	0	23
VOCATIONIAL	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1
VORKERS	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1
VORKLOADS	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1
VVORKIN	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1
WAGE	2	0	1	2	0	1	226	279
WAGES	0	0	0	0	0	1	81	115
WIORKING	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	1
WORK	34	113	62	29	25	36	234	882
WORK-AND	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	1
WORK-ERS	0	0	0	0	0	0	5	5
WORK-ING	0	0	0	0	0	0	12	12
WORK-RELATED	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	1
WORKED	1	4	8	0	0	2	20	50
WORKELS	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1
WORKER	0	0	0	0	0	0	18	22
WORKERS	2	2	2	0	0	1	123	198
WORKFARE	0	0	0	0	0	0	4	4
WORKFOR	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
WORKFORCE	0	0	0	0	0	0	3	3
WORKI	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	1
WORKING	15	8	22	6	2	11	66	300
WORKINIG	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	2
WORKINLG	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1
WORKL	0	0	1	0	0	0	0	1
WORKLOAD	0	0	0	0	0	0	4	8

Appendix 2: Table 1: Work Hits By Document

words	Implementing 1997	Mainstreaming Murphy 1997	EGCG 1998	Moser 1998	Precis 2000	Advancing Gender Equality 2000	Engendering Development	Totals	
WORKLOADS	0	0	0	0	0	0	4	7	
WORKPLACE	1	0	0	0	0	3	14	21	
WORKPLACES	0	0	0	0	0	0	2	3	
WORKPROGRAM	0	0	1	0	0	0	0	2	
WORKS	3	1	5	2	0	5	5	43	
WORKSITES	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	
WORLK	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	
WORLKED	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	
WVAGES	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	
	103	165	146	95	35	123	1985		4440
								4603	

Appendix 2: Table 2: Work Hits (selected) By Document

Word	1979 Recognizing The Invisable Women word count	% of text	1990 WID Progress Report word count	% of text	1994 Enhancing Women's Participation word count	% of text	1995 Murphy word count	% of text	1995 Wolfensohn Beijing Speech word count	% of text
Employment	19	0.17	30	0.27	19	0.08	27	0.06	0	0
Jobs	10	0.09	1	0	7	0.03	2	0	1	0.04
Labor	17	0.15	15	0.13	48	0.21	31	0.07	0	0
Wages	3	0.02	2	0.01	3	0.01	0	0	0	0
Work	22	0.2	37	0.34	45	0.19	91	0.22	3	0.12
Workers	12	0.11	9	0.08	6	0.02	1	0	0	0
	83	0.74	94	0.83	128	0.54	152	0.35	4	0.16

Appendix 2: Table 2: Work Hits (selected) By Document

Word	Promoting Gender Equality word count	% of text	Towards Gender Equality 1995 word count	% of text	Advancing Gender Equality 1995 word count	% of text	Implementing 1996 word count	% of text	Implementing 1997 word count	% of text
Employment	0	0	34	0.14	16	0.1	8	0.09	4	0.03
Jobs	2	0.01	16	0.07	8	0.05	0	0	2	0.01
Labor	0	0	95	0.41	49	0.3	4	0.04	8	0.07
Wages	0	0	18	0.07	7	0.04	0	0	0	0
Work	25	0.21	65	0.28	44	0.27	17	0.19	34	0.3
Workers	0	0	30	0.13	9	0.05	1	0.01	2	0.01
	27	0.22	258	1.1	133	0.81	30	0.33	50	0.42

Appendix 2: Table 2: Work Hits (selected) By Document

Word	Mainstreaming Murphy 1997		EGCG Report		Moser 1998		Precis 2000		Advancing Gender Equality 2000	
	word count	% of text	word count	% of text	word count	% of text	word count	% of text	word count	% of text
Employment	2	0	5	0.02	6	0.03	0	0	3	0.03
Jobs	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	0.01
Labor	20	0.08	10	0.05	25	0.16	0	0	6	0.06
Wages	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	0.01
Work	114	0.46	62	0.36	29	0.19	25	0.7	36	0.36
Workers	2	0	2	0.01	0	0	0	0	1	0.01
	138	0.54	79	0.44	60	0.38	25	0.7	48	0.48

Appendix 2: Table 2: Work Hits (selected) By Document

Word	Engendering Development word count	% of text
Employment	158	0.13
Jobs	63	0.05
Labor	417	0.35
Wages	81	0.06
Work	234	0.2
Workers	123	0.2
	1076	0.99

Appendix 2: Table 3: Social Reproduction Hits by Document (Selected)

words	1979 Recognizing	1990 WID progress report	Enhancing Women's Participation 1994	Murphy 1995	Wolfensohn Beijing speech 1995	Promoting Gender Equality	Towards Gender Equality 1995	Advancing Gender Equality 1995	Implementing 1996
BURCLENIS	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	0	0
BURDEN	3	1	5	0	0	0	2	3	0
BURDENI	0	0	0	0	0	0	2	0	0
BURDENS	0	0	0	1	0	0	0	0	0
BURDENSOME	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
CARE	15	45	35	5	2	3	42	20	8
CARECENTERS	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
CARED	0	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	0
CAREGIVER	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
CAREGIVERS	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	6	0
CAREGIVING	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
CARING	1	0	4	0	0	2	2	0	0
CHIL-DREN	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
CHIL-DRENS	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
CHILCDRENI	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	0	0
CHILCL	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	0	0
CHILD	9	16	18	3	2	3	22	18	8
CHILD-BEARING	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
CHILD-BIRTH	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
CHILD-CARE	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
CHILD-HOOD	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
CHILDBEARING	4	4	4	1	1	0	2	1	0
CHILDBEARINIG	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	0
CHILDBEARINLG	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	0	0
CHILDBIRTH	0	2	8	0	1	0	3	1	0
CHILDCARE	0	0	23	3	0	0	1	13	0
CHILDHOOD	0	0	3	0	0	1	2	4	0
CHILDHOODI	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	0	0
CHILDIEARINIG	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	0	0

Appendix 2: Table 3: Social Reproduction Hits by Document (Selected)

words	1979 Recognizing	1990 WID progress report	Enhancing Women's Participation 1994	Murphy 1995	Wolfensohn Beijing speech 1995	Promoting Gender Equality	Towards Gender Equality 1995	Advancing Gender Equality 1995	Implementing 1996
CHILDIEN	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	0
CHILDIENL	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	0	0
CHILDLESS	0	0	0	0	0	0	2	0	0
CHILDREARILG	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	0	0
CHILDREARING	1	0	1	0	0	0	3	0	0
CHILDREIL	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	0
CHILDREIN	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	4	0
CHILDREN	28	27	28	9	8	3	34	16	6
CHILDRENI	0	0	0	0	0	0	5	2	0
CHILDRENL	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	0	0
CHILDRENS	2	8	6	1	0	0	2	1	0
CHILDRIENI	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	0	0
CHILDRLEN	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	0	0
COOK	0	0	2	0	0	0	0	0	0
COOK-ING	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
COOKING	2	2	2	1	0	0	0	1	0
DOMES-TIC	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
DOMESTIC	8	0	3	1	0	0	10	5	0
HOME	7	13	17	4	2	5	7	7	1
HOMES	1	4	7	0	0	0	2	1	0
HOUSCHOLD	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	0	0
HOUSE-HOLD	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
HOUSE-HOLDS	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
HOUSECHOLD	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	0	0
HOUSEHDOLD	0	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	0
HOUSEHIOLC	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	0	0
HOUSEHIOLD	0	0	0	0	0	0	2	0	0
HOUSEHIOLDS	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	0
HOUSEHLOLD	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	0

Appendix 2: Table 3: Social Reproduction Hits by Document (Selected)

words	1979 Recognizing	1990 WID progress report	Enhancing Women's Participation 1994	Murphy 1995	Wolfensohn Beijing speech 1995	Promoting Gender Equality	Towards Gender Equality 1995	Advancing Gender Equality 1995	Implementing 1996
HOUSEHOID	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	0	0
HOUSEHOLCD	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	0	0
HOUSEHOLD	10	12	47	13	1	0	99	14	4
HOUSEHOLDL	0	0	0	0	0	0	3	0	0
HOUSEHOLDS	11	6	6	7	0	0	44	19	2
HOUSEHOLDERS	2								
HOUSEHOLS	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	0	0
HOUSELHOLCD	0	0	0	0	0	0	2	0	0
HOUSELHOLD	0	0	0	0	0	0	13	0	0
HOUSELHOLDS	0	0	0	0	0	0	5	1	0
HOUSELLOLD	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	0	0
HOUSELLOLDS	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	0	0
HOUSEWIVES	1								
HOUSEWORK	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
PENSION	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1
PENSIONERS	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
PENSIONS	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1
SUBSISTENCE	7	0	3	0	0	0	1	0	0
SURVIV-ING	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
SURVIVAL	5	0	9	1	0	0	6	3	0
SURVIVE	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
SURVIVING	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
TASK	2	0	3	44	0	12	1	1	5
TASKS	13	3	5	5	0	0	5	2	0
TRIPLE	0	0	1	0	0	0	1	0	0
UNPAICD	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	0	0
UNPAID	1	0	1	0	0	0	8	4	0

Appendix 2: Table 3: Social Reproduction Hits by Document (Selected)

words	1979 Recognizing	1990 WID progress report	Enhancing Women's Participation 1994	Murphy 1995	Wolfensohn Beijing speech 1995	Promoting Gender Equality	Towards Gender Equality 1995	Advancing Gender Equality 1995	Implementing 1996
Total hits in social reproduction cluster	136	144	243	99	17	29	354	152	36
Total hits	10765	10741	22833	40837	2440	11506	22801	15904	8566
Social Reproduction hits as % of total hits	1.3%	1.3%	1.1%	0.2%	0.7%	0.3%	1.6%	1.0%	0.4%

Appendix 2: Table 3: Social Reproduction Hits by Document (Selected)

words	Implementing 1997	Mainstreaming Murphy 1997	EGCG 1998	Moser 1998	Precis 2000	Advancing Gender Equality 2000	Engendering Development	Totals
BURCLENIS	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1
BURDEN	3	0	0	5	0	0	15	37
BURDENI	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	2
BURDENS	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	2
BURDENSOME	0	0	0	0	0	0	2	2
CARE	3	5	4	3	4	7	188	389
CARECENTERS	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1
CARED	0	0	0	1	0	0	1	3
CAREGIVER	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	1
CAREGIVERS	0	0	0	0	0	0	2	9
CAREGIVING	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	1
CARING	0	0	0	0	0	0	3	12
CHIL-DREN	0	0	0	0	0	0	5	6
CHIL-DRENS	0	0	0	0	0	1	0	1
CHILCDRENI	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1
CHILCL	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1
CHILD	0	2	4	3	1	6	182	297
CHILD-BEARING	0	0	0	0	0	0	3	3
CHILD-BIRTH	0	0	0	0	0	0	3	3
CHILD-CARE	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	1
CHILD-HOOD	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	1
CHILDBEARING	0	0	0	0	0	0	4	21
CHILDBEARINIG	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1
CHILDBEARINLG	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1
CHILDBIRTH	0	0	0	0	0	0	5	20
CHILDCARE	0	1	0	0	0	1	0	42
CHILDHOOD	0	0	1	0	1	0	12	24
CHILDHOODI	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1
CHILDIEARINIG	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1

Appendix 2: Table 3: Social Reproduction Hits by Document (Selected)

words	Implementing 1997	Mainstreaming Murphy 1997	EGCG 1998	Moser 1998	Precis 2000	Advancing Gender Equality 2000	Engendering Development	Totals
CHILDIEN	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1
CHILDIENL	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1
CHILDLESS	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	3
CHILDREARILG	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1
CHILDREARING	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	5
CHILDREIL	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1
CHILDREIN	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	4
CHILDREN	6	4	3	2	1	10	118	303
CHILDRENI	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	7
CHILDRENL	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1
CHILDRENS	0	1	0	3	0	1	41	66
CHILDRIENI	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1
CHILDRLEN	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1
COOK	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	2
COOK-ING	0	0	0	0	0	1	0	1
COOKING	2	0	0	0	0	4	2	16
DOMES-TIC	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	1
DOMESTIC	2	2	1	1	0	5	35	73
HOME	7	2	0	3	0	2	64	141
HOMES	0	0	0	0	0	0	3	18
HOUSCHOLD	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1
HOUSE-HOLD	0	0	0	1	0	1	41	44
HOUSE-HOLDS	0	0	0	0	0	0	15	15
HOUSECHOLD	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1
HOUSEHDOLD	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1
HOUSEHIOLC	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1
HOUSEHIOLD	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	2
HOUSEHIOLDS	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1
HOUSEHLOLD	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1

Appendix 2: Table 3: Social Reproduction Hits by Document (Selected)

words	Implementing 1997	Mainstreaming Murphy 1997	EGCG 1998	Moser 1998	Precis 2000	Advancing Gender Equality 2000	Engendering Development	Totals
HOUSEHOID	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1
HOUSEHOLCD	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1
HOUSEHOLD	6	4	15	34	4	11	377	651
HOUSEHOLDL	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	3
HOUSEHOLDS	7	2	3	2	1	3	163	276
HOUSEHOLDERS								2
HOUSEHOLS	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1
HOUSELHOLCD	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	2
HOUSELHOLD	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	13
HOUSELHOLDS	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	6
HOUSELLOLD	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1
HOUSELLOLDS	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1
HOUSEWIVES								1
HOUSEWORK	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	1
PENSION	0	1	1	0	0	0	70	73
PENSIONERS	0	0	0	0	0	0	7	7
PENSIONS	0	1	1	0	0	0	12	15
SUBSISTENCE	0	0	0	0	0	1	2	14
SURVIV-ING	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	1
SURVIVAL	1	0	0	1	0	1	21	48
SURVIVE	0	0	0	0	0	0	7	8
SURVIVING	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	1
TASK	4	36	6	16	3	1	5	139
TASKS	1	5	1	2	0	0	13	55
TRIPLE	0	0	0	10	0	0	1	13
UNPAICD	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1
UNPAID	1	0	0	2	1	0	5	23

Appendix 2: Table 3: Social Reproduction Hits by Document (Selected)

words	Implementing 1997	Mainstreaming Murphy 1997	EGCG 1998	Moser 1998	Precis 2000	Advancing Gender Equality 2000	Engendering Development	Totals
Total hits in social reproduction cluster	43	66	40	89	16	56	1437	2957
Total hits	11197	24561	17070	15066	3554	9784	115982	343607
Social Reproduction hits as % of total hits	0.4%	0.3%	0.2%	0.6%	0.5%	0.6%	1.2%	0.9%

Appendix 2: Table 4: References to Men by Document

words	1979 Recognizing The Invisable Woman	1990 WID progress report	Enhancing Women's Participation 1994	Murphy 1995	Wolfensohn Beijing speech 1995	Promoting Gender Equality	Towards Gender Equality 1995	Advancing Gender Equality 1995	Implementing 1996	Implementing 1997
MEN	26	12	73	46	7	17	83	36	10	8
HUSBAND	0	0	1	0	0	1	0	0	0	1
HUSBANDS	1	1	4	0	0	0	6	1	0	0
Total	27	13	78	46	7	18	89	37	10	9
Total hits	10765	10741	22833	40837	2440	11506	22801	15904	8566	11197
%	0.3%	0.1%	0.3%	0.1%	0.3%	0.2%	0.4%	0.2%	0.1%	0.1%

Appendix 2: Table 4: References to Men by Document

words	Mainstreaming Murphy 1997	EGCG 1998	Moser 1998	Precis 2000	Advancing Gender Equality 2000	Engendering Development	Totals
MEN	27	10	55	16	29	595	1050
HUSBAND	0	0	0	0	0	25	28
HUSBANDS	0	0	0	0	0	57	70
Total	27	10	55	16	29	677	1148
Total hits	24561	17070	15066	3554	9784	115982	343607
%	0.1%	0.1%	0.4%	0.5%	0.3%	0.6%	0.3%

Appendix 2: Table 5 References to Childcare by Document

words	1979 Recognizing The Invisable Woman	1990 WID progress report	Enhancing Women's Participation 1994	Murphy 1995	Wolfensohn Beijing speech 1995	Promoting Gender Equality	Towards Gender Equality 1995	Advancing Gender Equality 1995	Implementing 1996
CHILD-CARE	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
CHILDCARE	0	0	23	3	0	0	1	13	0
CRECHE	0	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	0
DAYCARE	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	0
KIN-DERGARTENS	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
KINDER-GARTENS	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
KINDERGARTEIS	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	0
KINDERGARTEN	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	0
KINDERGARTENS	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	1	0
NURSERIES	0	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	0
Total	1	0	25	3	0	0	2	17	0
Total hits	10765	10741	22833	40837	2440	11506	22801	15904	8566
%	0.0%	0.0%	0.1%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.1%	0.0%

Appendix 2: Table 5 References to Childcare by Document

words	Implementing 1997	Mainstreaming Murphy 1997	EGCG 1998	Moser 1998	Precis 2000	Advancing Gender Equality 2000	Engendering Development	Totals
CHILD-CARE	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	1
CHILDCARE	0	1	0	0	0	1	0	42
CRECHE	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1
DAYCARE	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	3
KIN-DERGARTENS	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	1
KINDER-GARTENS	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	1
KINDERGARTEIS	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1
KINDERGARTEN	0	0	0	0	0	0	2	3
KINDERGARTENS	0	0	0	0	0	0	2	4
NURSERIES	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	2
Total	0	1	0	0	0	1	9	59
Total hits	11197	24561	17070	15066	3554	9784	115982	343607
%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%

Appendix 3: Table 6: World Bank Loans to Ecuador, 1954-2004

PROJECT NAME	PRODUCT LINE	APPROVAL DATE	CLOSING DATE	LENDING PROJECT COST	IBRD COMMITMENT AMT (US$ millions)	IDA COMMITTMENT AMOUNT	TOTAL AMT	GRANT AMT
EC Institutional Reform	IBRD/IDA	6/22/04	12/31/08	24	20	0	20	0
SECOND INDIGENOUS AND AFROECUADORIAN PEOPLES DEVELOPMENT PROJECT	IBRD/IDA	6/17/04	9/30/09	44.97	34	0	34	0
Programmatic Human Development Reform Loan Project	IBRD/IDA	5/27/03	12/31/03	50	50	0	50	0
EC FISCAL CONSOLIDATION AND COMPETITIVE GROWTH ADJUSTMENT LOAN	IBRD/IDA	5/27/03	12/31/03	50	50	0	50	0
National System of Protected Areas	Global Environment Project	11/26/02	6/30/07	36.69	0	0	0	8
Agricultural Census and Information System Technical Assistance (Supplemental)	IBRD/IDA	4/25/02	N/A	4.8	4.8	0	4.8	0

Appendix 3: Table 6: World Bank Loans to Ecuador, 1954-2004

PROJECT NAME	PRODUCT LINE	APPROVAL DATE	CLOSING DATE	LENDING PROJECT COST	IBRD COMMITMENT AMT (US$ millions)	IDA COMMITTMENT AMOUNT	TOTAL AMT	GRANT AMT
Public Sector Financial Management Project	IBRD/IDA	3/26/02	3/1/07	18.84	13.86	0	13.86	0
Power and Communications Sectors Modernization and Rural Services Project (PROMEC)	IBRD/IDA	11/20/01	6/30/06	40.41	23	0	23	0
Power and Communications Sectors Modernization and Rural Services Project - PROMEC	Global Environment Project	11/20/01	6/30/06	2.84	0	0	0	2.84
Poverty Reduction and Local Rural Development (PROLOCAL)	IBRD/IDA	7/5/01	12/31/06	41.96	25.2	0	25.2	0
Rural and Small Towns Water Supply and Sanitation Project (PRAGUAS)	IBRD/IDA	10/17/00	4/30/06	50.25	32	0	32	0

Appendix 3: Table 6: World Bank Loans to Ecuador, 1954-2004

PROJECT NAME	PRODUCT LINE	APPROVAL DATE	CLOSING DATE	LENDING PROJECT COST	IBRD COMMITMENT AMT (US$ millions)	IDA COMMITTMENT AMOUNT	TOTAL AMT	GRANT AMT
Ozone Depleting Substances Phase-out II Project	Montreal Protocol	10/17/00	9/30/09	3.95	0	0	0	3.41
Albarradas in Coastal Ecuador; Rescuing Ancient Knowledge on Sustainable Use of Biodiversity	GEF Medium Sized Program	8/11/00	N/A	0.8	0	0	0	0.03
CHOCO-ANDEAN CORRIDOR PROJECT (GEF-MSP)	GEF Medium Sized Program	6/30/00	N/A	3.33	0	0	0	0.97
Financial Sector Technical Assistance Project	IBRD/IDA	6/22/00	6/30/04	14.09	10	0	10	0
Structural Adjustment Loan Project	IBRD/IDA	6/22/00	3/31/03	151.52	151.52	0	151.52	0

Appendix 3: Table 6: World Bank Loans to Ecuador, 1954-2004

PROJECT NAME	PRODUCT LINE	APPROVAL DATE	CLOSING DATE	LENDING PROJECT COST	IBRD COMMITMENT AMT (US$ millions)	IDA COMMITTMENT AMOUNT	TOTAL AMT	GRANT AMT
SECOND SOCIAL DEVELOPMENT PROJECT - HEALTH & NUTRITION - SUPPLEMENTAL LOAN	IBRD/IDA	10/7/99	N/A	21.61	20.2	0	20.2	0
Wetlands Inventory Project	GEF Medium Sized Program	4/21/99	N/A	N/A	0	0	0	0.75
Galapagos Monitoring Project	GEF Medium Sized Program	1/28/99	N/A	N/A	0	0	0	0.94
Ecuador International Trade and Integration Project	IBRD/IDA	6/11/98	6/30/03	42.6	21	0	21	0
HEALTH SERVICES MODERNIZATION PROJECT (MODERSA)	IBRD/IDA	6/9/98	12/31/05	65	45	0	45	0
Indigenous and Afro-Ecuadorian Peoples Development Project	IBRD/IDA	1/29/98	4/30/03	50	25	0	25	0

Appendix 3: Table 6: World Bank Loans to Ecuador, 1954-2004

PROJECT NAME	PRODUCT LINE	APPROVAL DATE	CLOSING DATE	LENDING PROJECT COST	IBRD COMMITMENT AMT (US$ millions)	IDA COMMITTMENT AMOUNT	TOTAL AMT	GRANT AMT
Agriculture Census and Information System	IBRD/IDA	1/29/98	1/31/05	25	20	0	20	0
El Nino Emergency Recovery Project	IBRD/IDA	12/11/97	12/31/00	66	60	0	60	0
Agricultural Research Project	IBRD/IDA	7/25/96	1/31/05	21	21	0	21	0
Judicial Reform Project	IBRD/IDA	7/18/96	11/29/02	14.3	10.7	0	10.7	0
Environmental Management Technical Assistance Project	IBRD/IDA	4/4/96	12/15/01	15	15	0	15	0
Structural Adjustment Loan	IBRD/IDA	12/13/94	10/31/97	200	200	0	200	0
Debt and Debt Service Reduction Loan	IBRD/IDA	12/13/94	7/31/95	80	80	0	80	0
Public Enterprise Reform Technical Assistance Project	IBRD/IDA	12/13/94	12/31/99	16	12	0	12	0

Appendix 3: Table 6: World Bank Loans to Ecuador, 1954-2004

PROJECT NAME	PRODUCT LINE	APPROVAL DATE	CLOSING DATE	LENDING PROJECT COST	IBRD COMMITMENT AMT (US$ millions)	IDA COMMITTMENT AMOUNT	TOTAL AMT	GRANT AMT
Modernization of the State Technical Assistance Project	IBRD/IDA	12/13/94	3/31/01	25	20	0	20	0
Irrigation Technical Assitance	IBRD/IDA	5/10/94	6/30/01	25.5	20	0	20	0
BIODIVERSITY PROTECTION (GEF)	Global Environment Project	5/9/94	6/30/00	7.2	0	0	0	7.2
THIRD SOCIAL DEVELOPMENT PROJECT (Emergency Social Investment Fund)	IBRD/IDA	2/22/94	6/30/98	30	30	0	30	0
Mining Development and Environmental Control Technical Assistance Project	IBRD/IDA	10/21/93	12/31/00	11	11	0	11	0
Phase-out of Ozone Depleting Substances Project	Montreal Protocol	10/12/93	6/30/97	1.6	0	0	0	1.6
Private Sector Development Project	IBRD/IDA	6/1/93	6/1/99	252	75	0	75	0

Appendix 3: Table 6: World Bank Loans to Ecuador, 1954-2004

PROJECT NAME	PRODUCT LINE	APPROVAL DATE	CLOSING DATE	LENDING PROJECT COST	IBRD COMMITMENT AMT (US$ millions)	IDA COMMITTMENT AMOUNT	TOTAL AMT	GRANT AMT
SOCIAL DEVELOPMENT II: HEALTH AND NUTRITION (FASBASE)	IBRD/IDA	7/21/92	6/30/01	102.2	70	0	70	0
SOCIAL DEVELOPMENT I: EDUCATION AND TRAINING (EB-PRODEC)	IBRD/IDA	12/17/91	12/31/99	118.7	89	0	89	0
Rural Development (PRONADER)	IBRD/IDA	7/16/91	12/31/00	112.7	84	0	84	0
Municipal Development and Urban Infrastructure Project	IBRD/IDA	12/20/90	6/30/99	300	104	0	104	0
Guayas Flood Control	IBRD/IDA	12/6/90	6/30/00	150	59	0	59	0
Small Scale Enterprise Project (04)	IBRD/IDA	2/1/90	6/30/96	50	50	0	50	0
Telecommunications Project (01)	IBRD/IDA	5/4/89	6/30/95	45	45	0	45	0
National Low Income Housing Project (02)	IBRD/IDA	1/12/88	6/30/94	60	60	0	60	0

Appendix 3: Table 6: World Bank Loans to Ecuador, 1954-2004

PROJECT NAME	PRODUCT LINE	APPROVAL DATE	CLOSING DATE	LENDING PROJECT COST	IBRD COMMITMENT AMT (US$ millions)	IDA COMMITTMENT AMOUNT	TOTAL AMT	GRANT AMT
Financial Sector Adjustment Loan Project	IBRD/IDA	12/22/87	12/31/89	100	100	0	100	0
Emergency Petroleum Reconstruction Project	IBRD/IDA	5/5/87	6/30/91	80	80	0	80	0
Guayaquil and Guayas Province Water Supply Project (02)	IBRD/IDA	12/16/86	6/30/97	31	31	0	31	0
Agricultural Credit Project (02)	IBRD/IDA	9/16/86	12/31/94	48	48	0	48	0
Power Sector Improvement Project	IBRD/IDA	6/3/86	12/31/93	8.5	8.5	0	8.5	0
Small Scale Enterprise Credit Project (03)	IBRD/IDA	3/27/86	12/31/92	30	30	0	30	0
Industrial Finance Project	IBRD/IDA	3/27/86	12/31/93	115	115	0	115	0
Agricultural Sector Loan Project	IBRD/IDA	10/22/85	6/30/89	100	100	0	100	0
Public Sector Management Project	IBRD/IDA	4/16/85	3/31/93	6	6	0	6	0
Small Scale Enterprise Credit Project (02)	IBRD/IDA	12/16/82	6/30/87	40.6	40.6	0	40.6	0

Appendix 3: Table 6: World Bank Loans to Ecuador, 1954-2004

PROJECT NAME	PRODUCT LINE	APPROVAL DATE	CLOSING DATE	LENDING PROJECT COST	IBRD COMMITMENT AMT (US$ millions)	IDA COMMITTMENT AMOUNT	TOTAL AMT	GRANT AMT
Vocational Training Project (02)	IBRD/IDA	6/3/82	6/30/90	16	16	0	16	0
National Low Income Housing Project	IBRD/IDA	5/4/82	6/30/88	35.7	35.7	0	35.7	0
Development Banking Project (05)	IBRD/IDA	2/23/82	12/31/86	60	60	0	60	0
Esmeraldas Rural Development Project	IBRD/IDA	7/21/81	12/31/91	17	17	0	17	0
Power Transmission Project	IBRD/IDA	7/21/81	12/31/85	100	100	0	100	0
Puerto Ila Chone Rural Development Project	IBRD/IDA	5/12/81	6/30/91	20	20	0	20	0
Highway Project (06)	IBRD/IDA	6/24/80	6/30/88	55	55	0	55	0
Small Scale Enterprise Credit Project	IBRD/IDA	6/19/80	12/31/84	20	20	0	20	0
Guayaquil Urban Development Project	IBRD/IDA	12/11/79	6/30/87	31	31	0	31	0
Development Banking Project (04)	IBRD/IDA	6/19/79	6/30/83	40	40	0	40	0
Tungurahua Rural Development Project	IBRD/IDA	12/21/78	12/31/87	18	18	0	18	0

Appendix 3: Table 6: World Bank Loans to Ecuador, 1954-2004

PROJECT NAME	PRODUCT LINE	APPROVAL DATE	CLOSING DATE	LENDING PROJECT COST	IBRD COMMITMENT AMT (US$ millions)	IDA COMMITTMENT AMOUNT	TOTAL AMT	GRANT AMT
Technical Assistance Project (02)	IBRD/IDA	8/2/77	6/30/85	11	11	0	11	0
Agriculture Credit Project	IBRD/IDA	6/14/77	12/31/83	15.5	15.5	0	15.5	0
Highway Project (05)	IBRD/IDA	5/19/77	12/31/85	17.5	17.5	0	17.5	0
Development Banking Project (03)	IBRD/IDA	12/28/76	6/30/82	26	26	0	26	0
Guayaquil Port Expansion Project	IBRD/IDA	5/11/76	12/31/81	33.5	33.5	0	33.5	0
Technical Assistance Project	IBRD/IDA	3/30/76	12/31/83	4	4	0	4	0
Seeds Project	IBRD/IDA	3/30/76	6/30/83	3	3	0	3	0
Highways Project (04)	IBRD/IDA	3/30/76	12/31/82	10.5	10.5	0	10.5	0
Vocational Training Project	IBRD/IDA	5/22/75	6/30/83	4	4	0	4	0
Guayaquil and Guayas Water Supply Project	IBRD/IDA	6/25/74	10/31/81	23.2	23.2	0	23.2	0
Milagro Irrigation Project	IBRD/IDA	7/5/73	12/31/80	5.5	0	5.5	5.5	0
Development Finance Companies Project (02)	IBRD/IDA	6/26/73	3/30/79	20	20	0	20	0
Power Project (03)	IBRD/IDA	2/1/72	12/30/77	6.8	0	6.8	6.8	0

Appendix 3: Table 6: World Bank Loans to Ecuador, 1954-2004

PROJECT NAME	PRODUCT LINE	APPROVAL DATE	CLOSING DATE	LENDING PROJECT COST	IBRD COMMITMENT AMT (US$ millions)	IDA COMMITTMENT AMOUNT	TOTAL AMT	GRANT AMT
Development Finance Companies Project	IBRD/IDA	12/15/70	3/31/76	8	8	0	8	0
Livestock Development Project (03)	IBRD/IDA	11/24/70	12/30/77	10	0	10	10	0
Interim Livestock Development Project (02)	IBRD/IDA	9/4/69	12/31/73	1.5	0	1.5	1.5	0
Fisheries Project	IBRD/IDA	9/3/68	3/31/80	5.3	5.3	0	5.3	0
Education Project	IBRD/IDA	6/27/68	12/31/80	5.1	0	5.1	5.1	0
Livestock Development Project	IBRD/IDA	6/19/67	12/31/73	4	4	0	4	0
Highway Project (02)	IBRD/IDA	5/26/64	12/31/74	17	9	8	17	0
Port of Guayaquil Project	IBRD/IDA	10/9/58	9/30/64	13	13	0	13	0
Railway Project	IBRD/IDA	11/1/57	11/30/58	0.6	0.6	0	0.6	0
Revised Quito Power Project	IBRD/IDA	9/20/57	12/31/61	5	5	0	5	0
Highway Maintenance and Construction Project	IBRD/IDA	9/20/57	6/30/63	14.5	14.5	0	14.5	0
Quito Power Project	IBRD/IDA	3/29/56	6/30/60	5	5	0	5	0
Guayas Highway Project	IBRD/IDA	2/10/54	12/31/59	8.5	8.5	0	8.5	0

Appendix 3: Table 6: World Bank Loans to Ecuador, 1954-2004

PROJECT NAME	PRODUCT LINE	APPROVAL DATE	CLOSING DATE	LENDING PROJECT COST	IBRD COMMITMENT AMT (US$ millions)	IDA COMMITTMENT AMOUNT	TOTAL AMT	GRANT AMT
GUAYAQUIL DRAINAGE & WATER & SANITATION	IBRD/IDA	N/A	N/A	35	35	0	35	0
Human Capital Protection Project	IBRD/IDA	N/A	N/A	50	25	0	25	0
Financial Sector Technical Assistance Loan Project	IBRD/IDA	N/A	N/A	10	10	0	10	0
Low-income Neighborhood Upgrading and Urban Land Management Project	IBRD/IDA	N/A	N/A	82	30	0	30	0
EC PROGRAMATIC II FISCAL ADJUSTMENT SAL	IBRD/IDA	N/A	N/A	100	100	0	100	0
Ecuador Trade Adjustment Assistance Project	IBRD/IDA	N/A	N/A	40	40	0	40	0

Appendix 3: Table 6: World Bank Loans to Ecuador, 1954-2004

PROJECT NAME	PRODUCT LINE	APPROVAL DATE	CLOSING DATE	LENDING PROJECT COST	IBRD COMMITMENT AMT (US$ millions)	IDA COMMITTMENT AMOUNT	TOTAL AMT	GRANT AMT
Rural Roads Project	IBRD/IDA	N/A	N/A	93	30	0	30	0
MILAGRO IRRIGATION I	IBRD/IDA	N/A	N/A	0	0	0	0	0
Rural Electrification Project	IBRD/IDA	N/A	N/A	0	0	0	0	0
Education Project (02)	IBRD/IDA	N/A	N/A	30	30	0	30	0
				3695.66	3174.18	36.9	3236.08	25.74

Appendix 3: Table 6: World Bank Loans to Ecuador, 1954-2004

PROJECT NAME	MAJOR SECTOR 1	SECTOR 2	THEME 1	META THEME 1	GOAL 1	THEME 2
EC Institutional Reform	Law and justice and public administration		Legal institutions for a market economy	Investment climate	Corporate Advocacy Priorities	Administrative and civil service reform
SECOND INDIGENOUS AND AFROECUADORIAN PEOPLES DEVELOPMENT PROJECT	Agriculture, fishing, and forestry	Water supply	Participation and civic engagement	Empowerment, security & social inclusion	Corporate Advocacy Priorities	Indigenous peoples
Programmatic Human Development Reform Loan Project	Health and other social services	General education sector	Public expenditure, financial management and procurement	Public sector governance	Corporate Advocacy Priorities	Child health
EC FISCAL CONSOLIDATION AND COMPETITIVE GROWTH ADJUSTMENT LOAN	Law and justice and public administration	Other domestic and international trade	Regulation and competition policy	Investment climate	Corporate Advocacy Priorities	Public expenditure, financial management and procurement
National System of Protected Areas	Agriculture, fishing, and forestry	Central government administration	Participation and civic engagement	Empowerment, security & social inclusion	Corporate Advocacy Priorities	Biodiversity
Agricultural Census and Information System Technical Assistance (Supplemental)	Law and justice and public administration			0		

Appendix 3: Table 6: World Bank Loans to Ecuador, 1954-2004

PROJECT NAME	**MAJOR SECTOR 1**	**SECTOR 2**	**THEME 1**	**META THEME 1**	**GOAL 1**	**THEME 2**
Public Sector Financial Management Project	Law and justice and public administration	Information technology	Public expenditure, financial management and procurement	Public sector governance	Corporate Advocacy Priorities	
Power and Communications Sectors Modernization and Rural Services Project (PROMEC)	Law and justice and public administration	Information technology	Regulation and competition policy	Investment climate	Corporate Advocacy Priorities	Climate change
Power and Communications Sectors Modernization and Rural Services Project - PROMEC	Energy and mining	Telecommunic ations	Climate change	Environmental commons	Global Public Goods Priorities	Climate change
Poverty Reduction and Local Rural Development (PROLOCAL)	Law and justice and public administration	General agriculture, fishing and forestry sector	Improving labor markets	Empowerment, security & social inclusion	Corporate Advocacy Priorities	Participation and civic engagement
Rural and Small Towns Water Supply and Sanitation Project (PRAGUAS)	Water, sanitation and flood protection	Sanitation	Decentralization	Public sector governance	Corporate Advocacy Priorities	Participation and civic engagement

Appendix 3: Table 6: World Bank Loans to Ecuador, 1954-2004

PROJECT NAME	MAJOR SECTOR 1	SECTOR 2	THEME 1	META THEME 1	GOAL 1	THEME 2
Ozone Depleting Substances Phase-out II Project	Industry and trade	Central government administration	Environmental policies and institutions	Environmental commons	Global Public Goods Priorities	Pollution management and environmental health
Albarradas in Coastal Ecuador; Rescuing Ancient Knowledge on Sustainable Use of Biodiversity	Agriculture, fishing, and forestry	General agriculture, fishing and forestry sector	Biodiversity	Environmental commons	Global Public Goods Priorities	Environmental policies and institutions
CHOCO-ANDEAN CORRIDOR PROJECT (GEF-MSP)	Agriculture, fishing, and forestry	Sub-national government administration	Biodiversity	Environmental commons	Global Public Goods Priorities	Land administration and management
Financial Sector Technical Assistance Project	Law and justice and public administration	Banking	Legal institutions for a market economy	Investment climate	Corporate Advocacy Priorities	Corporate governance
Structural Adjustment Loan Project	Law and justice and public administration	Banking	Public expenditure, financial management and procurement	Public sector governance	Corporate Advocacy Priorities	Tax policy and administration

Appendix 3: Table 6: World Bank Loans to Ecuador, 1954-2004

PROJECT NAME	**MAJOR SECTOR 1**	**SECTOR 2**	**THEME 1**	**META THEME 1**	**GOAL 1**	**THEME 2**
SECOND SOCIAL DEVELOPMENT PROJECT - HEALTH & NUTRITION - SUPPLEMENTAL LOAN	Health and other social services	Sanitation	Administrative and civil service reform	Public sector governance	Corporate Advocacy Priorities	Health system performance
Wetlands Inventory Project	Agriculture, fishing, and forestry	Central government administration	Biodiversity	Environmental commons	Global Public Goods Priorities	Land administration and management
Galapagos Monitoring Project	Law and justice and public administration		Biodiversity	Environmental commons	Global Public Goods Priorities	Pollution management and environmental health
Ecuador International Trade and Integration Project	Law and justice and public administration	Other domestic and international trade	Legal institutions for a market economy	Investment climate	Corporate Advocacy Priorities	Regulation and competition policy
HEALTH SERVICES MODERNIZATION PROJECT (MODERSA)	Health and other social services	Central government administration	Decentralization	Public sector governance	Corporate Advocacy Priorities	Child health
Indigenous and Afro-Ecuadorian Peoples Development Project	Health and other social services	Central government administration	Law reform	Public sector governance	Corporate Advocacy Priorities	Participation and civic engagement

Appendix 3: Table 6: World Bank Loans to Ecuador, 1954-2004

PROJECT NAME	MAJOR SECTOR 1	SECTOR 2	THEME 1	META THEME 1	GOAL 1	THEME 2
Agriculture Census and Information System	Law and justice and public administration			0		
El Nino Emergency Recovery Project	Law and justice and public administration		Natural disaster management	Empowerment, security & social inclusion	Corporate Advocacy Priorities	
Agricultural Research Project	Agriculture, fishing, and forestry	Tertiary education		0		
Judicial Reform Project	Law and justice and public administration		Judicial and other dispute resolution mechanisms	Investment climate	Corporate Advocacy Priorities	Law reform
Environmental Management Technical Assistance Project	Law and justice and public administration	Sub-national government administration	Law reform	Public sector governance	Corporate Advocacy Priorities	Environmental policies and institutions
Structural Adjustment Loan	Law and justice and public administration	General industry and trade sector	Administrative and civil service reform	Public sector governance	Corporate Advocacy Priorities	Tax policy and administration
Debt and Debt Service Reduction Loan	Law and justice and public administration		Debt management and fiscal substainability	Develop global partnership for development	Millennium Development Goals	
Public Enterprise Reform Technical Assistance Project	Law and justice and public administration	Power	Legal institutions for a market economy	Investment climate	Corporate Advocacy Priorities	Regulation and competition policy

Appendix 3: Table 6: World Bank Loans to Ecuador, 1954-2004

PROJECT NAME	MAJOR SECTOR 1	SECTOR 2	THEME 1	META THEME 1	GOAL 1	THEME 2
Modernization of the State Technical Assistance Project	Law and justice and public administration		Administrative and civil service reform	Public sector governance	Corporate Advocacy Priorities	Public expenditure, financial management and procurement
Irrigation Technical Assitance	Law and justice and public administration		Administrative and civil service reform	Public sector governance	Corporate Advocacy Priorities	
BIODIVERSITY PROTECTION (GEF)	Law and justice and public administration	General transportation sector	Biodiversity	Environmental commons	Global Public Goods Priorities	Environmental policies and institutions
THIRD SOCIAL DEVELOPMENT PROJECT (Emergency Social Investment Fund)	Health and other social services	Central government administration	Administrative and civil service reform	Public sector governance	Corporate Advocacy Priorities	Education for all
Mining Development and Environmental Control Technical Assistance Project	Energy and mining	Central government administration	Administrative and civil service reform	Public sector governance	Corporate Advocacy Priorities	Land administration and management
Phase-out of Ozone Depleting Substances Project	Environment			0		
Private Sector Development Project	Finance		Trade facilitation and market access	Trade & integration	Global Public Goods Priorities	Trade facilitation and market access

Appendix 3: Table 6: World Bank Loans to Ecuador, 1954-2004

PROJECT NAME	MAJOR SECTOR 1	SECTOR 2	THEME 1	META THEME 1	GOAL 1	THEME 2
SOCIAL DEVELOPMENT II: HEALTH AND NUTRITION (FASBASE)	Health and other social services	Sanitation	Administrative and civil service reform	Public sector governance	Corporate Advocacy Priorities	Health system performance
SOCIAL DEVELOPMENT I: EDUCATION AND TRAINING (EB-PRODEC)	Education	Other social services	Education for all	Education	Corporate Advocacy Priorities	Improving labor markets
Rural Development (PRONADER)	Agriculture, fishing, and forestry	Roads and highways	Improving labor markets	Empowerment, security & social inclusion	Corporate Advocacy Priorities	Participation and civic engagement
Municipal Development and Urban Infrastructure Project	Law and justice and public administration	Central government administration	Administrative and civil service reform	Public sector governance	Corporate Advocacy Priorities	Social safety nets
Guayas Flood Control	Water, sanitation and flood protection	Agricultural extension and research	Administrative and civil service reform	Public sector governance	Corporate Advocacy Priorities	Natural disaster management
Small Scale Enterprise Project (04)	Finance			0		
Telecommunications Project (01)	Information and communications			0		
National Low Income Housing Project (02)	Urban Development			0		

Appendix 3: Table 6: World Bank Loans to Ecuador, 1954-2004

PROJECT NAME	MAJOR SECTOR 1	SECTOR 2	THEME 1	META THEME 1	GOAL 1	THEME 2
Financial Sector Adjustment Loan Project	Finance			0		
Emergency Petroleum Reconstruction Project	Oil & Gas			0		
Guayaquil and Guayas Province Water Supply Project (02)	Water, sanitation and flood protection	Sewerage		0		
Agricultural Credit Project (02)	Agriculture, fishing, and forestry			0		
Power Sector Improvement Project	Electric Power & Other Energy			0		
Small Scale Enterprise Credit Project (03)	Finance			0		
Industrial Finance Project	Finance			0		
Agricultural Sector Loan Project	Agriculture, fishing, and forestry			0		
Public Sector Management Project	Law and justice and public administration			0		
Small Scale Enterprise Credit Project (02)	Finance			0		

Appendix 3: Table 6: World Bank Loans to Ecuador, 1954-2004

PROJECT NAME	MAJOR SECTOR 1	SECTOR 2	THEME 1	META THEME 1	GOAL 1	THEME 2
Vocational Training Project (02)	Education			0		
National Low Income Housing Project	Urban Development			0		
Development Banking Project (05)	Finance			0		
Esmeraldas Rural Development Project	Agriculture, fishing, and forestry			0		
Power Transmission Project	Electric Power & Other Energy			0		
Puerto Ila Chone Rural Development Project	Agriculture, fishing, and forestry			0		
Highway Project (06)	Transportation			0		
Small Scale Enterprise Credit Project	Finance			0		
Guayaquil Urban Development Project	Urban Development			0		
Development Banking Project (04)	Finance			0		
Tungurahua Rural Development Project	Agriculture, fishing, and forestry			0		

Appendix 3: Table 6: World Bank Loans to Ecuador, 1954-2004

PROJECT NAME	MAJOR SECTOR 1	SECTOR 2	THEME 1	META THEME 1	GOAL 1	THEME 2
Technical Assistance Project (02)	Law and justice and public administration			0		
Agriculture Credit Project	Agriculture, fishing, and forestry			0		
Highway Project (05)	Transportation			0		
Development Banking Project (03)	Finance			0		
Guayaquil Port Expansion Project	Transportation			0		
Technical Assistance Project	Agriculture, fishing, and forestry			0		
Seeds Project	Agriculture, fishing, and forestry			0		
Highways Project (04)	Transportation			0		
Vocational Training Project	Education			0		
Guayaquil and Guayas Water Supply Project	Water, sanitation and flood protection			0		
Milagro Irrigation Project	Agriculture, fishing, and forestry			0		
Development Finance Companies Project (02)	Finance			0		
Power Project (03)	Electric Power & Other Energy			0		

Appendix 3: Table 6: World Bank Loans to Ecuador, 1954-2004

PROJECT NAME	MAJOR SECTOR 1	SECTOR 2	THEME 1	META THEME 1	GOAL 1	THEME 2
Development Finance Companies Project	Finance			0		
Livestock Development Project (03)	Agriculture, fishing, and forestry			0		
Interim Livestock Development Project (02)	Agriculture, fishing, and forestry			0		
Fisheries Project	Agriculture, fishing, and forestry			0		
Education Project	Education			0		
Livestock Development Project	Agriculture, fishing, and forestry			0		
Highway Project (02)	Transportation			0		
Port of Guayaquil Project	Transportation			0		
Railway Project	Transportation			0		
Revised Quito Power Project	Electric Power & Other Energy			0		
Highway Maintenance and Construction Project	Transportation			0		
Quito Power Project	Electric Power & Other Energy			0		
Guayas Highway Project	Transportation			0		

Appendix 3: Table 6: World Bank Loans to Ecuador, 1954-2004

PROJECT NAME	MAJOR SECTOR 1	SECTOR 2	THEME 1	META THEME 1	GOAL 1	THEME 2
GUAYAQUIL DRAINAGE & WATER & SANITATION	Water, sanitation and flood protection			0		
Human Capital Protection Project	Social Protection			0		
Financial Sector Technical Assistance Loan Project	Finance			0		
Low-income Neighborhood Upgrading and Urban Land Management Project	Water, sanitation and flood protection	Solid waste management		0		
EC PROGRAMATIC II FISCAL ADJUSTMENT SAL	Law and justice and public administration	Other domestic and international trade	Regulation and competition policy	Investment climate	Corporate Advocacy Priorities	Public expenditure, financial management and procurement
Ecuador Trade Adjustment Assistance Project	Industry and trade	General information and communicatio ns sector	Export development and competitiveness	Trade & integration	Global Public Goods Priorities	Export development and competitivenes s

Appendix 3: Table 6: World Bank Loans to Ecuador, 1954-2004

PROJECT NAME	MAJOR SECTOR 1	SECTOR 2	THEME 1	META THEME 1	GOAL 1	THEME 2
Rural Roads Project	Transportation	Sub-national government administration	Decentralization	Public sector governance	Corporate Advocacy Priorities	Participation and civic engagement
MILAGRO IRRIGATION I	Agriculture, fishing, and forestry			0		
Rural Electrification Project	Electric Power & Other Energy			0		
Education Project (02)	Education			0		

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Zaman, Habiba. 1999. Labour Rights, Networking, and Empowerment: Mobilizing Garment Workers in Bangladesh. In *Feminists Doing Development: A Practical Critique*, edited by Marilyn and Ellen Judd. Porter. NY: Zed Books

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EDUCATION

9/2000 -2/2005 Rutgers New Brunswick, NJ.
Ph.D. in Political Science

- Dissertation: The World Bank's Employment Programs in Ecuador and Beyond: Empowering Women, Domesticating Men, and Resolving the Social Reproduction Dilemma. **DEFENDED February 2005.**
- Major field: Women in Politics. Minor fields: Comparative Politics; Globalization Studies. (GPA: 4.0).

9/1998 – 6/2000 Ohio State University Columbus, OH.
M.A. in Women's Studies (GPA: 4.0).

- Thesis title: Promoting Restructured Partnerships: Gender, Sexuality, and Structural Adjustment in the World Bank.

9/1994 – 5/1997 University of Leeds Leeds, UK.
B.A. Hons. (First Class)

- History and Sociology, with a specialization in development studies.

RELEVANT EMPLOYMENT EXPERIENCE

9/2004 - Ohio University, Women's Studies Athens, OH.
Visiting Assistant Professor

- Designed and taught undergraduate women's studies courses on Introduction to Women's Studies, the History of Western Feminist Thought, Sexuality in Transnational Perspective, and the capstone seminar for graduating seniors.
- Served on curriculum committee.
- Led workshops on equality for students employed in residence halls.

1/2003 – 6/2004 Rutgers, Political Science New Brunswick, NJ.
Instructor

- Designed and taught undergraduate political science courses on Gender and Western Political Theory, and Women and American Politics.
- Led discussion sections in undergraduate political science courses on Law and Politics, and Political Theory.

1/2003 -6/2004 Rutgers, Douglass College New Brunswick, NJ.
Instructor

- Taught Shaping a Life, an undergraduate course on research design, writing skills, and women's identity.

9/2002 –6/2004 Rutgers, Political Science Newark, NJ.
Instructor

- Designed and taught M.A. course on Gender and Global Politics and undergraduate course on Modern Western Political Theory.

1/2000 - 6/2000 Ohio State University Columbus, OH.
Instructor

- Taught introductory level undergraduate women's studies course, and compiled a course book of relevant readings.

9/1998 – 12/1999 Ohio State University Columbus, OH.
Research Assistant

- Research on 1970s lesbian feminism, women and drug policy, British imperialism in India, and sexuality and human rights.

3/1998 – 6/1998 Casa de los Amigos Mexico City, Mexico.
Program Assistant

- Seminar preparation and research activities for service-learning students studying in Mexico.

5/1997 – 10/1997 Service Civil International Vienna, Austria.
Program Coordinator

- Organized and managed program for African and Asian volunteers working on social projects in Austria.

8/1995 – 5/1997 International Voluntary Service Leeds, UK.
Committee Member

- Wrote grants, planned projects, trained volunteers for gender and development work, designed national and international equal opportunities policy.

9/1996 – 12/1996 St. Anne's Shelter Leeds, UK.
Teaching Assistant

- Taught numeracy and literacy skills to homeless adults.

8/1993 – 8/1994 Islamia High School Peshawar, Pakistan.
Teacher

- Taught mathematics, English, and social studies.

PUBLICATIONS

- Bedford, Kate. (2004). "Political Science." *glbtq: An On-line Encyclopedia of gay, lesbian, bisexual, and transgender culture.* Claude J Summers, ed. www.glbtq.com

This publication provides an overview of important GLBTQ research in the political science field, including work on gay and lesbian elected officials, sexuality and political theory, and sexuality and social policy.

- Bedford, Kate. (2004). "Gender and Politics." *The Encyclopedia of Politics and Government.* Mary Hawkesworth and Maurice Kogan, eds. New York: Routledge.

This publication provides an overview of important work in gender-related political science research; it includes coverage of research on women in political office, feminist political activism, gender and globalization, sexuality and social policy, and feminist political theory.

- Bedford, Kate. (2003). "How Employment Became Emancipation: Tracing the World Bank's Effort to Get Women into Work." *Reconfiguring Class and Gender*, edited by Dorothy Sue Cobble, Amanda B. Chaloupka, and Beth Hutchison. New Brunswick, NJ: Institute for Research on Women/Institute for Women's Leadership.
- Service Civil International. 1997. *Equal Opportunities Policy.* Brussels, Belgium.
- Wilson, Ara and Kate Bedford. 1999. 1970s *Lesbian Feminism.* www.womens-studies.ohio-state.edu/araw/1970slf.htm

CONFERENCES/SEMINARS

- 3/2005: presented extracts from my research into gender and sexuality in PRODEPINE, a World Bank ethno-development project oriented to indigenous and Afro-Ecuadorian people (University of Kent, Canterbury UK).
- 9/2002: presented "From Policy Advocacy to Statistical Assessment? A Feminist Exploration of the World Bank's Quantification of Violence Against Women" (American Political Science Association, Boston).
- 11/2001: presented "Economic Expertise in the World Bank's Violence Against Women Policy: A Feminist Exploration of Quantification" (Society for the Social Study of Science conference, Boston).
- 10/2000: presented "Heteronormativity in the Women and Work Policy of the World Bank." (Rethinking Marxism, Amherst).
- 3/2000: presented "Promoting Restructured Partnerships: Summary of Thesis Findings" (Cross Cultural Perspectives on Sexuality, University of Kentucky).
- 8/1997: presented "Equal Opportunities in S.C.I.: A Research and Policy paper" (International Conference of Service Civil International).